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of mankind, our world is united — but it is
united by fear. Fear of a nuclear funeral
pyre has linked mankind in a single emotion,
something never before experienced. Surely
we all agree that we have to do better than
that.

Paradoxically, there is hope in the thought
that violence may have reached its zenith.
Through history, as means of violence be-
came more extensive, violence became less
and less the nonri of human conduct. To be
sure, acts of individual violence persist —
but they are now viewed as aberrations in
human affairs, as crimes subject to social
sanction. Wars, too, continue — but the world
increasingly views them as a threat to all
of mankind and as a departure from a com-
mon standard that all nations ought to ob-
serve.

This change in attitude has been prompted
by increasing recognition of our interde-
pendence. People now identify themselves
with larger units than ever before, with
larger societies, with larger goals and



broader aspirations. This mounting sense of
social" and national interdependence is a
buffer against international violence. It
leaves less room for national wars; it creates
greater international pressure for the ob-
servation of common standards of behavior.

In time, existing alliance systems might
logically develop into a common world secu-
rity system. Surely that, too, would be in
keeping with historical experience, which
shows us how alliances among cities even-
tually became the foundations of larger
national unity. Indeed, it may not be pre-
mature to contemplate the implications of
the fundamental change in the function of
alliances: In the past they served to wage
war; in our age they deter war; tomorrow
they must shift collectively to the promotion
of peace.

All of that is in keeping with our basic
notion of the imiwrtance of man as the ulti-
mate value of our existence. Man can fulfill
himself never by war but only by peaceful
endeavor, never by seeking to impose uni-
versal ideologies on others but only by ac-
cepting universal responsibilities. By seeking
in our time to build a world of cooperative
communities, we may make it possible for
our children to live in a world that is truly
a human community.

Greater Unity in the West

United States policies, it seems to me, are
designed in keeping with that general frame-
work. I believe that they are also compatible
with the trend of events.

Today a new Europe is emerging. Some-
day — and that day will come sooner than
many of us yesterday dared to hope — Europe
will embrace an entire continent of reunited
peoples. It will be a continent no longer
divided by rusted barbed wire or sterile
ideological conflicts. It will be a continent
that links the United States and the Soviet
Union — and, indeed, even Japan — in a larger
community of the developed nations, sharing
a common recognition of the moral absolute
that in our age technological advancement
and material well-being impose a funda-



MARCH 13, 1967



415



mental obligation toward the rest of man-
kind.

But if that day is nearing — as I firmly
believe it is — it is nearing because we have
persisted, and will persist, in two more im-
mediate and mutually reinforcing tasks:
seeking ever-closer Western unity and striv-
ing to attain a true European settlement
through an East-West reconciliation.

In seeking Western unity through closer
Atlantic cooperation and greater Western
European integration, the United States is
not motivated by the delusion that a united
Western Europe would be a replica of the
United States. We are aware of the enormous
cultural diversity, the linguistic wealth, the
historical variety, of the European peoples.
A united Europe would not be one country,
nor would it be a melting pot. It would be
a continental mosaic, the richer for its
diversity, the stronger for its unity.

All that is surely in Europe's interest. It
is in ours, too — even though a united Eu-
rope may not only be a stronger partner but
conceivably, and in all candor, also a poten-
tial competitor. That risk we are prepared
to face, for it is a lesser risk than the main-
tenance of old national antipathies. There is
simply no room in contemporaiy Europe for
the anarchy of an international order based
on the supremacy of the national ego.

In speaking of greater unity in the West,
I believe it will no longer suffice to repeat
routinely the ideas that motivated us during
the fifties. Europe has taken the first steps
on the road to greater unity, and this hope-
ful beginning calls for new thoughts and
new aspirations. Precisely because the Com-
mon Market has taken shape and has sur-
vived a storm or two, precisely because
NATO has deterred war, precisely because
the European and the American peoples have
accepted the notion of interdependence, it
is time to ask, What new goals shall link
us, what is it that we must do next? Unity
grows out of common efforts and shared
goals; unity is never preserved by ritual and
cant.



