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or a new agreement without controls, would en-
able them once again to prevent the West from
testing while they prepare in secret.

But inasmuch as this choice is now no longer
open to them, let us hope that they will take a
different attitude on banning nuclear tests — that
they will prefer to see the nuclear arms race
checked instead of intensified, with all the dangei-s
that intensification is likely to bring: the spread
of nuclear weapons to other nations; the constant
increase in world tensions; the steady decrease in
all prospects for disarmament; and, with it, a
steady decrease in the security of us all.

Proposals for Geneva Disarmament Conference

If the Soviets sliould change their position, we
will have an opportunity to learn it immediately.
On the 14th of March, in (touovu, Switzerland, a
new 18-power conference on disarmament will be-
gin. A statement of agreed principles * has been

' For text, soo ihid.. Oct. 0, 1061, p. 589.

Department of State Bulletin

worked out with the Soviets and endorsed by the
U.N. In the Ions: nm, it is the constructive pos-
sibilities of that conference — and not the testing
of new destructive weapons — on which rest the
hopes of all mankind. However dim those hopes
may sometimes seem, they can never be aban-
doned. And however far off most steps toward
disarmament appear, there are some that can be
taken at once.

The United States will offer at the Geneva con-
ference — not in the advance expectation they will
be rejected, and not merely for purposes of propa-
ganda — a series of concrete plans for a major
"breakthrough to peace." We hope and believe
that they will appeal to all nations opposed to
war. They will include specific proposals for fair
and enforcible agreements : to halt the production
of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons and
their transfer to other nations — to convert them
from weapon stockpiles to peaceable uses — to de-
stroy the warheads and the delivery systems that
threaten man's existence — to check the dangers of
surprise and accidental attack — to reserve outer
space for peaceful use — and progressively to re-
duce all armed forces in such a way as ultimately
to remove forever all threats and thoughts of war.

And of greatest importance to our discussion
tonight, we shall, in association with the United
Kingdom, present once again our proposals for a
separate comprehensive treaty — with appropriate
arrangements for detection and verification — to
halt permanently the testing of all nuclear
weapons, in every environment: in the air, in
outer space, under ground, or under water. New
modifications will also be offered in the light of
new experience.

The essential arguments and facts relating to
such a treaty are well known to the Soviet Union.
There is no need for further repetition, propa-
ganda, or delay. The fact that both sides have
decided to resume testing only emphasizes the
need for new agreement, not new argument. And
before charging that this decision shatters all
liopes for agreement, the Soviets should recall
that we were willing to work out with them, for
joint submission to the U.N., an agreed statement
of disarmament principles at the very time their
autumn tests were being conducted. And Mr.
Khrushchev knows, as he said in 1960, that any
nation which broke the moratorium could expect
other nations to be "forced to take the same road."
Our negotiators will be ready to talk about this

treaty even before the conference begins on
March 14th — and they will be ready to sign well
before the date on which our tests are ready to
begin. That date is still nearly 2 months away.
If the Soviet Union should now be willing to
accept such a treaty, sign it before the latter part
of April, and apply it immediately — if all testing
can thus be actually halted — then the nuclear
arms race would be slowed down at last, the
security of the United States and its ability to
meet its commitments would be safeguarded, and
there would be no need for our tests to begin.

But this must be a fully effective treaty. We
know enough now about broken negotiations,
secret preparations, and the advantages gained
from a long test series never to offer again an
iminspected moratorium. Some may urge us to
try it again, keeping our preparations to test in
a constant state of readiness. But in actual prac-
tice, particularly in a society of free choice, we
cannot keep topflight scientists concentrating on
the preparation of an experiment which may or
may not take place on an uncertain date in the
future. Nor can large technical laboratories be
kept fully alert on a standby basis waiting for
some other nation to break an agreement. This
is not merely difficult or inconvenient — we have
explored this alternative thoroughly and found it
impossible of execution.

