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Still more distressing, the pressures of the
population explosion are making matters
worse. Recent United Nations statistics indi-
cate that illiteracy in the developing countries
appears to have grown by some 200 million
people in the past 6 years. It is estimated, for
example, that there are more illiterates in
certain Latin American countries today than
their total population in 1940. And in India,
132 million young people are not receiving
any formal education at all. The construction
of new schools and the training of more
teachers in many countries is proceeding at
a vigorous rate but not enough to keep pace
with population growth. If population growth
is not slowed, there would seem to be little
chance of overcoming illiteracy.

It is such facts as these that make it clear
that effective family planning programs can-
not be put off if developing nations are to
avert disastrous famines and to sustain rates
of economic growth sufficient to forestall
widespread social unrest and political up-
heavals. These programs are certainly not
substitutes for economic assistance, and we
have no intention of suggesting that they
should be. But in the long run they are a
necessity if programs for economic develop-
ment are to have a meaningful impact.

I have emphasized population policy
because it deeply affects the future of whole
nations and of the world. But when we speak
of "population programs" and "family plan-
ning programs" we must never lose sight of
two facts. First, we are talking about matters
which are for the decision of individual coun-
tries and individual families. Second, we are


thinking of the health and welfare of many
flesh-and-blood mothers and fathers, of their
children, and of the strength of their family
life. Our concern is not that the developing
countries should adopt special measures of
population control but only that they should
provide their people with choices comparable
to those which exist in our own country and
other advanced nations.

Multilateral Aid Programs

A fresh start — a great leap forward in
these vast projects — will be one of the main
tasks of the second postwar generation: to
develop the strategies and tactics for the war
against hunger, illiteracy, and disease; and
to develop the international will and the
international machinery essential to wage
and win these great battles.

For we know today that no country, how-
ever powerful, can win these battles alone.

This is the principle underlying the empha-
sis on multilateralism in our aid programs.
In fiscal 1968 over 85 percent of U.S. develop-
ment lending will flow through a multilateral
framework — through the World Bank and
its affiliates and consortia and through the
regional development banks. In this way, we
hope to promote the continued cooperation of
other aid donors to insure an equitable shar-
ing of the development burden. This is not to
say that other advanced countries are not
accepting their equitable part of the task.
This may have been true in the early postwar
years. It is not true today.

Economic assistance from other developed
countries has doubled in the last 9 years. By
comparison with other nations, the United
States does not provide a larger amount of
foreign assistance in relation to its economic
strength and capacity. As a whole, other aid-
giving nations of the free world spend a per-
centage of national income not much smaller
than the United States — even though their
average per capita income is far less than
ours. Indeed, some of them — the United
Kingdom, France, and Australia — spend as
much or more.

Our objectives reach beyond the measure-
ment of equity. There is, after all, little point
in apportioning among nations fair shares of
an effort that is itself inadequate or irrele-
vant. We are searching for ways to systema-
tize and coordinate international efforts and
to enlarge them, while we still have a margin
of time. Why? First, to increase the effective-
ness of our collective contributions — and to
share plans and problems; second, to insure
that aid efforts, both ours and others', are
not permitted to flag — for if that happens,
defeat is inescapable.

Collective Responsibility and Action

We are seeking to develop the habits of
collective responsibility and collective action.
We seek the development of peaceful coali-
tions for specific tasks and in specific regions,
each with objectives which transcend simple
nationalism and ideology. In this task, we
invite and welcome the cooperation of the
Soviet Union and other advanced Communist
countries in a labor of fraternity that should
acknowledge no boundaries.

These international efforts take a variety
of forms.

In the war on hunger, for example, Presi-
dent Johnson, in support of India's efforts to
feed its population in the face of severe
drought, has taken a new initiative to make
food aid an international responsibility
managed through the World Bank India Aid

To form the basis for a long-range
approach to the world food problem, the
United States is proposing in the Kennedy
Round negotiations an international grains
agreement containing a multilateral food aid
program to be supported by grain exporters
and importers alike.

And to facilitate the flow of fertilizer and
other agricultural inputs so essential to
increasing production in the developing
world, the United States has urged the estab-
lishment of a food fund supported by OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] members and designed to

MARCH 13, 1967


encourage private investors in OECD coun-
tries to invest in agriculture and agriculture-
related industries in the developing world.

George Woods, the President of the World
Bank, has estimated that the developing
world has foreign exchange shortages of $3
billion to $4 billion each year. Exchange
shortages are about $1 billion in Latin Amer-
ica alone. Foreign exchange shortages in
India threaten to disrupt the trade and in-
vestment liberalization programs which are
essential to India's progress. And meanwhile,
the debt problems of the developing countries
continue to grow. The outstanding public
debt of the developing countries rose from
$10 billion in 1955 to at least $36 billion by

To dampen this accelerating growth in
debt over the long run, the volume of aid
must be increased and the terms of lending
improved. In the short run the many impend-
ing debt crises must be forestalled. Here
again, this requires collective action by the
creditor nations. Such action is already
underway with respect to Indonesia and
Ghana and is likely for several others.