The Political Elite in Eastern Europe

A major objective of the United States,
defined recently by President Johnson in his
October 7th speech,^ is to end the partition
of Europe. Today, to be sure, the Soviet
Union and East Europe are not fully a part
of Europe. They are detached from it be-
cause of political, security, and ideological
considerations. Moreover, the East today is
ruled largely by a political eUte composed
of newly risen social classes, in large meas-
ure recruited from the peasantry, whose own
sense of political identification tends to take
a nationalistic expression. Its perception of
the world tends to be defined in terms of
land, territory, and space. All this gives the
East today a strong nationalistic tinge, in
addition to the Communist ideological pre-
occupations, and serves to perpetuate the
division of Europe.

But the East, in spite of this, is also seek-
ing broader cooperative solutions. Leaving
the Soviet hegemonistic aspects aside, I be-
lieve this is a good development, in some re-
spects. It shows that larger unity and larger
organization are recognized there as well,
both as a need and as a factor of stability.
For example, CEMA, the Council of Eco-
nomic Mutual Assistance, began as an es-
sentially ideological, political organization.
It included even Mongolia. Now increasingly
we find subregional cooi>eration becoming
acceiDted in the East in place of the more
pohtically motivated CEMA framework. As
CEMA fades, more genuinely East Euroi^ean
forms of cooperation are already beginning
to develop. This is progress, this is a recog-
nition even on the part of the intensely
nationalistic Eastern elites of the need for
larger scale collaboration.

The development of broader forms of
international cooperation is particularly im-
portant there, because it will provide, in the
long run, an alternative to growing internal
bureaucratic sterility and political parochi-



' Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.



416



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN



alism. In the Soviet Union, the internation-
ahst-minded inteUigentsia was replaced,
under Stalin, by a parochial-minded genera-
tion of increasingly nationalistic leaders.
Bureaucratic, narrow-minded, conservative
Communists, they are today most interested
in holding on to power. Increasingly, the
Soviet political elite is interested in con-
trolling power, in holding on to its position,
in maintaining an effective system of ruling-
class domination.

Gap Between Social and Political Systems

In consequence of this, there is developing
in the Soviet Union a widening gap between
the social and the political systems. The
political system came into being to create a
new society, an industrial society. Today that
society has taken shape, and the political
system is lagging behind it and has become,
to some extent, an impediment to further
social change. This creates pressures point-
ing to broad social alienation from the
political system.

In the future these tensions may be ac-
centuated by the problem of nationalities in
the Soviet Union. This problem is rising in
intensity, and the Chinese are beginning to
exploit it. When we think of the Soviet
Union, we only too often tend to forget that
50 percent of the Soviet population is not
Russian; increasingly these peoples are be-
ginning to have a sense of national identity
and national desire for self-expression. I
submit that tliis will become a major do-
mestic problem in the Soviet Union in the
decades to come.

In Eastern Europe we note some similar
general tendencies. Nationalism in East
Europe is now becoming a conservative force
and is exploited by the new elites in order
to maintain themselves in power, to protect
the status quo. The political expression of
this new political elite is bureaucratic, dic-
tatorial rule. The consequence of this, again,
is a separation of the social and political in
the life of these communities. In some coun-
tries you note the dearth of problematic



politics, absence of discussion of the larger
issues, no sense of the alternative.

In the long run, 1 am inclined to think
that the new functional intelligentsia in
East Europe, keenly interested in ties with
the West, will make itself felt. This func-
tional intelligentsia is quite different from
the intellectuals who shaped the Hungarian
uprising of October 1956, the 10th anniver-
sary of which we observed a few months ago.
These intellectuals of 1956 were to some ex-
tent a reflection of the past, intellectuals of
the humanist-generalist type, typical of a
preindustrial society. Today they are being
replaced by a functional intelhgentsia which
no longer performs the overall humanizing-
integrating role of their antecedents but
which in some ways is much more important
and much more relevant to the future of
their countries. Its members, I believe, will
make themselves felt in the long run, prob-
ably sooner in Czechoslovakia and Hungary
than elsewhere.

