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Department of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) online

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shares the view you expressed of a hopeful ap-
proach to Geneva and of a determination to lift
disarmament 7}egotiations mit of the field of
propaganda?

A. I wouldn't want to certify to an answer on
that ix)int today. Certainly I would hope that
they would come there M-ith some hope and deter-
mination to move this problem along. But I am
not going to guarantee what their attitude will
be, certainly at this point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, back on the subject of Viet-
Nam. You have said that the United States is
xoilling to talk, but you say you think that talks
are not required in 07'der to bring peace to the
area. As a practical matter, do you think it would
be possible to get the Cormnunisfs to cease and
desist aiding the North Vietnamese icithout hav-
ing some sort of negotiations?

A. This is not something on which the other
side is unaware of our view. No, I would think
that the subject of discussion would be relatively
simple, and I wouldn't now want to predict exactly
how discussions, if any occur, might go on. This
matter did come up in the Geneva conference on
Laos, where references were made to Viet-Nam
and to the Geneva Accords.

I don't want to pursue this question of exactly
how any talks might occur among governments.
Obviously there are talks, because the authorities
in Peiping and other capitals have addressed com-
munications, for example, to the cochairmen
through public channels, and there are the ICC
[International Control Commission] activities,
which are intergovernmental discussions. But I
don't at the moment foresee anj' specific form or
method of discussion.

Q. Thank you. sir.



U.S. Suggests International Authority
To Control Berlin Access Routes

Department Statement '

As the President suggested in his interview
with Mr. Adzhubei [Aleksei Adzhubei, editor of
1 2 vest ia] on November 25, 1961, the idea of an
International Access Authority would provide a
reasonable solution to the problem of access to
Berlin. We believe that this could eliminate the
dangers in the present situation while taking ac-
count of interests of both sides.

The one area in the world where extremely
grave danger exists of a collision between Soviet
and Western armed forces is in the Berlin access
routes, should any attempt be made to block access
to the city. The suggestion for the Access Au-
thority is intended to eliminate this danger by
placing an international authority in control of
the routes so that Berlin traffic will be able to
move freely without being subject to disruption
and harassment for political purposes.

What we have in mind would be the establish-
ment by agreement between the United States,
Britain, France, and the Soviet Union of an In-
ternational Access Authority to govern access
between West Germany and West Berlin on the
Autobahn and through the three existing air
corridors.

The Authority would be given control over the
Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn, the Berlin Air
Safety Center, airport facilities in West Berlin,
and other facilities in West Berlin necessary for
free air traffic in the air corridors. It would also
govern air traffic in the corridors and in the Berlin
air control zone.

Such an Authority would also be empowered to
appoint officials to carry out its functions, to fix
rules governing the use of the transportation and
commimications facilities under its control, to
charge fees to cover the costs of its operations, to
construct facilities along the highway, to operate
the Berlin Air Safety Center, and to engage in
other activities necessary to the carrying out of
its functions.

Such an arrangement would supplement exist-
ing access arrangements. Prior to its coming into



'Made by a Department press oflBcer on Mar. 3; for a
reply by Secretary Rusk to a question on this subject at
his news conference on Mar. 1, see p. 457.



Alorch 19, J 962



463



effect the Western allies on the one hand and the
U.S.S.R. on the other would, of course, have to
make arrangements to insure that the agreement
would be legally effective and binding respective-
ly in West Germany and West Berlin and in East
Germany and East Berlin.



Secretary Rusk Interviewed
on ''Eyewitness to History"

Following is the transcript of an interview of
Secretary Rusk hy George Herman on the Colum-
hia Broadcasting System's television program,
'■'■Eyewitness to History'''' on March 2.

Press release 140 dated March 2

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, do you see any-
thing about President Kennedy's speech tonight ^
which will have any impact on the forthcoming
disarmament conference in Geneva ?

Secretary Rnsk: The decision which the Presi-
dent discussed with the Nation earlier this eve-
ning adds great impetus to the importance of the
disarmament discussions in Geneva. There are
two aspects of the President's decision which af
feet the security of the United States.

The first is in the military side. And in the
absence of effective controls and disarmament, it's
important for us to maintain the validity of our
nuclear weapons. But the other, the disarma-
ment side, is just as important to our security, Ije-
cause when we look down the road ahead and we
see an arms race that threatens to spiral beyond
the competence of the mind of man, surely it is in
the interest of the security of the human race tliat
every feasible effort be made to bring this race to
a halt, to turn it downward, to try to bring these
weapons under control.