In short, in the absence of a firm agreement that
would halt nuclear tests by the latter part of
April, we shall go ahead with our talks — striving
for some new avenue of agreement — but we shall
also go ahead with our tests. If, on the other
hand, the Soviet Union should accept such a
treaty in the opening months of talks, that single
step would be a monumental step toward peace —
and both Prime Minister Macmillan and I would
think it fitting to meet Chairman Khrushchev at
Geneva to sign the final pact.

The Ultimate Objective

For our ultimate objective is not to test for the
sake of testing. Our real objective is to make our
own tests unnecessary, to prevent others from
testing, to prevent the nuclear arms race from
mushrooming out of control, to take the first steps
toward general and complete disarmament. And
that is why, in the last analysis, it is the leaders
of the Soviet Union who must bear the heavy
rasponsibility of choosing, in the weeks that lie

March 19, 7962


ahead, whether we proceed with these steps — or
proceed with new tests.

If they are convinced that their interests can
no longer be served by the present course of events,
it is my fervent hope that they will agree to an
effective treaty. But if they persist in rejecting
all means of true inspection, then we shall be left
no choice but to keep our own defensive arsenal
adequate for the security of all free men.

It is our hope and prayer that these grim, un-

welcome tests will never have to be made — that
these deadly weapons will never have to be fired —
and that our preparations for war will bring us
the preservation of peace. Our foremost aim is
the control of force, not the pursuit of force, in a
world made safe for mankind. But whatever the
future brings, I am sworn to uphold and defend
the freedom of the American people, and I in-
tend to do whatever must be done to fulfill that
solemn obligation.

America's Goal — A Community of Free Nations

Address hy Secretary Rusk ^

It gives deep satisfaction to any Davidson man
to return to Davidson College. I feel that I have
known this campus for 70 years, because my father
gave his children an intimate picture of Davidson
of the 1890's. Like other alumni, I have followed
its affairs with affectionate interest and have
shared their pride as it has moved from strength
to strength.

In returning to this familiar scene I naturally
reflect on the vast changes that have occurred in
the world since I was graduated 31 years ago.
What is only history for most of you is indelibly
stamped upon some of the rest of us as personal

The gravest problems of even the next decade
had not yet taken shape. The Japanese militarists
had not yet invaded Manchuria — that came in
September 1931. Hitler had not yet achieved
power in Germany. The speed of the usual air-
plane was little more than 100 miles per hour.

We had our worries and difficulties, and they
were not small. Millions of Americans were un-
employed, and other millions were earning no
more than a meager subsistence. We were waiting
impatiently for the corner around which, it was

' Made at Davidson OoIIoko, Havidsou, N.C., on Feb. 2^
(press release 118 dated Feb. 23).

said, lay prosperity. And we had a massive back-
log of unsolved social problems.

But we felt secure against the rest of the world.
The oceans and a small Navy seemed adequate for
our protection. Our regular Army was a tiny
skeleton. We did not dimly perceive that in little
more than a decade we would be fighting a war
for survival on all the continents and seas. Still
less did we perceive the world as it is today; nu-
clear weapons were still locked up in E = MC', the
campus ROTC had seen no bazookas — let alone
intercontinental missiles — space was just giving
up its ether, and we were timid about anything
resembling world responsibilities.

We bear worldwide responsibilities, not because
we want them but because we must bear them if
we wish our civilization to survive. We can be
safe only to the extent that our total environment
is safe. V>y environment I mean not only the land
and waters and air of the earth but the adjoining
areas of space, as far out as man can project in-
struments capable of influencing significantly the
life and affairs of the planet.

In this world of rapid and revolutionary
changes, we would have problems enough even if
there were no forces deliberately determined to
destroy freedom. But those forces exist, and in
many ways they are powerful. The ruloi-s of the


Department of State Bulletin

leadinji; Communist states are not only Marxists
who believe that their sj'stem is destined to prevail
over all others. They are Leninists, determined
to accelerate this alleged historical inevitability
by all practicable means.

