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Department of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) online

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the President's invitation to visit the United
States. Beginning on March 13 President Ahidjo
will spend 5 days in the United States as tlie guest
of President Kennedy. The first 2 days of the
visit will be spent in Washington.

This will be the first visit to the United States by
President Ahidjo since his country became inde-
pendent under his leadership on January 1, 1960.


White House press release dated February 21

President Kennedy announced on February 21
that His Beatitude Makarios III, President of the
Republic of Cyprus, has accepted the President's
invitation to visit the United States as a Presiden-
tial guest beginning June 5, 1962.

President Makarios will spend 2 days in "Wash-
ington and the following 3 days in another city
as a guest of the U.S. Government. The Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, Spyros Kyprianou,
will accompany Archbishop Makarios.

Letters of Credence


The newly appointed iVmbassador of the Philip-
pines, Emilio Abello, presented his credentials to
President Kennedy on February 20. For texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's re-
ply, see Department of State press release 110
dated February 20.


Department of Sfafe Bulletin

Policy for the Western Alliance — Berlin and After

hy McGeorge Bundy

Special Assistant to the President ^

The title which I have offered for these remarks
is large and general, and it may seem somewhat
pretentious. I\Iy intent is in fact the ojoposite.
It is to talk of the forces that shape our policy
rather than about that policy itself. Specifically,
I do not wish to attempt this evening a formula-
tion of American policy toward the immediately
important problem of the freedom of Berlin.
That has been done and will be done again, in
the course of the crisis, by the President and the
Secretary of State.

"Wliat I want to do is something quite differ-
ent — to sketch the larger context of continuing
Western purpose and opportunity within which
this Berlin crisis is taking place. The crisis in
Berlin is many things: It is clearly a test of
Western will and of Soviet ambition ; it is a con-
test for freedom and hope in the lives of 2 million
brave people in West Berlin; it is a test of the
understanding and fairness of mind of neutral

But Berlin is also a test of a larger sort : It is a
test of the relations among the Western nations
most concerned, and this, I believe, is its central
meaning. The object of our policy in Berlin
must be to advance the ends of our policy toward
Europe as a whole. So while I avoid specific
issues in the formulation of a common allied posi-
tion for the political and military defense of free-
dom in West Berlin, I believe that in discussing
the wider purposes of the Western alliance I may
still be making observations which are relevant
to the inmiediate crisis.

But before getting into my subject, I want to
offer a couple of warnings. Firet, let me remark

' Address made before the Economic Club of Chicago,
at Chicago, III., on Dee. 6.

that in speaking specifically of the Atlantic al-
liance tonight I intend no slight to our other great
connections in this hemisphere, in Asia, in the
Mediteri'anean, and in Africa. The time has long
passed when the United States could emphasize
one part of the world as against another ; we have
the task, rather, of seeking to frame and execute
policies in all parts of the free world which will
help to concert and harmonize the varied interests
of many proud and independent peoples. There
are stubborn differences and deep-seated causes of
tension among nations all of which we wish to
count as friends. It is natural that some Ameri-
cans should have more concern with one part of
the problem and some with another. But that is
not the position of the United States Government
in this administration. The New Frontier has
shown a fresh and greater interest in the problems
and opportunities of the developmg nations; it
also cares for Europe. These are complementary,
not conflicting, purposes, and the view of our rela-
tions with Europe which I am going to try to
sketch is fully consistent with enthusiastic and
enlightened attention to other continents as well.
It is, in a sense, a policy for Europe after the
age of colonialism; the Atlantic commimity itself,
as it grows in strength and prosfierity, can and
should grow also in its contribution to the welfare
of other parts of the world.

My second warning is about the nature of our
European affairs themselves. The relations of the
United States to Westarn Europe are convention-
ally divided into three categories: the economic,
the military, and the political. This is a sensible
and practical division, but it is well to recognize
that it is unreal. The underlying meaning of
effective action in all three categories is political,
in that it affects the fundamental course of power

Marzh 72, 1962


and purpose among the nations concerned. The
briefest glance at the record since World War II
will underline the point. The Marshall plan was
an economic undertaking; its immediate object
was the economic recovery of the participating
nations, all of them gravely weakened in this field
by the events of the Second World War. But the
larger purpose of the Marshall plan was politi-
cal — it was the maintenance of freedom in West-
ern Europe against the combined threat of com-
munism and chaos. The decision in the Congress
of the United States always rested on this political
assessment, and the pooling of programs by the
European states themselves would not have been
possible in the absence of deeply urgent political

The point can be proved as easily on the mili-
tary side. The level of our military assistance in
1949, the formulation of a Supreme Conunand
under General Eisenhower in 1950, the "great de-
bate" on sending troops to Europe in the follow-
ing months, and each of a series of major military
decisions which followed in the 1950's — all of
these, in fascinatingly varied ways, had political
origins and political consequences which trans-
cended their immediate military meaning. If it
is convenient to separate the European problem
into distinct elements, it is also dangerous, and
it will be important to bear in mind at each stage
that we are talking about aspects of a single, inter-
connected i^olicy for the West.

