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the United States.

The Postwar Period

In the postwar period you are all familiar
with the extraordinary efforts that the
United States made to bring about a cessa-
tion of hostilities and a rapprochement be-
tween the Nationalist and Communist ele-
ments in China. You are aware that there are
many in my own country who charged (I
think falsely) that in these efforts we were
overly sympathetic to and solicitous of the
Communist elements.

When these efforts broke down and the
Communists resumed offensive military
action we did what one traditionally does in
revolutionary situations of this kind. We kept
open our consulates in the territory they occu-
pied, and the American Ambassador was one
of the few ambassadors to remain in Nanking
when the Communists occupied that city.

Normally in such a situation the incoming
revolutionary forces respect diplomatic and
consular establishments, de facto contacts
are established, and ultimately formal rela-
tions are established.

However, even if we had considered estab-
lishing formal relations, the Communists
made such a course of action impossible by,
in effect, refusing to recognize the United
States. They violated our establishments and
arrested our consuls in Mukden and Shang-
hai. In Nanking they refused even to permit
the delivery of telegrams addressed to the
American Ambassador and actually sum-
moned him to appear before a so-called
"People's Court" on charges of mistreating
his servants. In fact, their whole attitude
seemed to be one of seeking to expel any and
all American presence in China, rather than
maintaining some relationship. Thus, I do
not think it a distortion to say that given the
history of that period. Communist China re-
fused to recognize the United States rather
than the other way around.

Many Americans, with their traditional
sympathy for the Chinese people, were baffled
and deeply disturbed by these developments.
Many felt that even Communists could not
be that unreasonable and that somehow or
other a substantial element of fault must lie
on the side of the U.S. Government. However,
when we see the efforts in China today to cut
even the few small remaining ties they have
had with those formerly so closely alined with
them ideologically, their actions at that time
with respect to the United States do not seem
so exceptional.

The unprovoked and unexpected attack
upon the Republic of Korea by Korean Com-
munist forces in June 1950 immediately
aroused American apprehensions about the
future course the Chinese Communists would
take. The attack in Korea, coming as it did
soon after the acceleration of Communist
insurgency in Burma, Malaya, and the
Philippines and concurrently with Chinese
Communist operations in Tibet, indicated a
grave danger that there would be an effort to
take over all of Asia by military force. The
action of the United States, which met the

MARCH 13, 1967


threat by sending its troops to Korea and
placing the 7th Fleet in the Formosa Strait
to prevent the widening of the war, together
with the great sacrifices made by other mem-
bers of the United Nations and, most impor-
tantly, of the Koreans themselves, prevented
any such takeover. The subsequent direct
entry of Communist China into the Korean
war even though it was evident that the
United States was not threatening China
aroused the bitter resentment of the Ameri-
can people. Despite intense pressure, how-
ever, the United States never carried the war
into China, though it was the base of supply
of men and materials.

Channels of Communication With Peking

Americans representing the United Na-
tions forces sat for hundreds of hours at
Panmunjom with a delegate from Peking as
one of the parties on the other side of the
table negotiating the armistice in Korea.
Then a political representative of the United
States, Arthur Dean, spent more hours at
Panmunjom with a political representative
of Peking seeking to negotiate arrangements
for a political conference on Korea.

Then in the spring of 1954 at Geneva a con-
ference on Korea was held with Secretary of
State Dulles representing the United States
and Chou En-lai, Communist China. This was
followed by the conference on Indochina.

It was at this time but outside these con-
ferences that I represented the United States
in direct bilateral discussions with a repre-
sentative of Peking's Foreign Office. When
those conferences were finished, contact was
maintained through our respective consular
officers in Geneva. Beginning on August 1,
1955, I again represented the United States
in direct and private conversations with a
representative of Peking until my departure
for Thailand in December 1957. The conver-
sations were then moved to Warsaw, where
they are still continuing, the 152d meeting
being held on January 25, 1967. In 1962, with
Ambassador [W. Averell] Harriman as the
U.S. representative and Foreign Minister


Chen Yi representing Peking, months of
negotiations were held by the 14 parties to
the Geneva conference on Laos.

