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In the economic field compare what is happen-
ing from East Germany eastward to North Viet-
Nam with the surging vitality of the economic
life of the free world, whether in Western Europe,
Japan, this country, or elsewhere. Mr. Khru-
shchev talked about incentive yesterday in his
speech on agriculture before the Central Commit-
tee. Nowhere has the force of incentive made
itself more dramatically felt than in free
institutions.

I do not myself believe that we need worry as
much as we used to about the intellectual impact
of Marxism. Some decades ago, when there was
a certain intellectual fashion in the Marxist analy-
sis of capitalism and free institutions, the Amer-
ican economic depression occurred and seemed to
some to prove this analysis correct. The ideologi-
cal impact of that depression was perhaps more
far-reaching and important in its consequence than
was the economic impact. But that has been
changing. And how? Because the application
of Marxist analysis behind the Curtain has been
modified from decade to decade; because the de-
bate between Moscow and Peiping has injected
confvision into that analysis; because the attempt
to identify modern, vital, socially conscious, pub-
licly responsible capitalism with the kind of
capitalism which Karl Marx was talking about —
or thought he was talking about — in the middle
of the 19th century is patently absurd to all who
wish to look; and because the performance of
those who have committed themselves to these
notions has fallen far behind their promises and
their performance is far less attractive to those in
the rest of the world.

As we move ahead on the basis of our commit-
ments to free societies and our commitment to
build a decent world order as described in the
United Nations Charter, I think we shall find
natural allies who have a common purpose and
wish to join in a common effort toward that goal.
These allies will be a great source of strength to
all of us in the years to come.

Eighty percent of the work of the Department
of State is not concerned with the great crises but
with the day-by-day and week-by-week business of



/March 26, 1962



491



building a decent world order. In that area we
have few contentious issues between allies and
neutrals. We have no great voting problems, be-
cause unanimity is usually present. We have the
job of getting on with the world's work, with the
humane work of mankind, on which we are agreed
and on which we have — I think in good conscience
we can say we have — the good wishes, the support,
the interest, the appreciation of men and women
and of governments in all parts of the world.

We need not consult our timidity and our fears.
We need to consult our confidence and move on to
get this job done.

Thank you very much.



QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD

Secretary Rusk: I believe there is an oppor-
tunity for a few questions before the break.

Q. How much help did Colonel Glenn's flight
do to our international prestige?

A. Well, I am not sure that I should say this
on the record, but I was, of course, watching his
flight. My own sense of what was at stake there,
from a foreign policy point of view, was such that
I am quite sure my pulse was twice as fast as his
at the moment of takeoff.

I will say this : It was very inspiring to see the
world reaction, as it came through my office, to
that performance. There were not only good
wishes and respect, but it was quite clear that
regardless of political orientation throughout
most of the world there was real joy that that
effort had succeeded.

I think it made an enormous difference to us.
But the stakes were very high there.

Q. [JohnJ.McCloy^. I am veiy glad you said
what you did. I have a question, but Pd like to
make a little speech first.

A. It won't be the first time you have made a
speech to me that I have observed. (Laughter.)

Q. On what you said about the personnel of the
State Departm^ent, I was a heneficiary of the qual-
ity, the experience, the training of that personnel
in a rather active post at one point. I want to
endorse the comment that you read from. I thinJc
the personnel of the State Department compares
favorably with any other personnel that I have
been coivnected with, either in the law business.



banking, or the military. They are devoted, they
are courageous, and I think it is time we got rid
of this notion that they only wear panties, rather
than troupers.

I have a question that puzzles me, that deals
with an area that I am not familiar with — very
faTniliar with, at least — that is Latin America
and this Alliance for Progress.

This juxtaposition of our aid together with land
reform — how far can they fit together — what —
how much — how do they march together? Can
we impose on a country, as a beneficiary — a po-
tential beneficiary of our aid — a condition that
they take some steps in what really affects their
fundamental constitutions, their political systems?
I imagine how disturbed we would be if someone
was trying to press us from the outside. I just
wonder if you would expand on that a little,
because I have heard a good deal of com/ment
about it.



Alliance for Progress

A. Yes. I may get in the way of my colleague,
Mr. Fowler Hamilton [Administrator, Agency
for International Development], who will be here
in a moment and may be exposed to similar
questions.

Let me say that here again is a notion which
ought not to be reduced to a simple slogan, and
there is danger in this idea.

I had, before I came to this particular post, a
considerable amount of experience with agricul-
tural problems in Latin America. I think it would
be wrong to try to generalize about what ought
to be done in this field throughout the continent.
There are some situations where land reform has
been carried to such an extent that the productiv-
ity of the particular unit has dropped below effi-
ciency and where recombination of small holdings
might be more effective in terms of total produc-
tivity. But I think that this is something which
has to be gone into country by country, and it is
not something which we can automatically impose
from the outside.