Economic Policy

With these warnings let me turn at once to the
economic sector. Here the great fact for present
policymakers Ls the splendid success of the Euro-
l^ean Common Market. This success is, in the first
instance, economic in the strict sense of the word.
The Common JMarket works, and it works as be-
lievers in the American system always asserted
that it would. It is a fact, and no longer only a
tlieory, that the enlargement of markets, the low-
ering of internal barriers to trade, and the expec-
tation of further stable progress in these directions
liave given new and dramatic economic strength
to the central states of free Europe. The separate
postwar miracles of Germany, France, and Italy
are now entering a second stage— tlie Common
Market miracle — and I am sure that it is not nec-
essary for me to say to this audience that men
wlio make decisions on investment, throughout the

world, have radically revised their preferences in
the light of this new phenomenon. Great Britain
has announced its desire to join. It is not at all
unreasonable to believe that this decision, if it is
followed by productive negotiations among all
concerned, may be a more powerful reason for
remembering 1961 than any of the immediate
crises which now seem to mark this year.

Our Government has welcomed both the growth
of the Common Market and the prospective acces-
sion of Great Britain to it. In this attitude, in
the Eisenhower administration as in this one, we
have had a fundamentally political purpose. We
believe in the reunion of Europe — and I shall have
more to say on our reasons for this view later on.
But for the moment what needs to be remarked
about the success of the Common Market is that it
presents us with a major challenge and a major
opportunity in terms of our own foreign economic
behavior. We must now decide whether we are
prepared to compete fairly and openly in the mar-
ketplace of the free world, and in the face of this
new major friendly rival, or whether our agelong
conviction that open markets are good for man's
freedom and prosperity must now be abandoned
in restriction and timidity.

Nothing can be gained by pretending that this
challenge does not exist. In the years after World
War II the undamaged and enormously produc-
tive American economy established itself in the
world's markets in such a way that effective export
is now an element in the livelihood of millions of
our citizens, in all parts of the country and in an
astonishing range of fields of production. This
is a proud accomplishment, and it must not be
cut short.

Our export surplus in the last 8 years lias run
at an average level of $5 billion a year. This sur-
plus does much more than make jobs for Ameri-
cans — it pays for our international security.
Without it our alliances would grow anemic, our
overseas strength could not be sustained, both our
aid programs and our foreign investment would
wither, our leadership in the free world would be
weakened, and our high claims for the economic
effectiveness of a free society would sound hollow.

It would be melodramatic to say that we must
export or die, but it is the precise and straight-
forward truth that we cannot stand still where
wo are. Our export surplus is no longer an auto-
matic consequence of seemingly effortless economic


Department of State Bulletin

superiority; our international economic position
will now get better or woi-se, depending upon the
energy and direction of our response to tlie pres-
ent challenges of a new pattern of world trade.
And while there are many elements in this new
pattern, the one which should properly attract
our first attention is the problem of our relation
to the emerging European economic giant.

The central and decisive question is whether
we and Europe are hoth willing and able to meet
a fair, competitive test. In this country, because
of our extraordinary advantages, some of our in-
dustries — and I make no distinction here among
capital, management, and labor — have grown soft.
Not all of our markets, abroad or at home, have
been won by effective demonstration of produc-
tivity, efficiency, and economy. Now our per-
formance faces a new and growing challenge.

This administration does not propose to turn
away from this challenge. We do not believe that
there can be an economic "forti"ess America." We
do not suppose that America, of all nations, need
fear fair competition. On the contrary, we be-
lieve that the emergence of a great new center of
production and trade can be good for all of us.
We propose to steer toward closer and stronger
trade relations in the open market of freedom —
and not to turn away in fear or narrow self-
interest from the prospect of zestful and mutually
beneficial expansion of exports and imports alike
among the great free trading nations.

I do not wish to suggest that there are no
pi-oblems in this policy. It has always been true
that the common interest in free trade implies
pressures upon the special interests and established
expectations of specific groups. "Wliat has always
been irritating about any simple schoolbook satis-
faction with the theory of free trade is that it may
imply a cavalier disregard for jobs, for property,
and for human beings themselves. That is not
the frame of mind of this administration. We are
concerned not with schoolbook theory but with
what happens in the real world. Moreover, we do
not suppose that sudden revolution is the key to
success. Really important changes in trade pat-
terns are most effective when they take place over
a periotl of several years. Adjustment assistance
in unusual cases can and should be used to ease the
transition. But with such sensible provisos as
these, we are sure that a bold policy of economic
self-confidence will be justified by its practical
consequences for the prosperity of all Americans.

