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Department of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) online

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it carCt get the bond issue proposition through
Congress, would you consider the loan proposi-

A. Well, the bond issue itself is a loan. The
question as to the amoimt of the loan and the
duration of the cost is one that we're now discuss-
ing with the Congress. The pur|50se of the bond
issue is to provide fuiancing for the Congo and
the Near East operations through 1963. I must
say that when we went to the General Assembly
this year we thought that there was a very clear
mandate to try to do two things — one was to assist
the Secretary-General to collect the an-earages
which are past due by many govermnents to both
these funds, and the other was to ti-y to get the
costs in the Congo, for example, distributed fairly
and evenly throughout the membership. Now we
think the Secretary-General's plan and the action
taken by the General Assembly would go a long
way toward doing both these things. The refer-
ence of the question of the compulsory character
of these assessments to the World Court," we think,
will clarify that problem and open the way for
many govei-nments to pay their aiTearages. The
bonds would be repaid as part of the general

" For text of the President's message to Congress on
the U.X. bond issue and statements made by Secretary
Rusk and Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson before the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, see ifttd., Feb. 26,
19G2, p. 311.

•U.N. doc. A/RES/1731 (XVI).

budget of the U.N., in which our proportion is
32 percent, rather than almost 50 percent, as we
have been paying thus far in the Congo. So we
think there are very large advantages to the
United States 'v\ the Secretary-Generars propos-
als, and we hope very mufh that the Congress will
see it our way.

Q. But many inemhers of Congress, including
Senator Aiken and Senator Jackson of Washing-
ton, have very real reservatioiis about setting a
precedent by this approach. Do you feel you can
overcome those reservations?

A. This matter of a precedent is a little difficult
to handle. The General Assembly itself was
aware of this and in its resolution on the subject
made a point of declaring that this bond issue
would not be considered, or should not be con-
sidered, as a precedent for financing future oper-
ation expenses of the U.N. But that is not
completely conclusive, of course. This will have
to be something that governments will have to take
into account if they're called upon to think about
this question again. It is not intended as a prece-
dent for future financing, but that is a point which
will need to be watched very carefully in the years

Q. Mr. Secretary, last week xohen you testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
you said that you regretted that so many other
issues had been mixed in with the bond proposal.
What did you mean by that? What are some of
these other issues?

A. Well, I think there have been questions and
complaints or criticisms of the U.N. bond proposal
from several different points of view. For ex-
ample, the questions which I very much respect
and feel that we must meet on their merits are
those which are raised among people who have
regularly and consistently supported the United
Nations over the yeai-s but who do believe that the
precise methods and the terms and the arrange-
ments ought to be looked at very carefully. We
have no possible objection to questions of that sort
because they are in the constructive direction and
come from those who are not trying simply to un-
dermine the United Nations.

There have been other complaints that have
come from a rather small minority which simply
is opposed to the United Nations and our partici-


Department of State Bulletin

pation in it. I believe that there's every indication
in polls and otherwise that the American people
are stanchly in support of the U.N. and recognize
the importance of the U.N. to our foreisrn policy
and to our national interest. I do think that when
the bond issue was first made public it happened
to come at a time when tlie situation in the Congo
had created a considerable amount of debate and
distress, in the middle of a violent phase of that
situation, and that the so-called Katanga debate
did have its repercussions on the U.N. bond issue.
But now that Adoula [Cyrille Adoula, Prime
Minister of the Republic of the Congo] and
Tshombe [Moise Tshombe, president of Katanga
Province] are moving apparently toward an
agreement and the situation there is much more
in order, I tliink that aspect of it will not be so
important. But it did come under several cross-
fires at tlie time it became public.

U.S. Role in Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, one que fit ion on South Viet-
Nam. We have committed ourselves in South
Yiet-Nam in a situation that is now described as
a war. While we haven't actually committed
American troops, our involveinent is such that the
question arises, could you tell us why is it necessary
to take such risks in South Viet-Naf)i, and how
far are we prepared to go?

