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fact, the main programs of the platform
which I presented to the party that elected
me. The main goal in my party, in my plal^
form, was men.

I mean by that a three-pronged attack
and a series of achievements in the fields of
education, health, better food, housing, and
social well-being. What you have said, Mr.
President, was a very vital lesson to me. I
am very grateful and very pleased to say
that our views coincide on such important

Once more I thank you very much for your
very inspiring and kind words.

Let us toast the personal health of the
President and Mrs. Johnson, and particularly
a toast to the greatness of the United States,
this country which is the foremost defender
of human freedom.

"Volunteers to America"
Program Gets Underway

The Department of State announced on
January 25 (press release 13) that a number
of its embassies abroad have been asked to
discuss with other governments the possi-
bility of sending young citizens to participate
in a "Volunteers to America" pilot project
beginning next summer. Approximately 100

young men and women from Latin America,
the Near East, Asia, and Africa will be se-
lected to teach in U. S. schools and serve in
community programs for 1 to 2 yeai-s.

President Johnson recommended such a
program in his message to Congress on in-
ternational education in February 1966.

The Department of State is acting under
its existing authorization to conduct ex-
change programs, contained in the Mutual
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of
1961 (Fulbrighi^Hays Act). The Peace
Corps, which is advising the Department on
the program, last spring sought authority for
a larger operation. Congressional committees
hearing the proposal noted, however, that in
the Fulbright^-Hays Act authority already
exists for the State Department's Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs to test the
idea with a pilot project.

The U. S. Office of Education is assisting
the State Department in placing the volun-
teers, working primarily through the Sup-
plementary Centers and Services Program
created under title III of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965. A re-
cent survey indicated wide interest in the

Most of the volunteers in the pilot project
will serve in schools throughout the United
States as teachers and resource persormel
in classes in modem languages, area and so-
cial studies, music, art, and physical educa-
tion. It is expected that they will also become
involved in local community activities and
development projects. Other volunteers will
work primarily in neighborhood centers or
in rural or urban community action pro-
grams alongside U.S. volunteers.

Participants will be selected jointly by
their own governments and representatives
of American embassies. They will generally
be young, unmarried, English-speaking grad-
uates of normal schools or universities in
their home countries.

Governments of the countries sending vol-
unteers will cover the costs of reciniitmenit
and interTiational transportation, while the
schools and agencies receiving volunteers
here will provide the living allowances. The



total cost to the U.S. Government, which will
cover 4-week training programs after arrival
in this country, domestic transpoitation, and
administration, has been budgeted at

United States Achieves Removal
of Foreign Import Restrictions

Press release 15 dated January 26


In 1966 and early 1967 the trading part-
ners of the United States took further im-
portant steps to liberalize their import trade
by removing quantitative imix)rt restrictions.

As in former years. United States efforts
to gain easier and expanded access to foreign
markets have been undertaken, on both a
bilateral and multilateral basis, primarily
within the framework of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The
GATT provides a general prohibition against
quantitative import restrictions but recog-
nizes that certain exceptions must be ac-
corded, in particular where a country's for-
eign exchange reserves are threatened by
balance-of-payments difficulties.

In the post^World War II period many con-
tracting parties found it necessary to main-
tain restraints on their imports for balance-
of-payments reasons. Since 1960-61, how-
ever, our major trading partners have gen-
erally had no balance-of-payments justifica-
tion to restrict imports, and their indus-
trial import trade is now practically
I free of quota controls. The agricultural
sector, however, has proven more difficult
to liberalize. Fui-ther, the important liber-
alization of trade which has come about
in the developed countries has not yet oc-
curred in the developing countries which, at
their present stage of economic development,
find quantitative import controls necessaiy
in protecting their low level of foreign ex-
change reserves and in directing the avail-
able foreign exchange to the purchase of

imixnis considered most essential to the
sound development of their economies.

