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forth by all of them, most recently, of course,
by President Johnson.

Speaking last August at the National Reac-
tor Testing Site for the Atomic Energy Com-
mission at Idaho Falls, the President, after
hailing the peaceful potential of atomic
power, said: ^

But there is another — and a darker — side of the
nuclear age that we should never forget. That is
the danger of destruction by nuclear weapons.

. . . uneasy is the peace that wears a nuclear
crown. And we cannot be satisfied with a situation
in which the world is capable of extinction in a
moment of error, or madness, or anger. . . .

Since 1945, we have opposed Communist efforts
to bring about a Communist-dominated world. We
did so because our convictions and our interests de-
manded it; and we shall continue to do so.

But we have never sought war or the destruction
of the Soviet Union; indeed, we have sought in-
stead to increase our knowledge and our under-
standing of the Russian people, with whom we share
a common feeling for life, a love of song and story,
and a sense of the land's vast promises.

After talking of our diffei-ences with the
Soviet Union the President posed the ques-
tion as to what practical step could be taken
forward toward peace. He answered himself:

I think it is to recognize that while differing prin-
ciples and differing values may always divide us,
they should not, and they must not, deter us from
rational acts of common endeavor. . . .

This does not mean that we have to become bed-
fellows. It does not mean that we have to cease
competition. But it does mean that we must both
want — and work for and long for — that day when
"nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
neither shall they learn war any more."

Since 1945, the conflict between the two
systems has sometimes taken the form of
trials of strength and periods of military con-
flict; more often, it has been conducted by less
violent methods. That confrontation, in
broader terms, has its "defensive" and
"offensive" aspects, to use military terms. I
propose to speak to you tonight about both

Force Not a Solution

On the "defensive" side we have reacted
to a series of threats of force on the part of
the Communists. Time and time again during
the course of the last 20 years, the United
States has had to confront Communist vio-
lence. Each time we have resolutely met this
challenge by bold actions which left no doubt
that we were willing to fight if necessary to
oppose Communist expansion by force of
arms; first in Iran, then in Greece, Berlin,
Malaya, the Philippines, Korea, Cuba, and,
of course, most recently in Viet-Nam. We
firmly believe that in the nuclear age no
power has the right to impose its ideas or its
system on others by the use of arms. This is
a fundamental lesson which all nations must
learn to live by. We have striven to drive that
lesson home.

Accordingly, when Greece was threatened
by Communist subversion in the immediate
postwar years, the United States did not hesi-
tate to come to its aid. At that time, there
were many who argued that we should not.
They said that Greece was under a conserva-
tive, indeed even a reactionary system, not
worthy of our assistance. Today, 20 years
later, Greece is a thriving democracy, and
even the severest critics of President Tru-
man's policy now agree that our efforts in
Greece contributed to peace and stability in
the Balkans.

A few years later we were confronted by
the invasion of Korea. The United States did
not hesitate to send its young men and to
commit its resources in order to insure that
peace and stability prevail in the Northern
Pacific. Because we did not hesitate, Commu-

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 1966, p. 410.

MARCH 13, 1967


nist China as well as Stalin's Russia learned,
painfully and at some cost to them, that the
United States is unflinching when faced with
the threat of force.

In Europe we have made it clear to our
friends and foes alike that we stand by our
commitments. They have been tested twice in
Berlin. The United States is still in West Ber-
lin, and no citizen of West Berlin need fear
about his future.

There was a time during the postwar con-
frontation when the Soviet leadership, be-
cause of misguided assumptions, concluded
that the balance of power could be turned in
its favor and that the United States could be
stared down in a nuclear confrontation.
Soviet missiles were implanted in Cuba. But
precisely because we stood firm and fast, wis-
dom prevailed and the Soviet missiles are
there no longer.

Thus painfully and gradually, a measure of
restraint has come into American-Soviet
relations. This has come about because the
Soviets have no illusions about our deter-
mination to meet force with force.

