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of such moment, and on such a scale, as to
make it important that we act together, as
we do on other great issues, on the firm
foundation of a Joint Resolution of Congress.

I ask you to support the broad approach
we have proposed to the international com-
munity as a basic strategy for the War on
Hunger. That strategy rests on three essen-
tial principles:

1. Self help. The War on Hunger can be
won only by the determined efforts of the
developing nations themselves. International
aid can help them. But it can only help if
they pursue well-conceived and well-executed
long-range plans of their own.

2. Multilateral participation. The assist-
ance of the international conununity must be
organized in a coalition of the advanced and
the developing nations.

3. Comprehensive planning. The interna-
tional community must develop a comprehen-
sive plan to assist India to fulfill its program
of achieving food sufficiency, not only during
this year, but for the next few years as well.

Most of you are familiar with the events
of the past year. Drought limited India's
food grain production to 72 million tons in
the 1965-66 crop year, compared with a rec-



ord 88 million tons the previous year. A mas-
sive international emergency program met
tlie immediate crisis. But India had to use
precious food reserves — that are thus not
available to meet the shortages created by a
second successive bad crop.

The weather since then has brought little
relief. The general outlook is slightly im-
proved, and over-all production may reach
79 million tons this year. But late last sum-
mer a severe drought hit heavily-populated
areas in north-central India. Unless Indian
production is supplemented by substantial
imports — perhaps 10 million tons by present
estimates for calendar 1967 — ^more than 70
million people will experience near famine.

The GoveiTunent of India has already
taken internal measures to move grain from
its more fortunate areas to the drought
areas. Imports of 2.3 million tons of grain
are now in the pipeline to meet India's needs
for the first two or three months of 1967.
India has purchased some 200,000 tons of
this grain with her own scarce foreign ex-
change. Canada with 185,000 tons, Australia
with 150,000 tons and the Soviet Union with
200,000 tons have already joined the United
States with its 1.6 million tons, in an im-
pressive multilateral eifort to help.

India's immediate problem — and the
world's problem — is to fill the remaining gap
for the balance of this year.

Because these facts bear heavily on the
extent of US food shipments, I have re-
quested and received careful verification
from our Ambassador in New Delhi, from
the Secretary of Agriculture and from mem-
bers of Congress, who have recently been in
India, including Senator [Gale W.] McGee
and Senator [Frank E.] Moss.

I am particularly grateful to Representa-
tive [W. R.] Poage and Representative
[Robert] Dole and Senator [Jack] Miller,
who at my request made a special trip to
India in December to assess the situation on
the ground. Their careful and thorough anal-
ysis of the situation in India and their rec-

ommendations to me have been of great

During the last two weeks, the Under Sec-
retary of State for Political Affairs and the
Under Secretary of Agriculture have con-
sulted in New Delhi and with most members
of the World Bank's India Consortium.

The work of all these men and the diplo-
matic efforts of the Government of India
have laid the foundation for the steps we
must now take.

The United States cannot — and should not
— approach this problem alone or on an im-
provised basis. We must support the Indian
Government's efforts to enlist the aid of
other nations in developing a systematic and
international approach to the problems of
Indian agriculture. Our long term objective
is to help India achieve its goal of virtual
self-sufficiency in grain by the early 1970's.
Meanwhile, as part of that effort, we must
help India meet its immediate food needs.


In line with policies established by the
Congress, and after promising consultations
with the Government of India and other gov-
ernments involved, I recommend the follow-
ing steps to achieve these objectives:

First: Our basic policy is to approach the
problem of Indian food through the India
Aid Consortium organized under the chair-
manship of the World Bank. That Consor-
tium has already developed a multilateral ap-
proach to economic assistance for India.
Now, we propose to make food aid a part
of that multilateral assistance program. We
seek effective multilateral arrangements to
integrate Indian food aid with broader pro-
grams of economic assistance and with cap-
ital and technical assistance for agricultural

In a preliminary way, we have consulted
with the Government of India and with
other members of the Consortium. There is
substantial agreement among Consortium

FEBRUARY 20, 1967


members on the major points of our pro-

— Meeting food needs of India during this
emergency should be accepted as an inter-
national responsibility in which each nation
should share;

— Emergency food and food-related aid
should be coordinated through the World
Bank Consortium;

— This aid should not diminish the flow
of resources for other development pro-
grams. It should be in addition to the targets
for each country suggested by the World

Adding food aid to the responsibilities of
the Consortium is sound economics and fair
burden-sharing. The Consortium provides a
proper channel for the food and food-related
aid of donors who have not previously been
involved in the food field. It will make clear
that food provided from outside is as much
a real contribution to Indian development as
capital for specific projects or foreign ex-
change assistance for import programs.

