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bring it to a successful conclusion.

It is very important that the Kennedy
Round succeed — on economic grounds, but I
think also on political grounds.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the United States and
the Soviet Union were to agree about the
armaments race in connection with an anti-
ballistic-missiles system, ivhich security
would then be offered European states ?

A. Well, it is a little hard to answer the
second part of your question, because we are
a long way yet from the first part of your

The essential problem is that if both sides
go down the path of establishing a network
of defensive antiballistic missiles and then
necessarily multiply their offensive missiles
for the purpose of saturating those defensive
missiles, then we have an arms race which
lifts us all into new plateaus of expenditure —
tens upon tens of billions of dollars on both
sides — with no great change in the under-
lying strategic situation.

So we would hope that ways and means
could be found to bring this under control.

Whatever the possibilities are, you can be
sure that we will be in very close consultation
with our allies on this problem, because we
understand fully that our allies have a big
interest in it, too.

Q. In Bonn there is much qtiestion of an
opening toivard the East. Does that mean
that, in connection rvith an atom-free zone in
Central Europe, the Rapacki Plan could be-
come actual again ?

A. Well, this plan, this type of plan, has
had a very important difficulty in it from the
very beginning.

One could imagine that the continent of
South America could be atom free in the sense
that there would be no nuclear weapons there
and South America might not then become
the target of nuclear weapons. In other
words, it might be removed from the military
aspects of nuclear war.

But Central Europe is the target of many
nuclear weapons and would remain the target
of nuclear weapons so long, for example, as
the Soviet Union has MRBM's and IRBM's in
its own territory aimed at Central Europe.

Technology has made a nuclear-free zone in
Central Europe very difficult to imagine. I
would suppose that in that respect the
solution lies in the general field of the reduc-
tion of nuclear weapons themselves, because
in these East-West relations that is crucial.
And we would hope that we could make some
progress toward the reduction of nuclear

MARCH 6, 1967


weapons. But a nuclear-free zone is not really
nuclear free if in fact it is the bull's-eye of
hundreds of nuclear weapons.

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Johnson said
on 7 October in New York^ that there is a
considerable change in the U.S. policy con-
cerning the reunification of Germany, which
would come at the end of a long process of
detente. Do you consider that it is really an
important change in United States policies?

A. Well, I am not at all sure that he des-
ignated that as a change at the time that he
made his speech.

I think we have had now 20 years of rather
harsh confrontation between East and West
Europe. And during those 20 years we have
not moved one inch toward the reunification
of Germany. I think one of the reasons for
that is that an attempt to solve that problem
by force would mean general war and prob-
ably general nuclear war.

So the question arises as to whether the
German people might not strengthen their
ties and move perceptibly closer to the possi-
bilities of reunification if the general rela-
tions between Western Europe and Eastern
Europe were improved.

I would think that it is worth finding out,
because we know that 20 years of harsh con-
frontation has not solved the problem. So
let's find out.

Burden Sharing in NATO

Q. Of course, if the Federal Government
could not comply with United States demands
as regards monetary arrangement or to sim-
ilar amount, would then the United States be
compelled to reduce its troops in Germany
and — which is even more actual — would you
see the possibility that a unilateral with-
drawal of British troops could be compen-
sated by purchases to be made by the United

A. Well, that matter is now being dis-
cussed among governments. I think there
have been some misunderstandings on the

' Ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

We are not asking the Federal Republic to
pay for the costs of stationing American
forces in Germany. Those costs are very
large indeed. We have been concerned about
the special problem of balance of payments, ■^
which arises from the fact that we have a
very large number of forces in Europe; and
it just happens that the largest number of
those forces are in the Federal Republic.

It might have been wise at the very begin-
ning, when NATO was organized, to work out
arrangements — perhaps a payments union of
some soi-t — which would insure that defense
considerations and the deployment of forces
would not in themselves bring about changes
in the balance-of-payments position of the
different members of the alliance.

