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territories which promote or are calculated to pro-
mote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of
arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft,
military vehicles, and equipment and materials for
the manufacture and maintenance of arms and am-
munition in Southern Rhodesia ;

(e) any activities by their nationals or in their
territories which promote or are calculated to pro-
mote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other
aircraft and motor vehicles and of equipment and
materials for the manufacture, assembly or mainte-
nance of aircraft and motor vehicles in Southern
Rhodesia: the shipment in vessels and aircraft of
their registration of any such goods destined for
Southern Rhodesia: and any activities by their na-
tionals or in their territories which promote or are
calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly
of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia;

(/) participation in their territories or territories
under their administration or in land or air trans-
port facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their
registration in the supply of oil or oil products to
Southern Rhodesia;

notwithstanding any contracts entered into or
licenses granted before the date of this resolution.

A Measured Response

The language of the resolution follows
very closely the draft Britain presented to
the Security Council. The only significant
changes, made by the Council with British
agreement, were the addition of oil, motor
vehicles, and aircraft to the list of embargoed
items.

Great Britain cautioned the Council
against allowing the situation to develop into
an economic or military confrontation with
the whole of southern Africa. Accepting the
British appeal for a moderate approach, the
Council turned down proposals for more



radical solutions. Amendments proposed by
African states and rejected by the Council
included a call for Great Britain to use all
means, including force, to end the rebellion,
as well as a condemnation of South Africa
and Portugal for their support of the illegal
regime.

The Soviet Union backed these amend-
ments and abstained on the final resolution
on the ground that it did not go far enough.
Having few responsibilities on the African
Continent, the Soviet Union risks little in
pushing for radical measures on Southern
Rhodesia. The course adopted by the Security
Council, however, reflects an admirable effort
to assure a response appropriately tailored
to the threat.

South Africa and Portugal

Because of the geographical location of
South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique,
the success of the sanctions program will, to
an important degree, depend on the future
willingness of Portugal and South Africa to
comply.

South Africa has thus far represented a
major obstacle to the success of the volun-
tary sanctions program. Its Government has
consistently declared the official neutrality of
South Africa in the controversy.

Portugal's role is also important to the out-
come of U.N. action. Contrary to the views
of the bulk of the international community,
its Government contends that the Security
Council's resolution of December 16 is in-
valid.

Economic Problems of Sanctions

The application of sanctions against
Southern Rhodesia could result in serious
economic repercussions for its neighbors,
notably Zambia. Although the Security Coun-
cil resolution of December 16 was carefully
worded to avoid aflfecting ti'ade in commodi-
ties essential to Zambia's economy, there
remains the ])ossibility of damage through
Rhodesian retaliation. Article 50 of the U.N.
Charter provides that any state facing special



374



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN



economic problems that stem from measu;-es
instituted by the Security Council shall have
the right to consult with the Council about a
solution.

The failure of member states to comply
with the Security Council's decision to apply
mandatory sanctions would not only violate
solemn treaty obligations; it would jeopard-
ize the success of the sanctions program.
And if the sanctions are not successful, the
result could be a situation of increasing vio-
lence, more costly and difficult to deal with.
It was in the hope of avoiding such a tragic
outcome that the Security Council limited its
action to moderate though firm measures
which all members could accept and observe.

Legal Considerations

In ordering mandatory economic sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia, the Security
Council acted on solid legal grounds. Because
a number of attacks have been launched
against the action, however, its legal founda-
tions are reviewed here.

1. It is argued that the situation in South-
ern Rhodesia poses no threat to international
peace, as is required before mandatory sanc-
tions can be applied, or that if there is a
threat it is posed not by the actions of the
Smith regime but by the possibility of action
against that regime by African states.

Under the U.N. Charter, the members have
entrusted to the Security Council the power
to "determine the existence of any threat to
the peace" and to "decide what measures
shall be taken ... to maintain or restore
international peace and security." This is
what the Council has done in the Rhodesian
case, and under article 25 of the charter all
U.N. members are obligated to accept and
carry out the Council's decisions.