Second: Should this program be estab-
lished, we will support the Indian Con-
sortium as it:

— Undertakes a detailed projection of In-
dian food production and food aid require-

— Prepares a program for non-food im-
ports required to meet food production tar-
gets, as the basis for determining the equi-
table share of each donor;

— Reviews India's self-help efforts, reports
regularly on progress and identifies areas for
future concentation of energies.

Third: We must take prompt action to help
India meet its emergency food needs. Our
best present estimate is that India needs
deliveries of 10 million tons of food grains
this year or roughly $725 million worth of
food. 2.3 million tons, worth roughly $185
million, are already in the pipeline from a
number of countries, including our own. To
keep food in the pipeline, I am making an
immediate allocation of 2 million tons, worth

nearly $150 million, to tide India over while
the Congress acts.

I recommend that Congress approve a
commitment to share fully in the interna-
tional eff'ort to meet India's remaining food^'
grain deficit of 5.7 million tons — worth about
$400 million. To that end, I recommend a
U.S. allocation of an additional amount of
food grain, not to exceed 3 million tons, pro-
vided it is appropriately matched by other
countries. I recommend that approximately
$190 million available to the Commodity
Credit Corporation in calendar 1967 be used
for this purpose. These funds, if allotted, will
have to be replenished by appropriation in
Fiscal 1968.

Fourth: I recommend your approval of an
allocation of $25 million in food commodities
for distribution by CARE [Cooperative for
American Relief Everywhere] and other
American voluntary agencies, to assist the
Government of India in an emergency feed-
ing program in the drought areas of Bihar
and Uttar Pradesh.

Fifth: We hope other donors vdll acceler-
ate their exports of fertilizers to India.

Unless the application of chemical fertil-
izers rises sharply in India, she will not be
able to meet her food grain targets. Those
fertilizer targets are ambitious, yet they
must be met and if possible, exceeded.
Marshalling more fertilizer imports is as im-
portant to meeting India's emergency as
gathering additional grain. India herself
must take prompt steps to increase her fer-
tilizer investment and production and im-
prove its distribution.

Sixth: I propose for the longer run to
continue encouraging U.S. private investors
to participate in India's program to expand
production of chemical fertilizers. We will
urge other governments to encourage their
own producers.

Seventh: We intend to pursue other initia-
tives in the broader context of world agri-
cultural development:

— We shall continue to press for multilat-
eral eflforts in every international forum in



ilj vhich we participate, including- the current
legotiations to establish a food aid program

3 IS part of an International Cereals Arrange-


I — We shall continue our policy of en-
jouraging private capital and technology to
ioin the War on Hunger.

— We shall press for the creation of an
nvestment guarantee fund by the OECD to
jncourage private investment in the agri-
ultural industries of developing countries.

— We shall make available to food deficit
nations the technology our scientists have
low developed for producing fish protein

— We shall look to the study by the Presi-
dent's Science Advisory Committee on the
problems of food production to supply fur-
;her and more definitive guidelines for near-
term action and for long-range planning.

None of these steps can be as important
as Indian resolve and Indian performance.
The Indian Government is committed to a
bold program of agricultural modernization.
That program is the foundation for the en-
tire international effort to help India. We be-
lieve that a self-reinforcing process of im-
provement is under way in India, affecting
both agricultural techniques and government
administration. On the basis of that convic-
tion, we can move forward to do our share
under the Food for Freedom Program of


I believe these proijosals are in our na^
tional interest. I believe that they reflect the
deepest purposes of our national spirit.

I am asking the Congress, and the Amer-
ican people, to join with me in this effort
and in an appeal to all the nations of the
world that can help. I am asking the Con-
gress to consider thoroughly my recommen-
dations and to render its judgment. The Ex-
ecutive Branch, this Nation and other
nations will give full attention to the con-
tributions that Congressional debate may

There are many legitimate claims on our
resources. Some may question why we devote
a substantial portion to a distant country.

The history of this century is ample reply.
We have never stood idly by while famine or
pestilence raged among any part of the hu-
man family. America would cease to be
America if we walked by on the other side
when confronted by such catastrophe.

The great lesson of our time is the inter-
dependence of man. My predecessors and I
have recognized this fact. All that we and
other nations have sought to accomplish in
behalf of world peace and economic growth
would be for naught if the advanced coun-
tries failed to help feed the hungry in their
day of need.

Lyndon B. Johnson

The White House, February 2, 1967.

FEBRUARY 20, 1967



Tasks of the Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa

Statement by William P. Rogers

Mr. Chairman, the question before us is
complex, and the time before the next meet-
ing of the General Assembly is short. All
delegations are familiar with the long and
frustrating search of the world community
to find a just and pacific solution for the
question of South West Africa. We agree
with Chief Adebo [S.O. Adebo, representa-
tive of Nigeria] and Ambassador Makonnen
[Lij Endalkatchew Makonnen, representative
of Ethiopia] and others that we need not
review the histoiy of United Nations con-
sideration of this question.