My point in mentioning all of this is simply
that whatever the difficulties and problems
that have arisen between Communist China
and the United States, they have not been due
to any unwillingness on the part of Washing-
ton to talk to Peking or any lack of channels
of communication between the two Govern-
ments. Considering the isolation maintained
around diplomatic representatives in Peking,
I have often made the assertion — and it has
not been challenged — that the United States
has had more in the way of the direct diplo-
matic-level conversation with the Chinese
Communists than any non-Communist coun-
try that has formally recognized them and
established representation in Peking. As far
as Communist countries are concerned, I sus-
pect that the situation has been much the
same, at least during the past few months.

U.S. Policy Toward Communist China

What have we been doing in all of these
conversations, and what has been our policy
toward Communist China ?

First, I want to make clear what our policy
is not. Much as we regret seeing the great
Chinese people subjected to harsh and tyran-
nical rule and their undoubted genius smoth-
ered by an old-fashioned doctrinaire regime,
it has never been any part of our policy to
seek any occasion to use force to overthrow
the regime.

At the same time, we have very deeply felt
that, in pursuance of the principle of creating
a political order in Asia which permits a true
freedom of national choice for the peoples of
Asia, we were obliged to assist those who
wanted to resist Chinese Communist efforts,
whether direct or indirect, to overthrow
established governments by violence and im-
pose by force regimes subservient to Peking.
Related to this is keeping the door open to
participation by China in the great construc-
tive tasks that lie ahead at such time as
Peking may turn from a policy of destructive


hostility to a policy of constructive coopera-
tion with its neighbors and the rest of the

My first bilateral conversations in Geneva
in 1954 concerned the many Americans who
were in prison in China, for the most part
simply because they were Americans, and the
Peking allegations that we were preventing
the return to China of the some 5,000 stu-
dents who had gone to the United States
between the end of World War II and the
Communist takeover. Peking's representative
at these and my subsequent talks beginning
in 1955 was Wang Ping-nan, then Secretary
General of their Foreign Office and, the last
I heard, now Vice Foreign Minister. At those
talks in 1954, we succeeded in obtaining the
release of a few Americans.

The first order of business in 1955 was also
these prisoners, and on September 10, 1955,
we issued a formal public agreement on the
subject 2 — the first and only bilateral agree-
ment ever reached between the two Govern-
ments. I will not go into the details of this
agreement except to say that now, 12 years
later, four Americans are still in prison in
China in clear and direct violation of the

Peking's Attitude Toward Taiwan

However, the main theme of much of our
discussion was the proposal that I put for-
ward to the effect that we agree to disagree
with respect to Taiwan but agree not to go
to war about it. For shorthand, the term "re-
nunciation of force" was used. That is, I pro-
posed that while fully maintaining whatever
principles they desired with respect to Tai-
wan, they would simply say that they would
not use force in the situation, and I offered
to make a reciprocal statement on behalf of
the United States.

Ambassador Wang resisted then and
Peking still stoutly resists this proposition,
taking the position in effect that if they
decide to do so they are fully entitled to seize

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 456.

Taiwan by force. They insisted then and still
insist that the people of Taiwan and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of China on Taiwan
have no rights except what Peking chooses to
give them and that the only answer is for the
United States to withdraw its recognition and
treaty commitments with regard to Taiwan
so that Peking can have a free hand to settle
questions in any way it chooses.

Incidentally, it was after some months of
discussion around this theme that I, for the
first time, heard the phrase "two Chinas."
The allegation was made that the proposition
that I was putting forward was a "plot by
the United States to establish a 'two China'

It thus became very clear that Peking was
not interested in any understanding or modics
Vivendi with the United States, however lim-
ited, except on the basis of turning Taiwan
over to them. This has become increasingly
clear over the years, not only with respect to
the United States but with respect to other
countries, as well as the United Nations. It
became very clear with respect to the United
Nations at the last General Assembly, when
Peking vehemently denounced any implica-
tion that Taiwan was even entitled to exist.

