United States. Dept. of State. Office of Public Co.

Department of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) online

. (page 98 of 101)
Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 98 of 101)
Font size
QR-code for this ebook


in the schedule of New Zealand take effect on July 1,
1962.

Agreement with the European Economic Community pur-
suant to artiile XXIV :(5 of the General Asreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Signed March 7, 1962. The con-
cessions set forth in the .schedule shall take effect on
the same date as that on which the schedule of the
European Community annexed to the interim agreement
between the United States and the European Economic
Community takes effect.

Joint declaration with the European Economic Commu-
nity. Signed March 7, 1962.

Agreement with the European Economic Community and
its member states with respect to corn, sorghum, ordi-
nary wheat, rice, and poultry. Signed March 7, 1962.

Agreement with respect to quality wheat with the Euro-
pean Economic Community, the member states of the
European Economic Community, and non-European
Economic Community countries signatory to the agree-
ment. Signed March 7, 1962.

Agreements providing compensatory concessions under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for certain
tariff actions taken by the United States. Effected
by exchanges of letters with the following countries on
the dates Indicated : Belgium, Luxembourg, and Neth-
erlands, January 29 and February 1, 1962; Denmark,
January 26 and February 12, 1962; Federal Republic
of Germany, January 29, 1962; Italy, December 8 and 9,
1961, and March 7, 1962; Japan, February 9, 1962;
United Kingdom, January 26 and February 16, 1962.

Acknotcledyed applicable rights and obligations of United
Kingdom: Tanganyika, January 18, 1962, with respect
to the following :

Protocol of rectification to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Habana March 24, 1948.
Entered into force March 24, 1948. TIAS 1761.

Protocol modifying certain provisions of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Habana
March 24, 1948. Entered into force April 15, 1948.
TIAS 1763.

Special protocol modifying article XIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Habana
March 24, 1948. Entered Into force April 19, 1048.
TIAS 1764.

Special protocol relating to article XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Habana
March 24, 1948. Entered into force June 7, 1948.
TIAS 1765.

Second protocol of rectifications to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva Sep-
tember 14, 1948. Entered into force September 14,
1948. TIAS 1888.

Protocol modifying part I and article XXIX of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at
Geneva Se|)teniber 14, 1948. Entered into force Sep-
tember 24, 19.j2. TIAS 2744.

Protocol modifying part II .nnd article XX^'I of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at
Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force Decem-
ber 14, 1948. TIAS 1800.

First protocol of modifications to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Aiinecy August 13, 1949.
Entered Into force September 24, 19.">2. TIAS 274.'').

Third protocol of r-ectlHcatlons to the General Agreement
on Tiiriffs iind Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949.
Entered Into force October 21. 19r,l. TIAS 2.".!)3.

Protocol modifying" iirticle XXVI of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13,
1940. Entered into force March 28, 1000. TIAS 2300.



Protocol replacing schedule I (Australia) of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy
August 13, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1051.
TIAS 2394.

Protocol replacing schedule VI (Ceylon) of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy
August 13, 1949. Entered into force September 24,
1952. TIAS 2746.

United Nations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization. Done at London Novem-
ber 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946.
TIAS 1580.

Signature and acceptance: Mauritania, January 10,
1062.



BILATERAL
Austria

Agreement amending the agreement of June 6, 1950, as
amended (TIAS 2072 and 3279), for the financing of
certain educational exchange programs. Effected by
exchange of notes at Vienna January 9 and March 13,
1901. Entered into force March 13, 1901.

Canada

(Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with re.spect to taxes on the
estates of deceased persons. Signed at Washington
February 17, 1961."

Ratified by the President of the United States: Feb-
ruary 7, 1962.

Greece

Agreement correcting convention for avoidance of double
taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect
to taxes on income of February 20, 1950 (TIAS 2902).
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Novem-
ber 20 and December 10, 1061. Entered Into force
December 19, 1961.

Indonesia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1054, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchanges of notes. Signed at Djakarta Febru-
ary 19, 1962. Entered into force February 19, 1062.

Iran

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the

Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1054. as amended (68 Stat. 4.-)5 ; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1700),
with exchange of notes of January 29 and February 8,
1962. Signed at Tehran January 29, 1962. Entered
into force January 20, 1962.
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of Jnnuary 20, 1962. Effected by exchange of
notes at Tehran February 17 and 20, 1962. Entered
into force February 20, 1962.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement on exchanges In the scientific, technical, edu-
cational, cultural, and other fields in 1962-1903.
Signed at Washington March S, 1902. Entered into
force March 8, 1962.



' Not in force.



512



Department of Sfafe Bulletin



THE CONGRESS



Speech Review Procedures of the Department of State



Following are texts of a statement made by
Under Secretary George W. Ball and remarks
made hy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
Roger W. Tubby before the Special Preparedness
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee on February 27.



