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— It should not be decided by the use of

— We are fully prepared to support the
decision of the Vietnamese people.

11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be
nonalined or neutral if that be their option:

— We do not seek to impose a policy of
alinement on South Viet-Nam.

— We support the neutrality policy of the
Royal Government of Laos, and we support
the neutrality and territorial integrity of

12. We would much prefer to use our re-
sources for the economic reconstruction of
Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace.
North Viet-Nam could participate in a re-
gional effort to which we would be prepared
to contribute at least one billion dollars:

— We support the growing efforts by the
nations of the area to cooperate in the
achievement of their economic and social

13. The President has said "The Viet Cong
would have no difficulty in being represented
and having their views presented if Hanoi for
a moment decides she wants to cease aggres-
sion. And I would not think that would be an
insurmountable problem at all."

14. We have said publicly and privately
that we could stop the bombing of North
Viet-Nam as a step toward peace although
there has not been the slightest hint or sug-
gestion from the other side as to what they
would do if the bombing stopped:

— We are prepared to order a cessation
of all bombing of North Viet-Nam the mo-
ment we are assured — privately or other-
wise — that this step will be answered
promptly by a corresponding and appro-
priate deescalation of the other side.

— We do not seek the unconditional sur-
render of North Viet-Nam; what we do
seek is to assure for the people of South
Viet-Nam the right to decide their own
political destiny, free of force.

General Taylor Discusses Recent
Developments in Viet-Nam

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, who is a Special
Consultant to President Johnson, met with
the President on Janimry 30 to report on
his trip to Southeast Asia. Following is his
opening statement at a press conference held
at the White House after the meeting.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have just re-
ported to the President on my rather short
and intensive visit to Southeast Asia which
I have just completed.

I was gone about 11 days and returned
Saturday night. The primary purpose for
going out was for my own individual reori-
entation and updating of my acquaintance
with the problems of Southeast Asia. I think
perhaps, also, to get out of the sometimes
gloomy atmosphere of Washington and see
what the feeling is in the front lines, where
this struggle is being conducted.

I did the usual things in South Viet-Nam.
I talked to our leading officials, numbers of
Vietnamese, traveled as much as I could,
visited most of our principal headquarters.

Overall, I would say that it is, to me, a
very, very exciting thing to see the progress
made in the last year and a half. I have

FEBRUARY 20, 1967


not been back since I left as Ambassador
just a year and a half ago.

I had perhaps the feeling of an architect
who has worked over a blueprint and a year
or so later sees the building that actually
came from the blueprint. The American con-
tribution out there in the military, political,
and economic fields is certainly impressive
and certainly reflects credit upon Ambas-
sador [Heni-y Cabot] Lodge, General [Wil-
liam C] Westmoreland, and all of their
many able assistants.

Just tripping quickly across the front of
American activities, I might give a broad
comment and then expose myself to your

I think the military sector has been cov-
ered extremely well by our reporting, and
probably very little needs to be said at this
time. There is an air of confidence among
our units which didn't exist when I was
there. So many of our difficulties a year and
a half ago, or 2 years ago, arose from the
inadequacy of military resources to cope
with the increasing threat of the Viet Cong
and also the infiltration of the armed forces
of North Viet-Nam to the South.

By virtue of our own buildup and also
the continued growth of the Vietnamese
forces, I would say that particular problem
is well under control.

The logistic successes of our people in
building ports, harbors, roads, airfields, of
course, is to me — not having seen this as it
went on — very impressive indeed.

I might mention the field of intelligence,
where so much visible progress has been
made in the last year and a half. When I
was Ambassador it was very rare to capture
a prisoner or to capture a document, and
when we got one, we handled it or him as
if made of gold.

In the recent Iron Triangle operation,
some 184,000 pages of useful intelligence
was taken. I visited the intelligence proc-
essing center in Saigon, and, literally in
basketsful, they were sorting out the doc-
uments which had been taken.