Thus, I have long said that those who advo-
cate this policy or that policy with respect to
Peking, either bilaterally or in the United
Nations, must answer the question as to
what they would propose to do \vith respect
to Taiwan. This is not because we or anyone
else says so, but because Peking says so. That
is, one must either accept Peking's principle
that the Government of the Republic of
China is not a government ahd that Taiwan
is not a state and not entitled to the protec-
tion of the United Nations or anyone else, or
not accept Peking's point of view. If the
answer is that you are not willing to accept
Peking's position, as Dean Rusk says, "They
hang up the telephone."

We've experienced this even in discussing
the proposals we made for an exchange of
press correspondents. Peking replied that it
was not willing to accept American corre-
spondents unless they would agree in advance

MARCH 13, 1967


not to write or say anything contrary to
Peking's point of view on this question.

Over the years we have made various other
proposals to reestablish at least some mean-
ingful contacts between the American people
and the Chinese people, such as to permit the
travel of doctors, scholars, and so on, but the
uniform answer has always been that the
United States must withdraw its protection
from Taiwan before anything else can be

The Goal for the Future

I do not want to leave the impression that
I can only see ahead of us a future of perma-
nent and unremitting hostility and tension
between Communist China and other coun-
tries of the Pacific. Personally, I do not be-
lieve that this is necessarily the shape of the
future. I have too much faith in the basic
pragmatic good sense of the Chinese people.

I, for one, see no reason to regard the pres-
ent attitudes of the Chinese Communists,
which have been largely responsible for the
tensions of the past, as immutable. I would
like to pay tribute today to the Japanese cor-
respondents on the mainland, whose reports
are a main source of information about the
turmoil that is now in progress there. How-
ever, not even they can tell us what the future
is likely to hold. Certainly many ideas, atti-
tudes, and institutions that had seemed very
permanent are being shaken to their foun-

I would hope and expect that those forces
in China which want to move from a reliance
on outworn shibboleths and doctrines, which
have repeatedly demonstrated failure, to
dealing with their own internal problems and
external relations in a practical way will ulti-
mately prevail. When their day comes, I can
assure you that they will find the United
States responsive. Indeed, this is our goal.
This goal was most recently stated by the
President in his January state of the Union
message: ^

We shall continue to hope for a reconciliation
between the people of mainland China and the world
community — including working together in all the
tasks of arms control, security, and progress on
which the fate of the Chinese people, like the rest of
us, depends.

We would be the first to welcome a China which
decided to respect her neighbors' rights. We would
be the first to applaud were she to apply her great
energies and intelligence to improving the welfare
of her people. And we have no intention of trying
to deny her legitimate needs for security and
friendly relations with her neighboring countries.

I am sure that you must share my hope
that the day will soon come when this goal
can be realized.


U.S. and Japan Adjourn Talks
on Fishing in New U.S. Zone

Press release 40 dated February 23

U.S. and Japanese delegations on Febru-
ary 21 adjourned their discussions which be-
gan on February 6 regarding the problems
related to fishing in the U.S. contiguous
fishery zone extending 9 miles from the U.S.
territorial sea.^ It was agreed to reconvene
the discussions in mid-April at a time con-
venient to both Governments. Although con-
siderable progress was made toward a solu-
tion of the problems through the frank ex-
change of views during the discussions, it
became apparent that no final agreement
could be reached at this time.

An understanding was reached that, in the
interim period prior to May 1, both Govern-
ments will voluntarily take such measures
as are practicable in order to avoid the oc-
currence of problems with respect to fish-
eries in the contiguous zone.

The U.S. delegation was headed by Am-
bassador Donald L. McKernan, Special As-
sistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Sec-
retary of State. The Japanese delegation was
headed by Minister Ryozo Sunobe of the
Japanese Embassy at Washington.