STATEMENT BY MR. BALL

Press release 127 dated February 27

I come before this subcommittee this morning
as the first witness to speak on behalf of the De-
partment of State. I am pleased to add my testi-
mony to that of representatives of the Department
of Defense and officers of the armed services who
have testified earlier. Their testimony has dis-
closed a fairly general agreement that speeches to
be made by senior representatives of the United
States Government, whether military or civilian,
and which deal with matters of foreign policy,
should be reviewed by the Department of State
to insure not only that the Government speaks
with one voice but that that voice advances and
does not impair our foreign policy.

But, even granting that the review of speeches
may be necessary, this committee is quite properly
concerned that the procedures for review be appro-
priate and that the principles applied in recom-
mending deletions or alterations be sound and
consistent.

Let me start with the principles.

In the conduct of United States foreign policy
we are aware every day that the United States is
an open society. In many ways this makes the
conduct of an effective foreign policy more com-
plex and difficult. "VVe live in a house with open
windows, and the whole world hears what we say
to one another.

But we would not change the system. Not only
does it reflect the fundamental values in which we



believe, but we are the stronger for it. Since
foreign policy in a democracy is responsive to
public opinion, it has the incalculable advantage
of a broadly based popular support, particularly
when our people are as informed, alert, aware of
world events as they are in this country.

It is therefore essential, as this subcommittee
has recognized, that those officials of the Govern-
ment who are responsible for the formulation and
administration of our foreign policy should be
diligent in keeping the American people advised
as to what they are doing and why they are doing
it.

This is, of course, the principal purpose to be
served by speeches of American officials to Amer-
ican audiences — the purpose of advising and
informing.

Four Audiences for Foreign Policy Speeches

When a representative of the United States
seeks to advise or inform the American people in
a public speech, he should be fully aware — Lu the
extent that his speech touches on the foreign policy
of the United States — that he is speaking not to
one audience but to at least four. The extent to
which the speaker's voice is likely to be heard by
all four audiences is directly related to the de-
gree and character of his official responsibility.

Wliat are those four audiences to which I refer?
First, of course, the American domestic audience.
Speechwriters and speechmakers, whether or not
they happen in a particular case to be one and the
same person, quite naturally design speeches pri-
marily for the immediate audience — whether the
audience in the hall or that larger American pub-
lic reached through radio, television, or the news
media.

But a speech well designed for the American do-
mestic audience may not serve equally well the
purposes of our country if it is also heard or read



March 26, 7962



513



by the three other audiences who are watching and
listening. What are those audiences?

First, the peoples and governments in the coun-
tries allied with us in our common struggle to pre-
serve freedom.

Second, the peoples and governments in those
countries — many of which have just acquired na-
tion status — that are uncommitted in the strug-
gle between the free world and the Sino-Soviet
bloc but whose independence and continued re-
sistance to Communist infiltration or aggression is
a vital concern to all of us.

Third, the Communist leadership in the Iron
Curtain countries, which operates a gigantic
propaganda machine that feeds on the distortion
of public statements by representatives of the
American Government, whether civilian or
military.

It is clearly too much to expect that officers in
our Military Establishment or officials of Gov-
ernment departments other than the Department
of State, who speak on aspects of our foreign
policy, should be fully informed as to the exact
construction that may be placed upon their words
in countries allied to us or in the uncommitted na-
tions, or be able to anticipate the manner in which
their words may be distorted by the propaganda
machinery of the Commimist bloc.

It is out of concern for the impact of speeches
on these latter three audiences, as well as on the
American domestic audience, that the State De-
partment has been entrusted with the review of
speeches not only by its own officers but by civilian
and military officers throughout the executive
branch. In performing this role what are tlie
considerations that miist enter into such a review ?

Considerations Entering into Review of Speeches

The effect of foreign policy statements made in
any speech is necessarily a fvmction of the time
in which the speech is made, events or trends
visible or invisible that may affect international
relations, and the position and responsibility of
the speaker.

Let me comment on each of these.

First, the timing of statements must he con-
sidered in relation to events of foreign policy sig-
nificance that are taking place or impending.
Consider, for example, the first part of 1961 : In
February the United Nations Security Council
was debating the strengthening of the United Na-



tions mandate in the Congo, against the back-
ground of the murder of [Patrice] Lumumba. In
March nuclear test talks resumed in Geneva. In
April came the Cuban crisis. Then the United
States and the United Kingdom presented a draft
treaty for a nuclear test ban at the Geneva talks,
and a week later we agreed to a call for a cease-fire
in Laos. In the same month [Yuri] Gagarin
orbited the earth and there was the so-called "re-
volt of the generals" against the Government of
France. In May the 14-nation conference on Laos
opened at Geneva, with foreign ministers in at-
tendance. In June the President went on an ex-
tensive trip abroad which included his Vienna
meeting with Premier Khrushchev.

