United States. Dept. of State. Office of Public Co.

Department of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) online

. (page 52 of 101)
Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 52 of 101)
Font size
QR-code for this ebook


service." Our problems are very real, and we will
minimize them only at our peril.

Yet I believe that any honest and informed
examination of our foreign policy balance sheet



February 72, J962



253



will reveal a combination of successes, near-misses,
and disappointments tliat is far more favorable
than might be assumed from those who have so
bitterly attacked the record.

Shield of Military Defense

Let us begin by looking at the improvement in
the essential tools of foreign policy, the instru-
ments with which we work.

For instance, an adequate shield of military de-
fense is absolutely essential to the vigorous and
effective conduct of our world relationships. In
the past 12 months this administration has taken
several major steps to fulfill Secretary McNa-
mara's [Secretary of Defense Eobert S. McNa-
mara] promise to redress the worldwide military
balance and to make our Military Establisluuent
"a more effective servant of United States foreign
policy."

Specifically, we have increased by 50 percent the
number of strategic bombers that are prepared to
take off in 15 minutes in case of threatened attack.
We have increased our Polaris submarine force
goals by 50 percent. We are doubling our capacity
to produce Minuteman intercontinental ballistic
missiles. We have substantially increased the
number of combat-ready ground forc« units, es-
pecially the size of the antiguerrilla forces so
important in Asia. At the same time the admin-
istration has eliminated a great many obsolete
installations and has formed a imified strike com-
mand combining some of the best elements of the
Army and the Tactical Air Force.

As a result, a greatly improved balance has been
achieved between nuclear and conventional strik-
ing power. If naked aggression should occur we
are now far less likely to find ourselves confronted
with the Hobson's choice of all-out nuclear war
or abject surrender.

Foreign Aid

A second paramount tool of foreign policy,
operating behind our military shield, is our over-
seas assistance program. With the establishment
of the new Agency for International Development,
this administration has for the first time put our
massive aid program on a long-term, centralized,
businesslike basis.

Let us briefly consider some of the basic changes
in our AID operations.



A most important new development is the estab-
lishment of clearly defined objectives. Bitter
criticism of the aid programs in recent years had
created an increasingly negative response among
Americans. Although no one doubted that we
were opposed to the Communists, there was con-
siderable uncertainty about the kind of societies
we were striving to create.

The new program is designed not only to dis-
courage communism but positively to encourage
those governments which are determined to de-
velop their own resources, with increasing individ-
ual opportunity and justice and with maximum
freedom of choice. Every effort is being made to
persuade developing nations to undertake pro-
grams that will enable them ultimately to sustain
their own growth and thus free them from the
need for outside assistance.

To attain this goal the new assistance program
concentrates on countrywide planning rather than
individual project construction. It embodies the
realization that our assistance can never be truly
effective in many areas of the world without inter-
nal reforms and a greater measure of social justice.
Strong inducements are included to promote such
reforms and to encourage a greater proportion of
self-help. The new emphasis is on loans rather
than grants.

We have also taken steps to obtain increased
help from other Western nations in underwriting
the economic plans of the developing nations.
This effort is being promoted through OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development], a new organization of some 20
Atlantic countries, plus Japan.

Overseas Information Program

A thiixi foreign policy tool we have sought to
strengthen and expand is the United States In-
formation Agency under the able leadership of
Ed Murrow.

USIA now maintains 219 posts in 99 countries.
Daily news reports and analyses are being broad-
cast over 87 radio transmitters, several of which
are of 250,000- watt strength. More are now being
built. Through other media, as well, substantial-
ly more information about the American people,
their Government, and its policies, in more lan-
guages and in more places, is being given out by
USIA than ever before.

Equally important, striking improvements have



254



Department of State Bulletin



been achieved in the quality and persuasiveness of
our overseas information work. America and
Americans are now being presented not as a self-
satisfied, smug people who have solved all their
problems but ratlier as members of a dynamic
democratic society aware of their own defects and
working to correct them, ready and anxious to
cooperate as partners with other non-Communist
peoples, proud of their great liberal traditions,
strong and determined to resist aggression while
always holding the door open to peaceful settle-
ments.