We have a certain — we have a certainty of cer-
tain strains as we move forward in the Alliance
for Progress. On the one side, we want to do all
that wo can to help them spur the energies of their
own peoples in their own resources and institu-
tions in economic development. On the otlier side,



492



Department of State Bulletin



we are concerned that this should proceed under
free mstitutions.

When we look back over our own 40- or 50-year
experience of astonishing development in this
country under free institutions, we can recall that
a great many of the steps which were vital to our
own economic development were highly contro-
versial, and we dealt with them through demo-
cratic institutions.

Some of these governments are going to be in the
position of proposing to their legislatures, of hav-
ing public debates, of submitting these issues to
democratic processes, and we cannot sit here in
this country and tell them what the answer must
be. So that we have got a job to do there. But
the thing that I think we can do for them — and
which is something which you gentlemen in busi-
ness can be of great help on — is to try to disclose
to them, try to recall to their minds, the essential
elements of rapid economic and social develop-
ment within free institutions. Because I think we
have in one generation learned a great deal about
this.

Tlie notion tliat it takes two or three hundred
years to develop is something we should scrap.
Tliat kind of talk has given the Communists an
advantage which we should not confer upon them,
because the examples of dramatic and rapid eco-
nomic development that we have in the modern
world are to be found in the free world.

We have added more to our gross national prod-
uct since 1920 than the present total gross national
product of the Soviet Union. In 1920 we had 1
percent of our farms electrified. Now 98 percent
of our farms are electrified. Look at our univer-
sity and school enrollments. This can be patterned
out in other free institutions.

Look at the economic vitality of free societies
like the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan,
compared to some of these others.

But we can call to their attention, through
public as well as private channels — and sometimes
more insistently through private channels than
public channels — the relationship between educa-
tion, hard work, extension service, aspiration and
ambition, reasonable sacrifice in the public inter-
est, the determination on the part of the family
unit to increase — to improve its own position —
the notion that great development comes from
building, from improving from the ground up and
not just decapitating from the top and trying to

March 26, J 962



distribute that. And some of these elementary
experiences of rapid development under free in-
stitutions is something I think we can find ways
to pass along.

I don't think there is a simple formula on land
reform, Mr. McCloy. This is something that has
to be studied very carefully in particular institu-
tions. But in many situations the ability of the
private farmer to own his own land is a very im-
portant incentive to development, as we found out
in this country. And by means of credit facilities
and land distribution and things of that sort, I
think we can make considerable advance in this
matter.

Perhaps one other question before we go.

OAS^Actions on Cuba

Q. Would you say a feto words about Cuba?

A. I think that the most important thing to be
said about Cuba at the present time is that there
has been a dramatic recognition in the hemisphere
over the last 2 years that what has happened in
Cuba must not happen elsewhere in the inter-
American system.

We had, for pei'haps some special reasons, some
disagreement at Punta del Este on the question of
how and whether we should expel Cuba from
the Organization of American States.' But there
was unanimity on the notion that this Marxist-
Leninist regime in Cuba is basically incompatible
with the inter-American system, and there was
imanimity in rejectmg the notion that the Com-
munist penetration of this hemisphere should be
accepted. And what is most important is to see
the extent to which in tliis hemisphere, both among
governments and among peoples, the early bloom
of the Castro revolution has worn off as it moved
away from the picture of a popular vote against a
dictatorship and it has become an obnoxious dic-
tatorship and has itself demonstrated it has no
miraculous answer to the problem of economic and
social development.

I think that the influence of Cuba in this hemi-
sphere has greatly diminished and there is a gen-
eral desire to see to it that tlus effort in this hemi-
sphere shall be isolated and not be permitted to
pose a security or other threat to other countries
here. I think that is the significance of what has



' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

493



happened in the last several months with respect
to Cuba. And of course the end of that story
has not come.

At the Punta del Este conference I think again
there was imanimity that the inter- American sys-
tem is waiting for the time when they can wel-
come back into this system a free Cuban people
and a government and institutions which are
compatible with tlie commitments of the inter-
American system.



U.S.S.R. Agrees To Begin Disarmament
Talks at Foreign-Minister Level

Following is an exchange of messages hetween
President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO MR. KHRUSHCHEV

White House press release dated March 6

March 5, 1962
Dear Mr. Chairman: I have received your
message of March 3, and I am glad to know of
your agreement that the meeting in Geneva on
March 14 should be opened by Foreign Ministers.
I am particularly glad that Mr. Gromyko will be
able to join with Lord Home and Secretary Rusk
before the meeting for preliminary discussions;
our hope is that these conversations might begin
on March 12. It will be the purpose of the repre-
sentatives of the United States, headed by Secre-
tary Rusk, to make every possible effort, to find
paths toward disarmament.