The Council had ample basis on which to
make a finding of a threat to the peace. The
illegal rebellion of the Smith regime in Rho-
desia has obstructed political development in
that territory toward independence on the
basis of majority rule, in defiance of the



principles and obligations of the U.N. Char-
ter. In the political context of the African
Continent, such action could lead to civil
strife that might involve other parties on
one or both sides of the conflict. This does
not necessarily presuppose deliberate forci-
ble action by other African states against
Rhodesia, although some states might very
well become involved in such conflict eventu-
ally whether they wished to or not.

The Council thus concluded that the
Smith regime's rebellion posed a threat to
stability, security, and peace in the area,
with which it must seek to deal effectively.

2. It is argued that the Security Council's
action violates article 2, paragraph 7, of the
charter, which prohibits U.N. intervention
in "matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state."

There is no basis for this contention. First
of all. Southern Rhodesia is not a "state"
and has not been recognized as such by a
single government or international organiza-
tion.

Secondly, the Security Council's move can-
not be considered "intervention" since the
Council acted at the specific request of the
legitimate sovereign, the United Kingdom.

Third, the situation in Southern Rhodesia
can in no way be considered a matter of
"domestic jurisdiction." The U.N. has con-
sistently recognized that Southern Rhodesia
falls under the provisions of article 73. This
article calls on members administering a ter-
ritory "whose peoples have not yet attained a
full measure of self-government ... to de-
velop self-government, to take due account
of the political aspirations of the peoples,
and to assist them in the progressive devel-
opment of their free political institutions.
. . ." Therefore, Rhodesia is the subject of
international responsibilities owed by Great
Britain on behalf of the peoples of Rhodesia
to the international community. It is the dis-
charge of these responsibilities which the
Smith regime is trying to frustrate and ob-
struct.

Fourth, article 2, paragraph 7, specifically



MARCH 6, 1967



375



provides that the principle of noninterven-
tion shall not prejudice enforcement meas-
ures under chapter VII. Economic sanctions
are such measures.

American Support for U.N. Action

Beyond the legal grounds, the reasons be-
hind strong U.S. support of U.N. actions
against Southern Rhodesia are several and
profound. Any other policy would deny our
owTi democratic heritage and the struggle
for equal rights both at home and abroad.
President Johnson expressed this thought in
his address on May 26, 1966, marking the
third anniversary of the Organization of
African Unity, when he said:^*

As a basic part of our national tradition we sup-
port self-determination and an orderly transition
to majority rule in every quarter of the globe. These
principles . . . g:uide our policy today toward
Rhodesia. . . .

The foreign policy of the United States is rooted
in its life at home. We will not permit human rights
to be restricted in our own country. And we will not
support policies abroad which are based on the rule
of minorities or the discredited notion that men are
unequal before the law. We will not live by a double
standard- — professing abroad what we do not practice
at home or venerating at home what we ignore
abroad.

Other reasons for U.S. support of firm
measures against Southern Rhodesia are
equally compelling. The birth of our own
nation gives us a natural sympathy for
peoples seeking self-determination — tnie self-
determination, not self-determination for a
small ruling clique. As a founding member
of the United Nations and a principal archi-
tect of the U.N. Charter, we also have a
special obligation to see its purposes upheld.
Article 1 names as a purpose of the U.N. the
development of friendly relations among na-
tions "based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of
peoples."

U.S. support for U.N. action is not based



" Ibid., June 13, 1966, p. 914.



solely on moral and legal imperatives, how-
ever. It is equally grounded in practical con-
siderations. The American national interest
is furthered if we can maintain friendly re- ^
lations with the world's newly independent
countries, for whom the Rhodesian issue is
of the greatest emotional and symbolic sig-
nificance.