These are only some of the most important
events which occurred in a space of only 5 months
to contribute to the changing climate in which
speeches were to be delivered. In addition there
was, and is at all times, an imending stream of
smaller but nonetheless significant happenings —
debates in the United Nations, speeches and state-
ments by foreign leaders, visits by heads of state
to this country or other countries, international
conferences, and the like. Moreover, there are at
all times confidential conversations imder way be-
tween nations — discussions that in tlie nature of
diplomatic discourse cannot be publicly disclosed.

Unless one is professionally immersed in these
events, he will not know how a particular utter-
ance may affect the development of this kaleido-
scopic pattern.

Second, toe must consider the interpretation that
may be given the speech in the light of the posi-
tion and responsibility of the speaker. Two con-
siderations must be borne in mind in tliis
connection.

One is the well-established tradition in demo-
cratic societies that civilians not only administer
but enunciate foreign policy. This is clearly im-
derstood within the American Government, and
I suppose that no one would question the prin-
ciple. However, it is important that it be observed
in practice. This is one of the considerations that
enters into the review of speeches.

The other consideration is that special attention
must be given to the effect on world opinion of
statements by high-ranking officers wlio conmiand
the vast military power of the United States. A
"bellicose" speech by a general or admiral charged
with responsibility for the deployment and em-
ployment of our military might is not likely to



514



Department of State Bulletin



frighten the governments in the Communist bloc
countries. Our experience has shown that those
governments are impressed not with words but
with the hard facts of our military capability.
Thus, for example, the Soviet Government has
unquestionably taken into accoimt our recent mili-
tary buildup in shaping its policies during the
Berlin crisis.

Not only will the Soviet leaders be immune
from threatening words of a high-ranking Amer-
ican military officer, but the people in the bloc
countries will be immimized. They will not hear
them at all — unless it serves the purposes of Com-
munist policy to permit them to do so.

The real impact of "warlike" statements by our
military leaders is most likely to be felt on the
other two audiences — the governments and peoples
in the Allied countries and in the uncommitted
nations.

One of the pernicious myths that the Soviet
propaganda machine seeks to spread around the
world is that America is dominated by a blood-
thirsty and irresponsible military clique prepared
to unleash atomic destruction unless kept in check
by Communist might. Anyone who keeps abreast
of the Communist propaganda line put forth by
the Soviet or Chinese radio or set out in the
speeches of Communist officials or in Communist
publications must necessarily be impressed with
the amount of space and time devoted to this at-
tempt to create the impression that United States
policy is dominated by warmongering generals
and admirals.

The absurdity of this propaganda does not nec-
essarily diminish its effectiveness among people
who have either been sealed off from direct access
to the free world or who are so ill-informed or
ill-educated that they lack the ability for critical
judgment. For this reason it is imperative that
statements by high-ranking officers of our Mili-
tary Establishment be given scrutiny by profes-
sionals versed in the techniques of Communist
propaganda. Statements may be perfectly well
intentioned and factually quite accurate. They
may be of a kind that would be fully imderstood
by the American audience to which they are ad-
dressed. Yet they may still lend themselves to
being wrenched out of context and distorted for
the malign purposes of the Commimist propa-
ganda machine. Employed in this manner, they
can create among our allies a false impression of
recklessness, while seriously undermining the



good faith and peaceful intentions of America
among the peoples of the micommitted nations.

There is, of course, a time and a place for vig-
orous statements with regard to the magnitude of
our military might. But we should employ such
statements only after careful consideration of all
the circumstances, so that they will contribute to
the objectives of American foreign and defense
policy rather than provide material for distortion
by those who would destroy lis. For example, the
President's speech in July on the Berlin crisis^
was designed to, and did, drive home the effective
buildup we were making and the seriousness of
our intentions.

How the Reviewing Procedure Operates

Let me turn now to the procedures which the
State Department follows in applying these prin-
ciples to the review of speeches and other public
statements.

The Department of Defense has been submit-
ting an increasing volume of material for review.
In 1959 it forwarded to the State Department
283 speeches, 218 articles, and 27 press releases —
a total of 528 matters for review.

In 1960 it forwarded 368 speeches, 257 articles,
and 78 press releases — a total of 703 matters for
review, or an increase of 175.

Last year it sent us 598 speeches, 495 articles,
and 86 press releases — a total of 1,179 matters for
review, or an increase of 476 over the preceding
year.

Of the speeches included in the above statistics
approximately 75 percent were to be delivered by
military officers, the remainder by civilians in the
Defense Department.

Let me describe briefly how this procedure
operates.