A. Well, the war that is going on there is a
systematic and large-scale effort by the Govern-
ment to deal with some 20,000 guerrillas who have
been supported, have been supplied, and have been
furnished leaders by the North Vietnamese. Our
effort there has been to assist this Government of
South Viet-Nam and its ai-med forces to deal with
this problem themselves, to win their own war
against these guerrillas. And this means help not
only in the military field, in terras of transporta-
tion, mobility, and equipment, but it also means
economic help for village programs that will make
it possible for the Vietnamese Government to win
the battle of the villages as well as the battle with
the armed elements of the Viet Cong guerrillas.
I wouldn't be able to predict exactly what the fu-
ture may hold in that, but we have reason, I think,
to be encouraged that the additional measures

which have been taken in the last few months M-ill
increasuigly show good success.

Perspective on U.S. Foreign Policy

Q. A fn/d question, sir. You''ve presided over
American foreign policy through 13 of the most
nerve-racking months in the history of this coun-
try. And the months ahead donH promise to he
much better. If you could talk personally to every
American, what counsel would you, give them on
maintaining perspective on our foreign policy in
this crisis-a-week existence that we lead?

A. I think the American people do know that
our main business is to build a kind of decent world
oi-der in which independent nations can live out
their own lives as they see fit, and to cooperate
freely across national frontiers in the interest of
getting common jobs done and moving ahead on
common interests. Thei-e is enormous strength in
getting this basic job done, because it means that
we have allies and friends and coworkers in every
part of the world. Indeed, the main business of
the Department of State, as far as mass is con-
cerned, is concerned just with this matter of build-
ing a constructive world order.

It's encouraging to me, it's very significant to
me, that no one of the countries which has become
independent since World War II, for example, has
gone behind the Iron Curtain. It's encouraging
that these newly independent countries have
shown themselves resistant to forces that would
attempt to take over their independence or move
in on them. And I think that the great historical
forces that are at work in the world tilt the course
of history in favor of freedom. This has been
the course of history in the past, and I think it is
bound to be the course of history in the future.
These ideas of freedom are deeply rooted in human
nature, and we find evidence everywhere that peo-
ple are not prepared to abandon their freedom
to foreigii control or this international Commu-
nist conspiracy. This is being felt inside the bloc
itself in increasing forms. So I would think that
if we tend to our knitting, we get on with our
main job, we create vibrant societies here and in
other free countries, there will be no problem of
effective competition with the Soviet bloc.

March 5, 7962


Toward an Atlantic Partnership

hy Under Secretary Ball '

I am assuming that as observers of world affairs
you do not limit your interest to day-to-day de-
velopments — to what is called in the jargon of the
press "hard news." You are concerned also with
those deeper forces that shape events and with the
political strategy that guides our own efforts to
control, or at least to influence, the play of those

If this assumption be correct — and I am certain
that it is — then I can, with some confidence, forgo
the dubious pleasure of trying to illumine last
week's headlines and direct my brief remarks
today — more fruitfully, I hope — at a concept of
major importance that has been the subject of
much thought and an even greater amount of con-
versation — the concept of the Atlantic partner-

In order that these comments may be three-
dimensional I should like to give them some depth
in time, if not in wisdom.

During the 19th century, with the assistance of
a growing technology, we Americans conquered
a frontier and consolidated it into a vast nation.
During the whole of that century we played only
a limited role in world affairs. We could afford
to cultivate our own garden, to occupy ourselves
with the taming of a rich and vast continent, since
British seapoM-er was playing much the same pro-
tective role for us then that our rockets and
strategic airpower play for Europe today. We
were a growing giant, a healthy, confident, not
always very graceful giant, who had not yet tested
his muscles away from home.

Western Europeans throughout this fateful
100 yeai-s were having quite a different experience.
They had no virgin continent to develop. Instead

' Address made before the World Affairs Council of
Philadelphia at Philadelphia, Pa., on Feb. (press release
82; as-delivered text).

they applied much of their capital and adminis-
trative talent to the building of world empires.
For many European nations the expansion and
consolidation of colonial systems provided the
same outlet for their energies as did the conquest
of the frontier for America.