Just what the net take in intelligence
value will be is not yet determined, but that

is simply indicative of the fact that our in-
telligence people, one, have more material
to work on, and, secondly, they have a pro-
fessionalism in the organization which, as I
say, I never saw when I was there and which
is very encouraging to me.

In the field of pacification — ^that word
which is described illy, the oi^eration "revo-
lutionary development" is the preferred term
in Viet-Nam — ^this, of course, has been the
area where progress has not been satisfac-
tory. It is uneven at best.

The basic problems there remain and are
likely to remain for a long time. There is
the absence of security, or levels of security,
throughout the provinces which does not
allow reconstruction efforts to be carried on

I often remind my American friends that
we found we couldn't plant the com outside
of the stockade as long as the Indians were
around. And we still have a lot of "Indians"
around in the provinces of South Viet-Nam.

The other major problem is the adminis-
trative complexity of this task, a complexity
that would baffle the most skilled adminis-
trative con^s. And, unfortunately, skilled
administrators are very much in short sup-
ply in South Viet-Nam.

The provincial chief is the unsung hero
of this war. He sits in his war-torn pro\ince
and has to deal with two Americans, a mili-
tary and a civilian, and then with his own
military and with eight or nine ministers
in Saigon. I think just to describe this re-
lationship suggests the complexities of the

At least two good things are taking place,
two encouraging new factors in the develop-
ment of the program. The first is the con-
summation of a program which has been in
existence for some time: to pool all the
American civil activities under an office
called the Office of Civilian Operation, under
Deputy Ambassador [William J.] Porter. It
is now in effect and in the field and certainly
should have a simplifying and consolidating
effect upon the American civil contribution.

The other, on the military side, is the
decision by the Vietnamese high command



to emphasize the role of the ARVN, the
Vietnamese Anny, in revolutionaiy develop-
ment. As a result, it has been decided that
approximately half of the infantry battalions
will be put in this kind of work in the prov-
inces, working under the province chief.

This, again, is a new development which
is just moving forward. But I would hope
that when the battalions are retrained and
in the field that for the first time there will
be a militaiy force to bridge the gap between
the successful search-and-destroy operation
and the follow-on civil operations which are
either paramilitary or police insofar as their
security aspects are concerned.

On the governmental side, I think all you
ladies and gentlemen know where we stand.
When I was Ambassador, of course, I had
to deal with five different governments. A
3-month government was a normal duration.
Now the Ky administration has been in office
since, well, over a year and a half, and it
looks as if they are well on the road to con-
stitutional government.

It is expected that the constitution will be
promulgated in March and presidential elec-
tions held probably around August or Sep-
tember. There are still obstacles along all of
these patlis, but none of them seems to be

On the economic front, the economists
have worked well — both the Americans and
the Vietnamese — in restraining inflation. We
could foresee the inflationary trends even
when I was Ambassador. As the American
forces came in, obviously we would create
problems for the economy. I would certainly
not suggest that this danger of inflation has
been licked, but it seems to be reasonably
under control.

All in all, I would say that a great deal
of progress has been made, but there are
sitill residual problems which will always be
with us. I think the principal one is in the
field of pacification — tlie development of the
provinces. I think that is going to be a long,
slow process.

On the military side, I would expect that
we can continue to retain the initiative and
to continue to inflict the same kind of heavy

casualties on the Viet Cong and the North
Vietnamese forces as we did in 1966.

But there is a new atmosphere out there,
a feeling that the log jam may be breaking a
little bit. The events of China are certainly
giving one cause to think as to the possible
repercussions in North Viet-Nam of these

So, in summaiy, I came back tremendously
impressed with progress, but also impressed
with the fact that there is unfinished busi-
ness; that the end is not in sight, but there
are cei-tainly indications that something is
starting to move and i>erhaps we can see
some change, some new development, in the
course of this year.