Forums for effective collective action are
already well developed in the trade field. We
are approaching the end of the Kennedy
Round of trade negotiations now taking place
in Geneva, the most extensive and elaborate
multilateral trade negotiations ever under-
taken. We shall know in the next few weeks
whether our efforts will yield significant

But in any case, the Kennedy Round is not
the end of the road for the liberalization of
world trade. Indeed, our Government is
already looking beyond the Kennedy Round,
devoting special attention to the trade prob-
lems of the developing world. As the barriers
to trade have been lowered, world trade has
soared. But the trade of the developing coun-
tries has not kept pace with their rising im-
port needs. After the Kennedy Round is over,
the great challenge will be to find ways to
expand exports of developing countries so

that they can finance more imports and
achieve the economic growth they need to pro-
vide their citizens with decent living stand-
ards. Whatever the policies adopted to meet
these needs, these policies can be deemed suc-
cessful only if they are fully accepted and
implemented by the major trading nations of
the world.

Contributions of the Private Sector

Up to now, I have spoken of the collective
tasks which confront governments. I should
be remiss if I failed to take note of the con-
tribution of the private sector of the
developed world as well as from emerging
private institutions within the developing
world itself.

The task of development is not a task for
governments alone. The capital gap itself is
somewhere between $5 billion and $20 billion
annually; and the great bulk of the knowl-
edge, managerial experience, and capital
required for development rests with our busi-
ness and professional communities. The
international companies, large and small,
which do business in the countries of the de-
veloping world are among the most important
agents of economic progress. Success in
development depends in substantial measure
upon our ability to mobilize these resources
and talents. This is the lesson we have
learned from the history of our own develop-
ment, and it is also the experience of the de-
veloping world. Those developing countries
which have experienced the most rapid
growth and the most broadly based progress
have been countries where national and
international private enterprise, encouraged
by public policy and investment, has

Perhaps the greatest contribution private
enterprise can make lies in the realm of agri-
culture. Most of the increase in world food
needs for the foreseeable future must be met
by increasing agricultural production in the
developing countries. This will require mas-
sive inputs of capital and technology — inputs



which are not presently available within
these countries, but which exist in the great
agribusiness complexes of North America,
Western Europe, and Japan. The problem is
how to transfer these resources to the areas
where they are needed, and in time. Develop-
ments that took decades must occur in these
countries within a few years if mass starva-
tion is to be avoided.

One of the great tests of the politics of
progress for the next few years will be the
ability of governments and business firms,
both within and without the developing
world, to find the policies to bridge the gap
which presently exists in agricultural busi-
ness investment between risk and reward.
This may well require the development of new
kinds of consortium arrangements, both
private and public, working together in
totally new and imaginative ways toward a
common objective. It will require govern-
mental policies and programs to make risk-
taking more attractive, within the agreed
rules of a new legal system for the conduct
of international business. This is a new fron-
tier in government-business relationships.

Still another frontier is being created by
the great advances recently made in educa-
tional technology. The potential market for
such technology in the developing world is
beyond measure, and the uses of teaching

machines and educational TV for accelerated
learning appear unlimited.

I have touched today on a few of the major
problems and opportunities of the politics of
progress. Peaceful coalitions such as I have
described, among governments and between
governments and businesses, will in my judg-
ment be a dominant characteristic of the next
decade. For every region and in every per-
spective, these problems require close coop-
eration between the advanced countries and
the developing countries, between Europe,
the United States, and Japan — and hopefully,
the Soviet Union and other advanced Com-
munist countries as well — on one side and the
developing countries on the other.

We live in a world which no longer knows
regional problems. The unity of the world is
a fact^in peacekeeping, in development aid,
in trade, in education. The only question is
whether man has wit enough to accept this
fact as the major premise of his policy.

Great common adventures like this should
confirm a greater sense of our collective re-
sponsibility for humanity's future — a height-
ened appreciation of "fraternity," that
neglected aspect of the great revolutionary
slogan of the 18th century. Such an apprecia-
tion of fraternity, of international partner-
ship, and of common humanity, is indispens-
able to the success of the politics of progress.

MARCH 13, 1967


Constructive Initiatives in East-West Relations

by Foy D. Kofiler

Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^

Thank you for your friendly welcome to
Cincinnati. I am glad to be with you this
evening. As a Buckeye born and educated,
I feel very much at home and among
friends. More than that, I might say it is
high time for me to come back here, because
my last visit was over 35 years ago. In July
of 1931 I came down from Columbus for a
few days to take the written examinations
to enter the American Foreign Service. I
suppose the 15 young hopefuls scribbling
away that summer in the hot, stuffy attic of
your old Post Office Building were about the
only persons in the city who were then par-
ticularly concerned with the foreign rela-
tions of the United States.

