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tlie papers today tliat the President will shortly
announce a resumption of nuclear tests.'' Could
you tell us, if this is true, what impact this would
Juive on the disarmament negotiations?

A. This is a matter wliich is being handled by
the President, and I would prefer not to make any
comments on that subject this morning.

Availability of Nuclear Weapons for Canada

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Canadian Prime Min-
ister [John Dlefenbaker'] said tlmt his Govern-
ment will not seek nuclear warheads so long as
tlie United States law does not permit of its having
joint control. But he has also said that in the
event of war, nuclear warheads would be instantly
available to Canada. Is there any such agreement
in effect, or do physical arrangements exist for
such a quick transfer?

A. My attention has been drawn to tliese recent
exchanges in the House of Commons in Canada
concerning the availability of nuclear weapons
for Canadian forces in Canada and Europe. Now,
of course, whether Canada wishes to arrange with
the United States to have nuclear weapons avail-
able for Canadian forces is a matter for Canada
to decide. The custody of United States nuclear
weapons made available for the forces of our
allies must remain with the United States. In
addition to assuring the safety and security of
nuclear weapons, this is one of the ways in which
the United States seeks to prevent the prolifera-
tion of independent national nuclear capabilities.

However, insofar as control over the use of such
weapons by Canadian forces is concerned, the
United States is willing to work out arrangements

" For a Department statement of Mar. 3, see p. 463.
' See p. 443.


for joint control fully consistent with national
sovereignty. The United States remams prepared
at any time to discuss such arrangements with the
Government of Canada, and we have of course dis-
cussed such arrangements with other governments.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in reference to your opening
statement on Viet-Nam, were you anticipating that
there might at some stage he major-power talks
on the situation in Viet-Nam?

A. I don't know today what might be in the
future on the matter of talks. "Wliat I wanted to
point out was that the issue there is extremely
simple. There is no problem in South Viet-Nam
if the other side would stay its hand, would leave
Viet-Nam alone, would stop this infiltration of
cadres and supplies and direction and control from
the north. Then the problem of peace in Viet-
Nam could be settled very quickly indeed. I don't
at the moment envisage any particular form of
discussion on that matter, but that is the issue and
it could be settled very simply.

NATO Nuclear Deterrent

Q. Mr. Secretary, would it he correct to infer
from your earlier ansiaer ahout a NATO nuclear
deterrent that %oe are noiv taking the initiative to
try to work out some sort of a plan rather than
letting someone else take the lead, as we had

A. We are in a rather special situation in that
field, because in the course of development of the
nuclear problem, a very heavy responsibility rests
upon the United States.

At the present time the nuclear deterrent is very
largely with the United States and with the
United Kingdom. We would be glad to know
what the other governments of NATO feel about
any alternative arrangements that they might
prefer, but we also know that these discussions
are not likely to move forward without our direct,
interested, and lively participation. So, rather
than saying we are taking the initiative, let me
say that we are a part of these discussions which
are going on.

I discussed these questions with NATO at the
meeting in December,' and the North Atlantic
Council is talking about them at the present time.
We are active participants on this matter from

'For text of a coniininiiquc issued at the close of the
meeting, see Bulletin of Jan. 8, 19C2, j). 51.


here on out, and we will be consulting with the
other goverimients of NATO on tliis point.

Q. Would you he in favor of a meeting hetxoeen
the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Brit-
ain, and Russia in advance of the Disarma7nent
Conference to take up specifically the question of
nuclear disarmament and a test han?

A. That was in our mind when we made the
proposal that the Foreign Ministers of the
U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the U.S.
should meet ahead of the Disarmament Confer-
ence. It was thought that we who had been talk-
ing about nuclear test ban treaties might profitably
have some preliminary talk before the conference
opened. It was our proposal, as j^ou will recall.
that we meet a few days ahead of the opening of
the conference. This is our invitation, and we
hope it can be brought about, because I think there
could be some useful talk in such a meeting.

