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I have heard predictions that have varied from five
years to 50 or even 75 years. . . .

All of the evidence suggests that Smith's
"realism" would place him with those who
favor the long term, the very long term,
rather than the short term of expectations.

The Rhodesian Front viewpoint is clearly
reflected in a South African article quoted
approvingly in the January 13, 1967, issue of



454



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN






Rhodesian Commentary, published by the
Rhodesian Ministry of Information, which
states: "Democracy, in the popular sense that
Jack is as good as his masters, is not the
divinely ordained method of government. It
is not a method at all."

Here you have the true feelings of the Rho-
desian leaders. If they resist meaningful
progress toward democracy and majority
rule, what do they envisage — the eternal rule
of a minority whose only distinction is their
color?

The Issue of Communism

There is abundant evidence that the policy
of the Smith regime is pushing it increasingly
in a racial direction. There is less talk of a
" multiracial society or pretensions of partner-
ship. There have been intimations of the
acceptance by the white community of
apartheid. In a recent speech, Ian Smith
stated, "I believe that ideal after which we
are striving is a system which acknowledges
our different communities and provides safe-
guards which will enable the different com-
munities to live according to their own wishes
and \vith adequate protection for their rights
and freedoms." We wonder if the white com-
munity understands the implications of this
position and where this road will lead them.

The Smith regime has attempted to enlist
sympathy and support by proclaiming itself
the defender of Western civilization and a
bulwark against communism. But a system
whose purpose is to exclude majority rule is
a mockery of accepted Western principles
and a travesty of an effective defense against
communism.

Yet one of the most persistent themes of
the Rhodesian Front leaders is that they are
building a dike against communism and
chaos. This becomes a justification for police
measures, the use of force, the detentions at
Gonakudzingwa and Wha-Wha, and the con-
stricting political and emotional atmosphere.
By neutralizing the possibility of a free
exchange of views and fruitful negotiations,
they have helped to deprive the African
nationalists of their options and to create a



situation which encourages resort to illegal
activity and assistance from foreign, includ-
ing Communist, sources. The Rhodesian
minority is thus encouraging the very insta-
bility it professes to wish to avoid. In the
long run it is frustration and loss of hope
that creates the climate for Communist influ-
ence. It is pertinent to this problem that,
despite energetic efforts, the Soviets and
Chinese Communists have not succeeded in
making any significant inroads against true
independence in Africa. But they could suc-
ceed if Africans believed that the West would
not support legitimate African aspirations
for self-determination.

The Rhodesian Front spokesmen assert
their right to independence on the basis of
self-government, which Southern Rhodesia
first acquired in 1923. But they overlook one
important fact: that Britain always reserved
constitutionally the right to veto any dis-
criminatory legislation directed at the indige-
nous population and that Britain never
yielded these reserved rights. Britain was the
ultimate sovereign authority; and when Rho-
desia adopted the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence, the powers of government over
Rhodesia reverted to the British. The white
Rhodesians have always had the option of
fruitful collaboration with the Africans and
the support of Britain, but instead they have
progressively resorted to a policy of repres-
sion, the dissolution of African nationalist
parties, the detention of their leaders, the
expulsion of religious figures and university
professors, the suppression of newspapers,
the censorship of press media, and finally
UDI.

Role of the African Community

In this sad chain of events, one must also
consider the question of African responsi-
bility. The leadership of the African com-
munity in Rhodesia is deeply divided and
even in exile tends to be more concerned with
its factional conflicts than with the true
needs of the society. It is often maintained
that this division in ranks led the nationalists
to oppose taking full advantage of the fran-
chise provisions of the 1961 constitution and



MARCH 20, 1967



455



that if the African nationalists had been more
flexible and statesmanlike they might have
been able, with British support, to achieve a
minimal power base which would have
hindered the shift of each succeeding gov-
ernment to the right. There is undoubtedly
some validity to these contentions, and the
Southern Rhodesian Africans might well
have been in a better moral position today if
they had shown more disposition to cooperate.
At the same time, the African nationalist de-
cision to boycott the 1962 elections must be
viewed against the pedestrian rate of African
advancement until that time, the highly lim-
ited franchise provisions of the constitution
of 1961, and the general African suspicion
of the chasm between what the minority gov-
ernment professed and the implementation of
its professions.