But we have wanted to find some balancing
factors because of the very special balance-of-
payments problems that we have. You see,
we would not have these problems if it were
not for the fact that we have some million
men in uniform all over the world, and have
carried a very substantial foreign aid

Now, we have met this in part with the
help of your Government through some arms
purchases which you have made in the
United States. There may be other ways in
which this special balance-of-payments prob-
lem can be met. I do not at the present time
want to talk about the connection between
that and levels of forces. Among other things,
I think that NATO forces should be based
upon a NATO-wide agreement on the nature
of the threat to NATO and a general agree-
ment on what is prudent for NATO as a
whole to do with respect to such a threat
and finally upon agreement among ourselves
as to the equitable sharing of the burdens of
what we all should do together.

I would hope we could find an answer to all
of these questions — the balance-of-payments
issues that you mentioned, as well as a
thoughtful and wise determination as to the
levels of forces NATO requires.

Q. Chancellor [Kiirf] Kiesinger conscious-
ly tries to avoid having to choose between
Washington and Paris. Would the United
States promote the new direction of the Ger-




man policy even if Bonn were to undertake
a direct diplomatic advance toward Moscow ?

A. Well, you have asked two questions
having to do with both East and West there.

First, let me say that the United States
has an interest, a very serious interest, in
good relations between the Federal Republic
and France. After all, we ourselves were
drawn into two World Wars in this century
which began with fighting between those two
countries, and we do not wish to see that
happen again.

That does not mean, however, that we do
not believe that you and we have certain
fundamental common interests, such as
NATO and Atlantic cooperation, which ought
not be sacrificed in that respect.

Now, as far as East-West relations are
concerned, I suppose that you will be probing
those, including the possibilities in Moscow.
I can assure you we do not sit here as jealous
friends. If you can make progress in your
relations with France, good. If you can make
progress in your relations with the Soviet
Union, good. But let's continue to work to-
gether on those matters which are of common

Toward a Durable Peace

Q. There is much talk of a new era in
European politics. One says that the cold war
is finished. What kind of function is then left
for NATO?

A. You know, I think we are in danger of
forgetting too much. Half your people, half
our people, can no longer remember World
War II. And one result of that is that the
central question which is before mankind
begins to recede into the background, and
that central question is. How do you organize
a durable peace in the world? And in 1945,
when we drafted the Charter of the United
Nations, we said that this requires collective
security for suppression of breaches of the
peace and acts of aggression and the settle-
ment of disputes by peaceful means. Now,
these questions we must not forget.

I gather that you feel in Europe that we are
beginning something like a detente, all of us,

with Eastern Europe. Well, let us just pause
for a moment and recall that if that is true —
and I hope it is true — if that is true, we did
not get to that point by sacrificing Azerbaijan
in Iran, by sacrificing the eastern provinces
of Turkey, by sacrificing Greece to the guer-
rillas, by sacrificing Berlin, or Korea, or the
Congo, or Southeast Asia — nor by saying to
the Cuban missiles, "Oh, come, welcome, you
are good neighbors."

This has been a long, difficult, costly, and
sometimes bloody path to get to a point where
there is some prudence on both sides.

So I would hope that all of us, including our
young people in both countries, would think
hard about that central question, How do you
organize a durable peace? Because if article
1 of the United Nations Charter represents
the lessons learned from World War II, the
important thing to remember is that we can-
not draw lessons from world war III — there
won't be enough left. And so we must never,
never forget this question: How do you or-
ganize a peace in the world as compared with
letting us all slip down the slippery slope into
a general war that nobody can want and that
no one can survive?

Q. As regards the Viet-Nam policy, it has
been said that — do you accept this differenti-
ation in the concept about it ?

A. I didn't quite get what you said about
the differentiation — excuse me.

Q. I mean what importance would you give
to this differentiation between these two sym-
bols of animals, the hawks and the doves?

A. Oh. Well, I think those two expres-
sions are becoming passe a bit now, because
I think people have begun to understand that
the differences are not as great as at one time
people supposed.