Q. Is it a correct interpretation of the statement
that you made ahout Canada that there has heen
no request from Canada for an arrangement for
joint control of nuclear weapons in Canada, and
secondly, if so, is the United States satisfied with
that situation in view of the fact that the U.S.
is stipplying $91 million worth of missiles to

A. My statement was intended to clarify the
situation with respect to our own law and our own
arrangements and our own ability to talk about
these matters with other governments. I did not
intend, nor do I now intend, to get into the diplo-
matic questions which are being or may be dis-
cussed between the two Governments on this

Q. Mr. Secretary, time is getting short before
March H. How many days do you need to get
ready to get there in time for a preconference Big
Three foreign ministers meeting?

A. We have been working intensively on the
issues which we expect to come up there for the
h'.st several months. We have the disarmament ad-
ministration in our State Department. We had
tlie statement of agreed principles last fall in the
United Nations, as well as the exchange of letters
on one point of substantial disagreement," and of
course a great deal of detailed and preparatory

• For texts, see tBirf., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 5S9.

Deparfment of State Bulletin

work has been going on. I don't tliink that we
will go to Geneva unprepared. Of course, as you
move to an actual meeting the pace of preparation
steps up, and I will be working on it very hai'd
and in the hope and expectation that I will be

Talks With NATO Allies Concerning Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary., couhl you say, sir, something
about the success xohich the administration has had
in its talks xoith the NATO allies ahout alining
their policy on Cuba loith that of the United

A. I think that particular point has been ele-
vated in importance perhaps beyond the world
situation. It has been for many months the prac-
tice in NATO to get a full report on important
matters that go on in other parts of the world
which are not the specific and immediate business
of NATO. In this instance we had an important
conference at Punta del Este,'° and our colleagues
in NATO had expressed the hope that we could
have someone who was present at Punta del Este
come over and give them a full report on the dis-
cussions and the situation. We sent Walt Rostow,
a senior and competent officer of assistant secre-
tary rank, who was at Punta del Este, for that
purpose. We did tell NATO members what the
Organization of American States had done, and
we expressed the hope that NATO members would
take into account the attitudes of the OAS, as ex-
pressed at Punta del Este, in the formulation of
their own policies toward Cuba.

For example there was a unanimous declaration
by the inter-American countries that steps ought
to be taken to interfere with the trade and traffic
in arms to Cuba or from Cuba. We would hope
that our friends in NATO would aline their
policies with that sort of provision. This was a
part of what has come to be a fairly normal pro-
cedure in making a full explanation to NATO
about what is going on in other parts of the world.
We have done that with respect to Southeast Asia
and other matters.

Q. Mr. Secretary, this is a question on tactical
nuclear iveapons, and I understand from Army
sources that one of the best capsule loeapons is the
demolition explosion of the nuclear type, and I
knoxo it is in use in exercises in NATO. I am

wondering if we have any inhibitions about using
tactical nuclear weapons in guerrilla tear fare in

A. Well, I would not suppose that nuclear
weapons are a counterguerrilla weapon of high
priority or that they are likely to be used in this
situation. I don't fit nuclear weajDons into the
problem of Viet-Nam in this situation.

Q. These are just landmines. They are not any
bigger than that.

A. Just low nuclear landmines? (Laughter.)
No, those are not contemplated. I would make
that very clear.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what pleased
you and what gave you some concern in the re-
port of the Attorney General [Robert F. Ken-
nedyl ?

A. Concern? Or are you simply speculating?

The Attorney General's trip " was most worth-
while. I will be having lunch with him today,
and we will be going over it in detail. I did talk
with him a little while immediately upon his re-
turn late yesterday. Our reports from all of the
counti'ies and the cai^itals that he visited were most
positive. There is no doubt whatever that his
visit was of very great help to all of us in our
foreign policy and in our relations with the coun-
tries he had a chance to see.

No Specific Form for Talks on Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement you
said the United States was always toilling to talk
about the Vietnamese situation. What sort of
talks do you think would be most fruiffxil? For
example, would a second round of the 195^ Geneva
talks do any good with the United States?

