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dent in Dominican Republic 425

Trade and Aid — Essentials of Free-World Leader-
ship (Rusk) 403

United States Agrees To Support Tunisian De-
velopment Effort 425

Germany. Policy for the Western AUiance — Berlin

and After (Bundy) 419

International Organizations and Conferences

CENTO Economic Committee (delegation) . . . 436
GATT Members Conclude Long-Term Cotton Tex-
tile Arrangement (text of agi-eement) .... 430
Secretary General of CENTO Visits Washington . 411
World Bank Reports Total Reserves of $651.7

Million 435

Japan. U.S.-Japan Committee Called Model for

Scientific Cooperation (Rusk) 425

Luxembourg. United States and Luxembourg Sign

FEN Treaty 437

Middle East

CEXTO Economic Committee (delegation) . . . 436

Secretary General of CENTO Visits Washington . 411

Military Affairs. Policy for the Western Alliance —

Berlin and After (Bundy) 419

Pakistan. McConaughy confirmed as Ambassador . 438

Philippines. Letters of Credence (Abello) .... 418

Presidential Documents

President Kennedy Congratulates President of Fin-
land on Reelection 418

U.S. Prepares New Proposals for Space Research

With Soviet Union 411


U.S.-Japan Committee Called Model for Scientific
Cooperation (Rusk) 425

U.S. Prepares New Proposals for Space Research

With Soviet Union (Kennedy, Khrushchev) . . 411

Treaty Information

Current Actions 438

G.\TT Members Conclude Ijong-Term Cotton Tex-
tile Arrangement (text of agreement) .... 430

United States and Luxembourg Sign FEN Treaty . 437

Tunisia. United States Agrees To Support Tunisian

Development Effort 425


IT.S. Prepares New Proposals for Space Research

With Soviet Union (Kennedy, Khrushchev) . . 411

U.S., U.K. Pledge Redoubled Efforts To Reach Nu-
clear Test Ban Agreement (text of report) . . 409

United Kingdom. U.S., U.K. Pledge Redoubled Ef-
forts To Reach Nuclear Test Ban Agreement
(text of report) 409

United Nations

Current U.N. Documents 436

U.S. Files Statement on Financial Obligations of

U.N. Members 435

U.S., U.K. Pledge Redoubled Efforts To Reach Nu-
clear Test Ban Agreement (text of report) . . 409

West Indies, The. Mission to West Indies Termi-
nated ; Office Reverts to Consulate General . . . 438

Name Index

Abello, Emilio 418

Ball, George W 412

Bundy, McGeorge 419

Coppock, Joseph D 426

Harrinian, W. Averell 438

Kennedy, President 411, 418

Khrushchev, Nikita 411

McConaughy, Walter P 438

Rostow, Walt Whitman 438

Rusk, Secretary 403, 425

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 19-25

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were issued prior to February 19 are Nos.
98, 99, and 100 of February 14, and 106 of February


U.S. participation in international con-

Stewart sworn in as Ambassador to
Venezuela (biographic details).

Philippines credentials (rewrite).

ICJ advisory proceeding on U.N. fi-

U.S.-U.K. report on Geneva test talks.

Rusk : Chamber of Commerce, Char-
lotte, N.C.

Economic aid to Tunisia.

Delegation to CENTO Economic Com-
mittee (rewrite).

Treaty of friendship, establishment,
and navigation with Luxembourg.

CENTO Secretary General visits
Washington (rewrite).

Rusk : Davidson College.

Cultural exchange (Germany).

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Vol. XLVI, No. 1186 ]VHaEc|i^9i:l962

B. P- ^-

by President Kennedy « 44o


NEGOTIATIONS • Exdumge of Messages Between
President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev .... 46a


NATIONS • Address by Secretary Rusk 448


MARCH 1 455


Assistant Secretary Martin 471

For index see inside back cover


Vol. XLVI, No. 1186 • Publication 7352
March 19, 1962

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Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Departml.nt
or State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the
Readers' Quids to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as tcell as
special articles on various phases of
internatioiuil affairs and tlie func-
tions of the Department. Infornut-
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Nuclear Testing and Disarmament

Address by President Kennedy ^

Seventeen years ago man unleashed the power of
the atom. He thereby took into his mortal hands
the power of self-extinction. Throughout the
years that have followed, under three successive
Presidents, the United States has sought to banish
this weapon from the arsenals of individual na-
tions. For of all the awesome responsibilities en-
trusted to this office, none is more somber to con-
template than the special statutory authority to
employ nuclear aims in the defense of our people
and freedom.