Reorganization of Overseas Operations

Tlie fourth and last aspect of our effort to im-
prove our vital tools of foreign policy has con-
cerned the strengthening of the State Department
itself and particularly the reorganization of our
overseas operations.

The initial step was to review the special quali-
ties now required of our ambassadors in an age
of greatly expanded and more complex foreign
operations. The time-honored practice of award-
ing a high proportion of ambassadorships to
wealthy campaign contributors is a political luxury
we can no longer afford. Almost without excep-
tion the 20-odd new noncareer ambassadors
appointed by the new administration are men with
extensive foreign policy experience, largely drawn
from university faculties and foundations. The
percentage of Foreign Service career ambassadors
appointed in 1961 was the highest in history.

A special effort has been made to promote out-
standing younger men in the Foreign Service, who
are likely to be more flexible and perceptive in
dealing with the problems of young and newly in-
dependent nations. Nearly all ambassadors now
speak the language of official discussion of the
country of their assignment.

A second step was to clarify the ambassador's
authority over the total United States program
in any country. Representatives of the Pentagon,
the Peace Corps, USIA, Food-for-Peace, AID,
and other Government departments such as Com-
merce, Labor, and Treasury are now operating un-
der his overall direction. The result in greatly
improved operations is already apparent.

A series of seven regional conferences has been
held in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to thrash
out specific obstacles to improved administration.
These conferences produced nearly 200 proposals



for administrative changes, a large number of
which have already been acted upon. The result
has been a substantial elimination of red tape,
the cutting down of needless reports, the speeding
up of communications and action from Washing-
ton, and far better coordination with the United
Nations and other specialized agencies.

U.S. Foreign Policy Strengtlis

I have thus far been discussing the operational
tools of foreign policy — the military, the Agency
for International Development, the United States
Information Service, and the State Department.
I believe that substantial progress has also been
made in many phases of policymaking itself. Let
me briefly review our efforts in specific coimtries
and regions.

In Latin America we have embarked on a bold,
fresh effort with the Alliance for Progress. This
dramatic new program can help create the kind
of continuing social and economic revolution
which has given our own country much of its
dynamic strength but which has been stifled in
many Latin American nations by strongly en-
trenched groups which oppose change in any
form.

As more just, democratic societies begin to
emerge, as economies expand, and as wealth is
distributed more broadly, there will be far less
likelihood of communism or any foreign totali-
tarian movement taking root in this hemisphere.
Indeed, the record since the war shows that no
free, prosperous, dynamic, and just society has
ever been subverted by communism from within.
Meanwhile, Castro's bloodthirsty, fanatic, and
irresponsible leadership has slowly reduced his
early appeal in most Latin American countries.

At the same time pressures within the Domini-
can Eepublic have forced out the notorious right-
wing Trujillo regime. In cooperation with the
Organization of American States, a potentially
explosive situation appears to have been brought
under control and a transition to orderly and
progressive government is under way.

In Africa, despite a succession of crises, con-
siderable progress has also been made. From a
high point in the summer of 1960 Soviet influence
has decreased in many areas, not the least of which
is the Congo itself. In Guinea, once considered a
Soviet pawn, the Government has recently dis-
missed the Soviet Ambassador. Nigeria and



February 12, 1962



255



Tanganyika have emerged as strong, free nations;
Uganda and Kenya soon will become independent.

The Congo, of course, continues to present diffi-
culties of vast proportions. Here the new admin-
istration has faced some of its most complex policy
choices, each with its own built-in risks.

For instance, we might have abandoned the
Congo as a hopeless mess and left it to work out
its own solution. This would have resulted in
continumg bloody chaos and the likely establish-
ment of a Communist stronghold in the heart of
Africa.

As an alternative we could have moved in mas-
sively with our own troops and resources. This
would have been extremely costly both in blood
and budgets. Almost certainly it would also have
produced a vigorous Soviet coimteraction.