A. I do not have in mind any specific form of
talk. The message that we want to get across to
the other side in the face of these comments and
declarations that they have made through various
channels is that there is no problem about peace in
Viet-Nam if they will simply decide to leave it
alone. It is just as simple as that. We have no
ambitions of a national sort ourselves. We can
think of a great many other things to do with our
resources or our manpower than the task we have
undertaken to assist the Government of South

' For background, see ibid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

" For announcements concerning Mr. Kennedy's trip,
see iUd., Jan. 8, 1962, p. 50, and Jan. 15, 1962, p. 99.

Morch 19, J 962


Viet-Nam in that situation. We have seen this
story before in other parts of the world since
1945. Peace could be immediate if this aggressive
effort would be suspended, if it were called off, if
it were canceled, and it is just as simple as that.
There are various ways, including this press con-
ference today, in which we hope to make that clear
to the other side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the talks he-
tioeen Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Ulbricht [Walter
Ulbricht of East Germany] have changed the
Berlin situation in any way?

A. We do not, of course, have detailed infor-
mation on those talks, but I would suppose that
they do not change the basic situation because we
have basic rights there, basic interests there, and
we hold the Soviet Union responsible for them
insofar as any action or conduct of theirs is con-
cerned. So I don't see how talks between Mr.
Khrushchev and Mr. Ulbricht could change the
situation as far as the West is concerned.

Q. Do you see any more pressures forthconning
in the near future?

A. I would not want to speculate on the future
on that. We have made it very clear what oiu'
vital interests are and that we will intend to insist
by whatever action is necessary that those vital
interests be respected.

Expropriation Case in Brazil

Q. What are the prospects for an early settle-
ment of the IT&T expropriation case in Brazil,
and what, if anything, can he done to safeguard
similar American industries in the future?

A. We are discussing that matter with the Gov-
ernment of Brazil. The company and state au-
thorities are also in touch with each other. I think
there are two rather separate points here. One is
the constitutional right of a government to deal
with persons and property within its own sovereign
jurisdiction. The other is the policy question as
to whether under a particular circumstance it is
wise to invoke that right.

There are some special problems, as we know,
in this country about the relationships between
public utilities and governmental authority.
Broadly speaking, wo feel very strongly that pri-
vate investment is an important part of the eco-
nomic and social development effort in any of

these countries with which we are closely asso-
ciated, which we are trymg to help get on with
that job.

We would hope very much that the large private
investment increment or component of the Alli-
ance for Progress will not be discouraged by atti-
tudes toward foreign private investment in this
hemisphere, or indeed in countries in other parts of
the world where economic and social development
is a major issue. In the indications that we made
at the first Punta del Este conference '- on the Al-
liance for Progress as to the kind of assistance that
might be expected, private investment was an im-
portant component. We believe that e\-eryone
should keep in mind the importance of creating a
climate in which this great energizing effort from
the private field can be linked to efforts made in
the public sector to get on with this job. Other-
wise I think that our contribution will be neces-
sarily limited in terms of what can be done in
particular situations.

There are some special difficulties in this par-
ticular case: we are talking about those with the
Brazilian Government.

Contacts Witii Foreign Educators and Students

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Attorney General on his
return yesterday made the point that we dorCt
seem to he getting through to the students and the
intellectuals in some of these countries. I know
you didnH mean to suggest hy your earlier answer
that you were not concerned about this, but I
wondered what thoughts you might have about
how ice could equip ourselves to meet these people
more directly.

A. That is a matter of very considerable im-
portance, one that I have had some personal as-
sociation with in private life for the last 10 years
in fellowships and scholarships to foreign students
and assistance to foreign univei-sities. I laiow that
we need to do more through our cultural exchange
programs and, indeed, in our aid programs to
strengthen the educational and intellectual life of
countries which are now moving into a new
chapter in their modernization.