Over the past year, the Department of
State and other agencies of the United States
Government have continued common efforts
to reduce obstacles to international trade. In
1966 discussions were held in Oslo under
GATT consultative procedures on a range of
agricultural restrictions of considerable
trade interest to the United States. Our Em-
bassy in Paris continued GATT consultations
begun in 1962 on certain agricultural restric-
tions impeding United States exports to
France. Both of these efforts led to further
relaxation of barriers.

The United States also continued to play a
leading ix)le in Geneva in regular GATT con-
sultations, where quantitative imix)rt restric-
tions maintained for balance-of-payments
reasons are examined by a committee of in-
terested GATT contracting parties. A num-
ber of consulting countries took important
steps to free part of their import trade from
quantitative controls; others moved to in-
crease the size of their quotas; and still
others stated their resolve to move in the
direction of further liberalization.

Listed below in summary form are the
more significant liberalization actions our
trading partners have taken over the past
year and in early 1967.



At the beginning of 1967 Austria removed import
quota restrictions from 11 tariff items or subitems.
Included in the Austrian action were: carpeting,
wooden and plastic furniture, wool blankets, and
certain types of electric accumulators and parts.


Eleven tariff items or subitems were removed
from quota control in January 1966. These items
included certain fish, sugar confectionery, marma-
lade, certain glues, friction material, and certain
lifts. In a further 1966 move Denmark lifted quan-
titative import restrictions from six tariff subitems,
including biscuits and rusks, flour and meal of sago
and arrowroot, certain marmalades and fruit jellies
and puree, basketwork and wickerwork, footwear

FEBRUARY 13, 1967


with uppers of rubber, and footwear with rubber
soles. Denmark also liberalized a number of items,
mostly in the agricultural area, in January 1967.
Dried apples and mixtures of dried fruits contain-
ing dried apples; fresh cod, plaice, and herring;
fresh asparagus; grits and flour of buckwheat and
millet are among the items no longer subject to
quantitative control.

intermediate iron and steel products. At the begin-
ning of 1967 Iceland made an adjustment-in its
quota controls, the net effect of which was to in-
crease the amount of imports which are free of any
quantitative control to 86.5 percent of total im-
ports based on 1965 trade. In this move quotas
were removed from unroasted coffee, electric motors,
glass, hollow plates, and veneer.


Since freeing over 170 tariff items or subitems
from quantitative restriction on January 1, 1966,'
Finland brought about another important liberaliza-
tion of its import trade in January of this year. This
latest action removed quotas covering 144 tariff
items or subitems including certain food products,
articles of leather, certain textiles, machinery and
equipment, and TV and radio receivers. On the basis
of Finland's 1964 import trade, these two liberaliza-
tions freed imports valued at some $60 million.


France increased quotas on certain agricultural
items of trade interest to us, and quantitative con-
trols which had formerly been maintained over more
than a dozen food items when imported from the
United States were removed. Quotas were also elimi-
nated from imports of certain preserved vegetables,
grape juices, orange juices, apple juices, certain
other juices, and coffee extracts. Another step taken
in late 1966 freed such manufactured items as cot-
ton terry fabrics, knitted or crocheted socks and
stockings, certain sewing machines and needles, elec-
tric cells and batteries, and lighters from quantita-
tive restriction.


The Government of Japan took two import trade
liberalization steps in 1966. The first freed cocoa
powder in small containers, streptomycin, and cer-
tain yarn of manmade continuous fibers from quan-
titative restrictions; the second freed penicillin,
tantalum and articles thereof, and certain outboard


Noi-way removed import quota controls from a
number of agricultural items of considerable trade
interest to the United States at the beginning of
1967. These included canned mixed fruit and fruit
cocktail, canned sour cherries, canned fruit juice
mixtures, certain canned vegetable juices, frozen
corn, and precooked (minute) rice.


