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Marines just across the 17th parallel while
we pick this ammunition out of our men,
instead of dealing with those trucks as a part
of the battle where we find them?

I think some elementary reciprocity is
required, and common fairness would require
that if there is an interest toward peace, both
sides help move toward it, because you cannot
stop this war simply by stopping a half of it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it is being frequently
said these days that — in the two Burchett
interviews and in what Mr. Kosygin [Soviet
Prime Minister Alexei N. Kosygin"] said yes-
terday — that the position of North Viet-Nam
has been changed; that instead of asserting
four preconditions, there is only noiv one pre-
condition, and it is therefore concluded that
there is movement in their position. Do you
accept the fact of movement in their position?

President Reaffirms U.S. Desire
for Peace in Viet-Nam

Following is the text of a message from
President Johnson to His Holiness Pope
Paul VI.

white House press release dated February 8

February 8, 1967

Your Holiness: I deeply appreciate your
message,' which is a great source of spiritual
support. I devoutly share your wish that the
suspension of hostilities over the Lunar New
Year may be extended and may open the way
to negotiations for a just and stable peace.
The Governments of the United States and
the Republic of Vietnam, together with others,
are devoting intensive efforts to this end. As
you know, the Government of Vietnam has
twice signified its readiness to discuss an ex-
tension of the truce with representatives of
the other side.

We are prepared to talk at any time and
place, in any forum, with the object of bring-
ing peace to Vietnam; however I know you
would not expect us to reduce military action
unless the other side is willing to do likewise.

We are prepared to discuss the balanced
reduction in military activity, the cessation of
hostilities, or any practical arrangements
which could lead to these results.

We shall continue our efforts for a peaceful
and honorable settlement until they are
crowned with success.

With great respect,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Not printed here.

A. Well, these are matters which can be
fully explored through existing channels, with
existing contacts, with the help of other
governments, if that seems desirable, in order
to find out whether there in fact is a basis of

But what has not been said by the Foreign
Minister of North Viet-Nam or by the Prime
Minister of the Soviet Union is what the mili-
tary consequences would be if we stopped the
bombing — what would the other side do. That
is a point which has been ignored; that is a

FEBRUARY 27, 1967


point on which we have had no response. And
we need some response on that.

Now, let me make it clear. We do not con-
sider that any action in the military field
need be a precondition for discussions. We
are prepared today to have talks with those
on the other side, to talk about either the
prospects for peace or to talk about the
mutual steps which the two sides can take to
reduce the violence and move this closer
toward peace.

We are prepared to talk about any point,
any handle which can be grasped, which
might make a difference in this situation.

For example, the demilitarization of the
demilitarized zone along the 17th parallel;
assistance to Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia,
in assuring the neutrality and the territorial
integrity of his country; the exchange of
prisoners — we are prepared to talk about any
point which could indicate some constructive
step forward.

Now, if we are faced with a major condi-
tion on the military side as a precondition for
discussion, then we are prepared to enter into
preliminary discussions with the other side
about what action can and should be taken
by the two sides in the military field.

But there needs to be some correspondence,
some reciprocity in these matters, if in fact
we are to move this toward a peaceful solu-

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the absence of these
discussions, if the decreased infiltration has
not reached what you call a "politically"
significant level, how do we measure mutual
deescalation steps on their part? What tech-
niques do we have for determining that this
has happened ?

A. Well, I think we would know rather
soon in the field whether there was a cessa-
tion of activity in and just north of the de-
militarized zone. There are many ways in
which we could get impressions as to the
intentions of the other side.

Now, one matter that bears upon the ques-
tion of intentions. As you know, we are now
in the middle of a Tet cease-fire. It's a 4-day
cease-fire, as far as we are concerned. There


have been a disturbing number of violations
of that cease-fire, and we have seen large
numbers of boats and other vessels dashing
south along the coast of North Viet-Nam to
resupply their forces in the southern part of ^
North Viet-Nam and in the demilitarized

Now, this indicates that it is their intention
to continue the operations, and the large num-
ber of incidents indicates that they are not
particularly interested in an actual cease-fire.