Our object now must be to make real progress
toward disarmament, and not to engage in sterile
exchanges of propaganda. In that spirit, I shall
not undertake at this time to comment on the
many sentiments in your letter with wliich, as I
am sure you know, the United States Goverimient
cannot agree. Let us, instead, join in giving our
close personal support and direction to the work
of our representatives, and let us join in working
for their success.



MR. KHRUSHCHEV TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY



Dnofflclal translation



Makch 3, 1962



Dbae Mb. President : I have carefully studied your
message of February 25 ' last. Having thought about
the considerations advanced by you concerning the forth-
coming negotiations in the 18-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee, I continue to adhere to the conviction that per-
sonal participation of the most responsible state officials
would be particularly necessary in the initial stage, and
I repeat — precisely in the initial stage of negotiations,
when their direction is being determined and, conse-
quently, their outcome is being predetermined to no small
degree.

You know that disarmament negotiations have been
continuing for a good fifteen years, now becoming active,
now dying out again, as if only to raise the hopes of
peoples to destroy these hopes again. All sorts of methods
of conducting such negotiations have been used : creation
of various committees and subcommittees, commissions
and subcommissions, discussion of disarmament questions
in the halls of the U.N., and exchange of views through
diplomatic channels, but, as they say, the cart is still
stuck.

To what conclusions, then, does this lead? First of all
that it would be at least short-sighted again to rely on
those methods that have already proven their uselessness
in the past and, secondly, that it is the direct duty of the
states participating in disarmament negotiations to find
new, more reliable methods for conducting such negotia-
tions. This Is what the Soviet Government did in ad-
dressing the Governments of all the countries included in
the 18-Nation Committee with the suggestion that the
work of that Committee be initiated at the highest level,
with the participation of the Heads of State or
Government."

Our proposal was dictated by only one thing: by the
desire to free disarmament negotiations from the routine
in which those negotiations became entangled as soon
as they started and to pave the way for an agreement
on general and complete disarmament. It would seem
incontestable that those state leaders who are vested
with the broadest authority and occupy the most respon-
sible position in their country also have much greater
possibilities of coping with these difficult tasks. There-
fore we regret that our proposal to begin the work of the
18-Nation Committee at the highest level has not met
with imderstanding on your part. The arguments ad-
vanced in your message are not capable of affecting the
weighty and serious considerations which speak in favor
of the fact that the course proposed by the Soviet Gov-
ernment is the best course.

You yourself note the necessity of approaching the
forthcoming negotiations in the 18-Nation Committee



Sincerely yours,



John F. Kennedy



' For texts of a U.S. message of Feb. 25 and a Soviet
message of Feb. 21, see Bulletin of Mar. 19, 1962, p. 465.

• For text of a Soviet note of Feb. 10, see ihid.. Mar. 5,
1962, p. 356.



494



Department of State Bulletin



with the utmost seriousness and purposefulness and have
come out in favor of the leading state officials devoting
undeviatlng attention to these negotiations. You also
recognize that personal participation of the Heads of
State in disarmament negotiations may prove to be use-
ful, although you adhere to the view that such participa-
tion should be deferred to a later stage in the negotia-
tions. In this connection you express the hope that
developments in the 18-Nation Committee and interna-
tionally will make it useful to arrange for the personal
participation of the Heads of Government before June 1
of this year.

Thus, as a result of the exchange of messages among
the leading officials of state.s, general agreement has
emerged with regard to the significance which the dis-
armament negotiations in the 18-Nation Committee are
acquiring. It is no less important that everybody has
now recognized the personal responsibility of the Heads
of Government and State for the success of these negotia-
tions and the necessity of direct participation by state
officials of the highest level in the work of the 18-Nation
Disarmament Committee. We take this as a definite step
toward our position. Inasmuch as the United States
and some of our other partners in the forthcoming nego-
tiations are not prepared for the time being to have the
leading state officials participate personally in the work
of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee from the very
beginning, we shall proceed, Mr. President, on the basis
that we both, as well as the leading state officials of the
other states members of the committee, will do that
somewhat later.

The most important thing, of course, is to achieve re-
sults, to reach agreement on general and complete dis-
armament, and, at every stage of the negotiations, we
shall do everything that depends on us in order to ensure
their success. Of course, we are in favor of fully utiliz-
ing the possibilities of the Foreign Ministers, who can
play their useful role if all the participants in the 18-
Nation Committee demonstrate the desire to reach agree-
ment on disarmament. The situation has developed in
such a way that the ministers are to be the first to set
sail after the creation of the 18-Nation Committee. Well
then, let us wish them success ! Of course there is no
objection to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United
States and the United Kingdom meeting, as you have
proposed, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
U.S.S.R. before the 18-Nation Committee begins its work.