It is impressive to come back 35 years
later and find this large group, brought
together by a vigorous organization concen-
trating on foreign affairs, meeting to devote
a full day to international concerns. Perhaps
those of you who have continued to live here
at home are hardly conscious of the extent
of the changes which have taken place in
your lives and attitudes as the United States
moved from isolationism to world power.
But as I have returned to my native State
from time to time, I have invariably been
reassured to find that my fellow Ohioans
have kept up with the times and with the
changes — that you have sought to under-
stand the increasing complexities of today's
world and are prepared to face up to the
tremendous responsibilities which have fall-

' Address made before the Cincinnati Council on
World Affairs at Cincinnati, Ohio, on Feb. 17 (press
release 36 dated Feb. 16).

en upon the United States in that complex

This growth in interest and understand-
ing is fundamental. Professional diplomats
sometimes wish they could conduct their
business in the good old Machiavellian way,
out of the glare of publicity and free from
public pressures. This would have some
advantages, it is true — advantages which
some of our opponents enjoy. However, in
our democracy there can be no foreign
policy which is not understood and sup-
ported by the people at large, particularly as
reflected by their elected representatives in
Washington. We thoroughly understand
this; and despite occasional abuse of our
American freedoms by extremists or self-
serving interests, we would not have it
otherwise. Indeed, we must all realize that
the easy way to lose the contests between
open and closed societies is to remake our-
selves in the image of our opponents. So it
is a privilege as well as a pleasure for me to
be with this representative and responsible
group of my fellow citizens tonight and to
have an opportunity to talk with you about
a subject which is vital to us all, East-West

In one way or another, this question of
our relations with the Communist countries
has preoccupied me during much of the 35
years since I left Ohio; and, as our chair-
man has pointed out, my service abroad has
involved two periods of residence in the
Soviet Union- — 21/4 years just after the war
as Minister-Counselor of the Embassy in
Moscow and the last 41/2 years as Ambas-



The longer I liave been associated with
the Soviet Union, the more I have been
impressed by the increasing complexities of
its society and the many facets of its life.
This is a country of great contradictions:
contradictions between the old and the new,
differences between what the Soviets say
and what they really believe, contrasts
between the accomplishments of advanced
technology and the poverty of everyday life.
I would like to discuss some of these contra-
dictions with you in a little more detail.

Contrasts in Soviet System

On the one hand, we are told by the
Soviet leaders that theirs is a modern soci-
ety based on a new and revolutionary
ideology. Elaborate plans have already been
announced to celebrate the 50th anniversary
of the Soviet Revolution. But anyone who
has lived in the Soviet Union quickly be-
comes aware that so much of what is said
and done, so many of the attitudes people
have can be traced back to the myths and
the traditions and the experiences of their
long and turbulent history. Let me take just
one example: The profound antipathy which
a Russian feels toward the Chinese does not
arise from a differing interpretation of
Communist ideology or from the struggle
for power and influence between the two
countries within the Communist world.
Rather, it is an ingrained prejudice which
goes back to the Mongol-Tatar invasions
seven centuries ago and Tatar occupation
and despoliation of the Russian lands for
the next three centuries.

Another contrast is striking. Soviet sci-
ence and technology at its best is on a level
with the most advanced in the world. Soviet
accomplishments in space bear witness to
this fact. Yet the average Russian lives
without the benefit of most of the applied
technology which is so readily available to
Americans and to West Europeans, ranging
from superhighways to nylon stockings. The
mechanization and automation of so much
of our working and leisure life is largely
absent in the Soviet Union. One cannot help
being struck by the remarkable contrast of

a society which produces better cosmonauts
than mechanics, more sophisticated elec-
tronics than plumbing, better sputniks than

You have all heard the boast that there
is no unemployment in the Soviet Union,
and in a technical sense that is not far
wrong. There are few persons who do not
have some gainful occupation. This is ac-
complished in a command economy by
simply assigning to industrial and agricul-
tural enterprises quotas of workers and fixed
wage funds. The observable result is that
instead of a few percent of unemployment
they have many times that much under-
employment. Moreover, the economy is
forced to operate in a strait jacket. Much of
the debate about economic reform you read
about in the Soviet Union today reflects a
realization that their economy must be
released from such strait jackets if it is to
operate efficiently and effectively.

