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but which also reduce tariff barriers and trade dis-
crimination throughout the whole of the free
world. New legislation is needed to insure that
the movement toward unity in Europe is accom-
panied by trading adjustments which will unite,
and not split, the free world.

It is not our intent to join the European Com-
mon Market. We cannot hope to enter into as
intimate arrangements with these countries as
they will form among each other. Our interests
and responsibilities run not merely to Europe but
also to Latin America and to the whole commu-
nity of free nations. We look to a partnership
between the United States and an increasingly
unified Europe. The organs of Atlantic coopera-
tion which are at hand— in NATO and the OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] — are the active instruments of that
partnership. We are working to strengthen those
instruments, even as we encourage and assist the
progress of European integration.

We are a Pacific as well as an Atlantic power.
As part of our efforts to tighten the bonds among
the developed nations of the Northern Hemi-
sphere, we have begun a new era of closer associa-
tion with our friends in the Pacific.

Like Western Europe, Japan experienced in the
1950's an economic miracle of revival and growth.
Like Europe, Japan is day by day entering on
the world scene as an important and responsible
power, prepared to play its part in the free world's
common enterprises of construction and mutual
interest.



' For text of President Kennedy's message on trade, see
ibid., Feb. 12, 1062, p. 231.



Working With the Developing Nations

The second component of our policy is to work
in long-term association with the developing na-
tions of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East,
and Asia. There — notably in the southern half
of the globe — we see a great revolutionary proc-
ess. These nations are determined to modernize
their economic, social, and political life — in their
own way, in their own time, in harmony with their
own history and aspirations. Throughout this
generation and beyond they will be undergoing
fundamental changes. Where colonialism still
exists, it will pass from the scene. Where politi-
cal and social power — and land — is still held by a
few, it will give way to the assumption of power —
and of the ownership of land— by the many. In
the cities new generations of men and women will
be coming forward, asserting new ambitions for
themselves and for their nations, demanding
and achieving the right to assume political
responsibility.

We cannot expect this process of modernization
to take place smoothly in all nations and at all
times. Tliere have been and will be upheavals;
but behind them are powerful, constructive forces:
the determination of citizens that their lives and
the lives of their children shall be enriclied and
that their nations shall have a place of dignity on
the world scene.

We intend that the United States shall work in
constructive partnership with those who would
modernize their societies on the basis of national
independence. And we intend to help those who
would frustrate the Communist attempt to exploit
this revolutionary process, to impose a totalitarian
straitjackct on their way of life and their institu-
tions, and to deny their citizens the right of choice
in shaping their future.

This is the objective of our programs of foreign
aid and the Peace Corps. This is the objective of
the Alliance for Progress. This is the basis for
our policy in the Organization of American
States.

The task ahead will take time. Communists
are determined to exploit the inevitable disrup-
tions that occur as underdeveloped nations
modernize. But we look to the developing half
of the free world with sober confidence. These
nations wish to strengthen their independence, not
to surrender it. In this finidamental objective
Americans are at one with them. And this fact



452



Department of State Bulletin



from day to day is becoming: increasingly clear.

"Wo and our children can live our kind of life
in a world of many self-respecting, independent
nations. This the Communists cannot say and
cannot believe as long as they believe their own
dogma. Here is an abiding strength in our posi-
tion and a basic weakness in theirs.

The underdeveloped nations of the free world
are full of vitality. Some are forging steadily
ahead with well-shaped national development
programs. Others, we are confident, will be
organizing such programs over the next few years.
But almost everywhere one can see energy and
determination and new generations coming
forward.

On the other hand, where Communists have
seized control, as in China and North Viet-Nam,
there are hunger and apathy — the products of
out-of-date, reactionary theories, brutally ap-
plied — as well as the tragic human costs of
totalitarianism.