Tour message also touches upon some questions relat-
ing to the substance of the disarmament problem. In
this connection I would like to make some comments of
my own.

First of all, a few words about control. You believe
that the considerations set forth with regard to this
point in my preceding message are based on an "incor-
rect understanding of the United States position".'

I would only be glad if the position of the United
States Government on the question of control were ac-
tually to prove different from what we have understood it
to be until now. Unfortunately, however, there are no



facts which would provide grounds for such a conclusion.

The attitude of the Soviet Union toward the question
of control has already been covered in my preceding
message of February 21 last. Is it really necessary to
repeat that the Soviet Union is for an honest agreement
on disarmament under strict international control. I
can confirm once more our repeated statements to the
effect that the Soviet Union is prepared to accept any
proposals of the Western powers for control over disarma-
ment if the Western powers accept our proposals for
general and complete disarmament. If the United
States Government is really concerned about how to
reach agreement on the establishment of control over
disarmament, then this readiness of ours removes
a priori all difficulties, and there remains no room for
substantive differences.

Now about nuclear weapon tests. Let us talk plainly.
I have just familiarized myself with your statement*
in which you said that you had decided that the United
States would conduct, beginning in the latter part of
April of this year, a series of nuclear tests in the atmos-
phere. No matter how you try to justify this decision,
there cannot be two views about the fact that it repre-
sents a new expression of the aggressive course in inter-
national affairs, a blow to the 18-Nation Committee
which is just about to begin its work, and a blow to the
forthcoming disarmament negotiations. No matter how
much you may try to prove the contrary, the shock wave
from the American nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean will
reach to the Palais des Nations at Geneva.

You state that it is absolutely necessary for the United
States to conduct nuclear tests in order not to lag behind
the Soviet Union. But you failed to utter even one word
about the fact that the United States and its NATO
allies have conducted many more nuclear test explosions
than the Soviet Union. That is a fact, and everyone
who does not have as his specific objective to misinform
world public opinion must be aware of the fact that, if
the United States and its allies add to the nuclear tests
already conducted another series of such tests for the
purpose of perfecting their nuclear weapons, then the
Soviet Union will be faced with the necessity of conduct-
ing such tests of new types of its nuclear weapons as may
be required under those conditions for the strengthening
of its security and the maintenance of world peace. Sev-
eral months ago the Soviet Union was already compelled
to conduct such tests by the aggressive preparations of
NATO states.

In asserting that the United States can in no way do
without new nuclear weapons tests, you leave much
unsaid. After all, the effect of the action planned by the
Government of the United States cannot be limited merely
to those nuclear explosions that have been planned by
the United States itself or its allies in military blocs.
No, you are beginning a new round of competition in the
creation of ever more lethal types of nuclear weapons
and you are unleashing, as it were, a chain reaction
which, what is more, will become ever more violent. And
this is what you called in your message a "reasonable
policy" !



' Ihid., Mar. 19, 1962, p. 465.
March 26, 7962



' For text, see iljid., p. 443.



495



Where then, Mr. President, is logic? On the one hand
you have repeatedly said in your statements that the
United States is superior to the Soviet Union with regard
to the power of nuclear weapons stockpiles. And your
military are openly boasting that they can allegedly wipe
the Soviet Union and all the countries of the Socialist
camp from the face of the earth.

On the other hand, you now say that the United
States has to conduct nuclear weapon tests for the al-
leged purpose of not lagging behind the Soviet Union in
armaments. These two things clearly do not jibe.

Your entire logic, Mr. President, adds up to the fact
that you have now announced the beginning of a new
series of nuclear weapon tests by the United States. But
quite recently you and the entire Western press argued—
and argued correctly — how harmful such tests are.
How much was said at that time about the fact that
nuclear tests contaminate the air, soil, and vegetation,
that radioactive fallout, together with contaminated
plants, reaches the organism of animals, and particularly
cows, and that such fallout is transmitted through milk
consumed by children.

But now it turns out that all these arguments were
directed only against the Soviet Union and were used
merely for the purpose of enabling the United States to
preserve its superiority in certain types of armaments.
And now that you yourself have come to the conclusion
that you need to conduct such tests, where did (hose
arguments go, where is that hunianitarianism with which
you were so generous in your statements and messages?
After the United States has been accumulating huge
stockpiles of nuclear weapons throughout the post-war
years who is to profit from new nuclear tests? Appar-
ently this is to the advantage of the monopolists who
profit from the arms race, in whom the desire for profit
outweighs all the dangers connected with the contamina-
tion of the atmosphere, the water, and the soil by radio-
active fallout.

Yet the people of the United States of America, just
as all the peoples of the world, are merely victims of
the policy conducted in the interests of monopolistic
capital. On the one hand, nuclear weapons are being
produced, and the monopolies are profiting from their
accumulation. On the other hand, by intimidating the



Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 94 of 101)