President Urges Ratification
of Consular Pact With U.S.S.R.

statement by President Johnson^

I have been asked to give a statement
about the Consular Convention that is pend-
ing before the United States Senate.^

I should like to say very briefly that T hope
the Senate will give its advice and consent to
the proposed convention with the U.S.S.R. I
feel very strongly that the ratification of this
treaty is very much in our national interest.
I feel this way for two principal reasons:

First, we need this treaty to protect the
18,000 American citizens who each year
travel from this country to the Soviet Union.
The convention requires immediate notifi-
cation to us whenever an American citizen
is arrested in the Soviet Union. It insures
our right to visit that citizen within 4 days
and as often thereafter as is desirable.

We need these rights to help to protect
American citizens. These are rights which
the Soviet citizens already have who travel

* Read at the opening of a news conference at the
White House on Feb. 2.

^ For a statement made by Secretary Rusk before
the Senate Committee on Foreigfn Relations on Jan.
23, see Bulletin of Feb. 13, 1967, p. 247.

FEBRUARY 20, 1967


in this country, because they are guaranteed
by our Constitution.

Second, the convention does not require the
opening of consulates in this country or in
the Soviet Union. It does provide that should
any such consulate be opened, the officials
would have diplomatic immunity.

The Secretary of State informs me that no
negotiations for consulates are underway and
that the most that he can envision in the
foreseeable future is the opening of one con-
sulate in each country, to be manned by from
10 to 15 people.

There are presently 452 Soviet officials in
the United States who have diplomatic im-
munity. If an additional consulate were
opened and if another 10 were added to the
452, Mr. Hoover has assured me that this
small increment would raise no problems
which the FBI cannot effectively and
efficiently deal mth.

In short, I think we very much need this
convention to protect American interests and
to protect American citizens abroad. In my
judgment, it raises no problem with respect
to our national security. Therefore, I hope
very much that the Senate, in its wisdom,
after full debate, will see fit to ratify it.

Department Issues 1967 Edition
of ''Treaties in Force"

Press release 19 dated February 2

The Department of State on February 2
released for publication Treaties in Force: A
List of Treaties and Other International
Agreements of the United States in Force
on January 1, 1967.

This is a collection showing the bilateral
relations of the United States with 145 states

or other entities and the multilateral rights
and obligations of the contracting parties to
more than 365 treaties and agreements on
75 subjects. The 1967 edition includes some
300 new treaties and agreements, including
the air transport agreements with Austria,
Canada, and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics; the "Gut Dam" claims agreement
with Canada; the status of forces agree-
ments with China and Korea; the treaty of
amity and economic relations with Togo; the
agreement concerning the availability of
certain Indian Ocean islands for defense
purposes with the United Kingdom; the Law
of the Sea convention on fisheries; and the
convention on settlement of investment dis-
putes between states and nationals of other

The bilateral treaties and other agree-
ments are arranged by country or other
political entity, and the multilateral treaties
and other agreements are arranged by sub-
ject with names of countries which have be-
come parties. Date of signature, date of
entry into force for the United States, and
citations to texts are furnished for each

The publication provides information con-
cerning treaty relations with numerous
newly independent States, indicating wher-
ever possible the provisions of their constitu-
tions and independence arrangements re-
garding assumption of treaty obligations.

Information on current treaty actions,
supplementing the information contained in
Treaties in Force, is published weekly in the
Department of State Bulletin.

The 1967 edition of Treaties in Force (336
pp.; Department of State publication 8188)
is for sale by the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 20402, for $1.50.



The United States, the United Nations, and Southern Africa

by Arthur J. Goldberg

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^

It is entirely proper that Africa should be
a special concern of the Negro community
in this country. In our diverse and pluralistic
society we are all, as President Franklin D.
Roosevelt said on a famous occasion, "fellow
immigrants" — and it is both traditional and
right that we should take an interest in
events in the lands of our respective an-
cestors. To do so does not raise any question
of divided loyalties; indeed, it is a source
of sitrength for our country that these ties
exist and are kept alive.