The great majority of newly independent
African states have sought to achieve multi-
racial societies and to protect the rights of
minorities. The success of a rebellion based
on white supremacy would seriously under-
mine their efforts. It would etch deeper the
lines of political conflict and strengthen the
hand of extremism and racism throughout
the continent. In so doing it could pave the
way for catastrophic racial violence. Pres-
sures in other African countries to support
violent measures against the white regime
in Southern Rhodesia would grow and
"armies of liberation" might be formed. De-
velopments of this kind would open a world
of opportunity to powers who believe their
interests are best served by international un-
rest.

Such events would hardly be in the interest
of peaceful development and certainly not in
the interest of the United States.

American policy of support for a measured
U.N. response to end the rebellion and bring
about majority rule in Southern Rhodesia
steers a course between those who advocate
the use of force and those who advocate a
hands-off policy. It is a narrow course, and
not without perils, but the only one which
offers promise. To use force now would bring
immediately the disruption and chaos we
seek to avoid. To do nothing would end in
the same result.

As 1966 drew to a close, the possibilities
for a negotiated compromise seemed to nar-
row. Until the Rhodesian rejection of the
agreement worked out on the Tiger, the
British had never insisted on majority rule
as a precondition for a transition. On De-
cember 20, however, Prime Minister Wilson



376



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN



told the House of Commons that he would
adhere to the policy expressed in the Com-
monwealth communique of September;
namely, that he would not again submit to
Parliament a settlement with Southern Rho-
desia involving independence before majority
rule.

On January 5, 1967, President Johnson
signed Executive Order No. 11322, officially
implementing mandatory economic sanc-
tions. ^^ Violation of the Executive order is a
criminal offense. The President acted under
the United Nations Participation Act, passed
by Congress on December 20, 1945, and
amended in 1949 and 1965, which authorizes
the President to apply sanctions voted by
the Security Council.

Section 5(a) of the act says:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law,
whenever the United States is called upon by the
Security Council to apply measures which said Coun-
cil has decided, pursuant to Article 41 of said Chap-
ter, are to be employed to give effect to its decisions
under said Charter, the President may, to the extent
necessary to apply such measures, through any
agency which he may designate, and under such
orders, rules, and regulations as may be prescribed
by him, investigate, regulate, or prohibit, in whole or
in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal,



telegraphic, radio, and other means of communica-
tion between any foreign country or any national
thereof, or any person therein and the United States
or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or
involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States.

The problem of Southern Rhodesia thus
remains to be solved. Failure on the part of
the international community to assist in re-
solving it in a just and peaceful manner
would not only endanger the principles of the
United Nations Charter; it would entail
grave consequences, both for the United Na-
tions and for our own interest in the stability
of Africa.



" For text, see ibid., Jan. 23, 1967, p. 146.



Letters of Credence

Sierra Leone

The newly appointed Ambassador of
Sierra Leone, Christopher 0. E. Cole, pre-
sented his credentials to President Johnson
on February 17. For texts of the Ambassa-
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see
Department of State press release dated Feb-
ruary 17.



MARCH 6, 1967



377



THE CONCRESS



Foreign Aid



Message From President Johnson to the Congress '



To the Congress of the United States:

Twenty years ago, President Truman set
forth the basic proposition underlying the
foreign aid program when he told the Con-
gress: 2

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work
out their own destinies in their own way. I believe
that our help should be primarily through economic
and financial aid which is essential to economic sta-
bility and orderly political processes.

This judgment was shared by Presidents
Eisenhower and Kennedy and by every Con-
gress since the 79th in 1946. It is my judg-
ment today. I believe it is the judgment of
most Americans.

Our commitment to assist the economic
growth and security of developing nations is
grounded in the hard realities of the postwar
world. We know that want is the enemy of
peace and hopelessness the mother of vio-
lence.

We know that —

In the long run, the wealthy nations can-
not survive as islands of abundance in a
world of hunger, sickness, and despair.