The Main Business of Free Peoples

Our first great task is to get on with the main
business of free peoples. President Kennedy put
it succinctly in his state of the Union message last
month : '

Yet our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful world
community of free and independent states, free to choose
their own future and their own system so long as it does
not threaten the freedom of others.

Some may choose forms and ways that we would not
choose for ourselves, but it is not for us that they are
choosing. We can welcome diversity — the Communists
cannot. For we offer a world of choice — they offer the
world of coercion. And the way of the past shows clearly
that freedom, not coercion, is the wave of the future. At
times our goal has been obscured by crisis or endangered
by conflict, but it draws sustenance from five basic sources
of strength :

— the moral and physical strength of the United States ;
— the united strength of the Atlantic community ;
— the regional strength of our hemispheric relations ;
— the creative strength of our efforts in the new and
developing nations; and
^the peacekeeping strength of the United Nations.

The Major Obstacle to Peace

I shall return to certain of these matters in a
moment, but I should like to comment briefly on
the major obstacle to a peaceful world in the
1960's. "We have heard a great deal from the
other side of the Curtain about their world revo-
lution. They predict its success, they back it with
action, they argue among themselves about how
best to get there — not about whether they should
try. What we have not heard about is the great-
est revolutionary potential they hold in their
hands — the revolution which the world would ex-
perience if they made a simple decision to live in
peace with it. Indeed it taxes our imagination to
picture the world which would be within the grasp
of mankind if the Communist bloc would act in
accordance with the United Nations Charter and
their own commitments made at the end of World
War II. The lifting of the shadows of fear, the
dispersal of the fog of suspicion, the freeing of

vast resources for the constructive tasks of man-
kind would, indeed, usher us into a new age.

This has not been their choice and the result
has been a series of crises in the postwar scene,
affecting every continent and adding danger and
anxiety to every year of our recent history. It is
not enough to note that so many of their efforts
have failed, that no people has yet embraced their
system in free elections, that no newly independent
nation has passed under their control. The crises
continue; if one is resolved, another takes its
place; others simply endure from year to year.
The great business of freedom requires constant
attention to these points of conflict and a major
effort by free men to insure that the revolution
of coercion does not succeed.

A year ago there was serious fighting in Laos,
fighting which was visiting tragedy upon a peace-
ful people in a land which ought not to become a
contending battleground for outsiders. Just as
we had no desire to establish bases or a military
position of our own in that country, so we could
not accept that it be swallowed up by aggression
from the north. An effort has been made, there-
fore, to find ways and means to permit Laos to
survive as a neutral and independent nation. In-
ternational agreement was reached on the stated
objective; the difficulty has been to bring the ob-
jective to reality. A precarious cease-fire, tangled
and complex negotiations among Laotian leaders,
and some unfinished business at the Geneva con-
ference lie behind the shifting news from that
still unhappy country.^ We believe the object is
sound — a genuinely neutral and independent
country — and we continue to give it the closest
attention. We should like to believe that peace
there is possible, that those who have proclaimed
unlimited appetites will leave the Laotians alone
to work out their own affairs, but I cannot in can-
dor report that the end of the crisis is clearly in

In Viet-Nam we found an even more dangerous
problem. For several years a guerrilla war has
been built up in South Viet-Nam by the North
Viet-Nam regime. Thousands of men have been
trained, infiltrated, in part supplied, and certainly
directed from north of the 17th parallel. The
Geneva Accords of 1954* have been systemati-

^ Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
March 19, 7962

•For bacliground, see ihid., July 10, 19G1, p. 8.5.

' For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955:
Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State publication
6446, p. 750.


cally violated by the North Viet Minh since the
clay of their sijziiing. A new and promising nation
in the south of that divided country, having found
its feet against severe odds, is being subjected to
attack, terror, assassination, and ambush. This is
not a war of "national liberation"; it is a gangster
war of terror and intimidation.

