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you consider necessary to bring about the
necessary discussions." Does this represent
any policy change as far as the United States
is concerned in that one might read it as wide
enough to allow for some negotiations with
the National Liberation Front ?

A. I would not read detail into it. When 17
nonalined nations last year indicated that
they thought there should be negotiations
without preconditions, we said, yes, we
thought that was a good idea. The other side
turned it down.

We are prepared to talk about the problem
without preconditions of any sort from either
side. We are prepared to have preliminary
discussions with the other side about precon-
ditions, if they want to talk about those. We
are prepared to come to a conference. We are
prepared to have bilateral discussions. We
are prepared to use intermediaries. We are
prepared to have discreet and private con-

But it is very hard to find someone on the
other side who is prepared to talk seriously
about bringing this matter to a peaceful con-

The Secretary-General has a new term of

FANUARY 9, 1967


office with the overwhelming unanimous sup-
port of the United Nations. As you know, he
is very much concerned in this major prob-
lem affecting the peace of the world. And so
we would be glad to see the Secretary-
General use the widest powers available to
him to probe the possibilities of a serious dis-
cussion about a peaceful conclusion of this

Q. Do you use the term "other side" ex-
clusively to mean Hanoi, or does it include
the National Liberation Front?

A. Well, we have not talked about pre-
conditions of any sort with the Secretary-
General, and so I don't suppose I need talk
about them here.

President Johnson has made some com-
ments — in July of last year — about the
Liberation Front.*

But let's see what the Secretary-General
might be able to accomplish in his contacts
with those who are directly involved in this
and might bring it to a conclusion.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are some keen
observers of this situation that think that so
long as Russia and Communist China are on
opposite sides, with their split, it ivould be
very difficult for Hanoi to sit down at the
conference table, tvith this conflicting advice
on either side of them. Do you think this is a
factor in holding up peace talks ?

A. I would prefer not to comment pre-
cisely on your exact question.

I think that undoubtedly the various capi-
tals in the Communist world tend to look over
their shoulders at each other in a matter of
this sort, and this somewhat complicates the
problem of responsible contacts and respon-
sible discussions with a view to winding this
matter up.

In that sense, there is no single place, there
is no single point of view with whom one can
enter into talks in order to bring it to a con-

So I think the complexity on the other side
does complicate the technical procedures, the

' At a news conference on July 28, 1965.

diplomatic procedures, by which one can
establish contact and move this thing for-

Q. Do you see any interest, Mr. Secretary,
on the part of Hanoi or the National Libera-^
tion Front in arriving at a longer Christmas
truce or talking about conditions for an
extended truce running into the new year?

A. No, I have not. From the statements
they made, it would point rather in the other

Americans Convicted in Soviet Union

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there anything that
the United States Government can do to try
to effect the release of Mr. [BueV] Wortham,
who was convicted to 3 years of labor today
by a Leningrad court ?

A. Well, we will continue to pursue this
matter. We did feel that, although these two
young men acknowledged the offenses for
which — with which they were charged, the
punishment was more harsh than the viola-
tions themselves would seem to warrant.

There are procedures of appeal and
clemency that are available, and we expect
that those will be utilized.

I do not myself wish to condone these par-
ticular actions, but I think, as the Soviet
Union moves into a period in which they are
trying to encourage tourism and have maxi-
mum contacts with other countries, that they
might recognize that on occasion minor inci-
dents of this sort may occur and that it will
be in their interest to resolve them in
accordance with the general practice of most
governments when temporary foreign guests
pull pranks of this sort — or whatever you
want to call it — that would be a violation of
local law.

I would hope that the Soviet authorities
would take cognizance of this sort of thing
and take action to mitigate the punishment
that has been meted out to these two men.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, Buel
Wortham's mother has expressed the hope
that he might be exchanged for the man



; named Igor Ivanov, who is being held in this

j coiintry under a 20-year sentence. Has any-

"> thing been done to negotiate such an ex-

] change?