The process of modernization in these southern
regions will be with us for many years. There
will be disappointments, frustrations, and set-
backs. But if we play our part there is every
reason to believe that the principles of national
independence and of human freedom will tri-
umph ; for in the end they represent the efBcieni
way teclinically as well as the right way morally.

Free-World Partnership

The third element in our policy requires that
not merely ourselves but all our partners in the
North build a new, expanded partnership with
the developing nations. "VVe are already be-
ginning to create the framework for such a free-
world partnership among equals, aided by the
imaginative transformation from colonialism to
independence within the British Commonwealth
and the French Conmiunity.

Over the past year this partnership has taken
the practical form of economic assistance, con-
certed among several governments, to India,
Pakistan, Tanganyika, Nigeria, Brazil, and
Bolivia. We hope this international pattern of
aid will be extended during 1962 by common
effoi-ts through the OECD, the World Bank, the
Colombo Plan, and other instruments of inter-
national collaboration.

We are working together on equally important
problems of trade. We will continue to do so
with increasing vigor.



But we look to more than a technical and eco-
nomic i)artiiership. In the Congo and in other
enterprises of the United Nations, representatives
fi'om the developed and underdeveloped nations
are working side by side to bi-ing about political
solutions in the common interest.

The men and women of the developed and less
developed nations are coming together, day by
day, in a wide range of other human activities : in
scientific, cultural, medical, and civic affairs. The
ties between them as fellow citizens of a common
planet in an exciting century are becoming
stronger. They form an essential basis for prog-
ress toward the community of free nations.

It is also plain that there are differences of view
between developed and less developed countries
within the free world, notably those arising fi'om
old colonial experience. These differences have
been disruptive at times, but they should not be
exaggerated. We shall find, as time goes on, a
widened area of community between the more
industrialized and the less industrialized peo-
ples — a community based on a common desire for
peace, a common dedication to the principles of
independence and free choice, a common commit-
ment to the United Nations Charter.

Demonstrating the Values of Free Choice

A fourth element in our policy is gradually to
draw all men into the community of independent
nations.

Communism as a creed and a system of interna-
tional power is dedicated in deadly earnest to the
destruction of national independence and human
freedom as we understand it. This is a hard fact,
and we must face this fact by mounting and main-
taining forces that frustrate the Communist im-
pulse to expand, over the whole spectrum of ag-
gression — from guerrilla infiltration to nuclear
war.

Equally we must meet the challenge of commu-
nism as a competing method for organizing soci-
eties by demonstrating, and helping others to
demonstrate, that human and national aspirations
can better be met under the banners of free choice
and interdependence.

But we have a task which goes beyond the mili-
tary and ideological defense of the free world.
The peoples who live within the Communist bloc
live in nations as well as within the international
Communist system. Their historic interests and
cultures are still there, beneath the surface of the



Morch 19, 1962



453



conformity imposed upon them. The idea of na-
tional independence is alive within the Communist
bloc, as it is elsewhere in the world; and it is
growing. We have witnessed in the past year new
assertions of this historic force, no respecter of
ideological boundaries.

In East Germany, a politically and morally
bankrupt regime, with the popularity and men-
tality of an occupation force, had to build a wall
across a world-famous city to complete the prison
whose boundaries of barbed wire run through
Central Europe. But more lasting than any wall
is the loyalty of Germans and East Europeans to
their nationhood, their culture, and their liopes for
independence.

On the mainland of China dramatic failure has
occurred in the past 3 years. It is rooted in the
persistent inability of Communists to organize the
capacity and incentive of men to grow food effi-
ciently — but it is a failure that reaches far beyond
agriculture itself. Behind this failure lies not only
the peculiarly close relationship required between
man and the soil he tills, but his relationship to
his own family and to the other human values
which make his life worth living. The cultural
heritage of the Chinese people will survive these
assaults on some of its more fundamental values.

In this setting of dual crisis within the Com-
munist bloc, the Communist parties of the world
have quarreled on issues of ideology, power, and
personality on a scale new to Communist history.

