United States. Dept. of State. Office of Public Co.

Department of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) online

. (page 16 of 90)
Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 16 of 90)
Font size
QR-code for this ebook

ures which might contribute to the improve-
ment of European security and the relaxation
of tension. In so doing, they hoped to bring
about conditions which could permit a grad-
ual and balanced revision in force levels on
both sides. At the same time, they reaffirmed
their conviction that no acceptable permanent
solution to the question of European security
is possible without agreement on the most
critical political problems.

8. Turning to economic questions. Minis-
ters noted that the gap between the most ad-
vanced and the less-developed countries had
widened further. They reaffirmed that all ad-
vanced countries, whatever their economic
systems, had a responsibility to offer assist-
ance to developing countries.

9. Ministers expressed the hope that the
present multilateral tariff negotiations (Ken-
nedy Round) would be carried to a successful
conclusion and would promote the expansion
of trade to the greater benefit of all. They
also attached great importance to the initia-
tives designed to overcome the existence of
two trading areas in Western Europe and to
facilitate technical co-operation between the
European countries concerned.

10. On the initiative of the Italian Govern-
ment there was an exchange of views on ques-
tions arising out of the uneven technological
development of different countries. Ministers,
after stressing the importance and complex-
ity of this problem, invited the Permanent
Representatives to study the procedure which
might be followed for further examination
and implementation of the Italian proposals,
and to report their findings to the Spring
Ministerial meeting. A Resolution on this
subject was adopted and is attached.

• See p. 78.

11. The Council reaffirmed the importance
of continuing to assist Greece and Turkey
within the framework of the Alliance in or-
der to maintain the effectiveness of their con-
tribution to the common defense. Recom-
mending wide participation in the aid
programme, the Council agreed that this pro-
gramme should be extended to cover the pe-
riod 1966-1970.

12. Ministers took note of the Secretary
General's report on his "Watching Brief"
concerning Greek-Turkish relations and re-
affirmed their support for the continuation
of his activities in this respect. They ex-
pressed their firm hope that the continuing
exchanges of views between Turkey and
Greece on the Cyprus question and on Greek-
Turkish relations would contribute to bring-
ing about positive results. They reiterated
their appreciation of the presence of the
United Nations Force in Cyprus and the hope
that an improvement in the situation in the
island would be achieved. They stressed that
no action should be taken which could worsen
the situation in the island and increase the

13. On the proposal of the Belgian Govern-
ment and recalling the initiative taken by
Canada in December 1964, the Council re-
solved to undertake a broad analysis of in-
ternational developments since the signing of
the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Its pur-
pose would be to determine the influence of
such developments on the Alliance and to
identify the tasks which lie before it, in or-
der to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for
a durable peace. A Resolution on this subject
was adopted and is attached.

14. Ministers approved a report on Civil
Emergency Planning. They noted that a re-
appraisal of these activities within NATO
had been completed and they reaffirmed the
importance of such planning for the protec-
tion of civil populations and in the support
of overall defence.

15. Ministers met as the Defence Planning
Committee on 14th December, 1966. As a fur-
ther step in the process initiated at Athens



in 1962, they approved recommendations re-
garding nuclear planning and consultation,
submitted by the Special Committee of De-
fence Ministers. They agreed to establish in
NATO two permanent bodies for nuclear
planning — a policy body called the Nuclear
Defence Affairs Committee, open to all
NATO countries, and, subordinate to it, a
Nuclear Planning Group of seven members
which will handle the detailed work.