Whatever the merits of its past positions,
however, the African community of Rhodesia
must find means of submerging its differences
and of presenting a strong and wise leader-
ship which will cooperate to insure the
interests of the country. We have seen this
happen in other countries. In Kenya, a na-
tional leadership has emerged under the
guidance of President Jomo Kenyatta which
is providing a bond of unity among all seg-
ments of the population and uniting them in
the spirit of Harrambee; i.e., working
together. It is significant, in this connection,
that there are now more Western business
interests and representatives in Kenya than
before independence.

During the period I lived in Southern Rho-
desia, I came to know a number of the men
now in power, as well as many others who
support them. Like all of us, they are condi-
tioned by the environment; and we must
acknowledge that the environment is almost
■unique — one of the very few places in the
world where an outmoded political structure
based on colonial principles of race repression
fights to preserve itself even after colonialism
has been generally discredited and has all but
disappeared. They refuse to come to terms
with the realities of 20th-century social and
political change, and they have been too iso-
lated to understand this obvious truth. In a



very real sense, our policy is designed to
bring them into the contemporary world, not
remove them from it.

Fundamentally this must mean acceptance
of the inevitability of majority rule. There is
an honorable place for the white minority in
Southern Rhodesia — a place where the white
man can live and prosper and contribute to
the healthy development of his country. The
realization of the rights of the majority,
which we accept as a social and political im-
perative, can certainly be attained without
the destruction or deprivation of the
minority. The white minorities in Kenya,
Tanzania, and Zambia have learned this. And
it must be emphasized that there are white
men of good will in Southern Rhodesia who
are aware of the enormous potential of
cooperation among the races. Some of them
have carried their convictions to the point
that they are now in prison along with their
African compatriots. There is every valid
reason for other white Rhodesians to heed
these lessons.

A Unique Problem

But why do we agree that the U.N. should
press this issue of principle with Southern
Rhodesia to a point beyond that we have
taken with respect to other places in the
world ? Why do we assert the universal appli-
cation of self-determination but not take
active measures to give effect to it every-
where? And further, if we support steps
against Southern Rhodesia, won't we have to
agree to similar steps in the future when they
are proposed to combat denial of self-
determination elsewhere?

The answer to these questions lies in the
uniqueness of the Rhodesian problem. We
acknowledge this uniqueness and consider
that our policy on Southern Rhodesia creates
no precedents or obligations with respect to
similar measures elsewhere either now or in
the future. Southern Rhodesia is a colony in
rebellion against the universally acknowl-
edged sovereign. Great Britain. It is not an
independent state in whose internal affairs
the United Nations is intervening. Further-
more, the sovereign authority. Great Britain,



456



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN






has asked the international community,
including the United States, to help it in its
task of restoring legitimate constitutional
authority in Southern Rhodesia. In terms of
the U.N. Charter, Southern Rhodesia is a
non-self-governing territory and Great Brit-
ain is the administering authority, obligated
"to develop self-government, to take due
account of the political aspirations of the
peoples, and to assist them in the progressive
development of their free political institu-
tions." The illegal regime is obstructing the
carrying out of these responsibilities of the
administering power in the territory. In no
other place in the world that I can think of
do these conditions apply. Therefore, the
mode of our response to the challenge of
illegal independence creates no problem of
corollary obligations. We are free to continue
our support of self-determination and our
opposition to racial discrimination elsewhere
in ways appropriate to each different case.