Colonial systems, however, had only a limited
survival value. They were conceived in an age of
slow sea transport, but they could not flourish in
a world of instantaneous communications and al-
most instantaneous transportation. Two world
wars weakened the power base on which colonial
structures rested. What began with marching
armies ended with powerful ideas that proved
corrosive to empires — the ideas of nationalism, of
self-determination, of the right of all men to first-
class citizenship in political systems of their own

In the decade and a half since the end of the
Second World War, we have seen the cumulative
impact of these convergent forces. During that
period the shape of the world has been altered —
and power and influence on the world scene have
been redistributed — as much as in the two
preceding centuries.

Two Major World Developments

I do not have the time, nor do j'ou have the
patience, for me to attempt any comprehensive
inventory of the changes that have taken place.
But there are two major developments that are
particularly relevant to the subject I promised to
talk about today.

First, over the whole of the free world colonial
systems have been liquidated. Out of the old co-
lonial systems has come a great flowering of small
nations. Born weak and sometimes prematurely,
they have, more often than not, been economically
underdeveloped and imderindustrialized. But


Department of State Bulletin

they have displayed a common quality — the qual-
ity of determination to establish and maintain
their national identities and to apply within their
own societies the tools and techniques that modem
technology has provided.

For the newly independent peoples of the world
the shattering of colonial structures has operated
like a kind of atomic fi-ss'ion to release enormous
energies — energies which, if channeled in con-
structive directions, can mean a new order of life
for millions of individuals in these newly created

In spite of the forebodings of political Cas-
sandras, the shattering of these colonial structures
did not mean the disappearance or even the dim-
inution of the strength of Europe. Instead the
European nations turned their efforts to the con-
struction of a whole new European system which —
this time like a kind of atomic fusion — ^has gen-
erated energies that have already transformed the
economic map of that continent.

The extraordinary speed of these simultaneous
developments has tended to obscure their magni-
tude. ^Mio could imagine in 1945 when the United
Nations was created that in a little over 16 years
it would have not 51 members but 104 ? And there
are more to come.

And wouldn't it have seemed equally fantastic
16 years ago, when Western Europe was all bricks
and rubble, that it could be rebuilt, reshaped,
transformed so profovmdly in spirit that France
and Germany, ancient enemies, would be drawn by
their own free will into a community more co-
hesive than any ever produced by the conquerors
of the past ?

But if so much can happen in 16 years, what can
the next 16 years bring forth ?

"When that question is posed in terms of tech-
nical advances — no matter how bizarre — our
imagination is not hobbled by an ingrained skep-
ticism. We seem to accept the fact that men soon
may be rocketing to the moon. We seem even able
to imagine the awful horror of thermonuclear war.

Why then should we be so defeatist when we
regard the future of our social, economic, and even
political institutions? Why should we be so un-
imaginative when we face the fundamental prob-
lem of how we must organize the power of the
free world, how we must combine our energies
effectively, not merely to defend what we have but
to create an abundance for eveiyone at a time when

man's productivity seems for the first time capable
of almost unlimited expansion ?

I think perhaps that this timidity would shrink
considerably if we realized how much we have
already accomplished toward building the power
and unity of the free world. What has already
happened in Europe belies the Marxist prediction
that the capitalist countries would weaken and
stagnate as a result of their internal and external
contradictions. Europe has in fact steadily grown
stronger and more united; at the same time, the
Communist bloc is displaying an obvious insta-
bility and its own inherent contradictions of a
kind Marx never envisaged.

But if Europe, throughout these turbulent post-
war days, has made great progress toward unity,
we in America, under the weight of our new re-
sponsibilities as world leader, have made just as
striking progress toward maturity. We have man-
ifested this coming of age in at least two ways:

First, %ve have turned our hacks on isolationhm
forever. We have recognized that isolationism
can be no more than a nostalgic fantasy in a world
of swift transport and communications, where
every man is every other man's close neighbor.
Through the NATO alliance we have combined
our military strength with that of our European
friends in a manner unthinkable before the war.
And we have made a start at perfecting procedures
for maintaining a continuing and comprehensive
dialog with our friends, the existence of which
insures we need not face the problems of war and
peace in disarray.