As you well know, the Department of Defense
decides in the first instance whether a particular
speech by a military or civilian representative of
that Department appears to involve some aspect
of om- foreign policy so as to need review by the
State Department. Once a speech is received by
the Department of State, our procedures are de-
signed primarily to insure that any statements in
that speech relevant to particular aspects of our
foreign policy are examined by those officers in
the Department who are engaged in the direction
and execution of that aspect of policy. This is



' For text, see Buixetin of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.



March 26, 1962



515



essential to an effective review system, since in
many instances only the top officers in a par-
ticular bureau of the State Department concerned
with a specific area of the world may be fully
informed as to a substantive policy that we are
attempting to carry out at that time. Such offi-
cer must be made responsible for insuring so far
as possible that statements made by either mili-
tary or civilian representatives of the United
States Government will advance that policy and
not diminish the chances of its effectiveness.

In practice, speeches are forwarded from De-
fense to the Policy Plans and Guidance Staff of
the Department of State. This staff is located in
the office of the Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs. Each speech is logged in on a
register. It is then assigned to a member of the
staff. He routes it to the bureaus or offices having
responsibility for various aspects of the subject
matter involved.

Let us suppose, for example, that the speech re-
fers to the situation now prevailing in the Congo
and involves more than a casual reference to that
situation. Under such circumstances the speech
would be sent to the Public Affairs Officer in the
Bureau of African Affairs, who would be respon-
sible for making sure that it was reviewed by the
officers in the bureau working on Congo matters.
If it appeared to involve any matter of special
delicacy, it would be read by the Assistant Secre-
tary for African Affairs or his deputy.

A speech on the Congo might in addition touch
on matters that would be of concern to our Bel-
gian or, say, our British allies. In that event the
speech would be considered by the appropriate of-
ficers in our Bureau of European Affairs as well
as the African bureau. The speech would prob-
ably also touch on the United Nations pi'oblems
and activities in that turbulent country. In that
event it would also need examination by officers
in our Bureau of International Organization
Affairs.

Similarly, if a speech should contain language
that concerned our relations with the Soviet Union
or some aspect of the Communist offensive, it
would, if of more than routine character, be re-
viewed by the Department of State specialists on
Soviet policy. These specialists are in touch not
only with the day-to-day developments of that
policy but are also expert in the nattire of the Com-
munist system and sensitive to the manner in



which the Communist propaganda machine might
distort such material to reinforce the propaganda
line it was following at the moment.

From these examples one can see that the ob-
jective of our State Depai'tment procedures is to
make sure that a speech receives the attention of
the individual or individuals best able to deter-
mine if it serves or impairs the policies that the
United States may at the time be pursuing. In
our opinion our procedures have served this pur-
pose effectively. The State Department is receiv-
ing an average of three or four speeches or articles
a day from the Department of Defense. On some
days it has received as many as 18. The average
time permitted for review is not more than 2 or ?>
days, and in some cases review is requested on an
urgent basis, since the speech is to be made the
following day.

Under such circumstances it is possible that the
responsible State Department officer concerned
with the development or administration of a par-
ticular policy may not be able to devote a great
deal of time or attention to the study of a speech
that could have some bearing on that policy. And
since the review process necessarily involves an
element of judgment, it is underetandable that,
from time to time, an alteration or deletion may
seem somewhat arbitrary to the officer or official
who is to deliver the speech.

But the review procedure has never been final
and categorical. Any officer or official who felt
that a particular alteration or deletion recom-
mended by the State Department was unjustified
has always been entitled to request a satisfactory
explanation for the change or to insist on recon-
sideration. In fact, early in December of last
year the appeal procedure — which had always
been recognized in fact — was made quite explicit
in a formal joint memorandum of policy - by the
State and Defense Departments.

Although wo feel our procedures have served
the national interest effectively, this does not mean
that they are not subject to improvement. In
fact, since this subcommittee began its inquiry we
have carefully rcstudied them. We have some
possible revisions in mind, and it is likely that
after wo have had the benefit of the subcommittee's
own findings and recommendations, the Secretary
of State will make some technical changes in the
administration of this responsibility.



' Not printed.



516



Department of State Bulletin



Department Prepared To Explain Changes

Members of tlie subcommittee have sought to
obtain from previous witnesses explanations as to
why specific deletions or alterations were recom-
mended in particular speeches. As I have tried
to make clear in this statement, recommendations
for each alteration or deletion are made against
the background of a whole series of conditioning
facts :

One, the rank or position of the individual mak-
ing the speech and to whom the views expressed
will be attributed ;

Ttoo, the audience to which the speech is being
addressed ;

Three, the nature of policies which the United
States is attemptmg to carry out at the particular
time in the particular area or in relation to the
particular country to which the comment in the
speech relates ;

Four, the effect of the speech in relation to cer-
tain publicly known events, such as impending
international conferences, negotiations, et cetera;

Five, the effect of the speech in relation to cer-
tain diplomatic moves or impending events that



Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 46, Jan- Mar 1962) → online text (page 98 of 101)