But until mankind has banished both war and
its instruments of destruction, the United States
must maintain an effective quantity and quality
of nuclear weapons, so deployed and protected as
to be capable of surviving any surprise attack and
devastating the attacker. Only through such
strength can we be certain of deterring a nuclear
strike, or an overwhelming ground attack, upon
our forces and allies. Only through such strength
can we in the free world — should that deterrent
fail — face the tragedy of another war with any
hope of survival. And that deterrent strength, if
it is to be effective and credible when compared
with that of any other nation, must embody the
most modem, the most reliable, and the most ver-
satile nuclear weapons our research and develop-
ment can produce.

The testing of new weapons and their effects is
necessarily a part of that research and develop-
ment process. Without tests — to experiment and
verify — progress is limited. A nation which is
refraining from tests obviously cannot match the
gains of a nation conducting tests. And when all
nuclear powers refrain from testing, the nuclear
arms race is held in check.

That is why this nation has long urged an ef-
fective worldwide end to nuclear tests. And that
is why in 1958 we voluntarily subscribed, as did
the Soviet Union, to a nuclear test moratoriimi,^
during which neither side would conduct new nu-
clear tests and both East and West would seek con-
crete plans for their control.

But on September 1st of last year, while the
United States and the United Kingdom were ne-
gotiating in good faith at Geneva, the Soviet
Union callously broke its moratorium with a 2-
month series of more than 40 nuclear tests.^ Prep-
arations for these tests had been secretly under
way for many months. Accompanied by new
threats and new tactics of terror, these tests — con-
ducted mostly in the atmosphere— represented a
major Soviet effort to put nuclear weapons back
into the arms race.

Once it was apparent that new appeals and pro-
posals were to no avail, I authorized on September
5th a resumption of U.S. nuclear tests imder-
ground,* and I announced on November 2d —
before the close of the Soviet series — that prepara-
tions were being ordered for a resumption of at-
mospheric tests and that we would make whatever
tests our security required in the light of Soviet

This week the National Security Council has
completed its review of this subject. The scope of
the Soviet tests has been carefully reviewed by
the most competent scientists in the country. The
scope and justification of proposed American tests
have been carefully reviewed, determining which

' Delivered from the White House by television and
radio on Mar. 2 (White House press release).

" For a statement by President Eisenhower, see Bulle-
tin of Sept. 8, 1958, p. 378.
' For background, see ihid., Sept. 18, 19G1, p. 47.").
* nid.
' Ihid., Nov. 20, 1961, p. 844.

March 19, 1962


experiments can be safely deferred, whicli can be
deleted, wliicli can be combined or conducted im-
derground, and which are essential to our military
and scientific progress. Careful attention has been
given to tlie limiting of radioactive fallout, to the
future course of arms control diplomacy, and to
our obligations to other nations.

Every alternative was examined. Every avenue
of obtaining Soviet agreement was explored. We
were determined not to rush into imitating their
tests. And we were equally determined to do
only what our own security required us to do.
Although the complex preparations have con-
tinued at full speed while these facts were being
uncovered, no single decision of this administra-
tion has been more thoroughly or more thought-
fully weighed.

Having carefully considered these findings, hav-
ing received the unanimous recommendations of
the pertinent department and agency heads, and
having observed the Soviet Union's refusal to ac-
cept any agreement which would inhibit its free-
dom to test extensively after preparing secretly,
I have today authorized the Atomic Energy Com-
mission and the Department of Defense to conduct
a series of nuclear tests — beginning when our
preparations are completed, in the latter part of
April, and to be concluded as quickly as possible
(within 2 or .3 months)— such series, involving
only those tests which cannot be held underground,
to take place in the atmosphere over the Pacific

These tests are to be conducted under conditions
which resti'ict the radioactive fallout to an ab-
solute mininuim, far less than the contamination
created by last fall's Soviet series. By paying
careful attention to location, wind, and weather
conditions, and by holding these tests over the
open sea, we intend to rule out any problem of
fallout in the immediate area of testing. More-
over, we will hold the increase in radiation in the
Northern Hemisphere, where nearly all such fall-
out will occur, to a very low level.

Natural radioactivity, as everyone knows, has
always been part of the air around us, with certain
long-range biological effects. By conservative
estimate, the total effects from this test series will
be roughly equal to only 1 percent of those duo to
this natural backgromid. It has been estimated,
in fact, tliiit the exposure due to radioactivity from
these tests will be less than one-fiftieth of the dif-
ference which can be experienced, due to variations


in natural radioactivity, simply by living in differ-
ent locations in this country. This will obviously J
be well within the guides for general population \
health and safety, as set by the Federal Radiation
Council, and considerably less than one-tenth of 1
percent of the exposure guides set for adults who
work with industrial radioactivity.