The threat to our security posed by in-



'H. Doc. 55, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (White House
press release dated Feb. 9).

' For President Truman's message to Congress
dated Mar. 12, 1947, concerning aid to Greece and
Turkey, see Bulletin Supplement, May 4, 1947, p.
829.



ternal subversion and insurgency cannot be
countered by withdrawal, isolation, or indif-
ference.

Men — acting together — have the power to
shape their destiny. Around the world, from
Mexico to Greece to Taiwan, we have seen
the energy and determination of the emerg-
ing peoples transform our aid into the seeds
of prosperity.

Abroad, as at home, the true national in-
terest of the American people goes hand in
hand with their sense of freedom, justice,
and compassion.

Precisely because foreign assistance pro-
grams are so vital to our national interest,
they must reflect the circumstances of the
late sixties, not those of the past. They must
respond to the ideas which move men in the
emerging nations today. They must draw
upon the lessons of experience. They must
take account of the growing wealth of other
advanced countries.

The proposals in this message reflect the
experience of our aid activities over two
decades. They emphasize the six guiding
principles on which our programs must be
based:

1. Self-help. — Nations develop primarily
through their own efforts. Our programs can
only be supplements, not substitutes. This is
the overriding principle.

2. Multilateralism. — Every advanced na-



378



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN



ion has a duty to contribute its share of the
:ost.

3. Regionalism. — The future of many
[countries depends upon sound development
|of resources shared with their neighbors.

4. Agriculture, health, and education. —
These key sectors are the critical elements
of advancement everywhere in the under-
developed world.

5. Balance of payments. — We cannot help
others grow unless the American dollar is
strong and stable.

6. Efficient administration. — Every Amer-
ican citizen is entitled to know that his tax
dollar is spent wisely.

New Directions

To carry out these principles, I propose —

A new Foreign Assistance Act, stating in
clear language our objectives, our standards,
and our program techniques.

A statutory National Adt^isory Committee
on Self-Help, to advise the Congress, the
President, the Secretaiy of State, and the
AID Administrator on how effectively re-
cipient nations are mobilizing their own re-
sources under the self-help criteria of the act.

A statutory objective that at least 85 per-
cent of our development loan funds he spent
in a regional or multilateral framework.

More than $1 billion in programs to im-
prove agriculture, education, and health, a
25-percent increase over last year.

A shift in emphasis in our aid policy in
Africa, to concentrate our help increasingly
on regional and multi-national projects.

Sympathetic consideration of a U.S. con-
tribution to a new special fund of the African
Development Bank.

A $200 million U.S. contribution to new
special funds of the Asian Development
Bank, in accord with the recommendations
of the Black mission, headed by Mr. Eugene
Black, my special representative on Asian de-
velopment.

A reorganization of the Agency for Inter-
national Development, to better carry on the



War on Hunger and to promote private in-
vestment and the growth of private enter-
prise in the less-developed world.

My proposals for programs authorized by
the Foreign Assistance Act in fiscal 1968
will require total appropriations of slightly
over $3.1 billion. Of this, some $2.5 billion
will be devoted to economic aid. Almost $600
million will be for military assistance. Funds
for the regional development banks would be
authorized by separate legislation.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1967

Foreign aid now rests on a legislative
foundation enacted in 1961. This pathfinding
statute has served the Nation well. But the
experience we have gathered over the past
several years should now be codified in a
new law.

/ propose the Foreign Assistance Act of
1967.

This act will contain a clear statement of
the philosophy which underlies our programs
and the criteria to be used in this administra-
tion. To provide the continuity needed for
sound management, it will contain authoriza-
tions covering 2 years. Most important, it
will provide a framework for each of the
basic thrusts of our aid policy.

1. Self-help

Self-help is the lifeblood of economic de-
velopment. No sustained progress is possible
without it. Aid provided as a substitute is
aid wasted.

