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will soon be bringing mass communication,
in the real sense, to our planet. They bear
with them, too, the implications cf the crea-
tion of a one-world classroom.

Tlie sky is no longer the limit!

strengthening International Education

In such an age, our position of world lead-
ership demands that we go far beyond our
present efforts in international education.

The International Education Act will make
a i-eal difference in helping improve the
faculties, facilities, and libraries of our col-
leges and universities. Its impact will be felt
at both the undergraduate and graduate
levels.

The new Center for Educational Coopera-
tion, among its other functions, will serve as
a Government manpower resources head-
quarters in the entire field.

These things give us a framework upon
which we can build.

Next year the President will convene an
international conference on education. Its
purpose will be to look beyond the programs
presently underway or even contemplated —
in fact, to take international education into
century 21. Planning meetings for the con-
ference will begin in the next few weeks,
under the chairmanship of Secretary [of
Health, Education, and Welfare John W.]
Gardner and Dr. James Perkins of Cornell.



164



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN



But we all should remember that the de-
termination of the Government to do its part
to strengthen international education in no
way diminishes the need for continued lead-
ership in this field by private institutions of
all kinds, foundations, universities, colleges,
churches, and others.

The role of the Government in this field
must always be to supplement, never to sup-
plant, the efforts of private groups and indi-
viduals. The bold experiments, the expanded
programs that should come from private in-
stitutions — like the Institute of International
Education — can be carried out only with the
continued support of American private bene-
factors. So take the initiative — do your job —
lead.

Indeed, one of the urgent tasks of our
American democracy is to find new ways and
means to mobilize and allocate both public
and private resources to the priorities of our
time without either destroying private initia-
tive or unduly enhancing public power.

The Second Industrial Revolution

Tonight I would like to address myself to
the next decade, to the world of the 1970's.
I would like to take advantage of the pres-
ence of so many illustrious figures from the
world of education and finance, foundations
and business, the communications media and
the arts, to raise certain questions which you
and your children must answer. And it is
appropriate that these questions be put to
you.

Governments — and government officials —
must deal with immediate problems. This
often clouds their perception of the future.
But you are less inhibited by these restraints
and better situated to anticipate what is com-
ing as well as to respond to what is here.

In speculating on the world of the 1970's
(and what I suggest here tonight can only
be considered as speculation by an amateur)
I would like to raise several questions about
the consequences of what has been called
the second industrial revolution.

The first industrial revolution was charac-
terized by the invention of powerful



machines which multiply man's capacity for
physical work. The second industrial revolu-
tion, which is coming upon us long before the
problems of the first have been solved, is
characterized by the invention of new elec-
tronic machines which are destined to mul-
tiply the capacity of the human mind.

Differences Between Developed Areas

One important consequence of the second
industrial revolution involves the techno-
logical gap which today separates the world's
most developed country, the United States,
from the other developed areas of the world
— yes, even Europe.

This unique gap exists in large part be-
cause the second industrial revolution has
developed in the United States far more than
in any other area. It results, in part, from
the difl'ering levels of technological progress
and organizational efficiency, which are also
affected by the factor of optimum size.

These can lead to the creation of dif-
ferences between two developed areas — "de-
veloped" in the sense of the first industrial
revolution — just as there are differences
which now exist between the so-called de-
veloped areas of the Northern Hemisphere
and the developing or underdeveloped na-
tions of the South.

Scientific and technical progress is con-
tinuing at an accelerated rate with no pros-
pect of reaching a saturation point. Dis-
coveries are based on previous knowledge and
in turn generate progress in other fields.
Progress becomes self-propelling.

Only four areas of the world — the United
States, Western Europe, Japan, and the
Soviet Union — have the educational and re-
search resources and other elements of a
technological base to deal with the current
pace of scientific discoveries. But none of the
four has the resources today to deal effec-
tively with the entire spectrum of these dis-
coveries, although the United States comes
closest to it.