We are in the process of establishing the
same principle in Viet-Nam. The issue there
is not a local one. It pertains to the peace of
Asia and, more fundamentally, to the kind
of strategy international communism will fol-
low in this decade. Having learned that overt
force does not pay, some Communists con-
cluded that covert force may open the gates.
We are keeping them shut. It is no secret that
we believe that in keeping them shut we are
aiding not only the cause of peace but also
the arguments of those Communists who have
already learned that violence is not the way
to global supremacy.

Had we been weak in Viet-Nam, we would
have helped the arguments of the more radi-
cal Communists who contend that covert vio-
lence is something to which the United States
cannot effectively respond. If we had not
responded, we would have proven the radical
Communists right.

These periods of violence have thus demon-
strated — and are demonstrating in Viet-Nam
— that Communists attempts to expand their
system by force can and will be contained by

the determination of the free world. But, as
I have suggested, these responses have been
essentially "defensive." And these contests
have also demonstrated that force is not a
solution to the basic conflict between political

In many respects the more important and
long-lasting aspect of our struggle with the
Communist world is the one I would describe
as "offensive," even though it is less spectacu-
lar. I have in mind active promotion of the
process of gradual change designed to shape
the kind of world we would all like to live in.
This quiet, subtle process has already brought
about fundamental evolutionary develop-
ments in the Communist world. We have
encouraged the powerful forces of nation-
alism by positive programs of developing
constructive relations with the countries of
Eastern Europe. Today the East Europeans
are increasingly desirous of developing rela-
tions with the West. Even Russian society at
large, as I can testify through countless con-
tacts, desires to participate in Western civili-
zation. It wishes to develop closer contacts
with the United States. It does not want to
be cut off from the Western World by an Iron
Curtain or an ideological curtain or any
other kind of a curtain.

I think it is our role in the world today to
take advantage of the trends of thought and
of the developments which I discussed to de-
velop a broader and more solid relationship
with some of the Communist states and to
encourage constructive change within. We
should not lower our guard, but we should
take advantage of every opportunity to
develop closer contacts and wider relations
with them, in order to shape a stable world.

In saying this, I would point out that I am
not suggesting anything really new. I am
rather proposing the active pursuit of a
policy which can be said to be nearly 20 years
old and already proven by positive results.
One of the great milestones in the history of
American foreign policy was President
Truman's decision in 1948 to provide immedi-
ate military and economic aid to support the
Yugoslav declaration of independence from
Soviet domination. Anyone familiar with



Eastern Europe knows that in the years that
followed Yuofoslavia has had a major
liberalizing impact on the rest of the Commu-
nist world. Under President Eisenhower we
N extended economic assistance to the Poles and
made it easier for them to preserve their free-
enterprise agricultural system. In 1958 we
signed an exchange agreement with the
Soviet Union which, in spite of some very
real problems, has worked remarkably well.
We have programs for the exchange of scien-
tists and scholars, cultural leaders and
exhibits, all of which have had a significant
influence. Since jamming ended in 1963, the
Voice of America has become a Russian insti-

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention

Freedom is a contagious thing. Those ex-
posed to it have found the virus grows
rapidly. There has been an awakening to the
accomplishments of the West and to the
atmosphere of free investigation here by the
many Soviet citizens who have visited Europe
and the United States. I have talked to many
who returned to their country greatly im-
pressed by their visit to ours. The vitality of
Americans who have visited the Soviet Union
and the information about the exciting things
being done in the West which they carry with
them has created a pool of respect and good
will among thousands of Soviet participants.

In recent years we have concluded the
nuclear test ban treaty and limited agree-
ments for cooperation between the United
States and the Soviet Union in such fields as
outer space, peaceful uses of atomic energy,
and desalination of sea water. In 1964 we
negotiated and signed a consular convention
which constituted an unprecedented break-
through in arrangements to protect American
citizens and American consular oflficials in the
Soviet Union.

