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Department of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) online

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tion and use of outer space,^ which was
endorsed by the General Assembly in Decem-
ber ^ and already has been signed by over
70 nations in Washington, Moscow, and
London. U.S.-Soviet agreement was a pre-
lequisite for subsequent unanimity of the
world body. Ambassador [Arthur J.] Gold-
berg, armed with broad authority from Presi-
dent Johnson, put his negotiating talents to
effective use in quiet, patient, detailed talks
with Soviet Ambassador Platon Morozov.

The treaty resei-ves the moon for peaceful
uses only and bans weapons of mass destruc-
tion in space, provides free access to all
installations on celestial bodies, and provides
for fullest public reporting by governments
of their space activities.

The multilateral framework of the 28-
member U.N. Outer Space Committee pro-
vided an excellent negotiating forum for all
concerned, including the Soviets and our-
selves. Not for the first time, the U.N. pro-
vided suitable "political space" for accom-
modation on politically sensitive issues.

It is an overstatement to say that such an
agreement could not have been successfully
negotiated without the U.N. framework. But
it is fair to say that U.N. machinery facili-
tated very materially U.S.-U.S.S.R. accom-
modation on the space issue in a period of
deep differences over Viet-Nam and of Chi-
nese Communist propaganda broadsides
against alleged Soviet collaboration with the
United States.

Use of the U.N. in the Peacekeeping Field

It is a remarkable tribute to the essential
purposes the U.N. serves that there should
be any convergence of U.S.-U.S.S.R. interests
in peacekeeping activities of the U.N., given
the deep-seated constitutional differences
which continue to exist over the peacekeeping
role of the organization.

The U.S.S.R. continues to insist that the
Security Council has the sole and exclusive
responsibility to organize, manage, and
finance peacekeeping operations. It wants no

role for the General Assembly apart from
discussion. It wants no strong U.N. execu-
tive or strong Secretariat. The unwarranted
Soviet attack last week on the highly circum-
spect United Nations Office of Public Infor-
mation is the latest evidence of this policy.

Conscious of the imbalance of real power
between large and small in the 122-nation
General Assembly, the United States has
long been ready to make even greater use of
the Security Council. But the United States
is not vdlling to subject all future peacekeep-
ing actions to the veto, to eliminate the re-
sidual power of the Assembly under article
10 to make recommendations in the peace-
keeping field, nor to weaken the Secretary-
General as the executive ann of the U.N. or
to reduce him to a glorified clerk.

The U.S.-Soviet differences are deep-
rooted and basic and are apt to remain over
the foreseeable future.

But they have not prevented limited con-
vergences in peacekeeping where U.S.S.R.
interests paralleled our own. Doctrinaire
Soviet ideological and constitutional scruples
have had to be subordinated. Recent U.N.
experience points up the situation.

The U.N. Force in Cyprus

Since early 1964, the U.N. Force has been
helping to maintain an uneasy quiet in
Cyprus. Last December the Security Council
again extended its mandate for another 6
months.* This action was taken unanimously.

Why did the Soviets not veto the establish-
ment of the Force, and why do they acquiesce
in the maintenance of the Force? For one
thing, Cyprus clearly wishes to keep the
Force on the island. Moreover, the Force has
the strong political backing of the unalined
Africans and Asians. Perhaps most im-
portant, the U.N. operation in Cyprus re-
flects the parallel U.S.-U.S.S.R. interests in
keeping a lid on factional fighting so that
this small island does not become a point of
direct military confrontation.

•• For text, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 953.

= Ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78.

« For background, see ibid., Jan. 30, 1967, p. 179.

MARCH 20, 1967


The Soviet position regarding the U.N.
presence there is carefully circumscribed.
The U.S.S.R. abstained on the original reso-
lution establishing the U.N. Force and has
contributed nothing to its financial support.
Soviet support for the U.N. presence has
been limited to voting for authorizing reso-
lutions. The Soviet position does not signify
a fundamental change toward U.N. peace-
keeping; it is a pragmatic, carefully hedged
response to circumstances in the eastern
Mediterranean which make the U.N. a use-
ful diplomatic instrument to achieve a limited
goal of containing third-party conflicts — a
goal that in this instance parallels our own.

U.N. Observers in Kashmir

Kashmir is another case in point.

At the outset of the flareup in the sub-
continent in August 1965, both the U.S.S.R.
and the United States saw the importance of
containing the conflict and ending the fight-
ing. Soviet interest at this stage paralleled
ours in enlisting U.N. efforts to bring about
a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Indian and
Pakistani forces that had crossed interna-
tional lines.