Trade is not a one-way street, of course, and we
shall have interests of our own to advance in re-
turn for increased access to our own great market.
A common market can be opened or closed, as
different parts of our own histoi-y demonstrate,
and we are in no position to attempt a policy of
unilateral free trade with a partner which does
not reciprocate. For example, we must obtain
reasonable access to this new great market for
agricultural as well as industrial products.

American trade is of course not limited to
Europe, and American political responsibilities do
not end at the boundaries of the North Atlantic
alliance. In framing our economic policy toward
the new Europe we must and will take full account
of the trading needs of other friends — in Latin
America, in Japan, and in other areas which have
not so far had historic access to the European mar-
ket. The "grand design" for prosperous and ex-
panding trade in the free world is clear and simple,
but each step forward will require complex and
careful arrangements to safeguard the multiple
interests of nations and people who could easily
be gravely damaged by simple assumptions defined
in narrow terms.

But this is not the place for a technical account
of our proposed response to the new challenge of
the Common Market. I have said enough, per-
haps, to make it clear that we are entering a new
and major phase in the determination of our trad-
ing policy and practice. The precise result of the
debate cannot be predicted. But that it is impor-
tant is clear, and for those who think in terms of
the promise of the Atlantic community, the essen-
tial direction is equally plain. We must move
toward partnership, not toward protection.


The Common Market gives promise of provid-
ing a lasting source of energy and prosperity to
the economic life of Western Europe. The mili-
tary security of the area is not yet so plainly
assured. Policy here has two great aspects — con-
ventional strength and nuclear posture. For us
in the United States the main purpose is what it
has been since the first days of NATO — to assist
in the creation of a general military position which
will in fact deter Soviet aggression while it sus-
tains the self-confidence of the people of the
Western nations.

In our view today this double objective requires.

March J 2, 7962


as a matter of urgency, a major reinforcement of
the conventional strenj^tli of the North Atlantic
alliance. We have of course a special concern
with the crisis in Berlin, but our policy is not
limited to, or defined by, any single moment of
trial. The free nations of Europe, in numbers,
skill, and energy, are more than a match in them-
selves for the Soviet Union. It is not sound, in
our judgment, that they should still be gravely
and heavily outnumbered and outmatched in their
conventional military strength. Europe, we be-
lieve, has a need to look strongly to its self-defense
in the levels of force below the nuclear threshold.
We see no way in which the United States can
do this job for Europe, but as we have been
leaders for many years in stressing the need for
nuclear strength in Europe, so today it seems im-
portant that M-e should leave no doubt of our pres-
ent sense of need in the conventional field as well.
Nuclear weapons must remain and be improved as
the ultimate deterrent and as the instrument of
retaliation in the face of massive aggression. But
they will not serve all of the needs of free men
through all time, and the European shield requires
major new conventional strength.

But let me emphasize again that the concern
of this administration for conventional reinforce-
ment is in no sense an indication of a lack of
interest or belief in effective nuclear dispositions.

The free- world nuclear deterrent today is more
than adequate to NATO's military purposes. Not
only does NATO have the full support of the
extraordinarily powerful strategic forces available
to the United States and the United Kingdom; it
is in its own right a major nuclear power. In-
human threats of attack on so-called "hostages"
are likely to bounce back against the interest of
those who make them. Europe could not bo at-
tacked without provoking a highly destructive
response from NATO nuclear forces, as well as
others outside the theater.

But it is time to advance our plans for future
NATO nuclear strength. There is a clear and
growing concern in Europe as to whether these
dispositions will be fully responsive to European
needs and desires. The basic position of this
Government on this point was stated by the Presi-
dent in a major address at Ottawa last spring.^
He there emphasized the United States willing-
ness to consider establishment of a NATO sea-

' For text, see Bcti.letin of June 5, 19C1, p. 839.

based, nuclear deterrent force, multilaterally
owned and controlled. He offered to commit five
Polaris submarines — or even more in appropriate
circumstances — to NATO. The immediate pre-
occupation of senior officers in all governments
with preparation against hazard in Berlin has
delayed the further consideration of this major
problem, but it is the view of the United States
Government that a constructive and effective solu-
tion is both important and possible. Europe
secure in reliance upon a NATO deterrent will
have a posture as against Soviet threats which
cannot but strengthen the unity and self-confi-
dence of the Western alliance as a whole.