In his state of the Union message last
month 3 President Johnson called on the Con-
gress to approve that consular convention
and to pass an East-West trade bill.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions initiated hearings on the consular con-
vention on January 23, when Secretary of

State Dean Rusk urged ratification.** These
hearings are continuing. Wittingly or unwit-
tingly, opponents of the agreement have con-
fused the issues by charging it is a "license"
for Soviet espionage — and in so doing they
have, in my view, cast some unjustified asper-
sions on the capabilities of our own internal
security agencies.

Perhaps I can help to clear up any mis-
understanding you may have as a result of
the confusing charges and confused reporting
on the Senate hearings. The proposed consu-
lar convention does not authorize, propose,
suggest, or provide for the opening of any
American consulates in the Soviet Union or
of any Soviet consulates in the United States.
That would be a separate question, subject to
separate negotiation and agreement between
the two Governments on a reciprocal and
mutually satisfactory basis. The consular con-
vention is designed to regulate consular
activities, above all to enable the United
States better to protect and assist its citizens
in the Soviet Union. This agreement would be
to the interest of the United States, even if
no new consulates were ever opened. It is
essential to understand that all states handle
routine matters involving their citizens and
their commercial and other interests through
consular channels. Such channels exist today
between the Soviet Union and the United
States in the form of consular sections in our
respective Embassies in Washington and in

Troubles have arisen over the years be-
tween the two Governments because of the
different nature of the police and court pro-
cedures in the two countries: Under Soviet
law a person who is arrested is normally held
incommunicado, without access from the out-
side, while his case is under investigation —
and this investigative process can last up to 9
months. Under this consular convention we
have secured a commitment from the Soviet
Government to notify us within 1 to 3 days of
the arrest of any American citizen and to
allow us to see him within 2 to 4 days and

'Ibid., Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.
* Ibid., Feb. 6, 1967, p. 247.

MARCH 13, 1967


frequently thereafter. If we had had such
early and continued access to the late New-
comb Mott, his tragic death might well have
been avoided.

Just since I signed this treaty in Moscow
21/2 years ago, 20 American citizens have
been detained by the Soviet police. We would
have been able to protect each of these Amer-
icans more effectively if this treaty had been
in force. The overwhelming quantitative ad-
vantage of this provision to the United States
may be appreciated from the fact that 18,000
Americans visited the Soviet Union last year
while less than 1,000 Soviet citizens visited
the United States. This ratio increases every
year as the number of American tourists
going to the U.S.S.R. grows, while the num-
ber of Soviet visitors to the United States
remains constant.

As for the controversial article providing
immunity for consular officers and employees,
I can say flatly that I would not want Ameri-
cans in these sensitive positions in the Soviet
Union without the protection of this immu-
nity. The distinction between diplomatic and
consular officers, in any event, has long been
obsolete. It dates back centuries, to a period
when international relations were handled
very differently than they are today. The
United States itself ended the distinction over
40 years ago by abolishing its separate diplo-
matic and consular services and establishing
a single, integrated Foreign Service of the
United States.

President Eisenhower, under whose ad-
ministration the negotiations were initiated,
said some days ago: "I have not changed my
belief that such a convention is in our na-
tional interest, that it will not impair our
national security, that it should enlarge our
opportunities to learn more about the Soviet
people, and that it is necessary to assure bet-
ter protection for the many thousands of
Americans who visit the Soviet Union each

Now let us turn to the question of trade. I
suppose none of us in this room doubts the
effectiveness of our economic organization in
this country. It has produced the most re-
markably well supplied society in history. The


Communist leadership is well aware of this,
too, and has for years been exhorting the
Soviet peoples with the slogan: "Overtake
and surpass the United States." There is
accordingly a readymade admiration and re- '^
ceptivity to American products — and possi-
bilities of benefits for our farmers and

Practical Aspects of East-West Trade

But trade is not just commercial; it is also
political. And our aim should therefore be the
creation of such commercial relations that the
Communist states develop closer ties with the
West, such relations that they will increas-
ingly be encouraged to evolve domestically
along the lines we desire. I can assure you
that the people in these countries know how
we and the Western Europeans live. They
know it is much better than the way they
live. They want to live as we do, to have cars,
adequate housing, and better clothing.