In 1966 Spain lifted quantitative import restric-
tions from some 75 tariff items. These included vari-
ous coated textile fabrics and garments, various
household goods and appliances, certain cutlery
items, nails, dyes, tanning extracts, and a range of
paper products.


In 1966 Iceland removed quantitative controls
from a range of products which accounted for about
7 percent of imports into Iceland in 1964. This im-
portant liberalization covered a wide range of items
such as malt, glucose, coniferous wood, carpets, knit-
ted or crocheted stockings, undergarments, piping,
glass articles, bottles, electric accumulators, wire,
certain tube and pipe fittings, and a variety of

' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 18, 1966,
p. 624.


On January 1, 1967, Yugoslavia embarked on a
bold and promising program of trade liberalization
affecting an important segment of Yugoslavian im-
port trade. According to some estimates, the amount
of 1967 imports which will be freely imported may
reach 50 percent. Among the items removed from
quantitative restriction are certain types of electri-
cal equipment, appliance components, signaling
equipment, stationery and other paper products,
most building materials, wood products, leather and
footwear, fruit juices, and many metals and min-.




Secretary Rusk Urges Congressional Support
for Consular Convention With the Soviet Union

Statement by Secretary Rusk '■

I come today to urge this committee and
the Senate to act favorably on the consular
convention \vith the Soviet Union.^

This convention was proposed by the
United States.

It is a step carried to agreement in 1964
after 5 years of painstaking effort.

It is a step proposed and endorsed by
three administrations representing both
political parties.

It is a step reported favorably by this com-
mittee 18 months ago.

It is a step which, at little cost, would be
very much in the national interest.

Why then has the Senate not so far acted
on this treaty? I believe this has been largely
because of misunderstanding.

There are a number of detailed aspects of
the convention, which the committee ex-
plored at length in 1965. You may wish to
raise these aspects with the two distin-
guished gentlemen who have come here with
me: Under Secretary of State [Nicholas
deB.] Katzenbach, who can discuss these
questions with the expertise of a former At-
torney General, and Ambassador Foy Kohler,
Deputy Under Secretary of State, who can
respond from his long experience as Ambas-

' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on Jan. 23 (press release 10). The com-
plete hearings will be published by the committee.

= S. Ex. D, 88th Cong., 2d sess.; for text, see Bul-
letin of June 22, 1964, p. 979.

sador in Moscow. (It was Ambassador Koh-
ler, you will recall, who signed this conven-
tion in Moscow in 1964.)

But whatever the details of the convention,
I would like to spend a few minutes dis-
cussing a single, simple, central fact of this
matter — a fact which has been misunder-

It has been argued — and widely thought —
that the purpose of this convention is to au-
thorize the opening of consulates by both
countries. That is not its basic puriJOse.
What this convention is primarily intended
to do, immediately upon going into effect, is
to permit the United States promptly to pro-
test and assist its citizens when they are
arrested and detained in the Soviet Union.

Even if no consulates were ever to be
opened by the two countries, this convention
would give American citizens in the Soviet
Union more rights than any Soviet citizen
possesses — rights which any Soviet citizen
already has in our open society without such
a treaty.

The importance of this result would be
considerable, both quantitatively and quali-
tatively. It must not be underestimated.

Quantitatively, the importance of the pro-
tections this convention would afford to
Americans increases every year. The number
of Soviet tourists and visitors to this country
is small and has remained fairly constant in
the past 5 years. It was about 900 in 1962,

FEBRUAHY 13, 1967


and it was about 900 in 1966. But the num-
ber of American tourists and visitoi-s in the
Soviet Union has increased steadily during
the same period. In 1962, 10,000 American
travelers went to the Soviet Union. In 1966
there were 18,000.

Let me supply the full figures for the

U.S. Travelen to V.S.S.R. Soviet Travders to U.S.






























3,074 *



The convention thus would benefit both
countries, but on simply a numerical basis —
comparing 900 with 18,000 — it is more valu-
able to the United States.