. A. No.

Q. Mr. Secretary, going back for a moment
to your comment about the Secretary-
General, where you say that he has a neiv
mandate and that you ivould be very glad to
see him, use the widest powers available to
probe the prospects of peaceful negotiations,
does that mean that if he should succeed in
doing what he did once before, in arranging
for the other side to send representatives to
Rangoon or someplace else, that we would
this time accept the offer and also go our-
selves ?

A. Well, I don't want to go into the ques-
tion of whether or not there was a previous
incident of the sort that you talked about in
exactly those terms.

Q. He has said so.

A. Well, I think that when the full record
is out some day that will take on a somewhat
different context, and I think it is not good
for the future for me to intrude into the past
on that particular point.

But he has a maximum latitude here, as
far as we are concerned in the situation, to
see what can be worked out on the other side
in terms of responsible discussions.

No Indication of Deescalation From Hanoi

Q. Mr. Secretary, there seems to be some
misunderstanding of our motives in seeking
a truce or an extended armistice, while, at the
same time, ive seem to tighten the noose and
hit harder ivith bombs in North Viet-Nam.
Cozild you put this in perspective for us?

A. Well, we have a military interest in hit-
ting military targets in North Viet-Nam to
try to impede, slow down, or interfere with
the steady movement of men and supplies
into the South. We have had nothing in the
way of reciprocity from the North in terms
of pulling back on their violence in South

We have tried over many, many months
now, since the pause of January, to try to
get some indication from the other side as to
whether they would be willing to talk about
deescalation or enter into deescalation, in
fact, without any formal agreements, on
some basis of reciprocity. We have not been
able to do that.

These particular incidents, I think, have
to be looked at against the background of
what is responsible for the fighting and who
would be glad to see it wound up. As far as
we are concerned, we regret every person
that has been lost in South Viet-Nam, and in
North Viet-Nam. And there should not have
been any of these casualties if these people
in North Viet-Nam had undertaken to live
at peace with their southern neighbors and
not launched their Liberation Front, for
which they are now celebrating the sixth
birthday, and not sent their cadres and their
men and their arms and their regiments into
South Viet-Nam to seize that country by

Now, all of this is unnecessary from our
point of view. And it could be brought to con-
clusion very quickly if that central ambition
on the part of Hanoi were abandoned. Now,
that's what is lacking here in this situation.

Now, in a struggle of this sort there are
going to be those who are injured by acci-
dent, or otherwise, or going to be those who
suffer from the struggle. But I should think
we ought to concentrate on why it started
and how it could be brought to a conclusion.
And, on that, I think the responsibility rests
very heavily with Hanoi.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the event no negotia-
tions for peace are upcoming, are we pre-
pared for a military victory in both North
and South?

A. Well, our objectives there have been
very clearly defined. We are trying to pro-
tect South Viet-Nam, under treaty commit-
ments, from this aggression by means of
armed attack from the North, from the in-
filtration of these men and arms into the
South. We have no desire to destroy North

JANUARY 9, 1967


Viet-Nam, or insist upon changing their
regime, or any of those things. We are trying
to meet our commitments to South Viet-Nam.
And, on that basis, this matter could be
wound up very quickly.

The NATO Council Meeting

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you assess for us,
please, the last week's NATO conference?
The reports from Paris were rather favor-
able. The French appear to be cooperative.
Brandt's [Willy Brandt, German Foreign
Minister'] debut got favorable reviews. I won-
der horv you feel about it ?

A. This was my 12th NATO meeting of
ministers, and I must say I thought it was
one of the most businesslike and most pro-
ductive of those that I have attended for
some time. I think there has been a rather
broad understanding between the Fourteen
on the one side and France on the other as
to the boundaries that now arise between
the Fourteen and France as to who would
take care of what kind of business.