It is clear to me that it is in our interest
to take actions which help bring about a
diversion of their resources from military
and space programs to consumer goods. Let
me put it to you this way. Who here would
not sooner have people in Yugoslavia grow-
ing tobacco rather than producing munitions ?
Who among us would not rather have Soviet
workers making passenger cars instead of
missiles? Isn't it better for us all that Poland
devote increased resources to production of
high-quality pork and ham? Who does not
think it useful that Romanian resources be
devoted to an automobile-tire industry rather
than to production of jet fuel?

Now, even if you agree that the answer to
the question should be affirmative, some will
still ask: "Why should we encourage trade
with the Communists, when they are supply-
ing the weapons being used to kill American
soldiers in Viet-Nam?" Well, this is a difficult
question, charged with emotion, even to me.
It deserves a frank answer, but that answer
cannot be as simple as the question, because
the world is not that simple. I think what I
have already said to you tonight — about the
evolution of the Communist world, about the
true nature of the "defensive" as against the


"offensive" aspects of the contest between
that world and ours — that these observations
ah-eady go a long way in providing the basic
answer. However, leaving aside the broader
problem, let us examine some practical

The kind of East- West trade we are talking
about would have no material relationship
with the Communist effort in Viet-Nam.
Trade in strategic goods has long been banned
by Western allied agreements and would re-
main banned. Neither the present level of our
trade nor any foreseeable growth in it could
have a measurable effect on the military
goods supplied to Viet-Nam.

The basic fact is that the Soviet Union is
not only self-sufficient in military production;
it is also a major supplier of conventional
arms outside its borders. The same is true of
the United States. The Soviet Union has
allies. So have we. Armed forces from the
opposing sides have been engaged from time
to time in various theaters in the past. In
Viet-Nam itself the arms situation is com-
plex. In the earlier years of the struggle in
South Viet-Nam, much of the equipment of
the Viet Cong was American, captured from
the French and Government forces.

In the past couple of years the bulk of the
enemy equipment is Chinese in origin, with
Soviet supplies being a relatively minor com-
ponent. The big Soviet military aid has gone
to North Viet-Nam in the form of antiair-
craft guns and missiles and radar and fighter
planes, items the Soviets describe as "defen-
sive." There seems in fact to have been some
element of restraint here, perhaps regarded
by Moscow as paralleling our own limited
purposes in Viet-Nam. Even so, I am not
trying to suggest that all this is not a bad
business. I am trying to suggest that these
questions of supplies and distribution of arms
are broader than Viet-Nam and that the
remedy must be sought in international
agreements limiting and bringing under con-
trol traffic in arms. How do you suppose a
Soviet citizen feels today about the vast quan-
tities of arms his Government supplied to
Red China?

In these circumstances, it seems clear that

even a complete ban on trade with the Com-
munists would have no effect upon their con-
tinuing to supply arms to the Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese. If anything, it could
encourage them to use less restraint in their
relations with the Vietnamese Communists,
because they would have less to lose if they
did pull out all the stops. In fact, we have
reason to believe that neither the Eastern
European countries nor the Soviets are par-
ticularly comfortable in their present position
and that they would welcome a decision by
the North Vietnamese to seek a settlement
of that conflict.