So, we have to weigh these things in trying
to assess the intentions and the motives of the
other side.

. Q. May I ask yoti another question, Mr.
Secretary? Are there any contacts or discus-
sions of any kind going on to extend that It-
day cease-fire to the 7-day cease-fire they say
they are going to honor?

A. Well, Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky
has indicated some time ago that he would
be prepared to discuss with the North Viet-
namese authorities the question of an exten-
sion of that cease-fire. This is something
which can be discussed, which can be looked
into. But I could not give you any details to-
day as to whether or not there are discussions
pointing in that direction. There are some
difficult operational questions about that.

Visit of Foreign IMinister of Germany

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I change the sub-
ject for a minute? Did the visit of Minister
[Willy'] Brandt eliminate some of the dif-
ferences which apparently exist between the
two countries on the interpretation of the
nonproliferation treaty?

A. Well, I very much welcomed the visit
of the Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister
of the Federal Republic. Mr. Brandt and I
have met each other many times before, but
this was my second meeting with him in his
new capacity; and, as you would suppose,
when the two of us get together, we range
pretty widely over a good many subjects of
international importance.

I think it will be possible to meet some of
the particular points that have been raised


in the Federal Republic on the nonprolifera-
tion treaty. For example, on the industrial
impact of a nonproliferation treaty, the fact
is that the nonproliferation treaty has noth-
ing to do whatever with the use of nuclear
materials for peaceful purposes, and that in-
cludes a wide range of industrial application.
The actual industrial spin-off from so-called
weaponry, that is, those items which are
limited to the gadgetry of weapons, is very
small, indeed, infinitesimal. And I think ex-
changes on the technical level will clarify that

But it was a legitimate point to raise, and
I hope that further exchanges will clarify it
to everybody's satisfaction.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in his news conference
this morning, Premier Kosygin defended —
apparently defended — the Soviet construc-
tion of an ABM system. I ivondered what you
thought of this, in the light of efforts on our
side to get a freeze ?

A. Well, I think that we might note that
Prime Minister Kosygin referred both to
offensive and defensive weapons in his press

We have placed before the Geneva con-
ference, some time ago, proposals for a freeze
in both these fields. And we are prepared to
discuss both offensive and defensive weapons
with the Soviet Union.

I would not myself interpret what he said
this morning as their last word on this sub-

Q. Mr. Secretary, the administration's
good faith in trying to reach discussions
while bombing and other military activities
still go on, has been cast into some doubt by
stories about the bombing that occurred in
mid-December, and arrangements, sup-
posedly, had been made for a meeting in
Warsaw. And I think Prime Minister
[Harold] Wilson referred to this in Parlia-
ment this iveek and called it a "misunder-
standing" on both sides. Could you elucidate
what that misunderstanding was?

A. No, because to do so would, in my judg-
ment, get in the way of the possibilities of
using existing channels to try to move this

matter toward peace. It is not for me to talk
about reports of particular channels that
might have existed at one time or another or
were speculated about. When the full story
comes out some day, it will be rather dif-
ferent than some of the things you have

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you accept his impli-
cation that part of the blame lies on the
United States?

A. I am not accepting or rejecting any-
thing at the moment. I am saying I am not
getting into the question of a particular chan-
nel that somebody said might have existed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do we know a great deal
about the character and life of Ho Chi Minh,
which seems to be relevant now? Mr. Salis-
bury [Harrison Salisbwy of the New York
Times] said he thought he had been a waiter
for 2 years in Nerv York City, which might
explain — [Laughter.]

A. Yes, we have had a good deal of bio-
graphic information on Mr.' ' Ho Chi Minh.
We, quite frankly, at the moment are more
interested in his future than his past.
[Laughter.] And we would like to have that
future be a peaceful one and that he would
work with us to make some peace in South-
east Asia.