This is particularly true today in the case
of the interest which the American Negro
community takes in Africa. It so happens,
by historical coincidence, that the independ-
ence movement in Africa and the great civil
rights movement among the Negro citizens
of the United States have come to fruition
at the same time — a double harvest of free-
dom. It is no wonder that these two move-
ments have felt a relationship to one another.

But in a broader sense Africa today is of
concern to every American. The entire con-
tinent is evolving in a charged atmosphere
of great expectations and profound difficul-
ties. The way in which this tension is re-
solved cannot fail to touch the interests of
the United States as a leading world power,
the most fundamental of which is our in-
terest in building a peaceful and stable

As we witness the efforts of African

peoples to achieve political equality and per-
sonal dignity and to eliminate racial dis-
crimination, we do well to recall President
Kennedy's observation that "peace, in the
last analysis," is "basically a matter of hu-
man rights." 2 As we also witness their
efforts to achieve economic and social devel-
opment, we do well to recall President John-
son's admonition that "rich nations can
never live as an island of plenty in a sea
of poverty." ^ Two main concerns of Africa
today, human rights and economic progress,
have a very direct bearing on our search
for the kind of world peace in which Amer-
ican freedom will be secure.

To further these great purposes in Africa
calls for many kinds of action — govern-
mental and private; bilateral and multi-
lateral; diplomatic, economic, technical, ed-
ucational — far more than I could begin to
describe in these few minutes. Instead, I
would like to concentrate on a few of the
burning political issues of Africa today,
issues whose outcome can make or break the
hopes of progress for the entire continent.

The issues I shall discuss have arisen in
the southern part of Africa. They all revolve
around the basic principle which heads the
list of African aspirations: the ending of
colonialism and of racial discrimination.

' Address made before the American Negro Lead-
ership Conference on Africa at Washington, D.C.,
on Jan. 27 (U.S./U.N. press release 5/Corr. 1).

^ For President Kennedy's address at American
University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see
Bulletin of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

' For an advance text of President Johnson's ad-
dress at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see ibid.,
Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

FEBRUARY 20, 1967


We all know with what dramatic speed
the independence movement has swept
through the greatest part of Africa in the
last decade. The changing membership of
the United Nations reflects this story. In the
United Nations' first decade, only 4 of its 60
members were African; and of these only 2,
Ethiopia and Liberia, were from black
Africa. With these exceptions, Africa re-
mained the Dark Continent, submerged in

Then, in the past 10 years, the number of
independent African nations rose from 4 to
39, nearly a third of the membership of the
United Nations. From the Mediterranean
southward through three-quarters of the
continent, political independence in Africa is
nearly complete. There has been no more
dramatic political development in modern

Today the last major part of the con-
tinent in which this movement for self-
determination and racial equality remains
largely unfulfilled is southern Africa. It is
this region which has come to the top of the
agenda at the United Nations. I would like
to comment on four situations with which
the United Nations has been dealing and
which are of important concern to the
United States: those in the Portuguese ter-
ritories. Southern Rhodesia, South West
Africa, and the Republic of South Africa.

Portuguese Territories in Southern Africa

Let me begin with the Portuguese terri-
tories of Angola and Mozambique. Portugal
is a longstanding friend and NATO ally of
the United States. But, regrettably, our
close association is clouded by our diflFerences
over the future of these territories.

This matter has been debated at length in
various bodies of the United Nations, includ-
ing the Security Council. Speaking for the
United States, I have made it clear, as have
my predecessors, that we unequivocally sup-
port the right of the peoples of Angola and
Mozambique to self-determination.^

Unfortunately, thus far there has been

little peaceful progress toward the exercise
of that right. It is over 3 years since con-
tacts on this issue have taken place between
Portugal and representatives of the African
states. These contacts ended without prog-
ress. The basic issue remains what it was:
to find a formula by which the peoples of
Angola and Mozambique can exercise the
right of self-determination in the spirit of
the United Nations Charter. Such a for-
mula should allow them to choose among all
the meaningful options: emergence as sov-
ereign independent states, or free association
with an independent state, or integration
with an independent state.