16. To improve the ability of NATO to
engage in timely consultation in the event of
crisis, Ministers approved the development
of new arrangements for the rapid exchange
and the more effective use of relevant infor-
mation and data. To facilitate such exchange
of data, Ministers approved in principle the
establishment of a new NATO-wide commu-
nications scheme along the lines recom-
mended by the Special Committee. They also
examined a report from the Special Commit-
tee on possible improved procedures for con-
sultation. They agreed that further studies
and planning in this important area should
be undertaken, and requested the Secretary
General and Permanent Representatives to
consider how this work could most usefully
be carried forward. The Special Committee,
set up in June 1965, has now completed its

17. Ministers reviewed reports on the pres-
ent status of NATO's military effort and
noted the force commitments undertaken by
governments for 1967 under the NATO Force
Plan adopted by Defence Ministers in July

18. After a comprehensive review of ques-
tions of strategy, force requirements, and
resources, in the course of which they dis-
cussed the military capabilities and intentions
of the Soviet Union, Ministers considered the
political, strategic and economic guidance
to be given to the NATO Militaiy Authorities
for their appreciation of the military situa-
tion as it will affect NATO up to and includ-
ing 1975. They gave instructions for further
studies in these fields in the light of this dis-

19. On the basis of the results of numer-
ous studies conducted since July 1966, Min-
isters gave instructions for further work to
be carried out within the framework of the
new defence planning review procedures due
to be initiated in January 1967 for the regu-
lar projection of NATO force planning five
years ahead. This work will be directed, pri-
marily, towards securing the best balance of
forces and the most effective use of the re-
sources made available by NATO govern-
ments for defence.

20. Ministers underlined the importance of
the defence of the flank regions of the North
Atlantic Treaty area and issued further guid-
ance regarding the provision of external rein-
forcements in defence emergencies. They also
gave instructions concerning the improve-
ment of the local forces in the South-Eastern
Region. Substantial progress was made to-
wards agreement upon the common funding
of the exercises of the Allied Command Eu-
rope Mobile Force.

21. Ministers agreed to study whether a
NATO satellite communication programme
should be established which would provide
for a co-operative effort by member nations
in the new and developing field of space tech-
nology and its application to NATO's vital
communications needs. Meanwhile, an experi-
mental project was agreed which will provide
a link between SHAPE [Supreme Headquar-
ters Allied Powers Europe] at its new head-
quarters and AFSOUTH [Allied Forces
Southern Europe] at Naples.

22. France did not take part in the discus-
sions referred to in paragraphs 15-20 and
did not associate herself with the correspond-
ing decisions.

23. The Council decided that a new perma-
nent headquarters should be constructed at
the Heysel in Brussels, and a new temporary
headquarters at Evere, also in Brussels. The
Council expressed its gratitude to the Belgian
Government for having made available these
two sites.

24. The regular Spring Ministerial Meet-
ing will be held in Luxembourg in 1967.

JANUARY 9, 1967


Annex A

Declaration on Germany

The Foreign Ministers of France, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom and the United
States met on 14th December, 1966, on the
eve of the Ministerial Meetings of the North
Atlantic Alliance, in Paris in order to discuss
the situation in Germany. The meeting took
place exactly eight years after the four For-
eign Ministers had met in Paris on 14th De-
cember, 1958, when Foreign Minister [Willy]
Brandt, then Governing Mayor of Berlin, re-
ported on the situation of Berlin. The Foreign
Ministers confirmed that their governments
would continue to be responsible for the se-
curity and viability of a free Berlin.

The Foreign Ministers of France, the
United Kingdom and the United States took
note of the intention of the Federal Republic
of Germany to develop human, economic and
cultural contacts between the two parts of
Germany. These contacts aim in particular at
alleviating the human misery which is a
result of the partition of the German people.
The three Ministers share the views of the
Federal Government and will support these
efforts within the framework of the responsi-
bilities incumbent on their governments.

The Ministers re-emphasised that the solu-
tion of the German question is one of the es-
sential problems in the relations between East
and West. This solution can only be achieved
by peaceful methods, on the basis of the right
of self-determination, and through the crea-
tion of an atmosphere of detente on the con-
tinent, under conditions guaranteeing the
security of all countries.