U.S. Position on Bombing Pause

Q. Mr. Secretary, a year ago you recall we
offered to maintain our bombing pause if the
other side would only come and talk. In fact,
we sent envoys around the world looking for
some signal from Hanoi of a ivillingness to
talk. Why is it that noiv we are umvilling to
make such an offer during the current pause ?

A. Well, let me point out that the other side
is not talking about a pause. The other side
is demanding an unconditional and perma-
nent cessation of the bombing. Now, that is a
very significant military step for us to take.
And unless it is accompanied by military
action on their part, it would create a situa-
tion in which they would be safe and secure
and comfortable, while sending their men and

FEBRUARY 27, 1967


their arms down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and
across the 17th parallel to attack South Viet-
Nam. So they have put this matter into a
somewhat different context.

As you recall, during the last pause in the
bombing, on the 34th day, instead of coming
back with counterproposals or countersugges-
tions, they simply publicly required that we
accept the notion that the Liberation Front
should be the sole spokesman for the South
Vietnamese people, that we accept their four
points and get out of South Viet-Nam. Now,
that was obviously impossible.

Q. In other words, sir, it is the shift in
position on Hanoi's side on the terms for a
bombing cessation that has caused a shift in
our position ?

A. Well, there is no shift in our position
in the sense that we are prepared to take up
political questions through political channels.

We are prepared to deal with military mat-
ters as military matters, and we are prepared
to discuss with the other side what actions
each side might take of a military character
that would move this matter toward peace.

Now, that has been true — this was in the
14 points at the beginning of last year. We
would be prepared to discuss the question of
mutual deescalation, that we would be pre-
pared to stop the bombing as a step toward
peace, but we can't stop the bombing simply
as a step toward closing off one-half of the
war while the rest of it goes on full force.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what did you think of
Senator [Robert F.] Kennedy's proposals
last night for a new policy toivard Red

A. Well, I saw his speech. I think, if one
thinks of these problems over a very long
run, that he had some interesting things to
say. And I commented on some of these mat-
ters myself before the Zablocki committee.
He did not get into the question which is the
central question in the short run; namely,
are you prepared to surrender Taiwan? Be-
cause in all of our contacts with Peiping and

since I have been Secretary of State they
have insisted that unless we are prepared to
surrender Taiwan, there is nothing to dis-
cuss. And so many of the efforts which we
have made to open up exchanges and to find
some means to improve relations with main-
land China, to reestablish contacts with the
great Chinese people on that mainland, have
not been of any avail because we cannot, of
course, surrender these 13 or 14 million
people on Taiwan to the mainland.

Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

A. Thank you.

Department Holds Conferences
for Educators in California

The Department of State announced on
February 10 (press releases 29 and 30) that
it was cosponsoring two foreign policy con-
ferences for educators in California, one at
San Jose State College on February 25 and
the other at the University of Southern Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles, on February 24 and 25.

Invitations were sent to faculty and admin-
istrators of educational programs for both
secondary and higher education.

Department of State officers expected to
participate were: George V. Allen, Director,
Foreign Service Institute, and former Am-
bassador to Iran, Yugoslavia, India, and
Greece; Charles Frankel, Assistant Secretary
for Educational and Cultural Affairs; Walter
J. Stoessel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs and former Deputy Chief
of Mission in Moscow; Gregory B. Wolfe,
Director, Office of Research and Analysis for
the American Republics; John K. Emmerson,
diplomat-in-residence at Stanford University
and former Deputy Chief of Mission in
Tokyo; and Philander P. Claxton, Special
Assistant to the Secretary of State for Pop-
ulation Matters.



East Asia Today

by William P. Bundy

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs ^

I want to talk today about what is going
on throughout East Asia. Viet-Nam is what
is on all of our minds, but I think it is impor-
tant to put that situation into the context of
what, in historic terms, I think are very
major and, in many ways, very promising
developments throughout the area.