Scientific and technological progress de-
pends greatly on the rate of investment in
research and development.



JANUARY 30, 1967



165



Recent Common Market estimates show
the total of scientists and research workers
in the United States to be 4 times greater
than in all the countries of the EEC [Euro-
pean Economic Community] and 3I/2 times
greater than in the Soviet Union.

According to the same estimates, research
expenditures in the United States are 7 times
greater than in the Common Market and 3V^
times those of the Soviet Union.

And U.S. per capita investment is six
times as much as in the Common Market and
four times that of the Soviet Union.

Organizational Structure and Capacity

Beyond the statistics, however, we are told
by European entrepreneurs that this dis-
parity in scientific research capacity is
widened by the difference in organizational
capacity between the United States and
Europe.

Aurelio Peccei of Olivetti, for one, believes
that only the United States possesses the
highly developed modern organization re-
quired to profit appreciably from the techno-
logical discoveries of today.

This is especially important in the new and
complex field of electronic data processing,
where organization is the decisive factor in
exploiting the potential capacity of highly
refined machines.

To translate the amazing potential of com-
puters into concrete benefits for society re-
quires an accumulation of skills which few
nations have. It requires, as Mr. Peccei
points out, "evolved user techniques, knowl-
edge of machine languages, advanced meth-
odology, rich program libraries, access to the
cross-fertilizing experiences of a vast net-
work of users, plus a competent array of
mathematicians, analysts and programmers."

What is relevant here is that the material
advantages which exist in an advanced
society such as the United States or Western
Europe are multiplied by the organizational
structure and capacity of the country or
region.



Western European countries today have j
neither the size required for such efficient
organization nor adequate basic infrastruc-
ture, such as fully sufficient communication
linkage essential to transmission of elec- -
tronic data. The end of the present fragmen-
tation of Europe is considered a necessity.

Technology and Unity

But, fortunately, on both sides of the
Atlantic we are beginning to face up to this
problem.

We have already taken steps to remove
barriers to the flow of scientific and techni-
cal information and instruments to and from
our country.''

As a United States Senator I proposed that
NATO, in meeting the new challenges facing
the alliance, should take concrete steps to-
ward narrowing the technological gap.

Proposals for such cooperative actions are
now formally before the NATO ministers.'
The OECD [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development] ministers
have recently authorized an analytical study
of the gap.''

One promising proposal has been Prime
Minister Wilson's [British Prime Minister
Harold Wilson] for a European Technologi-
cal Community. If Europe — which has
already seen the benefits of a Euroi)ean Eco-
nomic Community, a Coal and Steel Com-
munity, and an Atomic Energy Community
— were to pool her technology in a similar
way, I have no doubt that the gap would in
the next decade begin to close.

The fundamental question which I would
like to leave with you is: What are the impli-
cations of this second industrial revolution
for the international relations of the 1970's,
especially the late 1970's?



' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 12, 1966,
p. 894.

' For text of a resolution adopted by the NATO
Council of Ministers on Dec. 16, 1966, see ibid., Jan.
9, 1967, p. 52.

* For U.S. statements and text of a communique
dated Nov. 25, 1966, see ibid., Jan. 2, 1967, p. 19.



166



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN



I do not know the answer. But already
serious men are concerned that it could re-
sult not in greater unity, not in the cement-
ing of a long-cherished Atlantic partnership,
but in estrangement between Europe and the
United States.

Yes, it could release forces which would
widen the gap between the United States and
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at a
time when the ideological and military com-
petition between them might be diminishing.

If these are legitimate concerns, should
not men of vision and foresight seek to plan
for these eventualities and by decisive action
influence their development?

We must guide the technological revolu-
tion so that it can enhance our unity rather
than cause alienation and division.

This means that some way must be found
to insure a continuous exchange of techno-
logical and organizational experience be-
tween Europe and the United States which
will achieve an equilibrium that can be main-
tained and possibly someday expanded to in-
clude Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

If this seems fanciful, I would repeat that
I am discussing the next decade — which ends
in 1980 — not the present.