In Yugoslavia, of course, for different
reasons, we already see extremely interest-
ing political experiments being undertaken.
But the future significance of Yugoslavia
may be determined by the system's capacity
to cope with the instability likely to follow
after Tito's death and particularly by the
nationality problem which is likely to sur-
face. The outcome, if it is democratic, could
have significant implications for the political
character of the East European regimes as
a whole.

In the meantime, in some countries in the
East we find the army again becoming im-
portant. We have seen signs of that in Bul-
garia; I think there's rising evidence for the
same conclusion in relationship to Yugo-
slavia. Elsewhere the state bureaucracy will
become again more important and begin to
provide more momentum to social develop-
ment, to have greater influence in shaping
the policies of the nations.

All these changes in the East involve a
very gradual development from an inter-
national revolutionary orientation increas-



MARCH 13, 1967



417



ingly toward a new parochial conservative
nationalism with a Communist tinge.

Hence, in general I am inclined to think
that the Eastern political elite will not be
an active and positive force in shaping the
new European environment. It is much more
likely to be a conservative force interested
in preserving the status quo, including the
division of Germany.

Search for Security Arrangements

It is therefore up to us to think crea-
tively how to shape the new Europe and to
try to set in motion a process of change in
order to bring it about.

In the long run, it seems to me, the parti-
tion of Germany will not endure, for it can
only endure in an artificially divided Europe.

There are also internal reasons for the
instability of the East German regime; it
is impossible to create a nation artificially
in 20 or 30 or even 40 years, particularly
through foreign intervention. Certainly
Soviet presence seems to be a prerequisite
for the further maintenance of East Ger-
many. Hence, it is essential to think of
conditions which will change both of these
factors, which will promote internal evolu-
tion and the removal of external domination.
In my view, this cannot be done by headlong
assault, political or otherwise; the problem
therefore has to be skirted around. A new
environment has to be created, including
eventual security arrangements.

In the search for such security arrange-
ments, it is terribly important not to de-
stabilize the existing condition nor to set
in motion unnecessary political fears. More-
over, it is necessary to create a broader
framework of all-European economic co-
operation and relate economic to security
arrangements. I was struck in the course of
a recent trip to Europe that the East Euro-
peans, by and large, do not understand that
Western integration is a factor of stability
as of itself. They fear it unless it is accom-
panied by progress in the security field.

Recently the President made a speech
in which he spelled out the broad strategic



418



concept of the American point of view
toward Europe.^ As I understand it, this
concept involves the following major points:

First of all, he emphasized the interde-
pendence of further promotion of Western "*
unity with better East-West relations. His
speech provides a synthesis of what has
turned out to be the two predominant schools
of thought in Europe of recent years. The
United States holds that further building
of Western unity creates stability in Europe
and is therefore in keeping with the thrust
of history; East-West policies must be com-
patible with this thrust if they are to re-
solve the European problem.

Secondly, when he spoke of peaceful en-
gagement with the East, he did not mean a
search for accommodation with the Soviet
Union over the heads of the Europeans, nor
an immediate settlement. What he had in
mind, I think, was a creative building proc-
ess, a process of building a larger European
framework which lends itself to resolving the
existing problems. It is therefore a commit-
ment, an engagement to a process of change,
and not a quest for an immediate settlement,
particularly over the heads of the Europeans.

Thirdly, it involved the thought that East
Europe and Russia both have to be involved
in that process. I am convinced it would be
idle, and probably counterproductive, to
concentrate on stimulating East European
nationalism or hostility to the Soviet Union;
to be sure, the more independence there is
in the East, the better — but as a means and
not as an end in itself. Some East European
countries can act as transmission belts by
moving ahead of the Soviet Union, but not
for the purpose of separating themselves en-
tirely from the Soviet Union — rather for the
purpose of promoting a different kind of
East-West relationship.