In turning to specifically political matters I
repeat again that all of these matters are matters
of politics. If we can find a new trading relation
to the Common Market and if we can develop a
new cooperative strength in both conventional
and nuclear weapons, we shall have done much to
advance our basic policy of partnerehip with a
revived and strengthened Europe. But there re-
mains a specifically political problem — the politi-
cal problem of the separate Western European
sovereign states. Here our purpose is at some
distance from our means — for that purpose is the
political vmity of Western Europe, and plainly it
is not we Americans who can make this great
event come to jiass. Great sovereignties like
England, France, Germany, and Italy will not be
melted into a new nation of Europe by a wave of
any American wand. Yet our attitude is in no
sense irrelevant. The steps toward European
unity which have occurred since 1947 are neither
few nor trifling, and each of them has depended
in large measure upon the sj'mpathy and even the
support of the Government of the United States.
It will bo this way in the future, too.

And the line of development in Europe is clear.
Tho European destiny does now require a new
political connnunity. Tho road upon which the
six central nations embarked at Kome is not a
dead end but a through way, and the next moves
are already beginning. It is not an accident, in
my judgment, that we find an increasing harmony
of view on specific political problems between
Bonn and Paris. Nor is this harmony a danger,
in the large sense, to tho United States.

Indeed, I believe that it would bo bettor for the

Department of Stale Bulletin

United States if the relation between our voice
and tiiose of our principal partners in the alliance
of free men could be less unequal. As it is now,
we are the only great power, in the full 20th-
century sense, on the side of freedom. The
United Kingdom retains great influence by virtue
of its historic achievements and its continuing
comiection with the Conmionwoalth. The voice
of France will always be heard in the world, and
it is a voice of uncommon eloquence and personal
authority in these years of General de Gaulle.
The growing importance of Italy and of Germany
is equally plain. But all these voices speak in the
context of levels of power which simply do not
compare with those of the United States and the
Soviet Union, and the difference inevitably affects
the discourse. Partial dependency, as against
equal mutual reliance, is not good for the pride
or the judgment of free men, and when one power
is very much stronger than its allies there is an
unhealthy tendency to seek special and unique
connections at the major center. It would be
better if Western Europe were one great power.
A glance at the fimdamental indices of popula-
tion, production, and I'esources will show that only
internal political divisions stand between Western
Europe and this new role.

It is of course a hazardous business to predict
the form of political relationship which the
United States might have with an entity which is
only now beginning to come into existence. But
my own belief is that the most productive way of
conceiving the political future of the Atlantic
community is to think in teiTns of a partnership
between the United States, on the one hand, and a
great European power, on the other. This part-
nership would be directed to the constructive and
defensive tasks which must be discharged if a
genuine community of free nations is to be
created: aid to less developed areas, defense
against Communist aggression. It would not be
an ingrown white man's club; it would rather
look outward to larger burdens and opportunities.

Each of these great powers would, of course,
have close associates and friends : Canada and the
Latin American states on our side, the Common-
wealth and the less unified European neighbors on
theirs. And they would all be joined together
with other free nations in the wide range of com-
mon endeavors and enterprises which characterize
the free world. Such a partnership makes more
sense than a full-blown Atlantic union, which is

still constitutionally and psychologically out of
range for the people of the United States, and
it makes more sense than what we have today.
What might happen in such a new partnership is
perhaps best foreshadowed by the extraordinary
relation which was created in World War II be-
tween Great Britain and the United States. Even
then there was an uneven balance of power, but
magnanimity and good judgment led to the main-
tenance of an essentially equal relationship. This
was good for both sides, and it has not been to
the advantage of the United States that the rela-
tive power of Great Britain has much declined
since 1945. Wliat I am suggesting, in short, is
that the partnership of freedom now requires the
re-creation of a great central political force in
Western Europe. To this general end Americans
of both parties, through three administrations,
have given their support, and I believe that his-
toi-y will prove the wisdom of this unbroken

We have in prospect, then, a new Europe, with
the economic strength, the military self-confi-
dence, and the political unity of a true great
power. Since great states do not usually rejoice
in the emergence of other great states, we shall do
well to note briefly why it is that in this case we
can feel such confidence. The immediate answer
here is in the current contest with the Soviet
Union. It is certainly true that we and the free
men of Europe have a common interest in the
resistance of Communist expansion. By the same
token we cannot suppose that the Soviet Union
has now suddenly abandoned its 15-year-old
preoccupation with the division and weakening
of the Atlantic community. But in the end our
confidence in Europe rests on deeper and more
solid political ground. These peoples are our
cousins by history and culture, by language and
religion. We are cousins too in our current sense
of human and social purpose. It is in Western
Europe and in North America that the true op-
portunities of the modern world are now being
opened for the first time. These societies are
moving together into the age of everyman — the
age in which a happy combination of work and
leisure, of social activity and individual responsi-
bility, can offer to all citizens what the greatest
of past societies have achieved only for a few.
For this aspiration there is required, certainly, a
steady advance in material prosperity. But there
is required also something harder, deeper, and

March 72, 7962


decisive — a conviction, throughout the civil so-
ciety, that its end is man and Iiis possibilities. It

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 81 of 101)