What the British seek, and what most of
the world would find acceptable, in Southern
Rhodesia is a settlement that assures an
orderly but reasonable transition to majority
rule, with minority rights fully protected. The
British have never and do not now demand
immediate majority rule. Neither does the
British Commonwealth, the U.N., nor the
United States. The issue is not independence
under minority rule versus immediate
majority rule. Even now, after the present
British Government has committed itself not
to seek a settlement that involves inde-
pendence before majority rule, these are not
the choices facing Southern Rhodesia. If the
white minority were willing to accept what
the outside world sees as both right and
inevitable, it should be possible to reach a
settlement that provides for a restoration of
constitutional authority and for a transitional
period before legal independence in which
African educational opportunities were con-
siderably broadened and African training in
government accomplished by actual partici-
pation. The alternative to such a settlement,
if most of the white minority persists in its
efforts to hold back history, is a gradual
deterioration of the Rhodesian economy, a



continuing and probably increasing net
emigration of whites, mounting dissidence
and political activism, radicalization of the
African approach to the whole problem,
facilitation of Communist penetration of the
opposition movement, and, eventually, the
danger of organized violence on a scale that
the present regime will be unable to contain —
not a welcome prospect but one for which the
intransigent white minority in Southern Rho-
desia would bear a heavy responsibility.

If the rebel regime leads the Rhodesian
people into this tragic morass, more and more
of Africa will be affected. Racial tensions will
mount, reasoned counsels of restraint on the
part of responsible African leaders will spell
their political suicide, and proponents of mod-
eration outside Africa will be discredited in
the eyes of Africans.

There are sincere and honestly motivated
Americans who say that the Rhodesian rebel-
lion is of no concern to this country and that
we should not become involved in the inter-
national community's efforts to resolve this
problem. But we cannot ignore the conse-
quences of inaction. We can — and will —
determine the extent of our involvement, but
we cannot escape our responsibility to act
with others on a problem that has engaged
the concern of the world. Even if we were
not obligated to concern ourselves with these
issues by virtue of our responsibility under
the U.N. Charter, we would inevitably be
morally involved because of our national tra-
ditions and principles.

As we have developed our measured re-
sponse to this threat, we have stayed within
the confines of what is clearly authorized
under American law and the U.N. Charter.
The assertion from some quarters that the
executive branch of our Government is acting
illegally in pursuit of the Government's Rho-
desian policy is wholly without foundation.
Everything that has and will be done will
adhere scrupulously to the letter, as well as
the spirit, of the law.

Within this framework, let me summarize:

First, we believe that the efforts of the
illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia to per-



MARCH 20, 1967



457



petuate minority rule contributes to insta-
bility in that area. Therefore, we intend to
continue to work with the United Kingdom
as the administering authority and with the
international community in an effort peace-
fully to restore constitutional authority and
thus open the way to an orderly transition
to majority rule.

Second, we accept the obligation imposed
upon us by the U.N. Security Council resolu-
tion of December 16 providing for selective
mandatory economic sanctions against South-
ern Rhodesia. We hope that this program of
sanctions will convince the illegal regime in
Southern Rhodesia that it faces nearly uni-
versal opposition and convince it of the
wisdom of agreeing to a settlement accept-
able to the international community. We hope,



too, that all members of the U.N. will simi-
larly accept their obligation under the charter
to comply with the Security Council resolu-
tion.

Third, we continue to recognize the
sovereign authority of Great Britain in the
British colony of Southern Rhodesia and, like
every other government in the world, we re-
fuse to recognize Rhodesia as an independent
state.

Finally, we have adopted this policy toward
Southern Rhodesia because it is right in
terms of principle, because it strengthens our
position in the world, and because it helps
promote our objectives of stability and
orderly development in Africa. Surely a
policy that meets these tests is in the national
interest of the United States.



The U.N.: An Arena for Peaceful East-West Engagement



by Joseph J. Sisco

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs^



Obscured by the thunder of loud and fre-
quently acrimonious debate, a quiet, almost
unnoticed development of some importance
has been taking place at the U.N. We are
witnessing at the world organization an
occasional convergence of Soviet-American
interests and a limited parallelism of policies.