Fourthly, a growing reconciliation in
Europe and some form of reunification of
Germany are consequentially linked. Hence
this larger reconciliation of Europe in-
trinsically contributes to the reunification
of Germany.



' Ibid.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN



Finally, the President aiiaculated the
proposition that respect for territorial in-
tegrity and progress in the field of security,
perhaps on the basis of tacit reciprocity on
the part of East and West, could help
exentually to create a new political environ-
ment.

Beyond Bilateralism

All this in the long run could perhaps
lead to a general change in the character
(if East-West relations. It seems to me that
the time has come to think also beyond
purely bilateral relations. After all, in the
final analysis, bilateralism is purely a tech-
nical term for a European Europe articu-
hited by General de Gaulle. It seems to me
tliat we have passed the first phase — con-
frontation; we are completing the second
pliase — the exploration of bilateral relation-
ships; and we are on the eve of a third
jihase — trying to build, multilaterally, an
East-West relationship.

In this respect, there are already a num-
ber of existing bodies which lend themselves
to that end. The Economic Commission for
Europe, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the Council of
Europe, eventually even the European Eco-
nomic Community, are institutions which
might be adapted to that end, given suf-
ficient interest by the European members.
The life of an institution has to be judged,
after all, by larger purposes than its ovni
vested institutional interests. For some of
these institutions readjustment may be dif-
ficult, but the utility of such readjustment
must be judged in terms of its ultimate end.
I believe that through such cooperation new
East-West relationships could be established
and, beyond that, additional new East-West
bodies could also be created in response to
specific needs or to promote common new
ventures in Europe, involving all of Europe,
including to the extent possible the United
States and the Soviet Union.

In the security field, in my view, such
cooperation could eventually begin to extend



MARCH 13, 1967



to the alliance systems themselves, not in
order to dissolve them rapidly, thereby
creating instability, but in order to reduce
the level of the confrontation, thereby creat-
ing an easier political environment.

Moreover, multilateral economic coopera-
tion in the long run runs counter to central-
ized direction of individual Communist
states, and therefore this kind of multilateral
cooperation could provide the missing link
between the technological progress of the
Eastern society and the liberal political
evolution of the Communist system. In addi-
tion, the more intelligent East Europeans
realize that multilateral cooperation is in-
creasingly necessary to cope with such things
as the technology gap. For example, the
Czechoslovak Vice Foreign Minister recently
in Rude Pravo, the Communist Party news-
paper in Prague, very explicitly linked
Czechoslovak technological and economic
needs with the promotion of multilateral
Western economic cooperation.

Ending the "European Civil War"

Eventually, through such processes of
growing together these societies may be
transformed into something more compatible
to the democratic and humanist point of
view. I personally doubt that they will con-
verge with the West in the sense of acquiring
identical political systems or, indeed, even
similar political systems. But they could
become, through this process, semidictator-
ships of increasingly Socialist character
(and of less Communist dictatorial kind),
including more internal social pluralism.
Here I think Yugoslavia is a relevant
pioneer.

The Sino-Soviet dispute, moreover, has
had an accelerating impact on this process.
The East Europeans and the Russians in-
creasingly describe China as Fascist; and
the Russians, in my recent private conver-
sations in Moscow, were already fearful of
what may seem to be a fanciful illusion, fear-
ful of a Chinese-American alliance directed
against them. But even though this may be
fanciful, it could have a Europeanizing im-



419



pact on them, for it encourages a process of
deradicalization, it encourages a process of
adjustment to existing realities. It forces
them in the direction of ideological ecu-
menism. This was the historical experience
of the Social Democratic parties, and we
should not forget that 60 years ago the
Social Democratic parties were the most
revolutionary parties in Europe; today they
are hardly revolutionary.