Indeed, as the United States Representa-
tive, Ambassador Goldberg, observed in his
statement during the General Assembly
debate,^ virtually all the membership, with
only a few exceptions, agreed on the inter-
national status of South West Africa, on the
continuing responsibility of the United Na-
tions, on the failure of the Government of
South Africa to meet its mandatory obliga-
tions, and on the right of the people of South
West Africa to exercise the right of self-
determination as that term is universally
understood. With but one exception the com-
munity of nations speaks with unanimity in
the rejection of the imposition on the ter-

' Made before the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee for
South West Africa on Jan. 26 (U.S./U.N. press re-
lease 4). Mr. Rogers is U.S. Representative on the

' For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 31, 1966, p. 690.

ritory of the policy of apartheid. This
general agreement has a firm legal basis
deriving from the original mandate, the
League covenant, the advisory opinions of the
International Court of Justice, and the
resolutions of the General Assembly.

We are not asked to and, as others have
said, should not repeat here the debate of
last fall. The resolution which grew out of
the debate, after significant modification of
the original draft, reflected the desire of the
General Assembly to translate broad agree-
ment on essential principles into similarly
broad agreement on practical means for giv-
ing effect to the Assembly's decision.'

This ad hoc committee is the instrumen-
tality to develop those practical means. Its
task is to recommend to a special session of
the General Assembly what has been termed
"a considered blueprint for united and peace-
ful action for the benefit of the people of
South West Africa." * I believe, Mr. Chair-
man, the resolution itself and the subsequent
representative composition of this committee
are indications of the determination of the
General Assembly that a sincere eff'ort
should be made to achieve broad agreement
on a realistic plan of action.

There are three general principles which I
would like to allude to as we approach our

^ For text of General Assembly Resolution 2145
(XXI), see ibid., Dec. 5, 1966, p. 871.
* Ibid., Oct. 31, 1966, p. 690.



task. First, until the committee formulates
more definite conclusions based on verified
facts, we should not foreclose any course of
action which might lead us toward the at-
tainment of our objective. Second, my dele-
gation sympathizes fully with the desire for
speed, but it would be most unwise to ignore
the fact that we are dealing with a highly
complex problem. The desii-e for speed must
be reconciled with the imperative necessity
for accuracy, wisdom, and balance. History
will judge the work of this committee by its
success in meeting these criteria. Finally,
the overriding consideration of the com-
mittee in carrying out its mission must be to
contribute in the most effective way to the
permanent welfare of the people of South
West Africa.

For its part, the United States welcomes
the opportunity to serve on this committee.
We are not unmindful of the challenge of the
task before us nor of the differing views
members of this group and other United
Nations members may have as to how the
United Nations should now discharge its
responsibilities. We accept the general guid-
ance provided by the Assembly, and we are
confident that other committee members do

Our task is clear. It is the highly respon-
sible task of recommending what paragraph
6 of the General Assembly's resolution calls
"practical means by which South West
Africa should be administered, so as to en-
able the people of the Territory to exercise
the right of self-determination and to
achieve independence." In fulfilling this task,
we must take care that we do not stray from
the specific guidance given us by the Assem-
bly. And in any decision regarding the future
of the people of South West Africa our fore-
most concern should be whether they will
have any practical effect in assisting the pop-
ulation to realize self-determination and in-

Having made these general remarks, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to turn to some
thoughts on the organization of the commit-

tee's work. First, I would like to say that
my delegation listened carefully to the state-
ments made by Chief Adebo and Ambassador
Makonnen, as well as those by Ambassador
Ignatieff [George Ignatieff , representative of
Canada] and Ambassador Pinera [Jose
Pifiero Carvallo, representative of Chile].
We shall study carefully the memorandum
submitted by the delegation of Nigeria on
behalf of our African colleagues, as I am
certain will other members of the committee.
To their suggestions I would like to add our
own considerations, which have centered
around three basic questions:

1. What are the facts about the adminis-
trative requirements in South West Africa,
that is to say, what are the geographic,
ethnic, social, economic, and political factors
which are essential to an informed opinion
on the administrative requirements of the

2. What administrative and other changes
should occur to assure fulfillment of the re-
quirements of the mandate — material and
moral well-being and social progress — and
of the 1966 resolution — self-determination
and independence?

3. On the basis of the foregoing, who
should administer the territory and what
"practical means" can the committee rec-
ommend to the General Assembly?