However difficult and slow-yielding may be the
problems of the free world — the problems of alli-
ances and the divergent interests of strongminded
men and independent groups — we should be grate-
ful that our difficulties and quarrels are those
appropriate to a commonwealth of free men, not
to a convention of prison wardens.

What is our policy toward the Communist coun-
tries ? What view should we take of the possibility
of businesslike dealings on matters of mutual
advantage ?

Where we find that the interests of the free
world and the interests of a Communist state au-
thentically overlap — even where the overlap is
very narrow — we are prepared to talk and to ne-
gotiate, to find areas of agreement and even areas
of common action.

The greatest interest shared by peoples on botli
sides of the Iron Curtain is, of course, the preserva-



tion of peace. We think that the Soviet leadei-s
understand what a war fought with modern weap-
ons would cost them as well as others. But until
these and other arms are brought under control
and all nations refrain from aggression, there will
remain the danger of a great war.

In this past year we have created, within the
Government, the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. We have developed and will develop
practical, technically effective plans designed to
bring weapons under control and to lift from
mankind the threat under which we all live.

At the disarmament conference scheduled to
convene next month we shall be prepared to talk
seriously and precisely about the problems of dis-
armament. But we shall not mistake talk for
progress, slogans for workable arrangements. If
the Soviets are prepared for disarmament, with
effective verification, they will find us responsive.

We hope also that the Soviets will join us in
measures to prevent the extension of the arms race
into space,^ in developing the peaceful iises of
atomic energy, and in other constructive enter-
prises for the benefit of mankind.

I do not expect a sure peace to dawn tomorrow.
But I am not pessimistic about finding a safer and
more rational way for us all to live on this small
planet. And I believe that we can, by our national
conduct, bring influences to bear upon the Com-
munist states that may, in time, modify their re-
lentless hostility to the West and contribute to
practical arrangements based upon a mutual in-
terest in survival. '

The community of independent nations is an
open concept, rooted in the principles of the
United Nations Charter. For a long time to come
I believe there will be a fairly clear line between
the world of commimism and the world of free
choice; but we should be prepared to work pa-
tiently — beginning now — toward the day when the
community of independent nations and the United
Nations itself become identical.

Our main lines of policy are open for all to
judge and to debate. It looks to the spread
throughout the world of the principles of inde-
pendence and liberty on which this nation and this
society have been erected.



' For uu exchange of ui»>ssaKes between President Ken-
nedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev, see ibid.. Mar. 12,
1962, p. 411.



454



Department of Slate Bulletin



Secretary Rusk's News Conference off March 1



Press release 138 dated March 2

Secretary Ru^k: I would like to open today
with a statement on Viet-Nam. We have noted
recent comments from Peiping, Moscow, and
Hanoi about the nature and purposes of Anaerican
aid to Viet-Nam. I should like, therefore, to make
a brief comment on that situation.

Communist Aggression Against Viet-Nam

These comments from Communist capitals
wholly neglect tlie fact that the Republic of Viet-
Nam is under attack of Communist guerrillas
who are directed, trained, supplied, and reinforced
by North Viet-Nam — all in gross violation of the
1954 Geneva Accords.^ Irrefutable evidence of
this illegal and aggressive activity has been made
public; I can add that what is known publicly
is strongly and conclusively reinforced by intelli-
gence information.

United States military and economic assistance
and technical advice are being extended to the
Republic of Viet-Nam at its request to assist the
Vietnamese people to maintain their independ-
ence against this aggression.^ There have been
other examples, in almost every continent, of this
type of aggression.

The United States is assisting with training,
logistics, transportation, and advisory personnel
to enable the Government of Viet-Nam to deal
with this conspiratorial effort to take over that
counti-y by violent means. We have no combat
units in that country, and we have no desire for
bases or other United States military advantages.
All we want is that the Vietnamese be free to
determine their own future.

In reference to the demand by the Communists



'For text, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955:
Basils Documents, vol. I, Department of State publication
644(5. p. 7.50.