In the long run therefore, it seems to me,
the return of East Europe and Russia to a
larger European fold would bring to an end
"the European civil war" which has devas-
tated the Continent and destroyed it in the
course of the last 100 years. In that setting
the German problem will lose its intensity
and will become susceptible to resolution.
Moreover, such a return will be the begin-
ning of a process of creating a larger com-
munity of the developed nations, which
seems to me to be terribly needed and very
important. Such a community must emerge
if the developed societies are to be able to
deal with the chaos which the world is
likely to face in the underdeveloped regions
of our globe. Such a community is also
needed if man and society are to face ef-
fectively the unprecedented problems which
science and technology will impose on modern
society in the next several decades.

As we look ahead at problems men and
society will face in the course of the next
several decades, it becomes increasingly
clear to me that none of the existing ideo-
logical systems are relevant and pertinent
to our needs. It is therefore increasingly
important — particularly for the West, which
has always been the pioneer in human
thought — to look beyond the ideological
cleavages of the past and to begin to empha-
size what really unites the more developed
nations of the East and the West. In the
final analysis, we must not forget that
Marxism is a child of our own tradition; it
is up to us to point with confidence to the
emergence of a new Europe, one which can
link America and Russia in a cooperative
endeavor and one which is no longer divided
within itself.



Communist China

by U. Alexis Johnson
Ambassador- to Japan i

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with
such a distinguished and thoughtful group
as this the subject of my country's policy
toward Communist China. The question of
Communist China is of such overwhelming
importance to both of our countries that it
deserves the most thoughtful consideration
and the avoidance of demagogic statements
on either one side of the question or the other.
It also is not possible to talk about Commu-
nist China without talking about the Pacific
area and Asia as a whole, for what China is
or is not does so much to determine what the
rest of the Pacific and Asia is going to be.

One cannot discuss American policy and
attitudes toward Communist China, any more
than one can discuss Japanese policy and
attitudes, without reference to the historical
background.

While during the first century and a half
of our existence as a country we took little
interest or part in world affairs, China was
always somewhat of an exception. In 1784,
almost immediately following our treaty of
peace with Great Britain, the first American
trading vessel called at Canton, and the
second consulate we established in the world
was at Canton in 1787. By 1800, 30 to 40
vessels were engaged in trade with China.

In addition to American interest in trade
with China, the American people were
fascinated by Chinese history and culture,
which they greatly admired. At the same
time, they were genuinely moved by the
poverty and hardships endured by the masses
of China. There is scarcely a child of my or
earlier generations that did not each week at
Sunday school give his pennies for the sup-
port of a missionary in China or for the relief
of a famine in China. Returning missionaries
gave talks and showed pictures. so that even
as children we felt a sympathetic concern



' Address made before the Asian Affairs Research
Council at Tokyo, Japan, on Feb. 13.



420



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN



with respect to China quite different from
that toward any other part of the outside
world. This impulse found its outlet not only
in purely religious and relief activities, but
on a larger scale with the millions of dollars
that private American individuals and foun-
dations poured into educational institutions
and medical facilities throughout China.

Thus, while our interest in China was a
compound of hardheaded business and of con-
cern mixed with admiration, this latter aspect
was for many years uppermost in the mind
of the average American. I would not argue
if you were to say that we tended to be senti-
mental about China.

It is against this background that we re-
turned the Boxer indemnity to be used for
the education of Chinese in the United States.
It was also out of these fundamental Ameri-
can attitudes toward China that John Hay
propounded the Open Door doctrine in 1899
when it appeared that China was to be carved
up among the then colonial powers; that great
strains were introduced into our relationship
with Japan in 1915 when the Okuma Cabinet
delivered its 21 demands on China; and ulti-
mately, that the Manchurian incident in 1931
set in motion the chain of events that led in
1941 to the direct clash between Japan and



Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 72 of 90)