These considerations will of themselves
bring forth further questions. Thus, when
we consider the availability of information
on the territory, we should perhaps seek to
find out what sources of information can
provide the most accurate and necessary ma-
terial for us to pursue our work. We should
consider the possibility of utilizing as much
as possible the resources of the Secretariat.
It might be worthwhile to examine the ex-
tent to which we can obtain reports already
available as well as information from
scholars and reliable persons who have up-
to-date knowledge about the territory.

In seeking this information, we should,
of course, bear in mind the time limitations

FEBRUARY 20, 1967


in which this committee must work. In
gathering these facts, we should take into
account particularly the present system of
administration, the economy, the state of
education and communication, and the rela-
tionship among various groups in a popula-
tion which is known to be heterogeneous.

Other questions relating to information
will undoubtedly arise as we progress in our
work and as we seek to assure ourselves
that our views regarding the administration
of the territory have fully considered the
essential facts about the territory and the
wishes and desires of its people.

In connection with this aspect of our work,
Mr. Chairman, the United States Mission to
the United Nations, along with other per-
manent missions and international organi-
zations, received a note dated December 8,
1966, from the permanent representative of
the Republic of South Africa, enclosing a
statement by his Foreign Minister announc-
ing the intention of the South African Gov-
ernment to furnish interested governments
and organizations information on certain
aspects of South West Africa.

Such information would, of course, be of
particular value in this committee as the
U.N. body presently principally concerned
with the territory. It is our hope that
methods can be devised for receipt of infor-
mation by the United Nations, particularly
in areas where available information may
be insufficient or inaccurate.

Turning to the second basic aspect of our
considerations, relating to necessary admin-
istrative and other changes, we should direct
our attention to the developmental needs that
might exist economically, socially, politically,
and educationally, as well as to the type of
financial, technical, and administrative re-
sources that must be at the disposal of the
administrator. Further attention might well
be directed to the types of resources available
to supplement those of the territory. Serious
attention should be given the prospects for
improvement in the relations among the
various groups in South West Africa.

Finally, in examining further this second
question, we might well wish to determine
the extent to which improved education, com-
munications, and transportation systems are
necessary for the establishment of a gov-
ernmental structure that would take into
account a heterogeneous population. We
might also seek to find out what changes are
necessary to meet the economic and fiscal
needs should they prove insufficient to sup-
port needed development programs.

As to the third basic question, Mr. Chair-
man, the question of who should administer
the territory and what practical means we
can recommend to the General Assembly, my
delegation recalls that the General Assembly
had before it several proposals for the admin-
istration of the territory, including a proposal
for direct administration by the United Na-
tions. The Assembly neither endorsed nor re-
jected those proposals. Rather, after deciding
that henceforth the territory comes under
the direct responsibility of the United Na-
tions, it established this committee to recom-
mend practical means for the administration
of the territory.

In our view, therefore, the task of this com-
mittee includes the consideration of possible
alternative administration and the develop-
ment of some technique for determining
which of the alternative administrators is, in
fact, capable of fulfilling the administrative
requirements of the territory. Perhaps it
might prove necessary to consider other alter-
natives in addition to those discussed in the
General Assembly. However, in doing so, we
should avoid any expedient which would not
necessarily benefit the people of the territory.
In seeking a final solution we should bear in
mind the extent to which the United Nations
can fulfill its responsibility either through
direct administration or through some other
form of administration in order to assure
the welfare and basic rights of the inhabit-
ants of the territory and to provide for self-
determination and independence.

We would ourselves like to give further
thought to the questions which we have raised



during this general debate. Undoubtedly
other questions will arise during the course
of our discussions. The questions which have
been raised indicate the desire of the mem-
bers of this committee to explore thoroughly
thofee factors which may reasonably be con-
sidered if we are to fulfill our responsibility.
Recommendations which will lead to the in-
stitution of practical relief for the inhabi1>
ants of the territoiy — and which are there-
fore realistic and within the capacity of the
U.N. to achieve — must be based on a careful
exploration and evaluation of all avenues to
peaceful change. It is in this spirit that my
delegation approaches the task of this com-

Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as
those listed below) may be consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publica-
tions may be purchased from, the Sales Section of
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

General Assembly

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples. Note by the Secretary-General. A/6595.
December 14, 1966. 7 pp.

United Nations Development Decade. Report of the
Second Committee. A/6602. December 16, 1966.
13 pp.

Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of
Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects.
Report of the Special Political Committee. A/6603.
December 15, 1966. 19 pp.

World Social Situation. Report of the Third Com-
mittee. A/6614. December 16, 1966. 9 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:
Information furnished by the United States on
objects launched into orbit or beyond. A/
AC.105/INF.148-149. December 29, 1966.

Economic and Social Council

Measures Taken in Implementation of the United
Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination. Texts of (or ex-
tracts from) decisions taken by United Nations

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 54 of 90)