The Fourteen met as the Defense Commit-
tee and transacted a good deal of business
affecting the military arrangements in the
alliance, including the nuclear committee
that was established. Those were referred to,
I think, in paragraphs 15 to 21 of the com-
munique.'' In the communique France pointed
out that they had not participated in those
discussions and did not associate themselves
with it. But as far as the other discussions
were concerned, France was present and we
had a good exchange among all 15 on such
questions as the East-West relations.

I must say that there was a general feeling
that two of our eminent new members among
the ministers, Mr. George Brown of Britain
and Mr. Willy Brandt of Germany, both
made very strong impressions on the Council.
So I think on the whole it was a very, very
encouraging and a very good meeting.

Q. Mr. Secretary, coming back to the qiies-
tion of a missile freeze, Secretary McNamara
has also told us that the administration plans
to ask Congress for appropriations for the

* For text, see p. 49.

Poseidon missile and improvement on the
Polaris missile. Would the administration be
willing to put off deployment of this missile if
there could be some agreement ?

A. No, I wouldn't want to get into that
kind of question. That is a problem for the
Secretary of Defense, and these are matters
that the administration is considering in
connection with his presentation to the Con-
gress. It's a matter on which there will be
full discussion with the appropriate congres-
sional committees. I wouldn't want to point
to the future in that way today.

International Effort on Food Problem

Q. Mr. Secretary, on tivo food decisions
facing the administration, will the shipments
to Yugoslavia that Congressman [Paul]
Findley has objected to be released, and will
grain be released for India in the near
future ?

A. As far as India is concerned, very sub-
stantial quantities of grain will be arriving
in India during January. As you know, we
have been concerned that this food problem
be taken up as a general international prob-
lem in which all countries who are in a posi-
tion to contribute will do so. It is not true
that we have been putting pressure on par-
ticular countries, as I have seen reported in
the last day or so. But, nevertheless, we are
glad that some other countries are taking up
this matter seriously and are making some
significant contributions.

The prospect is that over the next decade
there is going to be a major crisis in the food
situation and all countries, including those
who are going to need the food and those who
are in a position to contribute in whatever
way, must make a concerted and sustained
effort to deal with it. Otherwise, there is
going to be considerable hunger in the world.

You saw Secretary [of Agriculture Orville
L.] Freeman's remarks yesterday on that
subject, and I would expect and hope that
appropriate international action will be
taken to assist the Indians in their critical

At the present time I am not actually sure
just what the situation is with Yugoslavia,



and I wouldn't want to comment on that

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you interpret the
•^ current upheaval in China in terms of the
\ possibility of change in our relationship with
j Peiping?

I A. Well, we have not tried to analyze the
significance of what is going on in China. We
have the feeling that it is important, these
events there. But I think we would be fool-
ing you if we said that we fully understood
exactly what is happening. My guess is that
some of the leaders in China don't know
exactly what is happening. So our present
ignorance doesn't embarrass us too much.

But we have seen no indications thus far
that what is happening there has any signifi-
cant bearing on their relations with us or
their attitudes toward us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your appraisal that
the Soviet Union has made a com,mitment to
an all-out deployment of the antiballistic mis-
^ sile system ?

I A. No. I have no information on that one
way or the other. We just don't know that.

Developments of 1966

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that it's getting

^ toward the close of the year, I wonder if you

. could summarize what you think have been

, the main gains and setbacks during the year

and what do you see in the year ahead?

A. Well, I would almost need some notice
on that question because that is a rather com-
: prehensive question.

I think that during this past year we have
„ seen continuing increase of contacts between
'J the East and West as far as Eastern Europe
i! is concerned. We had in front of us at NATO
t a little summation of the East- West contacts
I in the last few months among the NATO
countries, and I think there were about 185
items on that list, which is available to you.
There seems to be an interest in trying to
keep these East- West divisions under control
' and to try to find points of agreement if pos-
sible, whether in the arms field or in the
trade field, or cultural exchanges, or what-

ever. I would hope that that represents a
trend which will continue and that we can
begin to see some reduction of tension on a
more permanent basis between these two
great systems of states.