Some weeks ago the President was asked what
the principal disappointment was in his first year
of office. His reply was the failure to obtain a
nuclear test ban treaty in the negotiations in
Geneva in the spring of last year. It would be of
great importance that we make real gains, real
headwav in tliis field of disarmament. And I



can't but believe that the President's decision, fol-
lowing on the resumption of nuclear tests by the
Soviet Union, will add urgency and an underlying
sense of realism to the discussions in Geneva in
mid-March.

Mr. Herman; You do not feel then that a re-
sumption of American open-air nuclear testing
will detract from the possibilities of achieving a
realistic disarmament agreement?

Secretary Rusk ; No. I think that it adds to the
importance of realistic and careful and systematic
negotiations to see what can be done in this very
important field.

Mr. Herman: Does it add, do you think, any
kind of pressure or increased need on the other
side to resume realistic disarmament talks?

Secretary Rusk: Well that would be for them
to decide. As the President pointed out, Mr.
Khrushchev had indicated earlier that he assumed
that his resumption of tests would lead othei-s to
resume testing. I would think that they would
have to consider the same factors that all of us
are considering, what's best for their own security
and, indeed, the security of the entire Imman race.
But we do believe that testing itself, and talking,
can go forward. The President pointed out that
during the Soviet tests we did reach agreement
last fall at the United Nations in a statement of
agreed principles on disarmament. These are not
necessarilj^ contradictory. And indeed the dem-
onstration of the importance of disarmament, I
think, will make a contribution to the conference.

Mr. Herman: Are you personally as confident
as you were yesterday - that there will ho a con-
ference in Geneva ?

Secretary Ru^k: Oh, I'm sure there will be a
conference.

Mr. Herman: You believe you will be there?

Secretary Rusk: We have invited the foreign
ministers to come, and that means that we have
invited me to come; so I'm hoping tliat the situa-
tion will l)e such that I go.



' See p. 443.



' For the tran.script of Srcrctar.v Rusk's news confer-
ence of Mar. 1, see p. 455.



464



Departmcn/ of Sta/e Bulletin



President Kennedy Reaffirms Views on Frameworit
for Conduct of Disarmament Negotiations



Following is an exchange of messages between
President Kennedy and Nikita KhrusJichev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R.



PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE OF FEB-
RUARY 24 >

White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.) dated February 25

February 25, 1962
Dear Mr. Chairman: I regret that in your
message of February 21 you seem to challenge the
motivations of Prime Minister Macmillan and
myself in making our proposal of February 7 -
that the forthcoming Disarmament Conference
open at the Foreign Minister level. I believe that
there can be a legitimate difference of opinion
on the most effective and orderly way to make
progress in the \'itally important field of disarma-
ment. You have presented your own views and
I do not wish to imply that they are motivated
by anything other than your own conviction that
the way you suggest is the best way to proceed.
However, I must say that even though I have
given the most careful thought to the considera-
tions you advance, I continue to hold to my view
that the personal participation in Geneva by the
Heads of Government should be reserved until a
later stage in the negotiations when certain pre-
liminary work has been accomplished.

Indeed some of the statements you make rein-
force my view in this respect. Your discussion
of the control problem, for example, is based, in
my view, on a fundamental misconception of the
United States position that can probably best be
clarified in the light of discussion of specific veri-
fication requirements for specific disarmament
measures. It is not true, as you allege, that the
United States is seeking to establish complete con-



trol over national armaments from the beginning
of the disarmament process. Our position is a
quite simple one and it is that whatever disarma-
ment obligations are undertaken must be subject
to satisfactory verification. For example, if, as
we have both proposed, there is an agreement to
reduce the level of armed forces to a specified
nmnber, we must be able to ensure tlu-ough proper
verification mechanisms that this level is not ex-
ceeded. I do not propose here to discuss this
subject at length. I wish merely to point out that
this is the type of issue on which more work
should be done before it can usefully be dealt
with at a Heads of Government meeting.

If it were not for the existence of the Statement
of Agreed Principles " which was worked out so
laboriously between representatives of our two
countries last year, there might be greater force
to your reasoning that Heads of Govermnent
should meet at the outset to set directions for the
negotiations. In my view the Statement of
Agreed Principles constitutes just the type of
framework which would be the most that could be
expected at this point from a meeting of the Heads
of Government. Since this has already been done,
I believe now we need to have our representatives
do further exploratory work of a more detailed
nature.