' Ibid., Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.

' The new U.S. fisheries zone was established by
the enactment of P.L. 89-658, approved Oct. 14,



Emperor of Ethiopia
I Visits the United States

Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia
visited the United States February 13-17. He
met tvith President Johnson and other U.S.
Government officials in Washington on Feb-
ruary 13-15. Folloiving is an exchange of
greetings betiveen President Johnson and the
Emperor at a ceremony in the East Room of
the White House on February 13, together
with an exchange of toasts at a dinner at the
White House the next evening.


White House press release dated February 13

President Johnson

Your Imperial Majesty: It is a very great
honor this afternoon to welcome His Imperial
Majesty once again to American shores.

He has been our firm and cherished friend
for more than five decades. He and his people
have inspired us by their heroic example in
time of war. And they have impressed us by
the wisdom of their advice in time of peace.

The most destructive war in human history
might well have been prevented if the world
had only listened 30 years ago to the Em-
peror of Ethiopia. Mankind has seldom been
offered so accurate a prophecy. And it has
never paid a grimmer price for ignoring one
of its prophets.

I would like to repeat a statement His
Majesty made to the world in those dark days
before the Second World War. "Apart from
the Kingdom of God," he said, "there is not
on this earth any nation that is higher than
any other."

No one has ever offered a better prescrip-
tion for destroying the cancer of war.

Only when this simple moral truth is
finally accepted by all the leaders of every
land can we truly hope for lasting peace.

His Imperial Majesty has never raised his
voice in the halls of nations except to coun-

sel wisdom, restraint, and justice. He once
described the foreign policy of his own land
in these words:

We believe that war has become too dangerous a
method for solving international disputes. Man must
be as wise as he is advanced. He must allow his
wisdom and common sense to prevail over tempta-
tions that can only lead to the destniction of civiliza-
tion itself . . . the only safe way for the settlement of
international disputes is the method of peaceful nego-
tiation, conducted in good faith, and with the aim of
insuring peace and justice for all.

Your Majesty, I am told that in your coun-
try there is a proverb which says: "Truth,
and the morning, become light with time."

Much time has already passed. Your Maj-
esty, since you first tried to light our way
toward a better, more peaceful world. I hope
and believe that men are closer to reaching
that long-sought destination than ever before
in history. And our voyage has been guided
in no small part by the courage, the example,
and the wisdom of Ethiopia.

Your Majesty, we are greatly honored to
have you with us in the White House this
afternoon. We look forward with great an-
ticipation to your visit with us in the days

Emperor Haile Selassie 1^

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, distinguished
guests: First of all, Mr. President, I wish to
state my satisfaction on the fact you have re-
covered as spiritedly from your recent diffi-
culty with your health. It is nice to see you in
the state that I find you today.

Each generation thinks that the situation
it faces is the most serious one, the most
difficult one than that which was faced by
generations of the past. However, this may
be true today. I believe when we say the task
of this generation is burdensome we mean it.

Because of the progress mankind has
achieved and because of the diflSculties that
are at times part and parcel of progress and
prosperity, we find ourselves at a crossroad
where we might make the world safe for our

As translated from the Amharic language.

MARCH 13, 1967


future generations or we might all perish to-

The friendship between the United States
and Ethiopia is one of long standing. Our
association in the past many decades, I hope,
has been fruitful for both our peoples. Be-
cause the United States and Ethiopia believe
in the same fundamental and essential goals,
it is necessary that we should put our efforts
together so that we may make maximum con-
tribution for the safety and prosperity of the
generations to come.

In our discussions, Mr. President, I hope
we will have the occasion of considering the
certain questions of mutual concern, of ex-
changing views in a frank and open manner,
and arriving, I am confident, at a consensus
of understanding.