New Realities of a New Era

Reflecting on the problems which this sec-
ond industrial revolution will bring to our
own country in the next decade, a young
American pioneer in the second industrial
revolution, Mr. John Diebold, has proposed
the creation of "an institute for the con-
tinued assessment of the human consequences
of technological change."

Perhaps what is needed in the interna-
tional field is some equivalent forum which
would bring together under nongovernmental
auspices men of wisdom and experience from
the universities and foundations, science and
industry, politics and the professions, who
could systematically assess the implications
of this second industrial revolution for the
world of the 1970's. Their recommendations



would invariably become an important guide
to governmental decisionmaking.

Yes, we must have a global policy which
fits the new realities of a new era.

With such a policy, we shall be better pre-
pared not only to deal with the relations be-
tween the technologically advanced areas of
the world and the problems of survival and
peace which affect all countries, but also with
those areas where the first industrial revolu-
tion is still taking hold.

I refer to the problems of hunger and over-
population, education and social justice, and
distribution of wealth.

We shall be better prepared to strengthen
and enlarge the area of prosperity in the
world.

Building a Truly Human World

In the next decade, even more than the
present, the relationship between foreign
affairs and education will be important.

The scholar and the businessman, the
foundation and the university, will play a
significant role in accelerating the techno-
logical revolution and assisting mankind to
deal with its consequences.

But the closeness of their relationship, in
this decade or the next, in no way implies
that the university and the scholars and the
scientists should cease to independently pur-
sue their own ends. Chief among these is the
pursuit and dissemination of truth. Govern-
ment — at home or abroad — should not deflect
them from pursuing this end.

But in the next decade, as in this one,
scientific and technological education will not
be enough to sustain the spirit of civilization
or the functioning of a democratic society.

The vision of the poet and the philosopher,
the humanist and the historian, is needed to
stimulate what Shakespeare called the "bet-
ter angels of our nature."

Without these to guide us, the technologi-
cal revolution in the next decade can bring
the faceless men of an Orwellian world, men
whose sole distinction lies in their similarity
to one another.



JANUARY 30, 1967



167



The vision we need as we face the 1970's is
that of a great man who died in this city a
decade ago, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.

For him the marvels of modem science
and technology provided man with a new op-
portunity to build a truly human world.

Through his vision we can come to under-
stand that the growing interdependence of
mankind caused by the technological revolu-
tion can lead to a world civilization in which



both persons and nations find their individu-
ality enhanced, find their mutual dependence
and mutual fate a condition to be welcomed
rather than a threat to be feared.

If the men of talent and vision seize the
opportunity to plan now for the world of the
1970's, your children and mine at the turn
of the next decade can look forward with
hope and confidence to 1984.



Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today'' Program



Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rusk on the National Broad-
casting System's television program "Today"
on Jantmry 12. Interviewing the Secretary
were Hugh Downs from New York and
Joseph C. Harsch in Washington.

Mr. Downs: You know, so much of the Na-
tion and, indeed, the world is concerned
these days over our current foreign policy.
So it seems most appropriate to invite Sec-
retary of State Dean Rusk into our Washing-
ton studios this morning

Mr. Secretary, before we start on some of
the more immediate problems, and since this
is, as you may know, "Today" — the "Today"
program's 15th anniversary week, I wonder
if you'd tell us what you consider to be some
of the most important events that have oc-
curred over the past 15 years?

Secretary Rusk: Good morning, Hugh. I
think I would like to start by congratulating
you, and Barbara [Walters], and Frank
[Blair] on the "Today" program. It's a great
show, and I see it almost every day.

Mr. Doivns: Thank you.

Secretary Rusk: These 15 years have been
filled with important events. They began with
the winding up of the Korean war on the
basis of a rejection of North Korea's at-
tempts to seize South Korea by force.