As I have said and as I now repeat, I think it
is of the utmost importance that the Heads of
Government of the major nuclear powers assume
a pei-sonal responsibility for directing their coun-
tries' participation in and following the course of
these negotiations. I can assure you that the
Secretary of State would present my views with
complete authority. Even so, I hope develop-
ments in the Conference and internationally would
make it useful to arrange for the personal partici-
pation of the Heads of Government before June 1.
I do not, however, believe that this should be done



' Delivered at Moscow on Feb. 25.

' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 5, 1962, p. 355.



' For text, see iUd., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.



March J 9, J 962



465



at the outset and I must say frankly, Mr. Chair-
man, that I believe this view is well founded.
I believe that to have such a meeting at this point
would be to begin with the wrong end of the prob-
lem. The Heads of Government should meet to
resolve explicit jjoints of disagreement which
might remain after the issues have been carefully
explored and the largest possible measure of
agreement has been worked out at the diplomatic
level.

I continue to hope that you will agree to the
proposed procedure which was set forth in Prime
Minister Macmillan's and my initial letter of Feb-
ruary 7. I believe that the replies which have
been made by other prospective participants to
your messages indicate a general support for this
approach and I trust that you will give a favor-
able response.

I cannot conclude this letter without mention-
ing briefly the problem of nuclear testing. Since
I assumed the Office of President of the United
States, the conclusion of a nuclear test agreement
has been a primary objective of mine. The record
of American participation in the negotiations on
this subject has demonstrated fully the creative
effort we made to achieve agreement. It must be
understood that in the absence of an agreement
which provides satisfactory assurance that all
states will abide by the obligations they under-
take, there is no real basis for securing a safe end
to the competition in the development of nuclear
weapons. It is strange for the Soviet Union,
which first broke the truce on nuclear testing, now
to characterize any resumption of testing by the
United States as an aggressive act.

It was resumption of testing by the Soviet Union
which put this issue back into the context of the
arms race and that consequently forced the United
States to prepare to take such steps as may be
necessary to insure its own security. Any sucli
steps could not be characterized now as "aggres-
sive acts." They would be a matter of prudent
policy in the absence of the effectively controlled
nuclear test agreement that we have so earnestly
sought.

In our February 7 message, the Prime Minister
and I attempted to lay a further framework for
the conduct of the negotiations. We believe that
in a preliminary meeting among the Foreign Mbi-
isters of the United States, United Kingdom and
U.S.S.R. views could be exchanged and agreement
reached on the three parallel approaches we sug-



gested and on some of the procedural aspects which
we might jointly recommend to guide the Com-
mittee's work. Such a discussion, together with
the Statement of Agreed Principles, could give a
valuable direction and impetus to the Committee's
work.

Mr. Chairman, I think you agree that we must
approach this meeting with utmost seriousness and
dedication if we are to avoid a gradual drift to
the same kind of aimless and propaganda-oriented
talk which has characterized so much of past dis-
armament negotiations. This can be best achieved
if we who are ultimately responsible for the posi-
tions we take, and our chief diplomatic officials,
concern ourselves directly, as we are now doing,
with this subject. I believe we should consider
most carefully as we proceed when and how our
actual participation at the conference table could
be of most benefit.

John F. Ivennedy

MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY 21

UnofBclal translation

Deab Me. Pbesident : I have received your reply to
the proposal of the Soviet Government that the work of
the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee be initiated by
the Heads of Government (State) of the countries rep-
resented in that Committee. I must say frankly that I
am chagrined by your negative attitude toward that
proposal.

I shall not conceal that for a long time I have been
hatching the thought of beginning the work of the dis-
armament committee at the highest level. And as I have
already written,* your message of February 7 reached me
at the very moment when I was working on a message
on this question to the participants in the forthcoming
negotiations, and that encouraged me even more.

However, after your reply to my message," the situation
looks entirely different.

According to your message, you believe that even if
participation by the Heads of Government in disarma-
ment negotiations is possible it should be imstpoued until
such time when definite progress has been reached in
negotiations. But the legitimate question arises — who,
then, can ensure with the greatest probability of success
such progress, who can create a favorable situation for
negotiations? Those who are vested with the full breadth
of authority and who have the leading role in shaping
policy or, on the other hand, those who are not veste



Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 89 of 101)