The choice we made — all-out support for a coor-
dinated United Nations military and economic
effort — involves many obvious difficulties. Yet on
balance it appears both more promising and less
dangerous than either of the other two.

In the Far East, meanwhile, we have seen some
signs of improvement in the relations between
Japan and Korea and considerable improvement
in the relations of each of these key nations with
the United States. A series of Cabinet-level meet-
ings with the Japanese * served to strengthen our
relationship and to prepare for future coopera-
tion in a great many projects that the industriali-
zation and modernization of Japan will permit her
to undertake. In Koi'ea we have established
friendly ties with an energetic new government,
and we are working out new aid in defense agree-
ments.

In Southeast Asia the fighting in Laos has been
stopped, at least temporarily, while negotiations
in Geneva among the interested powers offer at
least some hope for a greater measure of stability.

In Europe we have seen the extraordinary de-
velopment of the Common Market as a prelude
to a strong anti-Communist united Europe.
Great Britain's decision to join the Common Mar-
ket may in retrospect turn out to be one of the
most significant events of the year.

This developing new community of nations has
a highly educated and technically skilled popula-
tion of 350 million, whose standard of living is
second only to that of the United States. Its



'For background, see ibid., Nov. 27, 1901, p. 890.
256



long-term economic and political implications are
staggering. By demonstrating the errors in Karl
Marx' analysis of economic and political forces,
it provides a powerful magnet for the unhappy
East European satellites. It also offers an ex-
ample to the underdeveloped areas of the world of
what free economies can accomplish working in
partnership.

In the United Nations we have scored a signal
success in obtaining the election by an overwhelm-
ing vote of an able and respected Acting Secre-
tary-General with full powers. This was
accomplished in the face of a savage Soviet at-
tempt to wreck the Organization with the troika
proposal. We have also been successful, I might
add, in keeping out Red China, pending a modi-
fication of its aggressive attitude toward Formosa
and its neighbors to the south.

In its first year the Kennedy administration has
also organized a new Disarmament Agency, set up
a greatly expanded Food-for-Peace effort wliich
has sharply increased our distribution of "surplus"
food i^roducts, and launched the dramatic new
Peace Corps, which is attracting thousands of
young men and women to the service of democracy
overseas.

This list of accomplislunents in the complex
field of foreign affairs achieved by a new admin-
istration in the space of a single year provides
a convincing answer to the reckless charge of
stagnation and incapacities within our National
Government.



The Soviet Record

Now let us briefly examine the Soviet record
to which many of tlie critics of this administra-
tion's record pay such extravagant tribute. How
does the outlook appear from the Kremlin ?

Certainly the Communist world is not happy
over the growing rift between Russia and China.
This division not only strikes at the very base of
Conununist cooperation and policymaking; it
opens up a genuine military problem in the Soviet
rear.

Although the erection of the Berlin barrier
creates extremely serious problems for the West,
it also provides striking evidence of the failure of
the Communist system in East Germany.

Similar failure is also revealed in the continu-
ing bitterness and political undependability, from

Department of State Bulletin



the Soviet point of view, of the peoples of Poland,
Hungary, and other satellite countries.

The sterility of Soviet policies in many other
parts of the world, notably in Africa, the Middle
East, Japan, and India, has also become increas-
ingly clear in recent months.

Where Have We Failed?

Now what about the less favorable side of our
balance sheet? "Wliat are the weaknesses?
Where have we failed ?

A frank review reveals several situations on
which no progress has been made and others where
our position has deteriorated.

Although we have successfully coordinated our
own approach to disarmament and succeeded in
shifting much of the onus for the present impasse
to the Soviet Union, no tangible gains have been
achieved. Indeed, the tempo of the arms race
has ominously increased.

Continuing Soviet intransigence on disarma-
ment and the stepped-up pressures on Berlin
appear to have been stimulated in some degree by
Soviet disappointments in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America and by the strengthening of the Com-
mon Market. But whatever the reasons, our
relations with Moscow remain tense and our
efforts to ease the tensions have thus far been
ineffective.