Those who are determined to meet our
commitment in South Viet-Nam are those
who take seriously the question of organizing
a durable peace.

The United States, Mr. von Borch, has
taken 200,000 casualties since 1945, in killed
and wounded, in various parts of the world —
200,000 — for the purpose of trying to stabi-
lize the peace. We have lost men in Greece

MARCH 6, 1967


and in the Berlin airlift and in Korea and in
Southeast Asia and in other places.

So that the hawks are not people who want
war. Most of them are people who are trying
to organize the peace.

Now, the doves, I think, may feel that you
can take chances and take gambles with this
question. My own view, quite frankly, is
perhaps in between the extreme doves and the
extreme hawks. I believe that we must quietly
do what is necessary to insure that a country
to whom we are committed is not overrun
by force by someone else and at the same
time act with prudence so that we ourselves
do not move this problem from a restricted
war into a general war.

Q. Mr. Secretary, don't you believe that
such a strong power, such as the U.S.A.,
could temporarily at least cease the bombing
of North Viet-Nam if direct negotiations
could be made possible?

A. Well, if we were to put North Viet-Nam
in a position where it could be safe and com-
fortable while it sends its armies and its arms
into South Viet-Nam, they could do that for
50 years.

Now, we have an operational question as
well. Here come 50 trucks down the road,
just north of the 17th parallel, loaded with
men and ammunition. Now, do we say to our
men just south of the 17th parallel, "We don't
hit them there, in the North, so you will just
have to pick that ammunition out of your
bodies tomorrow afternoon." We cannot do
that — we cannot do that.

Now, I think it has also been overlooked
that the demand by the other side has in-
creased. They say that a suspension of the
bombing, a temporary cessation, is an ulti-
matum. And they are calling now for an un-
conditional and permanent cessation of the

All right, we are prepared to consider that
if they will tell us what the result of that will
be. And no one has been able to tell us yet
what the result of that would be.

So this is not a question of a large country
and a small country — as far as these men who

get killed out there are concerned, the enemy
could be representative of as large a country
as there is. We can't do that to our men in
the field.

The other side knows how they can tell us ^,
what the result would be if we stopped the

So surely we have a right to know that.
Surely someone, somewhere in the world,
some day, will be willing to tell us that "if '.
you stop the bombing, x, y, or z will happen."

So we are listening.

U.S. Responsibilities In Europe

Q. Mr. Secretary, General de Gaulle be-
lieves that a continental independent Europe
from the Atlantic to the Urals can be
achieved, ivhich would put an end to the cold
war. Is this, in your opinion, possible without
the United States ?

A. Well, I don't think it is possible with
the Soviet Union up to the Urals. I suspect the
Soviet Union will not wish to be divided in
two in that fashion.

I think the question of our participation in
the North Atlantic arrangements is a ques-
tion that is to be shared and to be answered
by our friends in Europe in terms of "What
do you think about it?"

We have some very important interests in
our relations with Western Europe. We have
some responsibilities which resulted in part
from World War II, which we expect to take
seriously. And I can tell you that we do not
expect to have those responsibilities, on such
questions as Berlin, for example, determined
without the participation of the United
States. We didn't fight World War II for

Now, in t«rms of other arrangements, I
think those would be for everybody to think
about. I don't myself anticipate that for the
next 50 years that there will be a political
unification of Europe from the Atlantic to the

Q. The Soviet Government argues — and
this is heard in this country, too — that in the
Federal Republic nationalists, not to say Na-



tional Socialists, may come back to potver.
How do you judge the democratic stability of
the Federal Republic?

A. I don't share that concern. Of course,
you who live in the Federal Republic are
more expert on that than I am. But it is
my impression that there is a very strong
democratic commitment among the people of
the Fedei'al Republic and that the most ex-
treme right, the National Socialist kind of
tradition, will have little influence to play
there. I gather that there are many among
you who think that this is not a serious
problem, but it is a problem which must be
watched a bit. But we are not concerned
about that over here. We are interested, of
course, and there would be concern if it got to
be a problem. But this is not on our minds
at the present time.