I think out in Asia we know now that
South Viet-Nam is not going to be overrun
by force by North Viet-Nam. And we see a
recovery of confidence and hope among the
free nations of Asia.

I think this past year has seen a very ex-
citing demonstration of the intention of the
free nations of Asia to get on with their jobs,
not only nationally but in groups, in coopera-
tion with each other. We have had such dra-
matic developments as the founding of the
Asian Development Bank and the formation
of the ASPAC [Asian and Pacific Council]
group that recently met in Seoul, Korea. We
have a feeling that free Asia is on the move.
They are demonstrating a capacity to move
ahead economically and socially and with
more competence in the political field. Those
are all very much to the good.

We have been encouraged by the per-
formance of the Alliance for Progress and
the discussions which have been anticipating
the meeting of the foreign ministers in
February and a meeting of the heads of gov-
ernment in April here in this hemisphere. I
think in the broadest terms the general
trends have been in a constructive and
promising direction.

The most significant failure in 1966 has
been the failure to find a means to bring this
Vietnamese problem to the conference table
or to a peaceful solution. And I would hope
very much that the year 1967 would be a
time when that will become possible.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection ivith that
and in connection ivith the recent statement
to Secretary-General U Thant, are we saying
that ive will accept a cease-fire, a simple
cease-fire, which is lengthy or semipermor
nent ?

A. Well, we are saying that we believe
that the Secretary-General should exercise
his office to the fullest to explore all possibili-
ties of a responsible discussion with the other
side to bring this matter to a peaceful con-

JANUARY 9, 1967


elusion. I wouldn't want to elaborate that
matter in detail any more than is contained
in Ambassador Goldberg's letter, because
the Secretary-General himself ought to have
a maximum freedom of maneuver at this

Food Assistance to India

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to this
India food problem which has got to the
point, as I understand it, ivhere the United
States can't carry the bicrden alone — in
handling their financial and development
problems, why, recourse nms had to a con-
sortium, with the machinery to bring this
cooperation on the problem. I think it's Sena-
tor IGeorgel McGovern that is advocating
the possibility of some sort of thing like that
to work on food. What do you think of this?

A. Well, we have raised this food problem
in such organizations as the OECD [Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment]- — we did that here in Washing-
ton; ^ and in the FAO, the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions. The Indian Government itself is in
touch with a considerable number of govern-
ments to find out what assistance might be
forthcoming, not only from the food pro-
ducers but from those who might contribute
fertilizer or funds or other types of

I do think that a group of nations will
have to do what is necessary in a situation
of this sort. Whether it would be a formal
consortium or simply an informal arrange-
ment by governments dealing directly with
the Indian Government, I wouldn't want to
say at this point, but the OECD organiza-
tion and the FAO and other bodies will have
to give systematic and serious attention to
the food problem if, in fact, the problem is
going to be met here over the next few years,
and we strongly urge that they do so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has there been any
progress on the nonproliferation treaty in
the last couple of months ?

' For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 8, 1966,
p. 199.

A. I think what we last said on that re-
mains the situation, that certain underbrush
has been perhaps cleared away, but there still
are important problems to be resolved. This
is a matter in which allies on both sides pre-
sumably are in touch with each other. I'
would hope that this next year — that we are
not too long delayed in the next year, that
we might find some way to resolve this mat-
ter. It would be a major step forward if it
could be brought to a conclusion, but I can-
not today report that we have reached that
point. It is a matter of discussion among
many governments at the present time, and
we would hope some progress could be made.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to get back to the India
food problem for a moment, there is still
pending on the President's desk the request
of India for 2 million additioyial tons of food
grains beyond the very large quantities that
we have committed ourselves to send, and 1
believe they wanted this to arrive in Febi~u-
ary to tide them over until the March harvest
has come in. I think in the past you have said
that this request nms under urgent considera-
tion by our Government. Does what you have
just said now indicate that tve would hope
that other countries would share this btirden
with us so that we would not have to supply
all the 2 million tons by ourselves?