In many situations the bottleneck is not money
but people. We have a considerable contribution
to make in this field. Indeed, in the development
field wo have a unique contribution, and that is in

" For background, see iftii?., Aug. 28, 1961, p. 355, and
Sept. 11, 19U1, p. 459.


Deparlment of Slate Bullefin

what might be called ihc land-grant -college type
of higher education. We are now celebratmg our
hundredth anniversary of that system. This is a
system of education that was devised to assist with
development, and it is something in which we have
had a lot of experience.

If we can expand our contact with these educa-
tional institutions abroad, with the students and
professors, this Avill give them not only a better
understanding of the United States, which is im-
portant, but it will help put them in a better posi-
tion to make a direct and immediate contribution
to their own countries. So this is something that
we must develop and move on with and put more
funds and more effort into.

West New Guinea Dispute

Q. Mr. Secretary, in vieio of the Attorney Gen-
eroTs talks in both Djakarta and The Hague on the
West Neio Guinea prohlem, do you see a possi-
bility now for further progress toward a peaceful
settlement of that dispute?

A. I think there is a real possibility for a peace-
ful settlement of that matter, and I think both
sides want a peaceful settlement. Naturally they
have somewhat different views about what a peace-
ful settlement should be, but we do believe that
there is a basis for a peaceful settlement between
tlie two Governments, and we also know that the
general community, the international community,
would hope very much tliat a peaceful settlement
could be achieved.

I'll be talking about that in more detail today
at lunch with the Attorney General, and among
other steps I will be seeing Foreign Minister
[J.M.A.H.] Luns, who will be coming through
here tomorrow on the way to Tokj'o, and I will
have a chance to talk with him about it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we could clanfy
your statement on Viet-Nam. You said in your
initial statement that the U.S. is always prepared
to talk about situations that are a threat to peace.
That seemed to leave the impression that the
United States is indeed willing to have a major-
power conference. Later you said that if the Com-
munists were to cease and desist, there would be no
problem. Are you saying that it is a condition or
v^ould be a condition for any talks on Viet-Nam
that the Communists take the action of ceasing
and desisting?

March 79, 7962

631146—62 4

A. Xo, I was not talking at all about any par-
ticular fomi of discussion. I was simply saying
that in any contacts on the subject the primary
subject must be this matter of assistance from the
north to dissident elements in South Viet-Nam.
Achieving peace in South Viet-Nam is a very
simple thing, and complicated and prolonged talks
are not required if there is a desire for i)eace on
both sides.

Approach to Disarmament Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the past history of
disagreement and deadlock in dimrmament, are
you any more hopeful that this current Geneva
meeting will ease this problem or come up loith
specific agreements?

A. Well, I think we have to approach such a
critically important question as disarmament
with a measure of hope. We also must approach it
on a basis of realistic proposals. One of the rea-
sons why we suggested that the conference open
with foreign ministers and that there be some con-
sultation before the meeting actually convened was
that we want to make a real effort to get this dis-
armament question, if we can, out of the general
field of simply exchanging propaganda. It must
be evident to people on both sides of the Iron
Curtain that the trail ahead of us in this arms race
is a murky and dangerous trail. The arms race is
pressing onto the competence of the mind of man
in some of its technical aspects. Both sides of the
Iron Curtain have a fundamental interest in main-
taining the general peace. We would hope that
we would not go there and exchange propaganda
statements and freeze ourselves in position on all
sides and leave it at that. We have had enough of
that since 1945. We should sit down and talk
systematically and in detail and specifically about
steps which can be taken to begin to turn this race
downward instead of letting it continue in-
definitely upward.

No, we have to hope. We have to try on the
basis of hope. We approach it on that basis and
hope that all those who are present will do so.
Perhaps we can take some steps that will make a
big difference to the future of the human race, if
one can put it in such broad terms.