Nevertheless, I find it deeply regrettable that
any radioactive material must be added to the
atmosphere — that even one additional individual's
health may be risked in the foreseeable future.
And however remote and infinitesimal those
hazards are judged to be, I still exceedingly regret
the necessity of balancing these hazards against
the hazards to himdreds of millions of lives which
would be created by any relative decline in our
nuclear strength.

In the absence of a major shift in Soviet poli-
cies, no American President — responsible for the
freedom and safety of so many people — could in
good faith make any other decision. But because
our nuclear posture affects the security of all
Americans and all free men — because this issue
has aroused such widespread concern — I want to
share with you and all the world, to the fullest
extent our security permits, all of the facts and
thoughts which have gone into my decision.

Many of these facts are hard to explain in sim-
ple terms — many are hard to face in a peaceful
world — but these are facts which must be faced
and must be understood.

Significance of Soviet Tests

Had the Soviet tests of last fall reflected merely
a new effort in intimidation and bluff, our se-
curity would not have been affected. But in fact
they also reflected a highly sophisticated tech-
nology, the trial of novel designs and techniques,
and some substantial gains in weaponry. Many of
their tests were aimed at improving their defenses
against missiles — others were proof tests, trying
out existing weapons systems — but over one-half
emphasized the development of new weapons, par-
ticularly those of greater explosive power.

A primary purpose of these tests was the de-
velopment of warheads which weigh very little
compared to the destructive efficiency of their
thermonuclear yield. One Soviet test weapon ex-
ploded with the force of 58 megatons — the equiva-
lent of 58 million tons of TNT. This was a re-
duced-yield version of their much-publicized 100-

Deparfmenf of Sfofe Bulletin

megaton bomb. Today Soviet missiles do not ap-
pear able to carry so lieavy a warhead. But there
is no avoiding the fact that other Soviet tests, in
the 1 to 5 megaton range and up, were aimed at vm-
leashing increased destructive power in warlieads
actually capable of delivery by existing missiles.

Much has also been said about Soviet claims
for an antimissile missile. Some of the Soviet
tests which measured the effects of high-altitude
nuclear explosions — in one case over 100 miles
high — were related to this problem. While ap-
parently seeking information (on the effects of
nuclear blasts on radar and communication) which
is important in developing an antimissile defense
system, these tests did not, in our judgment, re-
flect a developed system.

In short, last fall's tests, in and by themselves,
did not give the Soviet Union superiority in nu-
clear power. They did, however, provide the So-
viet laboratories with a mass of data and experi-
ence on which, over the next 2 or 3 yeai-s, they
can base significant analyses, experiments, and
extrapolations, preparing for the next test series
which would confirm and advance their findings.

And I must report to you in all candor that
further Soviet series, in the absence of further
Western progress, could well provide the Soviet
Union with a nuclear attack and defense capability
so powerful as to encourage aggressive designs.
Were we to stand still while the Soviets surpassed
us — or even appeared to surpass us — the free
world's ability to deter, to survive, and to respond
to an all-out attack would be seriously weakened.

Purposes of New U.S. Test Series

The fact of the matter is that we cannot make
similar strides without testing in the atmosphere
as well as underground. For, in many areas of
nuclear weapons research, we have reached the
point where our progress is stifled without experi-
ments in every environment. The information
from our last series of atmospheric tests in 1958
has all been analyzed and reanalyzed. It can tell
us no more without new data. And it is in these
very areas of research — missile penetration and
missile defense, for example — that further major
Soviet tests, in the absence of further Western
tests, might endanger our deterrent.

In addition to proof tests of existing systems,
two different types of tests have therefore been
decided upon. The first and most important are

called "effects tests" — determining what effect an
enemy's nuclear explosions would have upon our
ability to survive and respond. We are spending
great sums of money on radar to alert our defenses
and to develop possible antimissile systems — on
the communications which eiuible our command
and control centers to direct a response — on hard-
ening our missiles sites, shielding our missiles and
their warheads from defensive action, and pro-
viding them with electronic guidance systems to
find their targets. But we cannot be certain how
much of this preparation will turn out to be use-
less: blacked out, paralyzed, or destroyed by the
complex effects of a nuclear explosion.