Waste is a luxury none of us can afford.
The only obligation tied to our aid is the
recipient's obligation to itself — to mobilize
its own resources as efficiently as possible.
I will not ask any American citizen to con-
tribute his tax dollars to support any coun-
try which does not meet this test.

• Accordingly, the act will make it clear that
the development job is primarily the respon-
sibility of the developing countries them-
selves. In no case will the United States un-
dertake to do for any country what it should
do for itself. Nor will we assist in any ven-



MARCH 6, 1967



379



1



ture which we believe has received less than
full support from the recipient country. The
United States will insist on the general eco-
nomic policies necessary to make our aid
effective.

We are now applying strict and effective
self-help standards. The results are evident
in the fact that, on the average, each citizen
in the major aid-receiving countries is sav-
ing 1 of every 8 dollars he earns. These sav-
ings become investments. For every dollar
the United States and other donors provide,
these local sources invest $10.

Still, there is an urgent need for a per-
manent, nonpartisan, public body to evaluate
self-help performance.

Thus, the act I propose will authorize the
President to establish a National Advisory
Committee on Self-Help. This Committee will
consist of members from both parties, from
the business community, from labor, from
universities, and from other walks of life. It
will review and evaluate our aid programs
in as many countries as it sees fit. It will ex-
amine our programs to see whether the re-
cipients are extending their best efforts and
whether we are making the best possible use
of our aid. Its findings will be available to
the Congress.

2. Multilateralism and burden sharing

Development is a world problem. No single
country has all of the resources required.
Equity demands that no single country be
asked to carry the bulk of the load.

/ propose that the act set as an objective
that 85 percent of our development loans be
undertaken in a regional or multilateral
framework.

This action fits the trend of recent years,
as advanced nations have increasingly ac-
cepted the responsibilities associated with
their growing wealth. The combined value
of our economic and food aid is less than
seven-tenths of 1 percent of our national in-
come, only slightly more than the average
for all advanced countries. We devote smaller
shares to foreign assistance than such coun-
tries as France and Belgium.



But these figures do not tell the whole
story. Our defense expenditures far exceed
those of all other free nations combined and
serve their common interest. This burden
too must be counted in the balance.

Thus, we must redouble our efforts to get
other donors to enlarge their commitments.

3. Regionalism

Resources know no national boundaries.
Rivers flow through many countries, trans-
portation and communication networks serve
different peoples, sources of electric power
must be shared by neighbors. Economic ad-
vance in every part of the world has required
joint enterprises to develop shared sources
of wealth.

These facts underlie the growing movement
toward regional cooperation:

The Alliance for Progress has transformed
the inter-American system of institutions into
a reliable and dynamic engine of change.

Asian initiatives have created the frame-
work for cooperation of all kinds. Such insti-
tutions as the Asian and Pacific Council and
the Asian Development Bank are clear evi-
dence of the new will to press forward.

/ propose that the act state that the United
States ivill encourage regional economic de-
velopment to the maximum extent consistent
ivith the economic and political realities in
each region.

I propose three steps to carry out this
policy:

First, in most African countries, we will
gradually shift to cooperative projects which
involve more than one donor or more than
one recipient.

Second, we will seek an appropriate means
of responding to the recent request of the
African Development Bank for U.S. partici-
pation in a special fund to finance worthy
projects which are beyond the means of the
Bank's ordinary capital.

Third, we will respond favorably to the
request for special funds for the Asian De-
velopment Bank. Preliminary explorations
suggest a U.S. share of $200 million, to be



380



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN



contributed over a number of years with
matching arrangements and balance of pay-
ments safeguards.

These proposals spring from a philosophy
of pragmatic regionalism. They reflect the
facts of economic life.

Political unity is neither required nor ex-
pected. But the resources available for devel-
opment are too scarce to scatter among many
countries when greater promise lies in joint
action. We must take full advantage of the
benefits of cooperation.

4. Agriculture, health, and education



Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 66 of 90)