Annex B

Resolution on International

Technological Co-operation

(Adopted by the Council on 16th December,


The North Atlantic Council :

Recognising the need for continued pro-
motion of economic co-operation within the

spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic

Having noted proposals submitted by the
Italian Government on 5th October and 7th
December, 1966, the additional comments
provided to the Council by the Italian Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, and the statements of
other Ministers in the course of the debate;

Convinced that it is important that con-
sideration be given to the Italian proposals
so that measures can be applied as soon as
possible to give renewed impetus to interna-
tional co-operation in the technological field;
and to such other measures as will serve to
raise the general level of scientific and tech-
nological achievement;

Recommends that the Council in Perma-
nent Session study the procedure which
might be followed for further examination
and implementation of the Italian proposals,
and report its findings to the Spring Minis-
terial Meeting;

Instructs the Secretary General to submit
shortly to the Council in Permanent Session,
a report on the scientific and technological
programmes already underway in NATO in
view of the contributions these activities can
make toward a reduction of technological dis-

Annex C

Resolution of the North Atlantic

The Council, desirous of achieving the
fundamental purposes of the North Atlantic
Treaty in the spirit of cohesion and solidarity
between the signatories of the Treaty:

Considers it essential to analyse the politi-
cal events which have occurred since the
Treaty was signed, with a view to ascertain-
ing their influence on international relations
and on the Alliance itself;

Accordingly, the Council Undertakes to
study the future tasks which face the Alli-
ance, and its procedures for fulfilling them,
in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor
for a durable peace. It will examine ways of
improving consultation within the Alliance,
including the European member countries.



In carrying out this study at a hig-h politi-
cal level, the Council will Utilise the most
appropriate possible procedures for fulfilling
its mandate.

A preliminary report will be examined at
the Spring 1967 Ministerial Meeting and the
Ministerial Council at its meeting in Decem-
ber 1967 will draw the appropriate conclu-
sions that emerge from the enquiry.


Press release 291 dated December 12


Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, chairman
Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense

U.S. Representative on the
North Atlantic Council
Harlan Cleveland

Members of the Delegation

Department of State

Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to France

Robert R. Bowie, Counselor, Department of State

Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secre-
tary of State

Eugene V. McAuliffe, Director, Office of NATO and
Atlantic Political-Military Affairs

Jacob M. Myerson, Office of NATO and Atlantic
Political-Military Affairs

Samuel T. Parelman, secretary of delegation. Deputy
Director, Office of International Conferences

Richard I. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs

Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs

George S. Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs

Andrew L. Steigman, Staff Assistant to the Secre-
tary of State

George S. Vest, Deputy Director, Office of NATO
and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs

Department of the Treasury

Douglass Hunt, Special Assistant to the Secretary of

the Treasury
James F. King, Assistant to the Secretary of the

Charles A. Sullivan, Assistant to the Secretary of

the Treasury

Department of Defense

Maj. Gen. Russell Dougherty, USAF, Director, Euro-
pean Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs

John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for International Security Affairs

Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs

Adm. A. G. Ward, U.S. Representative to the Mili-
tary Committee, North Atlantic Treaty Organi-

Gen. Earle Wheeler, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff

Frederick S. Wyle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs

U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation and European Regional Organizations
Dwight Dickinson, Director, Office of Political Affairs
Philip J. Farley, Deputy U.S. Representative on the

North Atlantic Council
John A. Hooper, Defense Adviser and Defense Rep-
Timothy W. Stanley, Director, United States NATO
Force Planning Group

JANUARY 9, 1967


Viet-Nam and the International Law of Self-defense

by Leonard C. Meeker
Legal Adviser ^

Throughout this land, the war in Viet-
Nam weighs heavy on the minds of Ameri-
cans. It is again and again the subject of our
talk, under the pressing flow of news dis-
patches and under the thousand impacts this
war has on our lives. It is never far from our

Fighting a war is never cheap, never easy.
The Viet-Nam war is a particularly difficult
one. As President Johnson has said, this is a
new kind of war. It is not a war of major
battles to be won or lost. It calls for courage
and fortitude to stick it out, over a long
period of time if need be.