I believe that leaders must from time to
time come together, face each other, and dis-
cuss problems they share in common. It is
not enough that we deal through diplomatic

Mr. President, I know of the hard work
that you have in your country. I know of the
immense responsibility you carry for the
safety of mankind, for the maintenance of
peace. I know also of your splendid effort in
maintaining national peace and security. I
am glad, under the circumstances, that you
are able to consider my coming to the United
States for the purpose of dealing with mat-
ters of mutual interest.

Ethiopia and Ethiopians are laboring to-
day not only for the peace and prosperity of
our people, but also realizing the fundamental
common interest which we share with other
African people, we have dedicated ourselves
to building a united and a more prosperous
Africa. We found that the interest that af-
fects Africa affects also Ethiopia and vice
versa, because our destiny with the African
Continent is a common one.

We have to put up a common effort to see
that the continent's interests are protected.
As it is well known, the Organization of
African Unity was established in Addis

Ababa. I believe this organization has made
a good beginning in the interest of all of the
African people.

I hope, Mr. President, during our private
conversations I will have an opportunity of '^
exchanging views with you about matters of
mutual concern, as well as matters that re-
late to the Organization of African Unity.

Let me say again that I am glad to be in
the United States today and I pray that our
discussions will bear fruit. Thank you.


White House press release dated February 14

President Johnson

Your Imperial Majesty, Mr. Vice Presi-
dent, Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished guests,
ladies and gentlemen: It is a high privilege
tonight to honor one of this century's most
courageous, farsighted, and respected states-
men, who has earned an indelible place in the
hearts of men everywhere.

Monarch of the oldest Christian kingdom
and an ancient civilization, you. Your Maj-
esty, personify to us the eternal spirit of de-
votion to freedom and independence of your
Ethiopian people.

The essence of the Ethiopian character was
put in your stirring words many years ago:
"With God's help, we have always stood
proud and free upon our native mountains."

It is difficult for me to express to you to-
night the very special place that you occupy
in our tradition — indeed, in the tradition of
all mankind.

Many of us in this room tonight recall the
night of June 28, 1936, when the Emperor of
Ethiopia made a plea to the League of Na-
tions — a plea for his suffering people which
was also a very moving appeal to the con-
science of humanity.

Your Majesty's final question to the League
has echoed down the years with prophetic

I ask the 52 nations who have given the Ethiopian



leople a promise to help them in their resistance to
h.' aggressor, what are they willing to do for

And the great powers who have promised the
ruarantee of collective security to small States on
vliom weighs the threat that they may one day
niffer the fate of Ethiopia, I ask, what measures do
ou intend to take?

Representatives of the world, I have come to
3eneva to discharge in your midst the most painful
)f the duties of the head of a State.

What reply shall I have to take back to my people?

We all know — to our shame — the reply
i'our Majesty received.

The betrayal of Ethiopia was in truth the
;urning point on the road to aggression and
.var. Its lesson has been etched into our
nemory and has spurred us in building a
,vorld where solid commitments to resist op-
pression are no longer just scraps of paper.

Your Majesty, we also recall with great
pleasure your triumphant return to Addis
\baba and your remarkable reconstruction
)f your nation as you put into action your
ong-held and long-frustrated ideals of mod-

— building schools, a fine university, hos-
pitals, dams, airports, factories;

— turning Addis Ababa into a dynamic,
)eautiful modern city;

— proclaiming a revised constitution and
egal system;

— training young Ethiopians for the tasks
)f the future in the 20th century.

Your Majesty has not confined your con-
cern just to your people.

We have all witnessed, and can testify to
vith admiration, your striking performance
IS a leader of Africa's many and diverse
peoples and as a mediator in potentially ex-
plosive confrontations between various
\f rican states.

(The Organization of African Unity — which
your initiative in 1963 was instrumental in
creating — is one of the most hopeful institu-
;ions in the movement toward peace, reason,
and unity in the great continent of Africa.

It has always been a unique privilege and
pleasure for me to have an opportunity to ex-

change views on international affairs with
one whom I consider to be one of the world's
greatest elder statesmen.

Today, as in 1963 when we last talked, we

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 73 of 90)