The first step, in our view, is for the
parties to commence a genuine dialog on
the basis of recognition of the principle of
self-determination. This is the indispensable
way to a peaceful solution of the troubles
which afflict these two territories. The United
States, as a friend of Portugal and of the
peoples of Angola and Mozambique and as a
nation deeply concerned for peace and sta-
bility in Africa, will continue to do all it can,
both in and out of the United Nations, to
facilitate such a dialog and help it to reach
a successful conclusion. Here, as in all these
African disputes, the same observation ap-
plies that I made last September before the
United Nations General Assembly about our
own search for peace in Viet-Nam: ". . . no
differences can be resolved witliout contact,
discussion, or negotiations." ^

Southern Rhodesia and U.S. Interests

Next we come to the grave situation in
Southern Rhodesia, one of the two remaining
colonies in Africa, where a white minority
is attempting to pei^petuate its rule over the
nonwhite 94 percent under the cover of a
spurious independence.

I will not review the long history of this

" For background, see ibid., Aug. 19, 1963, p. 303,
and Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1034.
= Ibid., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.



issue leading up to the United Nations de-
cision last month to impose mandatory eco-
nomic sanctions against the Smith regime."
Nor do I need to detain you with the legal
justification of the United Nations actions,
which I have twice discussed at length right
here in Washington within the past month,
once in a siieech '' and once in a letter to
the Washingioh Post. The legal soundness
of this position is attested to not only by the
United States Government but also by the
other governments, including Western pow-
ers, who joined in voting for the Security
Council resolutions on this issue.

Today I want to concentrate not on these
legal aspects but on the reasons of national
self-interest which led the United States to
support United Nations action in this situa-
tion. Contraiy to propaganda assertions, we
have not been engaged in pulling British
chestnuts out of the fire. We have acted,
and shall continue to act, for good Ameri-
can reasons of our own. These reasons can
be summed up in five points.

1. First and foremost, it is a basic in-
terest of the United States to promote peace
and stability in the world. Tlie "good neigh-
bor" principle in international affairs is not
confined to the Western Hemisphere; it is in
the United Nations Charter, and it applies
to every part of the world, including Africa.
And experience demonstrates that in Africa
today peace and stability are inseparable
from orderly progress toward self-deteiTni-
nation and equality for all the peoples of
that continent. If the attempt to deny these
rights to the African majority in Rhodesia
were to succeed, this would inevitably
strengthen the hand of violence, extremism,
racism, and instability in the heart of Africa.
The moderating and res]X)nsible participa-
tion by the United States in an international
approach to the Rhodesian problem is es-

^ For a U.S. statement and text of a resolution
adopted by the U.N. Security Council on Dec. 16,
1966, see ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 73.

' Ibid., Jan. 23, 1967, p. 140.

sential to the resolution of that problem by
l)eaceful means.

2. Second, much of the standing of the
United States in world affairs derives from
our historic stance as an anticolonial power.
Throughout the great decolonizing era since
World War II we have been faithful to the
cause of self-determination and independ-
ence for colonial peoples. In supporting U.N.
action in Rhodesia we are pursuing the con-
sistent goal of all American administrations
since World War II.

The Smith regime is not asserting the
right of self-determination for all the people
of Rhodesia, but merely the right of the 6
percent who are white to rule over the 94
percent who are black. That is the whole pur-
pose of their illegal seizure of power; and
when we oppose such acts we do not thereby
deny self-determination or independence, we
support and affirm the:m.

3. Third, as a founding member of the
United Nations we have a particular obliga-
tion to prove that when we ratified the
charter with its pledge of supiwrt for "hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race," we meant

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 52 of 90)