One of those developments is what increas-
ingly in the last year and a half many ob-
servers and all of us in the Government have
come to see as a new atmosphere of hope and
confidence throughout East Asia and the
Pacific — a psychological change of the very
greatest importance. For 2 years ago many
Asian nations, particularly those in South-
east Asia, thought that the wave of the future
would be Red. They recognized, of course,
that the United States had the power to play
a major helping role in turning back that
wave, but they doubted that we would be
willing to use our power to preserve an Asia
of free and independent nations. There was a
belief that we were too rich, too far away,
too secure, perhaps too soft, too different in
race and culture, too Europe-oriented, for
them to depend on our willingness to make
the sacrifices of blood and treasure necessary
to preserve that peace in Asia, which is a
vital national interest of this country.

There spread throughout the area an emas-
culating hope that since the future appeared

' Address made before the Commonwealth Club of
California at San Francisco, Calif., on Jan. 20, as-
delivered text; an advance text was issued as press
release 8.

to lie with the Chinese dragon and with the
other Communist nations with similar and
more specific local designs, perhaps behaving
well toward that dragon would at least induce
him to choose to eat you last. That debili-
tating feeling — that a prime goal of foreign
policy must be to af^pease the dragon — has
now virtually vanished. It is held, I think, in
few, if any, of the nations that stretch from
India in the west around the whole crescent
to Japan and Korea. And a main reason — if
not the main reason — for the new feeling of
confidence is what we have shown we are
prepared to do in seeing the conflict through
in Viet-Nam: that we will continue to use
our power as long as it is needed to help
preserve Viet-Nam's right to determine its
own destiny free from external interference
and to help preserve — for only they can do it
in the last analysis — the right of other
nations to do the same.

At the same time, the free nations of Asia,
nations working out their own destinies in
their own way, realize — and the Manila com-
munique ^ underscored it — that our military
presence will be withdrawn just as soon as it
is no longer needed. So there has been a
sharp decline in anticolonialism and an ac-
ceptance of a cooperative role for Western
nations and for the United States in the
future of Asia. There are those who suspect
our motives, but I think the vast majority
of Asians accept our willingness to partici-
pate in the future of Asia in the spirit of

• For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.

FEBRUARY 27, 1967


cooperation expressed by the President in his
Honolulu speech. ^

What our stand in Viet-Nam has done —
and this is quite explicit in the words of a
nonalined Asian statesman, the extremely
able, Oxford-educated Chinese Socialist, Lee
Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore
— is to "buy time" for the rest of the area.
And the galvanic effect of our stand is per-
haps most dramatically illustrated by the
change in the position that President
[Ferdinand E.] Marcos of the Philippines
has taken. In 1965 he did not favor the send-
ing of Philippine troops to Viet-Nam. After
his election he successfully advocated and
finally got the approval of his Congress for
the dispatch of an engineer battalion to Viet-
Nam. Explaining his apparent change of
position, he put it very simply. In 1965, as
he said, according to the information avail-
able, "the United States did not seem com-
mitted to protect Viet-Nam, and that, as in
Dien Bien Phu, South Viet-Nam was already
lost. But today," he continued, "in view of
the resolution of the United States Govern-
ment to help protect the freedom-loving
peoples of Asia, the least the peoples of Asia
can do is to fulfill their own part and that
is to demonstrate their own love for freedom
by fighting with their own men, with their
own complement and their own soldiers, for
freedom." The Philippine contingent is now
in Viet-Nam, as are forces from Korea in
very large numbers; from Thailand, which
has just committed a battalion of combat
ground forces; and from Australia and New

So what we have done in Viet-Nam, I
think, has made a contribution, a major con-
tribution, to this very palpable confidence
factor in the area. Behind it lies a much more
basic thing, for the future of Asia will of
course be determined by the energy, the drive,
the cohesion, and the capacity of the Asian
nations themselves to work for the welfare
of their people. The key question is what are
they doing with what Lee Kuan Yew called
the bought time. For, as he said, "If we just

' For text, see ibid., Nov. 28, 1966, p. 812.

sit down and believe people are going to buy
time forever after for us, then we deserve
to perish." So what I am talking about today
is an accounting of what the Asian nations
are doing — were doing to a very major degree
already but are now doing with increased
energy and cooperation in the climate of con-
fidence that increasingly exists in the area.
There is no doubt that East Asia is one of
the great centers of world civilization, that
the people have the potential and the talent
to make progress if they may have security.