There are few who would not be rid of the
war. It impinges directly on the lives of
American young men by the tens and hun-
dreds of thousands. Most Americans are
anxious to turn our full resources to another
great war — a war on poverty and hunger at
home and throughout the world. Some believe
the Viet-Nam war divides the world at a
time when we are most impelled to seek world

One cannot but be concerned about these
problems. No one can say that debate is
unnecessary — quite the contrary. We are
dealing with great issues. There are risks to
be weighed and roads that must be chosen.

It is my purpose, in the hour we have to-
gether this evening, to locate the Viet-Nam
war in the great river of time: first, to indi-

' 1966 Louis Caplan Lecture in Law at the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Law School, Pittsburgh, Pa.,
on Dec. 13 (press release 292).

cate something of how it arose; then, to relate
it to the existing framework of international
law; finally, to consider the place of this con-
flict in the building of a more stable and just
world order as nations move along the high-
road of history.

Origins of the Viet-Nam Conflict

Viet-Nam has a very short political his-
tory under that name — one that does not go
back even 20 years. Viet-Nam is made up
of three areas that were included in what
France called, for purposes of colonial admin-
istration, Indochina. Those areas were:
Tonkin in the Red River Delta of the north,
Annam along the central coast, and Cochin
China in the south around Saigon. In the
19th century France ruled these areas as pro-
tectorates and colonies, along with Laos and
Cambodia; all together, they made up Indo-

The colonial picture was a typical one: ad-
ministrators from France to govern; French
armed forces to keep order; colonists to direct
agriculture and trade; native gentry and
leaders who were clients of the French and
profited from the relationship; finally, the
Indochinese majority, who performed the
labor of the country and received relatively
little return for their toil.

Japan's military leaders, as part of their
program of expansion and conquest, occupied
Indochina in 1940. The colonial administra-
tion and the European residents of Indochina
by and large collaborated with the Japanese.



They hoiked thereby to keep the political, eco-
nomic, and social situation under control.

It was in World War II that the recent his-
tory of Viet-Nam began. Dissidents who
opposed the French and the Japanese carried
on a resistance movement. Ho Chi Minh was
the acknowledged leader of this movement
from the beginning. By 1945 the drive for
independence had become a significant politi-
cal force. The sense of nationalism and the
ideas of self-detennination were at work in
Indochina, as they were elsewhere in Asia
and soon came to be in Africa.

But France in the postwar period did not
follow the course of independence soon taken
by Britain for India, Bumia, and other
Commonwealth territories. France sought
instead to restore and reinforce its colonial
administration in Indochina. What had been
wartime resistance by the Viet Minh orga-
nization continued and grew as a struggle to
rid the country of colonial rule. In 1949
France sought to stem the tide by setting up
indigenous governments of limited authority
in Cambodia, in Laos, and in a new State of
Viet-Nam. France kept control of foreign
affairs, defense, and financial matters.

The guerrilla campaign of the Viet Minh
grew into a major war with the French
colonial forces. At the end of 5 years the bat-
tle of Dien Bien Phu had been lost by the
French, and Paris had decided to seek a po-
litical settlement. This was the origin of the
Geneva conference of 1954, in which the five
great world powers took part, along with
Cambodia, Laos, and North and South Viet-
Nam — each of which by then had its own
regime. The Government in the South had
been created by and was alined with France.
Hanoi was the seat of the rebel Viet Minh
regime which had been fighting the French.
Its concentration of militaiy and political
power was in the North, but it had guerrilla
units operating throughout the countiy. The
participants in the Geneva conference did not
have to produce any agreement at all. They
were free to continue all the existing dis-
agreements. The French and Viet Minh mili-
tary forces could have gone on with the
fighting, to whatever conclusion it would

yield. Since, however, they did reach a series
of international agreements, we are entitled
to look at them as binding legal instruments.
We will want first to see what contracts
were made. We will want to see what provi-
sion was made for insuring compliance. We
will want to look at what happened in fact.
We will want to examine the legal rights of
the- parties in the circumstances of 1956 to