Communist ideology still provides the
basic guidelines for Soviet leadership. It
forms the intellectual rationale for the polit-
ical and economic system. Official Soviet
spokesmen go to great pains to justify their
actions in terms of Communist dogma, and
castigate their enemies for failing to con-
foiTn to its teachings. Yet the very fact that
Stalin and Khrushchev, the leaders who
dominated and personified that system for
more than 40 of its 50 years of existence,
have been rejected and discredited is a good
measure of the decline of the basic ideology.
It is no longer an effective instrument of
political power and clearly has little to do
with the daily life of the people. On the
basis of my personal experience, I believe
the East Europeans and Russians are in
some respects even less ideologically oriented
than their West European brothers. I
remember talking not long ago to an East
European Communist professor, whom I
asked, "Why did your ideology die so
quickly?" To which he responded, "Die so
quickly? I think it took too long to die!"
His attitude is symptomatic of many others
who, disillusioned by Stalinism, embittered
by persistent economic and social failures

MARCH 13, 1967


of the system, are turning to more prag-
matic solutions.

In this situation, the revolution of rising
expectations which has already affected so
much of the world has penetrated the Soviet
Union and is producing profound effects.
The Russians are becoming increasingly
aware of the way we live in the West and
the benefits which are available to us. They
are demanding some of the same things for
themselves and are building up irresistible
pressures on their rulers.

Any progress in satisfying this demand,
however, is going to require some very
tough decisions. There is a simple mathe-
matical formula involved here. The gross
national product of the Soviet Union was
about $330 billion last year; on a compa-
rable basis, less than half that of the United
States, which was about $740 billion. With
such a relatively small economic base, the
Soviet Union still tries to rival us in space
and military programs. The fact that the
new Soviet leadership is nearly 2 years late
producing the 5-year plan it promised bears
testimony to the difficulty it is having mak-
ing the necessary decisions on allocations of
resources among guns, butter, and sputniks.

Fragmentation in the Communist World

I would like to make one final observation
about my experience in the Communist
world. When I first went to Moscow in 1947,
it was the headquarters of world com-
munism, dominating the entire world move-
ment. Today we can no longer talk of a
Sino-Soviet bloc. Indeed, we cannot properly
refer to a Soviet bloc. The Communist world
has ceased to be a monolithic entity. Every
day brings new evidence of increasingly
independent actions by governments which
once were completely subservient to Mos-
cow. Doctrinal communism has proved no
match for the powerful forces of national
aspirations in our century. The most recent
manifestation of this has been, of course,
the Soviet-Chinese dispute. But the first
crack in the machinery appeared in 1948
with the Soviet- Yugoslav split. Since then
Yugoslavia has continued to go its own

independent way and is experimenting with
changes in its economic and political system
that are of importance for the Communist
world as a whole. It has made significant
moves toward the market economy and is to-
day debating the role the Communist party
should play in its political life, how much
dissent should be permitted, and what forms
of liberty should be introduced into a sys-
tem that was once completely totalitarian.

Ten years ago, both Poland and Hungary
challenged Soviet supremacy. Although the
Hungarian revolution was brutally crushed,
Poland did gain a measure of autonomy. Its
government has not broken with the Soviet
Union; we should have no illusions about
that. Nonetheless, significant aspects of
Polish life are free of Communist control.
More than 80 percent of Polish farmland is
privately owned and cultivated. Collectiviza-
tion has been abandoned altogether. A
measure of freedom of expression is toler-
ated. Extensive contacts with the West have
been developed. Hundreds of young Poles
are studying in Western institutions, many
of them in the United States.

In the last few years, the process of frag-
mentation in the Communist world has been
accentuated by the Sino-Soviet dispute. The
preoccupation of Moscow and Peking with
their increasingly bitter struggle has given
the smaller Communist powers and parties
the opportunity to go their own ways, free
from the constrictions of an agreed doctrine
or the domination of a central authority.

With this background of a many-faceted,
contrasting society whose people are demand-
ing more goods for themselves and whose
world is increasingly being dominated by na-
tional considerations, we must ask ourselves
what policies seem best designed to achieve
United States objectives? What policies will
aid in creating the kind of world we want to
live in: a world of cooperative communities in
which ideological divisions no longer create
fundamental gulfs between men and socie-
ties, a world in which violence giVes way to
the rule of law, a world in which poverty and
suffering are overcome by worldwide efforts
to improve the well-being of man?



I have had the ]irivilege of working on
these questions with several administrations,
particularly with President Eisenhower, with
President Kennedy, and with President John-
son. This succession of Presidents, of diifer-
ing political persuasion, have all reached
essentially the same conclusions regarding
our relations with the Soviet Union and the
Communist world. Each of them, looking at
the problem from the point of view of the
national interest, of the well-being and
security of all Americans, came to hold essen-
tially the same views. The policies which have
issued from their profound consideration of
how to insure a peaceful world have been set

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 70 of 90)