The end of the Berlin crisis is difficult to see.
To ease the danger of an open break, a new agree-
ment is needed which will in some way assure the
future of West Berlin. Tliis is necessary because
the future of that city, its very life, lies in the
morale of its people. Their morale, in turn, de-
pends on the protection of Berlin's economic and
political viability.

In our own hemisphere, while the Castro in-
fluence has considerably lessened, there is no doubt
that we suffered a serious setback last April.

In Southeast Asia the problems that confront
us continue to be grim. Although the fighting,
for the present at least, has stopped in Laos, it
has increased in intensity in Viet-Nam. The con-
tinuing crisis in these former French colonies has
its origins in the late forties and early fifties, when
the Communists were permitted to assume the
mantle of nationalism in a war of national
liberation.

In Laos our objective remains the creation of a
neutral and independent nation, pure and simple.



This objective is in line with reality. Had we
been willing to settle for such an objective sonie
years ago, both we and the war-weary Laotians
would be better off today.

In Viet-Nam the guerrilla depredations of the
Communists are reaching new heights. The situ-
ation there is not a happy one, and none of the
choices confronting us assure a happy solution.
We are working vigorously not only to strengthen
the Viet-Nam military and police capacity to deal
with this insurgent but to promote the essential
reforms which will give the people a cause for
which to fight.

The stability of East Asia is further endangered
by the continuing development of a bellicose at-
titude of Communist China. One of the primary
unfinished tasks of American foreign relations is
to devise a balanced long-range China policy. It
is not enough simply to oppose year after year
China's entrance into the United Nations. We
must counter the challenge in much greater depth
and devise programs that will enable us to deal
more effectively with all possible developments.

Some Fundamental Questions

An objective review of American foreign policy
in 1961 must also include several additional ques-
tions of a fundamental nature which still remain
unanswered : For instance, can we organize our re-
sources and muster the will necessary to fulfill
the extraordinary hopes that have been created by
the Alliance for Progress? Can we speed up our
overseas aid operations, cutting red tape, improv-
ing our standards, resisting pressures to preserve
right-wing dictators who have little eupport
among their people ? Above all, can we find some
means of breaking the deadlock on arms control
with agreement on effective inspection safeguards
that will lessen the chance of nuclear war ?

Resolutions for 1962

One thing at least is certain : 19G2 like 1961 will
have its full quota of challenges, its own surprises,
and its own hard decisions. As we prepare for
these clearly predictable trials, some New Year's
resolutions may be in order. Here are a few that
strike me as relevant and important :

Let us give more adequate attention to the long-
range forces which create the crises with which we
must deal.



February 72, 1962



257



Let us develop greater patience in dealing with
the swings of the political pendulum and resist the
temptation to see every issue in black-and-white
terms.

Let us put our aid program on a sound basis of
self-help in such a manner that nations will be
encouraged to produce not only more goods and
services but also a greater measure of social justice
and individual participation.

Let us not allow developing nations to turn the
possession of a local Communist minority into a
national asset, like oil, coal, or uranium, that auto-
matically qualifies them for maximum U.S. assist-
ance.

Let us use our increased military strength and
the advantages of the new European union to re-
invigorate the NATO defense system so that it will
indeed be a genuine counterbalance to Soviet
power.

Let us further improve and expand our infor-
mation and cultural programs both at home and
abroad.

In particular, let us strengthen the communica-
tions system between Washington policymakers
and the American people so that our foreign poli-
cies are better explained and more clearly under-
stood.

Let us also hope that our news media will be
more willing to report the accomplishments of our
National Government as well as the crises, the ef-
forts as well as the needs, and the disasters that
have been averted as well as the setbacks that have
occurred.

Above all, let us come to realize that we Ameri-
cans are not omnipotent, that we cannot mold
every situation to our wishes, that the United
States represents only 6 percent of the population
of this planet, and that we can never run it, even
if we wanted to do so.