At least as important, however, is the
qualitative argument — the fact that this con-
vention would allow the United States to
take protective action in those incidents
when American citizens have been detained
for long periods with little or delayed assist-
ance from their Government.

To those accustomed to the vigilance of
American courts in protecting the rights of
arrested individuals, it is jarring to recog-
nize that, under Soviet law, access to an ar-
rested person can be refused while the case
is under investigation — for a period of weeks
or even longer, up to 9 months.

There is not even a present requirement
that the United States must be notified of an

Such treatment is not only unjust by our
standards but must have wounding impact
on the individuals involved. Surely such inci-

' No exact count is available of the number of U.S.
tourists visiting the Soviet Union; so the figures in
this first column are approximate. You will notice
that we have revised upward, from 12,000 to 15,000,
our 1964 estimate in this category. This we did
after checking data from all available sources, in-
cluding Soviet sources as well as our own passport
offices. [Footnote in original.]

■* The sharp increase in U.S. exchange visitors to
the U.S.S.R. in 1966 was largely attributable to
heavy U.S. attendance at a number of major inter-
national conferences. [Footnote in original.]

dents have serious public impact in this
country. Without rules of the kind this
convention would provide, the arrest of an
individual quickly becomes an international

That I am not exaggerating is evident
from recalling even briefly a few of the
recent cases. One was the case of the RB^7
flyers in 1960 and 1961. Another was the
case of Professor [Frederick] Barghoom,
whose arrest in 1963 we learned of only
after 12 days, and whom we were never per-
mitted to see in prison.

Another was the tragic 1965 case of New-
comb Mott, in which 9 days elapsed before
any American official was allowed access to
him, and then only for 1 hour. Only three
other consular meetings were allowed in the
next 10 weeks prior to trial. Mott was sen-
tenced to 18 months in prison. Apparently in
a state of despondency very likely related to
the isolation in which he had been held, he
died shortly afterward in circumstances that
have yet not been fully explained.

Thomas Dawson, a Peace Corps volunteer,
was apprehended by Soviet border guards
on September 11, 1966, while gathering sea-
shells barefoot near the Soviet-Iranian bor-
der. Our Embassy was never notified of his
arrest, and it was not until September 20
that consular access was accorded.

And the most recent instance, which is still
unresolved, is that of the arrest of Buell Ray
Wortham and Craddock Matthew Gilmour
on October 1, 1966, for currency violations
and theft.

In just the 30 months since the convention
was signed, we know of at least 20 cases
where Americans have been detained by the
Soviet police. Some of these Americans acted
foolishly — or worse. Some committed acts
which are regarded as criminal under Soviet
but not American law; some apparently com-
mitted acts which would be criminal in both
countries. In none of these cases did the
Soviet authorities adhere to the standards of
notification and access provided for by this

I cannot assure you that, if this consular
convention had been in force, we could have



prevented the tragic outcome of the Mott
case or prevented these other Americans
from being jailed. But the standai-ds pro-
vided by tliis convention would have greatly-
assisted us in our efforts to assure them the
protection that is normal among most states.

Equally important, this convention could
well have eliminated the need for the United
States to make repeated representations, at
very high political levels, in order to secure
even late and limited access to our citizens.

The rights of international due process
which this convention would provide should
be available without question, \vithout delay,
and without the need for continuous and
insistent high-level diplomacy. They should
be accoixled as a matter of course.

That goal — the maximum possible protec-
tion and assistance for American citizens
on a regular and routine basis — is our cen-
tral purpose in this convention, a purpose
about which I cannot imagine any serious

This convention is not necessary to au-
thorize the reestablishment of consulates
between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The President's foreign policy re-
sponsibilities under the Constitution already
give him the authority to permit the estab-
lishment of foreign consulates in this coun-

That is an authority which has been acted
on repeatedly, not only with a number of
other countries but specifically with the So-
viet Union. Soviet consulates were estab-
lished in New York and San Francisco in
1934 and in Los Angeles in 1937. The United
States established a consulate in Vladivostok
in 1941 and was prepared to open another
in Leningrad in 1948, when both countries
withdrew their consuls.