There was unanimous support for resolu-
tions in the Security Council in September
1965 which provided for the enlargement of
the existing U.N. observer corps and its de-
ployment along the international boundary.''
Everyone recognized that unless the conflict
was localized, it could provide a dangerous
temptation for the Chinese Communists to
press further against Indian borders and
thus increase the risk of a larger war.

However, there were limits to Soviet coop-
eration. Once the cease-fire took hold and the
danger of escalation receded, Soviet and
American interests began to diverge again.
Moscow began raising questions about the
conduct of the U.N. operation. It sniped at
the Secretary-General, maintaining that he
had exceeded his authority in recruiting and
deploying the enlarged observer force with-
out specific, detailed approval of the Security
Council. It raised problems with regard to

' For background, see ibid., Sept. 27, 1965, p. 526.

financing. These doctrinal considerations
proved secondary, however, to the need to
achieve concerted action to end the hostili-

All this illustrates that Communist
ideology and doctrine often takes a back seat
when overriding Soviet national interests are

Science and Technology

Parallelism has been spurred by the scien-
tific and technical imperatives of our times,
leading to East-West cooperation in a wide
range of multilateral undertakings. The
U.S.S.R. participates with other scientifically
advanced countries in international scien-
tific and technical programs.

I have mentioned outer space: We have
been cooperating on technical and legal
aspects of space in the U.N. Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

We are moving ahead in numerous other
cooperative ventures. In the World Meteoro-
logical Organization we have taken the lead
with others, including the Soviet Union, in
planning the World Weather Watch, a world-
wide cooperative venture to improve man's
ability to predict the course of weather. In
the International Telecommunication Union,
we cooperate in allocating frequencies.

The United States and the Soviet Union
have participated in three major ocean-
ographic surveys: in the Indian Ocean, the
tropical Atlantic, and Kuroshio in the Pacific,
the latter two under the auspices of the Inter-
governmental Oceanographic Commission.

As science and technology develop, there
will be additional opportunities to engage the
U.S.S.R. and Eastern European countries in
international cooperative action of this kind.
But it is important to keep politics and
political invective out of international meet-
ings and programs on scientific and technical
matters. Unfortunately, the other side has
not always been able to resist the temptation
to exploit the occasion of technical meetings
for political ends by injecting extraneous
political issues into the discussion of techni-
cal matters. Moreover, their financial sup-



port of various voluntary programs in
convertible moneys has been minimal, and
this has been an obstacle to greater Soviet
cooperation in U.N. economic and scientific

These, then, are three principal areas of
limited parallelism which have emerged in
the U.N. system, convergences which sei-ve
mutual Soviet-American interests despite the
continuing wide ideological gulf.

There remains a fundamental incompati-
bility between Communist ideology and
charter principles. Communist theory en-
visages a monolithic world built by coercion;
we see one of diversity based on free choice.
Communist ideology distrusts international
organizations that Communists cannot con-
trol. The charter is based on the assumption
that international organization is beyond con-
trol of any one state.

Despite the clash of doctrine, we stand
ready to explore the possibilities of U.S.-
U.S.S.R. parallelism. In the long run, peace-
ful engagement in international cooperative
action is in the interest of East and West.
There is a fundamental reason for this. What
is influencing the policy of all great powers,
including the U.S.S.R., is the growing aware-
ness that the technological and weapons
revolutions have changed the basic terms of
reference of international order and of na-
tional security policies. And Communist
society itself is becoming more varied and
less monolithic under the impact of modem
technology and modern thought. Secretary
Rusk said recently in the context of East-
West relations: * "It is too late in history to
maintain intractable hostility across the en-
tire range of relationships. . . ."

In this period of history certain vital
national interests can best be achieved

through common endeavors and through par-
ticipation in international mechanisms for
peace and development. To this end, as the
President noted in his state of the Union mes-
sage last month,9 "We are shaping a new
future of enlarged partnership in nuclear
affairs, in economic and technical coopera-
tion, in trade negotiations, in political con-
sultation, and in working together with the
governments and peoples of Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union." This is also our policy
at the United Nations.

A sobering look at the abyss of nuclear
war, the stake both we and the U.S.S.R. have
in keeping the peace, the realization of our
common vulnerabihty to disease and starva-
tion and disorder, the imperatives of techni-
cal endeavors in an age of technological
revolution — all these impress on Moscow and
Washington and other capitals persuasive
reasons for international cooperation and for
engagement in international processes that
make possible adjustments and the promotion
of our respective national interests without

The clash of ideologies in the U.N. — inso-
far as East-West relations are concerned —
remains too sharp to permit agreement on
basic philosophic values. Attempts to define
common philosophic goals could divide
rather than unite us. Progress toward a
peaceful and cooperative order is more likely
if we drop abstractions — including cold war
abstractions and Utopian abstractions — and
seek out areas where practical interests are

The practical step toward peace, the
President has noted, is "to recognize that
while differing principles and differing
values may always divide us, they should not,
and they must not, deter us from rational
acts of common endeavor." i"

' In an address before the Executives Club of
Chicago on Nov. 30, 1966.

' Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.
' Ibid., Sept. 19, 1966, p. 410.

MARCH 20, 1967


Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara Discuss
Developments in Latin America and Viet-Nam

Folloiving is the transcript of a press con-
ference held at the White House by Secretary
Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara at the conclusion of a Cabinet
meeting on February 28.

White House press release dated February 28


We just had a Cabinet meeting at which I
reported to the President and the Cabinet in
more detail on our Foreign Ministers meeting
in the Western Hemisphere at Buenos Aires
the other day.'

We feel it was a very successful meeting
with a high degree of solidarity on the great
objectives here in the hemisphere, particu-
larly in the economic field.

The Foreign Ministers have recommended
to the Presidents of the hemisphere that the
Presidents themselves meet in Punta del
Este, Uruguay, on April 12 and 14 and there
take up such great issues as the economic
integration of the hemisphere, the trade prob-
lems of the hemisphere, the war on hunger
and the increase in agricultural productivity,
scientific and medical improvement, a limita-
tion on unnecessary defense expenditures,
and some other important matters.

We were very pleased that the Foreign
Ministers admitted a new member, Trinidad
and Tobago.2 That makes 22 members now

' See p. 472.

' While the Foreign Ministers were in Buenos
Aires, the Council of the Organization of American
States met in special session there on Feb. 23 and ap-
proved Trinidad and Tobago's application for OAS

in the inter-American system, although
Cuba's membership is in suspense.

We have been very encouraged by what has
happened at that meeting. I think the Presi-
dents will have a good meeting in April.

I also reported on the present state of
affairs with respect to peace in Viet-Nam.

There was a very important interview in
Paris recently with Mr. Mai Van Bo, the
North Vietnamese representative in Paris.
He underlined that what is required by them
of us is a permanent and unconditional
cessation of bombing in the North and that
there would not be any corresponding mili-
tary moves taken on their side to deescalate
the military action.

As you know, we have indicated many
times, to the Secretary-General of the U.N.
and to others, including Hanoi, that we would
be prepared to stop the bombing if they would
take corresponding military moves on their
side but that we cannot stop half the war.

We have seen evidence recently of in-
creased supply activity along the coast, rein-
forcing their troops in South Viet-Nam,
increased numbers of trucks, and so we have
taken additional measures to stop that infil-
tration or to impair it or to slow it down.
Those measures have included artillery fire
into the DMZ and across it; action by our
naval ships, particularly at night and in bad
weather, to interrupt that traffic along the
coast; and a certain mining of internal water-

We are determined to do our best to sup-
port our men out there and to make it com-
pletely clear to the other side that they
cannot succeed in seizing South Viet-Nam by



force — at the same time to invite them to
enter into discussions.

We have repeated over and over again,
both publicly and privately, that we will

\ negotiate without conditions or we will
negotiate about conditions or that we will dis-
cuss a final settlement and that we will be
prepared to take up any part of this problem,
such as the deescalation of military activity
or the demilitarization of the demilitarized
zone or the exchange of prisoners or any part
of it which might move us a little step toward

We cannot report today that we see those
moves by the other side pointing toward a

r peaceful solution.


I As Secretary Rusk said, we reported to
the Cabinet on both the diplomatic and mili-
tary situation in Southeast Asia.

I pointed out that the military operations
in South Viet-Nam have increased both in
tempo and intensity in the past 60 to 90 days.
In part, this is a reflection of the continuing
increase in the number of U.S. military per-
sonnel in South Viet-Nam.

We today have about 415,000 U.S. military
men there. This has permitted a very sub-
stantial increase in the rate of U.S. opera-
tions and the pressure of U.S. and South Viet-
namese and friendly operations against the
Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.

This is evidenced in a number of ways.
Areas of South Viet-Nam that include the
bases of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
forces are now under attack, areas that
haven't been penetrated by friendly forces
for more than 20 years.

One of these, for example, in Tay Ninh
Province, is today the subject of a 23-
I battalion attack by U.S. forces. The increase
I in U.S. strength has also permitted the reas-
signment of certain of the South Vietnamese
military forces to the pacification effort in
order to increase the progress in that area.
Beyond that, as you know, we have
modified somewhat the character of our mili-

tary operations against the lines of commu-
nication from North Viet-Nam to South
Viet-Nam — roads, railroads, inland water-
ways — over which the North Vietnamese are
moving the men and materiel that are funda-
mental to the Viet Cong and North Viet-
namese operations in the South.