We are far from the peace and reconcilia-
tion between Communist and non-Communist
states of which President Johnson spoke
recently.2 But the U.N. in recent months has
provided opportunity for something more
than the narrow concept of coexistence. It
has provided the opportunity for modest,
peaceful engagement of both the United
States and the Soviet Union on issues where
our interests converge, this despite continu-
ing differences over Viet-Nam. The original



charter concept of big power unanimity is
still only a distant illusion, but at least small
steps toward consensus are being taken.

Such steps are faltering and incomplete,
for fundamental differences remain between
the United States and the U.S.S.R. regarding
world order and the proper place of the U.N.
in the scheme of things. These steps reflect
the changing relations between East and
West and between Peking and Moscow. They
reflect also our efforts to utilize the United



■ Address made before the foreign policy confer-
ence for educators at Los Angeles, Calif., on Feb. 24
and at San Jose, Calif., on Feb. 25 (pre.ss release 41
dated February 23).

^ For an advance text of President Johnson's ad-
dress at New York, N. Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see
Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.



458



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN






Nations to help cany forward President
Johnson's policy — to build bridges between
East and West, to achieve arrangements
which are mutually advantageous and which
in the long run could revitalize some of the
woi'k of the U.N. And perhaps more funda-
mentally, these steps mirror the cold hard
fact of nuclear stalemate and danger that
moves the largest and strongest powers of
the world to pursue parallel policies where
mutual interests are served.

It is about the role of the U.N. in promot-
ing parallel U.S.-U.S.S.R. interests that I
wish to speak to you today.

The United Nations serves the national
interests of the United States in many ways:
in helping us share our security responsibili-
ties around the world, in providing a frame-
work for organizing a durable peace, in regu-
lating for the good of mankind the global
effects of the scientific and technological
revolutions of our time, in providing an
efficient way of channeling some of our
foreign aid.

Beyond this, the United Nations offers a
political environment for peaceful East-West
engagement, a place where certain parallel
interests of the great powers, including
those we share with the Soviets, can be pur-
sued to everyone's benefit.

The possibility of engaging the U.S.S.R.
in cooperative action in the U.N. has been
complicated by a certain ambivalence in the
Soviet attitude toward the U.N. and inter-
national organizations. Its revolutionary doc-
trine assumed that old forms of international
relationships, including "bourgeois" interna-
tional law, were parts of a passing old order
that would be replaced by a new interna-
tional system when the "revolution" spread
to other countries. International institutions
were to be manipulated and subverted; they
were not to be objects of joint Conununist
and non-Communist cooperation.

At the same time, however, the Soviet
Government has come to realize that the
"bourgeois" international order will not soon
pass away and that there are opportunistic
advantages to be derived from being an
insider within international institutions. In



recent years this development has been forti-
fied by the mutual recognition that third-
area conflicts can embroil the two major
colossi and that in an interdependent world
living in an era of nuclear stalemate the
U.S.S.R. has a stake, within certain limits,
in promoting order and stability.

This two-sidedness helps to explain the
often contradictory and vacillating Soviet
behavior in the U.N. They see the U.N. as a
propaganda forum, as an arena of political
competition, particularly in the "third
world." But they also see the U.N. as an
international institution which offers limited
opportunities for at least minimal coopera-
tion with the United States in the context of
multilateral dealings.

Let us look more carefully at this two-sided
Soviet approach to the U.N.

The U.N. as a Propaganda Forum

The U.N., and particularly the General
Assembly, serves all members, including the
United States and the U.S.S.R., as a platform
for getting national messages across to the
world. The Assembly — with 122 members, all
but 26 considered as economically less de-
veloped member states who account for less
than 18 percent of the contributions to the
regular budget — has become an important
diplomatic stage for the smaller countries.
Here they play a role in world affairs. Here
they can together assert their views and
exert political pressures on matters which
interest them most, notably decolonization,
human rights, and economic development.