What this convention would do, however,
through its various technical protections, is
to provide the basis on which we believe we
could prudently reestablish consulates on a
reciprocal basis.

Given these protections, we would like to
open a consulate with 10 or 15 American
employees, probably in Leningrad, to provide
better protection for our citizens in the So-

viet Union. In return, we would permit the
Soviets to open a parallel consulate in a com-
parable American city.

Some have expressed the fear that such
an office, coupled with the reciprocal crimi-
nal immunity provisions of the convention,
would encourage Soviet espionage and sub-
version. They have argued that this danger
outweighs the benefits which the convention
might bring to the United States.

The possibility they fear must not be ig-
nored, but I do not see how this consular
convention can add significantly to the risk
of espionage. Let me outline my reasons for
these conclusions:

First, the anticipated increase in the num-
ber of Soviet personnel in this country is
small. At present, there are 1,018 Soviet
citizens in this country, 452 of them with
diplomatic immunity. One Soviet consulate
would add only 10 or 15.

Second, the immunity provisions' of this
convention would give these added represent-
atives no exemptions which Soviet diplo-
matic personnel do not already have — and
in fact would provide less, since they would
not be immune from civil action.

Third, we are all aware of the excellent
work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
in controlling possible espionage by foreign
representatives and agents in this country
over the years. I believe they can cope with
a few more — a belief with which, as you
know, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover is in basic agree-
ment. Our confidence in the FBI's work in
this field reduces even further the already
small risk involved in the establishment of
such a Soviet office.

Fourth, adoption of the criminal immunity
provision in this convention could affect bi-
lateral agreements with 27 other countries
and could result in similar immunity for 290
consular personnel — none of them from bloc
counti-ies. But this is not a large number
when compared with the total of 9,400 per-
sons in the United States with full diplo-
matic immunity. Nor is it a dangerous prece-
dent. According to a State Department
survey, between 1939 and 1964 there were 11
consular officers charged with crimes. Five

PEBRUAEY 13, 1967


of these were for traffic offenses. Two of the
eleven were convicted.

Fifth, under the convention all persons en-
joying inununity are under a duty to respect
the receiving country's laws, including traf-
fic laws. To enforce this obligation, the con-
vention expressly provides for the unre-
stricted right to declare an individual
persona non grata.

I have discussed, Mr. Chairman, the merits
of the convention. Like every other treaty,
this convention must, of course, be judged
on its merits. However, we should be mindful,
too, of its place in our overall relations with
the Soviet Union.

As President Johnson said in his state of
the Union message to the Congress: "Our
objective is not to continue the cold war but
to end it." ^

I should like to reiterate our national
policy of expanding our contacts with the
U.S.S.R. so as to end the mutual isolation of

our two societies. Increased contacts can re-
duce misunderstandings between our two
countries and lead, in time, to international
cooperation in areas where we are able to find
common interests and mutual advantage.

Mr. Chairman, I firmly believe this conven-
tion would serve our national interests. It
would support and promote imjyortant objec-
tives of our foreign iwlicy. More tangibly, it
would substantially strengthen the capacity
of the United States to protect a large and
increasing number of its citizens who travel
to the Soviet Union. And I believe that this
practical gain justifies support of the conven-
tion by those who may not share our view
about larger objectives.

In practice, the possible risks of espionage
and of enlarged criminal immunity are both
small and controllable.

In short, committee and Senate approval
of this consular convention would benefit the
Nation, and I urge your support.

Second Annual Report on the International
Coffee Agreement Transmitted to Congress


White House prese release d&ted January 19

To the Congress of the United States:

I am transmitting to you my Second An-
nual Report on the operation of the Interna-
tional Coffee Agreement as required by P.L.

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 46 of 90)