This period has seen the multiplication
of nuclear weapons and the development of
competitive nuclear weapon systems, raising
for the first time in man's history the opera-
tional issue of the survival of the human race
— although, I think we can take more confi-
dence from — than we think from the fact
that it's been 21 years now since a nuclear
weapon has been fired in anger. That's a far
more important fact than most people
suppose.

It does point to the tragedy that the
Baruch proposals were not accepted back in
1946, under which there would have been no
nuclear power.

I think the historians will say that one of
the most dramatic aspects of this 15 years
has been the doubling of the membership of
the United Nations, the emergence of 60 or
more new nations into the world community
by — largely by peaceful means.

We have seen the second generation come
to power in the Soviet Union.

We've seen major division within the
Communist world because the authorities in
Peking have isolated themselves, even in the
Communist world, by their doctrines of mili-
tancy and aggressiveness.

We've had the experience of the Cuban
missile crisis in which men had to look down
the long cannon's mouth of great catastrophe.



168



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN



And I think everybody came away from
that more prudent, a little more cautious
about how they conduct themselves in world
affairs.

We wind up this 15 years with some big
problems on our hands, the central one being
how we organize a durable peace.

I think in the next decade we're going to
face a critical food situation throughout the
world to which all nations must address
themselves.

But I think also that we can see that com-
mon sense is making some headway.

President Kennedy took to the Senate the
nuclear test ban treaty.

President Johnson has moved on the civil
air agreement with the Soviet Union, the
consular agreement, his East- West trade pro-
posals, the space treaty. We hope that we'll
be able to find some answer to the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons.

So there's a full agenda ahead. But when
we look back on these 15 years, I think we
can see some steady progress toward peace
and reason in the world.

Mr. Downs: Thank you. And on that note,
I'll turn the questioning now over to NBC
diplomatic correspondent Joseph C. Harsch,
who I see is sitting in the studio alongside
you.

Aggression in Southeast Asia

Mr. Harsch: Thank you, Hugh. I'm glad
I am here.

Mr. Secretary, I'd like to start it out by
going back to the news conference that Sec-
retary-General U Thant of the United Na-
tions did 2 days ago. In that there appeared
to be considerable differences with American
policy. For example, he said, "I do not sub-
scribe to the generally held view that if South
Viet-Nam falls, then country X, then coun-
try Y, then country Z will follow. I do not
agree with this so-called domino theory." Is
this a matter of difference with our policy?

Secretary Rxisk: Well, I myself have never
subscribed to something called the domino
theory, because that suggests that we're
merely playing games with little wooden



blocks with dots on them. Actually, the prob-
lem is the old problem of the phenomenon of
aggression.

Country X, if you like, is South Viet-Nam.
North Viet-Nam is trying to seize South
Viet-Nam by force.

Country Y is, perhaps, Laos. We had an
agreement on Laos in 1962 under which there
would be no North Vietnamese forces in
Laos. And Laos would not be used as a route
of infiltration into South Viet-Nam. That
has not been performed. And the govern-
ment that we agreed on in Geneva in 1962
has not been permitted to exercise authority
throughout Laos. And the International Con-
trol Commission has not been permitted to
exercise its functions in the Communist-held
areas of Laos. So, undoubtedly, there are
appetites with respect to Laos.

Country Z is, perhaps, already Thailand.
The other side has announced that they are
going after Thailand. There are subversive
guerrilla elements in northeast Thailand
trained outside. There's a Thai training camp
now in North Viet-Nam preparing additional
guerrillas to go into Thailand.

So, there's no need for something called
the domino theory.

The theory is that proclaimed in Peking
repeatedly, that the world revolution of com-
munism must be advanced by militant means.
Now, if they can be brought toward an atti-
tude of peaceful coexistence, if the second
generation in China can show some of the
prudence that the second generation in the
Soviet Union has shown, then, maybe, we can
begin to build a durable peace there.

Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, the Secretary-
General of the U.N. also in that same news
conference said, "I do not subscribe to the
view that South Viet-Nam is strategically
vital to Western interests and Western se-
curity." What are our vital strategic interests
in the area? Do you regard Viet-Nam as
vital?

Secretary Rusk: Well, there are important
geographical features, natural resources,
large numbers of people in Southeast Asia.

I think the heart of the matter is, again,



JANUARY 30, 1967



169



the phenomenon of aggression. And if the
momentum of aggression should begin to roll
in that part of the world, stimulated or sup-
ported or engaged in by those who are com-
mitted to the spread of the world revolution
by violence, then that seems to put us back
on the trail that led us into World War II.

What is important is that all nations, large
and small, have a chance to live unmolested
by their neighbors, as provided in the United
Nations Charter.

Article 1 of the charter deals with acts of
aggression, breaches of the peace, the neces-
sity for peaceful settlement of disputes.
Article 2 of the charter is about the self-
determination of people. These are very im-
portant lessons derived from the events
which led us into World War II. We feel that
we've got to hang on to those lessons, be-
cause if they lead us into world war III,
there won't be much left from which we can
draw lessons and start over again.

Threat to Durable Peace

Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, is it not the
question so much of our vital interests, as of
the threat to our vital interests?

Now, you said yesterday i that four Presi-
dents have identified this area as being stra-
tegically important to us. At the time that
process started — we're talking about Presi-
dent Truman now and then President
Eisenhower's time — there certainly did seem
to be a major threat to our interests in that
area.

What has happened to the nature of that
threat? During the last year I had in mind
the breach between Moscow and Peking. Is
there not a diminution in the threat to our
interests in that area because Moscow and
Peking are no longer close together?

Secretary Rusk: Well, Peking has the capa-
bility of maintaining a major threat there,
de])ending upon both its policy and its action.

You see, we have a very strong interest
in the organization of peace in the Pacific,
just as we have in the Atlantic. We have



' In an informal press interview.



alliances with Korea and Japan and the Re-
public of China and the Philippines, Thai-
land, Australia, New Zealand. So, we are
very much interested in the stability of the
peace in the Pacific Ocean area and in East
Asia.

Now, if these aggressive pressures from
Hanoi, with the support of Peking, should
move into Southeast Asia, not only are hun-
dreds of millions of people involved and vital
resources involved, but the prospects for a
durable peace dissolve.

And so we have a tremendous interest in
establishing in that area of the world, as we
have done in the NATO area, the notion that
the nations must be left alone and be allowed
to live in peace, as the Charter of the United
Nations provides.

Leadership Struggle in Mainland China

Mr. Harsch: But the danger 2 years ago
was much greater than it is now, surely.

Secretary Rtisk: Well, I'm not sure what is
going to be the reaction of the authorities in
Peking when they get all of these present
troubles sorted out. What are they going to
do about their doctrine of militant support
of the world revolution ?

They've had a series of setbacks in the last
2 years, a major setback in Indonesia,
catastrophe in the Afro-Asian conference.
They put in an ultimatum to India during the
India-Pakistan fighting and had to back
away from it. They've been almost expelled
from the world Communist movement.
They've been expelled from four or five coun-
tries in Africa.

Now, these have undoubtedly put great
pressures on the leadership there. And my
guess is that one of the reasons why there
is considerable turmoil at the top in main-
land China today is that there must have
been some important policy discussions there
about whether or not they're on the right
track and that this has led to differences
among the leadership which are being re-
flected in some of the events that we hear
about from day to day now.

Mr. Harsch: What is your reading, as of



170



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN



this — right now, on what's going on in
Peking ?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that it is fair
to suspend judgment on that.

If I say that I don't really know, it doesn't
embarrass me very much, because I suspect
that Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Ch'en I, and
these other people out there don't really know
exactly what is happening there. But there
seems to be an authentic struggle of leader-
ship among the top 12 or 15 people in that
system. There seems to be a considerable de-



Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 34 of 90)