Constructive Developments in East Asia

A quick survey of what major countries in
the area have done, and are doing, gives clear
evidence of the potential and of the promise.

The Japanese economic success story is
well known. Yet the scale of their success
is hard to exaggerate. The less than 100
million people of Japan have a gross national
product roughly as large as the more than
700 million people of mainland China. Some
economic forecasts indicate that by 1975 the
figure may be two to one in Japan's favor.
Within a short time Japan may be the third
largest economic power in the world, ranking
ahead of any country except ourselves and
the Soviet Union.

In nearby Korea you can see the beginning
of what could turn quite rapidly into a
smaller scale but dramatic success story. In
1964 and 1965 Korea's growth rate was over
8 percent. For 1966, figures which have just
been received, and I think are correct, indi-
cate a real growth increase of 12 percent.
This growing prosperity can be seen dramat-
ically. The President's stop in Seoul was an
eye opener, particularly to those who had not
seen Korea for many years. Every observer
who gets out to the countryside agrees that
the progress extends very deeply throughout
the country and is not a showcase operation
confined to the cities. You just cannot help but
be struck by the drive, the passion for educa-
tion, and the sense of real progress on every
side in that country. When you consider the
tremendous devastation, the virtual destruc-
tion of Seoul during the Korean conflict, the
over 1 million Korean casualties in that war,



one can at least take hope for what can be
done in Viet-Nam after the end of the con-
flict, for there— although any destruction is
to be deplored — the scale of destruction has in
fact been very much less. The Korean political
system is settling down, and the presidential
election scheduled for April should be an-
other milestone of political maturity.

On Taiwan, the Republic of China has had
a sustained growth rate averaging 10 percent
annually over the past 3 years. It is now able
to offer on a small but still very significant
scale technical assistance, mainly in agricul-
ture, to 22 African and Asian nations. In
contrast to that performance and to the per-
formances of Hong Kong and Singapore,
where Chinese people have shown what they
can do, mainland China's growth from 1958
through 1965 appears to have been just about
on an average of zero per year, and its GNP
may have actually declined.

In the Philippines President Marcos enjoys
a prestige that gives him a greater oppor-
tunity for achievement than any Philippine
President since the death of Magsaysay.
With our help, that of the World Bank, and
we hope others, he is working on the key
problems of his country — smuggling, land
reform, agricultural productivity.

In Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, we
find extremely rapid economic growth. Singa-
pore and Malaysia, next to Japan, enjoy the
highest per capita income in Asia. They are
attempting to diversify their economies and
at the same time to create multinational

Thailand has averaged a 7 percent annual
growth over the last 10 years, and projec-
tions indicate that that rate will be sustained
or even possibly increased. Thailand has a
significant insurgency problem in the north-
east, an area which was until recently left
out of the progress of the rest of the nation.
But the great majority of the Thai are loyal
to their Government and to the royal family,
and the Thai leaders are aware of the re-
forms that must be made and are moving in
that direction. The proper measures are un-
der way. Though the Thai insurgency is
backed by mainland China and North Viet-

Nam, there is no reason to anticipate that
the problem in Thailand will reach the level
in South Viet-Nam, even in the earlier years
of '59, '60, and '61.

As we continue to go around the area, we
come to Indonesia, where the change in the
past year and a half must be bracketed with
our action in- Viet-Nam, with all the support
that South Viet-Nam has received in holding
its head above water, and with the cultural
revolution on the mainland of China as one
of the most significant events in the area.
Indonesia is the fifth most populous country
in the world and the most populous in South-
east Asia. Two years ago the odds favored

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 57 of 90)