■ For an exchange of messages between President Ken-
nedy and President Ngo Dinh Diem, see Bulletin of
Jan. 1, 1962, p. 13.



that the cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva confer-
ence and other countries concerned consult re-
garding Viet-Nam, the United States is always
prepared to talk about situations which represent
a threat to the peace, but what must be talked
about is the root of the trouble; in this case it is
the Communist aggression against Viet-Nam in
disregard of the Geneva Accords.

The President made it clear last Decemljer in
responding to the Vietnamese request for assist-
ance that

. . . our primary purpose is to help your people main-
tain their independence. If the Communist authorities
in North Viet-Nam will stop their campaign to destroy
the Republic of Viet-Nam, the measures we are taking
to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary.

There is no threat to the peace of Southeast
Asia from the south or from across the Pacific
Ocean; the threat comes only from the north,
from those who have declared their intention to
force the rest of the world into their pattern —
despite the fact that no people has yet cliosen
that pattern in a genuinely free election. Tliere
can be peace overnight in Viet-Nam if those re-
sponsible for the aggression wish peace. The sit-
uation is just as simple as that.

Foreign Service Retirement Benefits

I might comment quite informally on some dis-
cussions which have occurred with respect to the
Foreign Service and the effect of a law which
makes certain additional retirement benefits avail-
able up to May 31st of this year, a law which was
passed, I think, in 1960. We have not had a rush
of applications for retirement to take advantage
of this law from among our senior and competent
Foreign Service officers, although there will be
some who will undoubtedly take this particular
provision of law into account when they consider
their own personal situation. For example, in the
case of some individuals who are considering tills
problem, if you wish to consider it in terms of



March 19, 7962



455



what it would cost to buy an annuity from insur-
ance companies to provide the equivalent retire-
ment of the special increment which is available
up to May 31st, in many cases the capital value
of this particular feature is in the order of $40,000
or $50,000. In a profession where men are not
able to save substantially and provide estates for
their family, and so forth, this is an important
factor to be taken into account.

But on the other hand we do not have the im-
pression that this is impelling Foreign Service
officers to change drastically their own personal
approach to this problem. Indeed we have a num-
ber of Foreign Service officers who are working
free, in the sense that, if they were to retire today,
their retirement would be somewhat larger than
the present salary of their present posts. We
have a great sense of dedication in the Foreign
Service, and I do not believe that this is going
to be a major element in that situation.

Also I think it is fair to point out that we have
in this administration made great use of our pro-
fessional service. I think the percentage of our
posts abroad held by career officers is something
over 70 percent. It is true that we have sent a
niunber of younger men to new posts. I think
that I have had the privilege of bidding Godspeed
to almost 25 Foreign Service officers who have
gone out to their first chief-of -mission post. But
let me add that some of the posts to which they
are going require young men under the circum-
stances of the situation.

Finally I should like to say that I do not have
the impression, sitting where I sit, that members
of the Foreign Service are acting like scared
rabbits with respect to policy matters. It is the
duty of a professional service to support the ad-
ministration which is in power at the time and to
give it its best judgment and advice. We are very
pleased to see the vigor, the intelligence, and the
capacity which is brought to bear by our pro-
fessional service, including sticking their necks
out on proposing policy, analyzing situations,
estimating, and predicting. We have, I am glad
to say, a vigorous Foreign Service, to which I am
extremely grateful.

Perhaps we could take questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a story this morning
in the Herald Tribune about a possible nuclear
partnership hetioeen NATO and the United
States. Could you comment on that?