The Kremlin cannot run it either. With an
angry China on its flank, an increasingly restless
youth, a set of unhappy satellites, and an economy
staggering under the burden of an immense war
machine, the Kremlin faces problems that I for one
would not exchange for our own. The Russians
are not all 10 feet tall.

Unhappily, this does not make our task any
easier or the danger any less. Indeed, the gi"ow-
ing difficulties with which the Kremlin must con-
tend may help explain the reckless military pres-
sure in Berlin and elsewhere.



What we Americans will need most in the try-
ing months ahead is a proper sense of perspective,
a clearer understanding of the scope and nature
of the challenge, and a keener appreciation of our
own great moral and material strength.

Our long-term national purpose is the purpose
of nearly all mankind : the gradual creation of a
world in which an increasing measure of individ-
ual dignity, self-government, and material welfare
may gradually become a reality. I believe that
the historians of our time will record that in 1961
we made a good beginning.



U.S. To Give Dominican Republic
$25 Million as Emergency Credit

Statement by President Kennedij

White House prcsa release dated January 22

The Government of the United States is en-
couraged by the present trend in the Dominican
Republic and the steps taken toward the restora-
tion of orderly democratic processes in that
country. The Dominican Republic people have
gone through a difficult period which has had un-
favorable, though temporary, economic repercus-
sions. I have reviewed these problems with the
United States Coordinator for the Alliance for
Progress, Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, who, along with
other experts, recently visited the Dominican Re-
public at my request.^

As a result of this review and in view of the
urgent nature of the Dominican Republic's bal-
ance-of-payment situation, the United States is
willing to make available up to $25 million as
emergency credit.



U.S. Military Assistance Team
Visits Dominican Republic

Press release 66 dated January 26

The Departments of State and Defense an-
nounced on Januai-y 26 that, at the invitation of
the Government of the Dominican Republic, a
United States military team headed by Brig. Gen.
William A. Enemark, USA, Director, Western
Hemisphere, Office of Assistant Secretary of



* For a White House announcement of the departure of
a faotlindinK mission to the Dominican Republic, see
Bulletin of .Ian. 20, 1962, p. 177.



258



DepartmenI of Sfafe Bulletin



Defense (International Security Affairs), De-
partment of Defense, will arrive in the Dominican
Republic on January 28 for a stay of several days.
The team will be prepared to survey with the
Dominican authorities the possibilities for a pro-
gram of military assistance and cooperation
within the framework of the democratic and con-
stitutional government being achieved in the
Dominican Republic.



President of Brazil Visits U.S.

White House press release dated January 20

President Joao Belchior Marques Goulart of
Brazil has accepted an invitation from President
Kennedy to visit the United States as a Presiden-
tial guest beginning February 20.

President Goulart will spend 2 days at Wash-
ington, where he will meet with President Ken-
nedy, Secretary of State Rusk, and other high
officials of the U.S. Government. He will spend
the following 3 days at New York as the guest of
the U.S. Government.

Depending on the time available and the pro-
gram to be organized, it is possible that at the end
of his official visit the President of Brazil might
spend several more days in the United States in a
private character in order to visit some industrial
and technological research centers of interest in
connection with Brazilian economic development.



GATT Cotton Textile Committee
Meets at Geneva

The Department of State announced on Jan-
uary 26 (press release 57) that W. Michael
Blumenthal, Deputy Assistant Secretaiy for
Economic Affairs, would serve as delegate and
chairman of the U.S. delegation ^ to the second
session of the Cotton Textile Committee of the
Greneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at
Geneva January 29-February 9.

The meeting will continue the work initiated
by the 19-nation Committee in its first session
October 23-27, 1961, and will consider recom-
mendations made by its technical subcommittee
concerning a long-term solution to the problems
involved in international trade in cotton textiles.



Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at
Vienna October 4, 1961."
Acceptance deposited: Holy See, January 11, 1962.

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traflBe, with annexes. Done at



Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 52 of 101)