Moderator: Ladies and gentlemen, we are
at the end of this — may I ask you a personal
question? Five years ago my colleague in this
program asked you how you liked your job
as Secretary of State of the most powerful
nation in the world. At that time, you
answered in a positive sense. The 5 last years
have been extremely important and very tir-
ing years. Your answer to the question —
would it be the same today? How do you like
your job now ?

A. Oh, I think so. As far as my age is con-
cerned — and I am aware of it because I had a
birthday yesterday — most of my problems
come from people who are older than I am.
But in any event, in these very interesting
and exciting years through which I have
lived, I have felt real satisfaction in being

able to serve men like President Kennedy and
President Johnson and in one situation or
another to be able to help a little bit in trying
to establish some peace in the world.

Moderator: This is the end of our confer-
ence toith the Secretary of State.

May I thank you once again for having
found the time to be here with us and answer
our questions.

Viet-Nam Hostilities Resumed
Following Tet Cease-Fire

Statement by President Johnson ^

It had been our hope that the truce periods
connected with Christmas, New Year's, and
Tet might lead to some abatement of hostil-
ities and to moves toward peace. Unfor-
tunately, the only response we have had from
the Hanoi government was to use the periods
for major resupply efforts of their troops in
South Viet-Nam. Despite our efforts, and
those of third parties, no other response has
as yet come from Hanoi.

Under these circumstances, in fairness to
our own troops and those of our allies, we
had no alternative but to resume full-scale
hostilities after the cease-fire. But the door
to peace is, and will remain, open, and we
are prepared at any time to go more than
half way to meet any equitable overture from
the other side.

' Read to news correspondents by George Christian,
Press Secretary to the President, on Feb. 13.

MARCH 6, 1967


". . . the reasons behind strong U.S. support of U.N.
actions against Southern Rhodesia are several and pro-
found." This background paper, prepared in the Bureau of
International Organization Affairs, outlines the crisis in
Southern Rhodesia and defines the moral and legal impera- ^
tives and practical considerations which are the basis of U.S.
support for the U.N. actions against Southern Rhodesia.

Southern Rhodesia and the United Nations: The U.S. Position

Southern Rhodesia is a landlocked territory
in south-central Africa, bounded by Zambia
on the north, Portuguese Mozambique on the
east, South Africa on the south, and newly
independent Botswana on the west. It is
150,333 square miles in area, about the
size of California. Southern Rhodesia's alti-
tude — most of its territory is between 3,000
and 5,000 feet above sea level — gives it a
pleasant, even climate despite its tropical
location. Its population includes about 4,105,-
000 Africans, 224,000 whites, and 21,000 of
other ethnic groups.

The principal agricultural products of
Southern Rhodesia are tobacco, sugar, cotton,
and citrus fruits; and cattle raising is an
important industry. It is rich in asbestos,
gold, chrome ore, coal, and manganese.

Southern Rhodesia is surprisingly new. It
was founded by British empire builder Cecil
Rhodes, who in 1889 obtained a charter con-
ferring commercial privileges and adminis-
trative responsibilities in the territory on his
British South Africa Company. White settle-
ment began the following year. Rhodes' com-
pany ran the colony until 1922, when the
British Government offered the white settlers
a choice of becoming a self-governing colony
or forming a union with South Africa. They
chose the former, and in 1923 Southern Rho-

desia was formally annexed by Great Britain.
The 1923 constitution provided for a Gov-
ernor to represent the British Crown and a
single house of Parliament with 30 members.
The franchise was open to adult British sub-
jects having an annual income of over £200,
regardless of race. Although the British Gov-
ernment retained certain reserve powers over
any legislation which discriminated against
Africans or amended the constitution and
could disallow any act of the legislature
within a year of enactment, it never exer-
cised these powers directly during the 38
years in which the constitution remained in

The People

The first white settlers beckoned to South-
em Rhodesia by Rhodes were Boers and
British of varying trades and background
who founded Salisbury and other small com-