Trade is thus not a weapon which could
be effectively employed in the conflict in Viet-
Nam. On the other hand, we can have in trade
another useful instrument to maintain
leverage on the Communist world and to en-
courage the demands within the Communist
countries for greater availability in consumer

In sum, we must be able to use our vast
power and our resources to shape the kind
of world we would want to see our children
live in. The President recently called for "a
broader vision of peaceful engagement." ^
This was not a call for an immediate accom-
modation with the Soviet Union, nor was it
an effort to attain a settlement in Europe on
the basis of the status quo. It is rather a com-
mitment on the part of the United States to
continue seeking a new Europe in which a
more durable settlement can eventually be

We approach this task in a spirit of self-
reliance and optimism. We know we have the
means to repel aggression wherever it occurs.
We know we have the will to do so. Of this,
let no one have any doubt. But it is not
enough simply to react to Communist chal-
lenges. If we are to win this contest, we must
remain on the "offensive"; we must take posi-
tive and constructive initiatives. We know
that our citizens, intelligently perceiving the
realities of this age, will support an East-
West policy that uses to the fullest the wealth
and diversity of this nation to shaoe an
enduring peace.

= Ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

MARCH 13, 1967


In this article, based on a speech he made at Carlton Uni-
versity in Ottaiva, Canada, on January 20, Mr. Brzezinshi,
one of the newest members of the Department's Policy
Planning Council, discusses the need to "emphasize what
really unites the more developed nations of the East and
the West." "It is up to us," he concludes, "to point with con-
fidence to the emergence of a new Europe, one which can
link America and Russia in a cooperative endeavor and one
which is no longer divided within itself."

Toward a Community of the Developed Nations

by Zbigniew Brzezinski

Before discussing more specifically the
relationship between the United States and
the Eastern half of Europe, let me begin
by outlining — as I see them — some of the
more fundamental assumptions that guide
U.S. thinking about international affairs.

It is our fundamental belief that in our
age we must seek to construct a world of
cooperative communities. These communities
need not be of one mold; there is no single
prescription for them. Some may reflect
similarities in development and in ways of
life. Some may be regional; others may cut
across regional boundaries. But the basic
point is that today the profoundest problems
we face are too great for the nation-state,
the traditional unit of international affairs,
to handle.

This does not mean that the nation-state
has outlived its usefulness or that we seek
to create a world of supranational political
cartels. The nation-state will, for a very long
time, remain the primary focus of civic
loyalty, the basic source of historical and
cultural diversity, and the prime force for
mobilizing the individual's commitment.

However, today the world needs more than

the nation-state to organize global peace, to
promote global welfare, to diffuse globally |
the fruits of science and technology. All of |
these things can be done more effectively and
more rationally if nation-states cooperate
with one another in the setting of larger com- '
munities, of cooperative communities that
reflect what unites them and submerge what
has traditionally divided them.

It is to the promotion of such a world
of cooperative communities that the United
States is globally committed. That commit-
ment is in keeping with broader historical

The thrust of history clearly points to the
emergence of larger units as an inevitable
consequence of social and political develop-
ment. The nature of economic organization
increasingly involves wider and wider pat-
terns of interrelationships. Modem economic
organization can no longer be confined to
small national entities. Science and modern
weapons technology increasingly require a
broad and highly complicated continental
industrial base. (The recent Italian proposal
for a common effort to close the so-called
technological gap is symptomatic of a widen-



ing realization of this fact.) Modem com-
munications put men in continuous contact
with one another on a scale unprecedented
in history, and they completely eliminate the
notion of distance as a factor inhibiting
human relations.

A Wider Sense of Self-Identification

All these factors together shape man's
subjective conception of reality, and they
give him a broader and larger vision of that
reality. Through time, man's self-identifica-
tion and his perception of the world around
him have moved from family to city to
province to nation and now increasingly to
regional cooperation. None of this means
that nations are fading — but like city-states
in their turn, they are no longer the ultimate
repositories of sovereignty and they no
longer define the outer limits of man's

It is, morever, clear that the creation of
a world of cooperative communities is the
real imperative of our search for a stable
peace. Today, for the first time in the history

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 71 of 90)