Second — and quite as hnfortant — we have he-
gun to face the implications of economic interde-
fendence. Through the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development], we
have begun to take far-reaching steps toward eco-
nomic cooperation. We are concerting our mone-
tary policies with those of our European friends;
and the OECD will certainly play an important
role in the administration of standby credit ar-
rangements that have recently been developed to
assist countries in balance-of-payments difficulties.
We have begim frank discussions and reviews of
our domestic economic policies, recognizing that,
unless we are all committed to policies of adequate
growth, distortions and imbalances can play havoc
with our international economic relations.

Finally, we have developed new mechanisms for
coordinating: our efforts with those of our Euro-

tAarch 5, 1962


pean friends to bring about more effective aid to
the underdeveloped nations.

Foundations of Partnership

But many will ask why it is that, faced as we
are with massive common responsibilities and pos-
sessing together most of the economic strength of
the free world, America and Europe have not gone
faster and farther in forging an Atlantic partner-

The answer, it seems to me, is that the logic of
history lias compelled an essential phasing. It has
been necessary for Europe to move toward sub-
stantial internal cohesion in order to provide the
solid foundations ujwn which the structure of an
Atlantic partnership can be erected.

Let me explain what I mean.

During the whole of the postwar period we
Americans have been disturbed by the enormous
disparity between our own resources and those of
any other nation of the free world. We have been
proud tliat the United States was a world leader,
but we have sometimes foimd it less than satisfac-
tory to be a world leader isolated by the possession
of too large a portion of total wealth, power, and

As we have felt the increasing weight of the
burdens and responsibilities of leadership — in-
creased geometrically by the existence of a real
and present danger from Communist ambitions —
we have wished, sometimes wistfully, for a closer
and stronger Atlantic partnership. Yet a strong
partnerehip must almost by definition mean a col-
laboration of equals. When one partner possesses
over 50 pei"cent of the resources of an enterprise
and the balance is distributed among 16 or 17
others, the relationship is imlikely to work very
well. And so long as Europe remained frag-
mented, so long as it consisted merely of nations
small by modern standards, the potentials for true
partnership were always limited.

It was in recognition of this fact that since the
war we have consistently encouraged the powerful
drive toward European integration. We have
wanted a Europe united and strong that could
serve as an equal partner in the achievement of
our common endeavors — an equal partner com-
mitted to the same basic values and objectives as
all Americans. For our European friends, like
ourselves, believe in the preservation and extension
of freedom. We are all dedicated not only to

defending the free world but to assisting the less
fortunate nations to attain the level of economic
and political strength that will give them self-
respect and independence.

From time to time we have heard timid voices
complaining that a united Europe might become
a neutralist "third force." Such views rest on
a misunderstanding of the neutralist phenomenon.

European neutralism — as distinct from historic
neutrality— is a thing of the past. At its peak,
a decade ago, it was an expression of weakness,
not strength. It sprang from a belief that Europe
could no longer play a significant role in the power
contest between the United States and the Com-
munist bloc. Persuaded that they could not in-
fluence the outcome by taking sides, its advocates
assumed a role of Olympian detachment from the
battle, measuring out equal amounts of criticism
for each side. As the nations of Western Europe
have grown stronger and more united, the voices
of neutralism that produced such a frightful
cacophony 10 years ago have been largely stilled.

But there are a few who profess fear of a strong,
united Europe for still a different reason. They
see the specter not of a neutralist third force but
of a third force that will go a separate way from
ours and will seek its own interest to our detri-
ment. A powerful continental entity, they argue,
will be tempted to try a new kind of balance-of-
power politics, to play the East against the West,
to sell its weight and authority to tlie highest
bidder, to serve its own parochial and selfish

Such a prediction, I am persuaded, misconceives
the nature of the forces at work on lx)th sides of
the Atlantic. It overlooks the vitality and solidity
of our common heritage. It ignores the reality
of our common objectives. It rejects, in fact, the
very interdependence of the members of the
NATO alliance on which our national security is
now base

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 71 of 101)