Since the U.N. is a center stage for the
small countries, it has become an important
arena for wooing their political support.
Soviet strategy in the U.N., for example,
is increasingly aimed at allying itself with
third-world majorities to marshal support for
its foreign policy aims and counter the
United States' policies abroad — in Viet-Nam,
in Europe, and in Asia and Africa.

The recently concluded Assembly illus-
trates how the Soviets seek to use the U.N.
as a prime arena for political warfare against
the United States and the West.



MARCH 20, 1967



459



— In its yearend review of actions at the
21st General Assembly the Soviet delegation
on December 22 issued a sweeping attack on
American policy both inside and outside
the U.N.

— ^It introduced or supported ineffectual
propagandistic resolutions on nonintei'ven-
tion, the use of force, and chemical and bio-
logical warfare, directed against our actions
in Viet-Nam, and sought unsuccessfully to
brand the United States as an aggressor.

— It tried to undermine U.N. support for
the Republic of Korea but was resoundingly
defeated.

— It pegged out the most extreme positions
on colonial and racial issues, irrespective of
their practical utility in advancing self-
determination and human rights.

There is nothing unusual about such
propaganda thrusts. They were very similar
to those made by the Soviets in several pre-
vious Assemblies; they were played in
accordance with well-established rules of the
game. They were largely unsuccessful be-
cause the smaller nations are reluctant to
become political footballs between major
powers. Moreover, on issues which are of
direct concern to the Africans — Southern
Rhodesia, South West Africa, economic de-
velopment — there is more interest in the
Assembly in deeds than in oratory. Thus, the
limited parallelism does not mean that the
litany of invective hurled at the United
States by the Soviet delegation will abate
or that sharp differences over key policy
issues will disappear.

The United States, of course, uses the U.N.
platform to counter hostile propaganda, to
explain our policies, and to advance our own
objectives in the political, social, and eco-
nomic fields.

What is more important in the long run
is the possibility of exploring opportunities
for employing the U.N. as an instrument for
bridging differences and promoting interests
we hold with other major powers, particu-
larly the U.S.S.R.

This requires tactics of opportunity. The
convergence of U.S. and Soviet interests is



often random, temporary, or minimal. There
appears to be no grand U.S.S.R. design in
this area. Consequently, we do not work to
any predetermined pattern. But we can and
do exploit all situations in which cooperation
can take place on a basis of mutual benefit.
Three principal parallelisms have been
discernible in recent months.

Contact and Negotiation at the U.N.

At the last General Assembly, Secretary
of State Rusk once again met with Foreign
Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko for quiet
talks. These two leaders have met more often
at the U.N. than anywhere else. Such meet-
ings are routine practice during the opening
days of the Assembly, and they can take
place without ringing alarm bells or stimu-
lating undue expectations.

This is an important institutional develop-
ment; it is precisely the sort of quiet diplo-
macy the late Dag Hammarskjold saw as a
primary function of the U.N. Its importance
usually cannot be measured by dramatic re-
sults; but such quiet talks, at a minimum,
contribute to better understanding between
the two major military powers in this pre-
carious nuclear era. There is no substitute for
first-hand exchanges and direct discussions;
the U.N.'s existence facilitates such talks,
and in the words of Churchill, it is better
"to jaw, jaw than war, war."

Similarly, we have come to appreciate the
advantages of the U.N.'s multilateral frame-
work for accormnodating differences and
making adjustments in what might other-
wise be even more difl!icult direct negotia-
tions.

Outer space shows the possibilities. In
1963, the Assembly adopted a resolution ban-
ning the use of weapons of mass destruction
in outer space.^ While this was a unanimous
action of the membership, it was also a re-
flection in the first instance of quiet bilateral
discussions and agreement between the
United States and the U.S.S.R.

The first step ultimately led to the dra-



' For text, see ibid., Nov. 11, 1963, p. 754.



460



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN



niatic and successful negotiation of a treaty
on principles to guide states in the explora-



Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 78 of 90)