The Geneva Accords

The 1954 Geneva conference produced
agreements on Cambodia and Laos as well as
on Viet-Nam, but for present purijoses we
shall consider only the instruments relating
to Viet-Nam.2 The chief of these was the
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in
Viet-Nam. It was signed on behalf of the
commander in chief of the French Union
forces in Indochina and on behalf of the com-
mander in chief of the People's Army of

The very first article of the Viet-Nam
cease-fire agreement fixed a demarcation line,
near the 17th parallel in central Viet-Nam,
"on either side of which the forces of the
two parties shall be regrouped after their
withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army
of Viet-Nam to the north of the line and the
forces of the French Union to the south."
Under article 19 of the same agreement, the
two parties were bound to insure that the
zones assigned to them "are not used for the
resumption of hostilities or to further an ag-
gressive policy." And under article 24 each
party was obligated to "commit no act and
undertake no operation against the other
party." Articles 16 and 17 of the agreement
prohibited the introduction into Viet-Nam of
additional armed forces or weapons, but per-
mitted the rotation of troops and the replace-
ment of wornout or used-up materiel. Article
18 prohibited the establishment of new mili-
tary bases throughout Viet-Nam territory.

In a separate document, known as the

^ For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-
1955, Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State
publication 6446, p. 750.

JANUARY 9, 1967


Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference,^
the conference powers agreed that the settle-
ment of political problems in Viet-Nam
should "permit the Viet-Namese people to
enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed
by democratic institutions established as a
result of free general elections by secret bal-
lot." There were to be general elections in
July 1956 under the supervision of the Inter-
national Control Commission. Consultations
on this subject were to be held between repre-
sentatives of the two zones beginning in July

Here, then, were the basic undertakings of
the Geneva accords. If observed, they should
have kept the peace in Viet-Nam. What was
to insure that the parties would live up to
these undertakings ? The agreement sought to
provide some machinery for international

There was to be an International Control
Commission, made up of representatives of
India, Canada, and Poland. The Commission
was to oversee fulfillment of all the obliga-
tions of the agreement. It was to have inspec-
tion teams at its disposal and access to any
and all places in both zones of Viet-Nam.
Some of the Commission's decisions could be
made by majority vote; others, including
those dealing with violations or threats of
violations which might lead to a resumption
of hostilities, would require a unanimous vote
of all members.

In this respect, the arrangement was
flawed from the beginning. Any member of
the Commission could veto a decision on a
question of compliance with the agreement.
On other matters, even a majority might be
unobtainable because the representative of
India, in carrying out his Government's
policy of nonalinement, could remain aloof
and equivocal on important matters. Vetoes
were in fact cast, and the Indian chairman
of the Commission often pursued his national
policy of neutralism and nonalinement. The
Commission had other difficulties, too. The
zonal authorities, and particularly those in
North Viet-Nam, denied access to the inspec-
tion teams of the Commission.

' Ibid., p. 785.

As a result of this state of aflFairs, the
world has not had an eff"ective, authoritative,
and impartial reporting mechanism on the
facts in Viet-Nam. There could and did arise
disputes about the facts in Viet-Nam. For
example, who lived up to the cease-fire
agreement, and who broke it? Was the sub-
sequent conflict indigenous and essentially a
civil war, or was there the intervention of
substantial and perhaps crucial external
force ?

Events in Viet-Nam Since 1954

Issues like these have a bearing on the
international legal rights of the parties. Be-
cause they are an essential part of the legal
analysis, we must try to deal with them.
Since, for the most part, we do not have avail-
able authoritative findings by an impartial
international body, it is necessaiy to work
with the best evidence that can be gathered.

I should like to set out what the United
States Government believes happened after
July 1954 and to set these events beside the
provisions of the Geneva accords. I shall, of
course, discuss what the Government of
South Viet-Nam and the Government of the
United States did after July 1954. But be-
cause their actions were in the nature of a

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 16 of 90)