In the face of this systematic aggression we —
and others — have joined with the Government
of South Viet-Nam in additional measures to pre-
serve the independence of that nation.

The stakes are greater than South Viet-Nam
itself. All Southeast Asia — the independence of
its peoples and their right to develop in their own
way — is at stake. And beyond this region the in-
ternational community confronts a question that
afl'ects the lives of men and women — and of na-
tions — on every continent: Shall this form of ex-
ternal aggression be allowed to succeed?

In Korea the international community proved
that overt aggression was unprofitable. In Viet-
Nam we must prove — once again, alas — that semi-
covert aggression across international boundaries
cannot succeed.

The United States has no national requirements
in that area. If the campaign to destroy the Re-
public of Viet-Nam is stopped, the measures we
are taking to assist its defense efforts will no
longer be necessary. We stand by our statement
made in 1954 at the Geneva conference ° that we
would refrain from the threat or use of force to
disturb the Geneva Accords but that we would
view any renewal of aggression in violation of
these accords with grave concern and as seriously
threatening international peace and security'. We
are determined that South Viet-Nam shall have
the chance to develop independence; and we are
determined that this ugly and dangerous form of
external aggression shall be effectively resisted.

In the Congo we have supported the effort of
the United Nations. To bring about a unified and
independent Congo seems to us to be the only
objective that offers a realistic chance for the ad-
vancement of the peoples of the Congo and for
peace in central Afiica. In midsummer 1960
President Eisenhower committed the United
States to the support of a United Nations solu-
tion; the alternative would almost certainly have
injected a great-power struggle into the heart of
Africa with its immense costs, heightened dan-

' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1954, p. 162.

gers, and tragic consequences for the African peo-
ples. His decision was the right one.

The execution of United Nations policy in the
Congo has been an extraordinarily difficult and'
often painful enterprise; but the objective is cor-
rect, and the progress made toward it in recent
weeks has been most encouraging. When the Con-
go has been effectively organized under a govern-
ment impervious to outside infiltration, it can get
on with the task of building a nation under
constitutional arrangements of its own choosing.
The Congo should be a thriving nation, for it is
richly endowed with natural resources; it will in-
evitably have enormous influence upon the rest of
Africa. The stakes are very large, and those who
are seeking a decent world order will not under-
estimate them.

The Challenge in Berlin

It is in Berlin that we face the most direct and
fundamental Soviet challenge to the position of
the United States — and indeed of the entire free
world. Having fenced off and walled off their
areas of occupation in East Germany and East
Berlin, the Soviets now seek to encroach on the
free western sectors of Berlin. West Berlin is not
just a dot or a part of a dot on your map. It is a
thriving metropolis — 214 million people — which
has a larger population than 37 of the 104 members
of the U.N. and which produces more economic
wealth than 62 of the membei-s of the U.N

The Western allies, backed by all the NATO
powers, have the most solemn obligation to pro-
tect the freedom of the West Berliners. This is
a duty to ourselves as well and to our own security,
for the freedom of West Berlin is the key to the
freedom of us all. To protect this freedom re-
(juires the continued presence of Allied troops
and free rights of access. These are vital interests
which the West shares with the West Berliners.
The most dangerous aspect of the Soviet challenge
is the challenge to these rights of access. The
Soviets assert that by unilateral action they could
extinguish the Western rights on which this ac-
cess depends and submit access to the hostile con-
trol of the authorities they have established in
East Germany.

Frankly there is no genuinely satisfactory solu-
tion to the ])roblems of Germany and Berlin short
of the reunification of the comitry and the reestab-
lishment of a united Berlin as its capital. We

Department of Slate Bulletin

have made it clear, however, that we are pre-
pared to discuss current problems and to seek
arrangements which, with good will on both sides,
could ease the confrontation and reduce tensions.
To this end we have recently proposed that to
remove this dangerous question from the areas of
conflict we should agree with the Soviets to es-
tablish an International Access Authority " which
would control the movements along the Autoiahn
and in the air corridors from Berlin to Western
Germany and the outer world.