A. Well, you will recall that in Ottawa the
President indicated we would be prepared to dis-
cuss that question with our NATO allies.' Those
discussions are now going on. It is to consider
in what way a NATO nuclear deterrent might be
formed which in any way varies from the present
arrangements. The NATO alliance now has the
powerful support of vei"y great nuclear power,
and those arrangements are well understood within
the alliance. But we are at the present time talk-
ing within NATO, at the North Atlantic Council
and between governments, about the possibilities
of what is generally called a NATO nuclear deter-
rent. I cannot be specific about details, because
those discussions are going on and will presum-
ably go on for some time, but this is one of the
matters that will come up as a very specific and
important matter at the May meeting of NATO
in Athens.

Geneva Disarmament Conference

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Geneva Disarmament
Conference is only 2 weeks off now. Mr. Khru-
shchev has sent a new message to General de
Gaulle saying he still wants a meeting at tJie
summit. Do you know whether there is going to
be a Geneva Disarmament Conference or not?

A. Yes, there will be a Geneva Disarmament
Conference. It has been agreed to. There will
midoubtedly be representatives of the 18 nations
there. I suppose that what is in your mind is who
will be there. We have invited me to be there
among others. Our proposal has been that we
start that conference with foreign ministers,* and
I hope very much that that proposal will turn
out to be acceptable. At the present time there is
no specific agreement among all those involved as
to just who will be there, but there will be a con-
ference, there will be negotiations, and we hope
that that conference can get down to serious
business.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a report in that con-
nection in the paper this morning tlmt you plan
to go whether Mr. Gromyko shoivs up or not. Is
that correct?

A. No, I think it would be fair to say that I
hope to go. I hope that the conference will open



* lUiL, June 5, 1961, p. 83.0.

* See p. 465.



456



Department of State Bulletin



at the foreign ministers level, but in the various
contingencies that are not yet sorted out and may
not be sorted out for a few days I don't know just
exactly who will be there, but I would hope to be
there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in relation to your statement
on Viet-Nam, do you consider that the Chinese,
North Vietnamese, and R\i,ssian statements repre-
sent a rather concerted action, or do you see a
special degree of belligerence from the Chinese in
this situation?

A. I would not wish to speculate about that this
morning. "We know of discussions, differences,
and problems that have occurred within the Com-
munist bloc; whether these statements that have
Ijeen made in different ways by the three capitals
represent a concerted action is something for us
to think about rather than to talk about at this
particular point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday in an interview °
you indicated that you would he prepared to dis-
cuss Berlin and Southeast Asia at Geneva if Mr.
Gvomyho hrings it up. Would you be prepared
to discuss this in a detailed xoay to assist or to take
the plaice of the Moscow talks?

A. In that interview, my first appearance on
German television, I simply pointed out that if
the foreign ministers get together they are likely,
in their garrulous way, to talk about a good many
things. The agenda would be disamiament, and
we would hope that we could get disarmament off'
to a good start. But when such people are to-
gether, other questions almost certainly would
come up. I would not at this point want to say
whether that would involve any systematic dis-
cussion of the sort that would in any sense be a
substitute for, or a new chapter in, the talks which
Mi-. Thompson [Llewellyn E. Thompson, U.S.
Ambassador to the U.S.S.E.] has been having.

Q. Could you comment, Mr. Secretary, on Lord
Home's apparent suggestion that there may be an
exchange guarantee on access to Berlin for recog-
nition of East Germany?

A. "We believe, on the question of access, that
tlie first essential is for the other side to recognize



° For transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk on
a German television program produced by Radio Free
Berlin and North German Radio on Feb. 28, see Depart-
ment of State press release 131 dated Feb. 28.

March J 9, 1962

631146—62 3



tJio basic rights of the AYest. "We have suggested
that tliere be some sort of international machinery
for insuring access.^ If this is to be a matter of
sensitivity and irritation and possible danger, one
of the best ways is to get these basic rigiits, which
the other side cannot change, in the hands of an
international authority which can manage them
without the irrelevancies or ii-ritations wliich
might otherwise develop. I have not seen the par-
ticular statement you referred to, but our position
is that we do not expect to recognize East
Germany.

Q. Mr. Seci^etary, there have been reports in



Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 87 of 101)