Q. In rejecting last xoeek the Khrushchev pro-
posal that the disarmament conference be opened
icith a summit level. President de Gatille held that


tlie key to disarmament was nuclear disarmament
and proposed a Four Power meetimj on that. If
there is a meeting of the United States, Britain,
and Russia to open the Disarmament Conference
with discussion of nuclear disarmament, do you
see the possibility of France joining that dis-

A. We are in touch with all of the "Western
Five, who were members of the original Commit-
tee of 10. That is the United Kingdom, France,
Italy, Canada, and the United States. As a mat-
ter of fact, we are consulting as a group here in
Washington at the present time. We shall be in
close touch with them on it. The whole field of
nuclear weapons is a very important part of the
total disarmament problem, but I cannot go into
further detail at this time.

Alliance for Progress

Q. A year ago this month, the Alliance for
Progress got under way." Are we completely
satisfied at the pace with which most of the Latin
American nations are engaging in self-help

A. On the Alliance for Progress we and the
Latin American governments ought never be satis-
fied. Here is something that requires what a
former colleague of mine once called "divine dis-
content." We will have no problem in committing
the fmids that we told our Latin American friends
we would commit in this fiscal year. We are going
ahead, and there is no difficulty in meeting those
targets. But for years to come this will be un-
finished business. There will always be something
more to be done. It is an urgent problem, and
there will be many things done that ought to have
been done sooner. I would not suppose that we
are ever really going to be satisfied or contented,
because this great problem of growth and develop-
ment is insatiable, at least as far into the future
as we can see.

We are trying to move ahead in our own pro-
cedures in order to come to our conclusions with
dispatch, with a minimum of redtape and com-
plexity, and at the same time to press our friends
in Latin America to get on with their plans and
their steps with more speed and clarity. They
have some problems because the Alliance for
Progress is based on the notion that rapid eco-

nomic and social development can occur within
free institutions. That means that many of them
have their own legislatures, their own procedures,
their own laws to pass, their own administrative
arrangements to devise, their own steps to take,
and some of these are controversial in their coim-
tries. Similar steps were taken in our country
as we moved on in our own development. So are
we satisfied? No. Do we expect to be satisfied?
No. Are we working at it ? Yes I

Framework of Disarmament Talks

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection icith the Dis-
armament Conference and initial measures in ad-
vance of disarma7nent, there has been some hope
expressed that you may make progress on the Irish
resolution, or point three of the Presidenfs state-
ment at the U.N. on disarmament.'^* In the event
you did make this progress and agreement seemed
likely, tootdd the United States go along with if
without the participation of Communist China?

A. Well, the whole issue is one which would
come up within the framework of the disarma-
ment talks. Of course, as the President said,
there are some important steps in disarmament
which could not be taken unless the authorities in
Peiping joined the party.

Q. Joined the conference?

A. I said joined the arrangements that were
made, but this is a matter for the future.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the United States agree
with Prime Minister Macmilla7is view in his let-
ter to Mr. Khnishchev that there should be a sum-
mit gathering out of the Geneva meeting in case
there is either progress or a deadlock, ichich
would seem to guarantee a summit meeting of
what happens?

iV. The Presidenfs reply and the Prime Min-
ister's reply were based on a conunon undei-stand-
ing between them as to our attitude on these and
other points.

The President, in his reply, indicated that there
might be certain i>oints of difficulty which might
be resolved only at the heads-of-government level.
This would be in relation to the presence of, and
prospects for, general progress. The President's
attitude — and as I read the Prime Minister's re-

' For background, see ibid., Apr. 3, 19C1, p. 471.


" For text, see ihid., Oct. IG. 1961. p. 622.

Department of Slate Bulletin

ply, the Prime Minister's attitude — is that we
should start these negotiations at the foreign-min-
isters level, that if there came a point where the
heads of government could fruitfully, profitably,
and usefully meet to get on with this job, then they
would be prepared to consider the possibility of
doing so. But I think the basic approach of the
two is the same.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have had now a number
of exchanges toith the Soviets on the question of
Geneva arrangements. Do you see any evidence
in these exchanges that the Soviet Government

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 88 of 101)