We have made it clear that M'e ourselves do not
seek or intend to use force to change the present
circumstances. However, the rights and interests
for Berlin to which I have refeiTcd are basic to
our security and to our position in the world. The
President has made it clear that they are not
to be surrendered either to force or through

The Communist Threat in the Western Hemisphere

Nearer home, in concert with our Latin Ameri-
can neighbors, we have taken steps to insulate the
Western Hemisphere against inroads by Commu-
nist imperialism. Last month at Punta del Este,
the members of the Organization of American
States voted unanimously (excepting for Cuba)
that the Castro Communist offensive is a clear
and present danger to the unity and freedom of
the American Republics and that "the present
Government of Cuba, which has officially identi-
fied itself as a Marxist-Leninist government, is
incompatible with the principles and objectives of
the inter- American system." '

The Castro government has now in fact been
excluded from the Council of the OAS. Special
machinery has been set up within the OAS to
recommend joint action to deal with Communist
subversive activities. In accordance with another
resolution, adopted unanimously, the OAS de-
termined to stop trade or illicit traffic m anns be-
tween Cuba and other American countries. And
the OAS Council is instructed to consider further
trade restrictions, with special attention to items
of strategic importance.

Thus we are working, in cohcert with our neigh-
bors, to assure that the process of modernization
now at work in the hemisphere shall not be per-
verted or exploited by commiuiism. And the story
of freedom in Cuba has not reached its final chap-

' See p. 463.

' Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

ter; the peoples of the hemisphere have made it
clear that they look forward to the return of the
Cuban people to their ranks.

These critical problems have not reached a final
solution. Some may be with us for years. Othei-s
will certainly arise; for we live in a time of tur-
moil, in which new nations are being born and are
seeking to modernize their way of life. And the
international Communist movement aims to ex-
ploit this turmoil to its advantage. It does not
become a confident and powerful nation, faced
with such prospects, to give way to moods of im-
patience and frustration.

The stonns are not the main story. They beset
our course, and we must go on learning the arts
of driving through or around them and of using
the strong winds to move us forward. But we have
our own course, our own goal.

The world in our centuiy is passing through the
disintegration of the international order that pre-
vailed in the last century toward a more compre-
hensive order in the next. The outlines of the new
order are foreshadowed in the opening pages of
the U.N. Charter.

Our goal is a free community of nations — inde-
pendent but interdependent — uniting North and
South, East and West, in one great family of man,
outgrowing and transcending the great antago-
nisms that rend our age. This goal is not abstract.
It is not a matter of words. In our day — in our
time — we are moving toward it, following a policy
that has four major components.

Tightening Bonds Among the Developed Nations

First, we seek to strengthen the bonds of associ-
ation among the more mdustrialized free nations,
which mainly lie in the northern half of the world.

In Europe we see emerging, through an exciting
constitutional process — recalling often the Ameri-
can debates of the 1780's — a new great power.
Carrying forward the momentum of the Marshall
plan, Europe in the 1950's achieved a pace of
progress unexampled in its long history, a pace
which even Europe's most optimistic friends never
predicted in the dark aftermath of the Second
World War. But from that war, and from the
difficult history of this century, Europeans of
many nations drew the conclusion that their con-
tinent could again be great only if it moved toward

Americans can take satisfaction from the fact

March 79, 7962


that we, in the immediate postwar years, urged
this course upon our European friends. Now, as
that unity begins to become a reality, we must all
adjust our affairs to this massive fact of history.

We aim to develop a new partnership with
Europe in all the dimensions that responsibility as
a great power in the 19G0's requires: in military
affairs; in sustained assistance to the under-
developed areas; in trade; in managing together
the monetary problems upon which the stability
of our economy rests; and in the major issues of
international politics.

It is in this large perspective that the President
has asked Congress for new trade legislation.*
We must negotiate with Europe in ways which do
not merely protect American economic interests

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 86 of 101)