As their descendants proved insufficient in
number to supply the skilled manpower re-
quired to support the territory's growing
economy, especially the rapid expansion
brought about by the two World Wars, the
Southern Rhodesian Government offered
strong incentives to encourage immigration.
The new immigrants, mostly skilled blue-



collar workers, were able to earn high wages
and live in a fine climate with many comforts
and amenities. The white population has
quadrupled since 1936, when it was only
55,000. Thus, most of the whites now in
Southern Rhodesia are fairly recent arrivals,
and the economic stake for most of them is
a job in an urban center rather than land
or property.

The Africans in Southern Rhodesia belong
to the great family of Bantu-speaking peoples
who inhabit central and southern Africa and
whose many languages are related. The two
principal groupings are the Mashona and the
Matabele, who at one time warred on each
other. Differences between the two groups
have diminished over the years, and the main
split among Africans now is between the
urban dweller and the tribally oriented rural

Only about half of Southern Rhodesia's
Africans live in the rural reserves set up
under the Land Apportionment Act. which
designated special areas to be used by whites
and Africans. The rural reserves are popu-
lated largely by women, children, and elderly
persons, who are usually assisted by their
wage-earning kinsmen in the towns. Detrib-
alized Africans are migrating in increasing
numbers to the African townships in and
around urban areas, which are reserved pri-
marily for whites. The urban African popula-
tion, though predominantly Rhodesian-bom,
includes many Africans from Malawi, Zam-
bia, and Mozambique.

Until recent years the mass of the African
population was politically inert, partly be-
cause of the traditions of the Mashona tribe,
which placed great value on moderation and
patience. The increasing regulation intro-
duced by the whites and their technological
society disrupted the African's traditional
patterns and beliefs and upset his social rela-
tionships without offering usable substitutes.
White values made the African eager for in-
creased political rights and economic advance-
ment, but white restrictions denied them,
resulting in frustration and bitterness.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

In 1953 the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland was formed out of Southern Rho-
desia and the British protectorates of North-
ern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, with powers di-
vided among the central government and the
three territorial governments. The Federal
Government consisted of a Governor General
representing the Crown, a Prime Minister, aa
Executive Council, and a 59-member Federal
Assembly which included 12 Africans and
3 Europeans representing African interests.

The Federation, promoted by Southern
Rhodesian whites hoping to benefit from the
exploitation of Northern Rhodesian copper
while at the same time heading off the drive
for independence by Africans in the two pro-
tectorates, proved an outstanding economic
success. But the Federation's political pros-
pects foundered on the rocks of heightened
African political awareness and desire for
independence. Rioting broke out in Nyasa-
land in 1959, and African territorial govern-
ments came to power in both Northern Rho-
desia and Nyasaland within the next 2 years.
Britain accepted the right of individual terri-
tories to secede from the Federation, and in
December 1963 the Federation was formally
dissolved. Nyasaland became the independent
state of Malawi in July 1964; and Northern
Rhodesia, the independent state of Zambia
in October 1964,


The breakup of the Federation ended hopes
for political union of the three territories,
but it left the economies of Malawi and
Zambia closely entwined with Southern Rho-
desia's. Zambia, a nation rich in natural re-
sources and with the potential for healthy
economic development, remained especially
dependent on Southern Rhodesia. Its thriving
copper industry, the mainstay of its economy,
looks to Southern Rhodesia for skilled white
labor and its essential supplies of coal, petro-
leum, and electric power as well as railway
access to southern African ports. In 1964 one-
fourth of total Southern Rhodesian exports

MARCH 6, 1967


went to Zambia, including two-thirds of its
exports of manufactured goods. Many Rho-
desian private businesses service Zambia, and
international corporations selling in both
countries generally operate out of Salisbury.
Negotiations for a new Southern Rhodesian
constitution began well before the formal
breakup of the Federation. A conference in
February 1961 drafted its provisions, and it

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 64 of 90)