A. I believe some announcements have al-
ready been made from some other govern-
ments, and Secretary Freeman indicated that
there would be a million tons of wheat arriv-
ing in India in January.

Q. In January? But what about February?

A. Well, that would be for distribution in
the month, presumably during the month of
February, and arrangements are being dis-
cussed about what might be done beyond that.
But there is no specific word today about
action taken beyond those already an-
nounced, and when the action — when any de-
cisions are made on this, they will be

The press: Mr. Secretary, we wish you a
Merry Christmas, and we hope you will be
able to take the whole day off. Thank you
very much.



North Atlantic Council IVIeets at Paris

The North Atlantic Council held its regular
ministerial meeting at Paris December 15-16.
Following are texts of the final communique
and three annexes which were released by the
Council at the close of the meeting on Decem-
ber 16, together ivith a list of the members of
the U.S. delegation.


1. Ministers of member governments of the
Atlantic Alliance have met in Paris.

2. The North Atlantic Council, meeting on
15th and 16th December, reaffirmed the pur-
poses and principles of the Alliance, and their
resolve to ensure stability and well-being in
the North Atlantic area, and to unite their
efforts for the preservation of peace and se-
curity for their peoples.

3. The Alliance has demonstrated its value
by successfully averting threats to peace and
safeguarding the security of the Atlantic
area. By its defensive strength including its
effective means of deterrence, as well as by
maintaining its solidarity, the Alliance has
produced the basis for the present marked
reduction of tension in Europe. This basis
remains essential for the security of the Alli-
ance and for progress towards a peaceful
solution of outstanding problems, including
the problem of Germany.

4. The Council associated itself with the
views expressed in the Declaration by the
Governments of France, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the
United States which appears as an Annex to
this Communique. With regard to Berlin, the
Council stands by its declaration of 16th De-
cember, 1958.*

5. Ministers agreed on the need for con-
tinued efforts to achieve a peaceful solution
of the German problem to meet the German
people's fundamental right to reunification.
So long as Germany continues to be divided
there cannot be a genuine and stable settle-
ment in Europe. The peaceful progress of
Europe must proceed from reciprocal confi-
dence and trust, which will take time to grow
from sustained policies of co-operative effort
and better understanding on both sides. It
means especially removing barriers to freer
and more friendly reciprocal exchanges be-
tween countries of different social and eco-
nomic systems.

6. For their part, the members of the At-
lantic Alliance have confirmed their intention
to continue their efforts to secure better rela-
tions with the Soviet Union and the states of
Eastern Europe in the political, economic,
social, scientific and cultural fields. Ministers
examined the report on East/West relations
prepared in accordance with the instructions
given at the last Ministerial meeting in June
1966.2 They welcomed the wide range of sug-
gestions in the report and emphasised their
willingness to explore ways of developing co-
operation with the Soviet Union and the
states of Eastern Europe in tasks of interest
and benefit to all concerned. They, moreover,
noted that contacts, conversations and agree-
ments have recently increased. In the field of
East/West relations there are clearly differ-
ent approaches which can be adopted,
whether between individual countries or in a
wider international framework.

7. Ministers welcomed the approval by the
United Nations Outer Space Committee of a
draft treaty on the peaceful use of outer

' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4.

' For text of a communique issued on June 8, 1966,
see ibid., June 27, 1966, p. 1001.

JANUARY 9, 1967


space.' Encourag-ed by this, they affirmed
their determination to continue to consult ac-
tively on problems of disarmament, to keep
under review the progress of international
discussions on measures to prevent the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons, and to seek
agreement on satisfactory arms control meas-

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 15 of 90)