We know enough from earlier tests to be con-
cerned about such phenomena. We know that
the Soviets conducted such tests last fall. But
until we measure the effects of actual explosions in
the atmosphere under realistic conditions, we will
not know precisely how to prepare our future de-
fenses, how best to equip our missiles for penetra-
tion of an antimissile system, and whether it is
possible to achieve such a system for ourselves.

Secondly, we must test in the atmosphere to
permit the development of those more advanced
concepts and more effective, efficient weapons
which, in the light of Soviet tests, are deemed
essential to our security. Nuclear weapon tech-
nology is still a constantly changing field. If our
weapons are to be more secure, more flexible in
their use and more selective in their impact — if
we are to be alert to new breakthroughs, to exper-
iment with new designs — if we are to maintain
our scientific momentum and leadership — then our
weapons progress must not be limited to theory
or to the confines of laboratories and caves.

This series is designed to lead to many im-
portant, if not always dramatic, results. Improv-
ing the nuclear yield per pound of weight in our
weapons will make them easier to move, protect,
and fire — more likely to survive a surprise at-
tack — and more adequate for effective retaliation.
It will also, even more importantly, enable us to
add to our missiles certain penetration aids and
decoys and to make those missiles effective at
higher altitude detonations, in order to render in-
effective any antimissile or interceptor system an
enemy might some day develop.

Wlienever possible, these development tests will
be held underground. But the larger explosions
can only be tested in the atmosphere. And while
our teclinology in smaller weapons is unmatched,

March 19, J 962


we know now that the Soviets have made major
gains in developing larger weapons of low weight
and high explosive content — of 1 to 5 megatons and
upward. Fourteen of their tests last fall were in
this category, for a total of 30 such tests over
the years. The United States, on tlie other hand,
had conducted, prior to the moratorium, a total
of only 20 tests within this megaton range.

U.S. Obligation To Protect Free-World Security

"While we will be conducting far fewer tests than
the Soviets, with far less fallout, there will still
be those in other countries who will urge us to re-
frain from testing at all. Perhaps they forget
that this country long refrained fi-om testing, and
sought to ban all tests, while the Soviets were
secretly preparing new explosions. Perhaps they
forget the Soviet threats of last autumn and their
arbitrary rejection of nil appeals and proposals,
from both the U.S. and the U.N. But those free
peoples who value their freedom and security, and
look to our relative strength to shield them from
danger — those who know of our good faith in seek-
ing an end to testing and an end to the arms
race — will, I am confident, want the United States
to do whatever it must do to deter the threat of

If they felt we could be swayed by threats or
intimidation — if they thought we could permit a
repetition of last summer's deception — then surely
they would lose faith in our will and our wisdom
as well as our weaponry. I have no doubt that
most of our friends around the world have shared
my own hope that we would never find it neces-
sary to test again — and my own belief that, in the
long run, the only real security in this age of
nuclear peril rests not in armament but in dis-
ai-mament. But I am equally certain that they
would insist on our testing once that is deemed
necessary to protect free-world security. They
know we are not deciding to test for political or
psycliological reasons — and they also know that
we cannot avoid such tests for political or psycho-
logical reasons.

Decision May Strengthen Prospects for Peace

The leacl'irs of the Soviet Union are also watch-
ing this decision. Should we fail to follow the
dictates of our own security, they will chalk it
up, not to good will but to a failure of will — not
to our confidence in AVestern superiority but to


our fear of world opinion, the very world opinion
for which they showed such contempt. They
could well be encoui-aged by such signs of weak-
ness to seek another period of no testing without
controls — another opportunity for stifling our
progress while secretly preparing, on the basis of
last fall's experiments, for the new test series
which might alter the balance of power. With
such a one-sided advantage, why would they
change their strategy, or refrain from testing,
merely because we refrained? Wliy would they
want to halt their drive to surpass us in nuclear
technology? And why would they ever consider
accepting a true test ban or mutual disarmament ?

Our reasons for testing and our peaceful inten-
tions are clear — so clear that even the Soviets
could not objectively regard our resumption of
tests, following their resumption of tests, as pro-
vocative or preparatory for war. On the contrary,
it is my hope that the prospects for peace may
actually be strengthened by this decision — once
the Soviet leaders realize that the West will no
longer stand still, negotiating in good faith, while
they reject inspection and are free to prepare fur-
ther tests. As new disarmament talks approach,
the basic lesson of some 3 years and 353 negotiat-
ing sessions at Geneva is this — that the Soviets
will not agree to an effective ban on nuclear tests
as long as a new series of offers and prolonged
negotiations, or a new uninspected moratorium,

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