In September last year, for example, we
ran about 12,000 attack sorties against these
lines of communication in North Viet-Nam.
A period of bad weather has forced us to cut
that to about 6,600 or 6,800 sorties per

To supplement the air operations, we have
initiated the mining of the inland waterways
and the estuaries, along which and through
which pass a very substantial percentage of
the men and materiel from north to south.

We have added naval gunfire to air bom-
bardment of these lines of communication,
and we have authorized artillery fire from
emplacements in South Viet-Nam against the
concentrations of men and supplies in the
demilitarized zone and just north of that.

All of these actions, as I say, are supple-
ments to the air campaign, an air campaign
which has been penalized in recent weeks by
periods of bad weather, an air campaign
which is of great importance to us as we see
signs of North Vietnamese efforts to raise
the level of supply from north to south.

I think it is very important to recognize
the weight of this air campaign, recognize
the price that it is imposing upon the North
for their continued support of the South. It
is quite clear that the air campaign hasn't
stopped the infiltration. We never believed it

But it is also quite clear that it has forced
the diversion from other activities in the
North of some 300,000 men to repair the
roads, the railroads, the bridges, the depots,
that are the foundations of the lines of com-
munication from north to south. It has forced
the diversion from other activities of about
125,000 men to the air defenses of North
Viet-Nam and the diversion of tens of
thousands of others to coastal defenses.
Roughly a half a million men, therefore, that
would otherwise be occupied, many of them

MARCH 20, 1967


in raising the level of military pressure from
north to south, have been diverted to offset
the effects of our air campaign against the
military targets.

And the magnitude of this price to the
North, I think, is recognized by them and it
has been translated into their worldwide
campaign to force us to stop this.

I think when you recognize the effects of
this, you will understand why we don't
believe we can stop it without reciprocal
military action on their part.

In conclusion, I reported that the increased
tempo of operations in the South, the addi-
tional weight of the effort in the South, has
very substantially increased the fatalities
being suffered by the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese. They are roughly 40 to 50 per-
cent higher in the last 90 days than they were
during 1966.


Q. Could I ask, Mr. McNamara, on this
step-tip of the level of support from north to
south, does this mean that they are actually
moving more people across the border, that
the infiltration is up, or only that the activity
in the North is up ?

Secretary McNamara: The activity in the
North is up. We can't tell, and won't be able
to tell for many months, the level of infiltra-
tion of men at the present time, because we
can only measure that by information re-
ceived from intelligence sources in South
Viet-Nam, and it takes perhaps 4 to 6 months
to correlate the sources of information and
come up with reasonably accurate figures.

But we can measure every day, through
our reconnaissance activities, reconnaissance
aircraft operating in North Viet-Nam and
the movement of trucks from north to south
over the roads both in North Viet-Nam and
over the pass leading from North Viet-Nam
into Laos and hence the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Q. Mr. Secretai~y, the interview that you
referred to, was that a newspaper intervieiv
or someone other of the North Vietnamese
diplomats ?

Secretary Rusk: It was an interview pub-
lished, I think, in the New York Times on
February 23.

Q. Secretary Rusk, there is an assumption
in this city that the Russians noiv really ^
ivant the war in Viet-Nam stopped. How does
this square with the other side's starting to
use Soviet 140-mm. rockets?

Secretary Rtisk: We hope that the Soviet
Union, as one of the two cochairmen, will
support the 1954 and 1962 Geneva accords.
And in the joint communique of Mr. Kosygin
[Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Soviet
Council of Ministers] and Prime Minister
[Harold] Wilson in London the other day,
they both reaffirmed their support of those

We know that the Soviet Union has been
supporting Hanoi, particularly in some of the
more sophisticated weapons. Most of those
have been used in North Viet-Nam itself, but
some of them have turned up in the South.

It is true that we and the Soviet Union
have important differences of view on this.
But we would hope that all sides could take
the 1954 and 1962 accords as a basis for a
settlement and that somehow the two cochair-
men, despite some of the complications that
they might see in it — M^e could move this
situation to a conference or to a settlement
based on those accords.

Q. Mi: McNamara, is the use of the water-
ways something new, of the North Viet-
namese, and if not, why have we waited this
long to mine those?

Secretary McNamara: The North Vietnam-
ese moved, first, from rails to highways. As
we attacked the rail routes, they were forced
to use the land routes. As we attacked the
land routes, they moved a higher percentage
of their traffic to the water routes. As I men-
tioned earlier, as bad weather affected our air
sorties and reduced them by perhaps 50 per-
cent from September to January of this year,
we felt it necessary to supplement our attacks
on the water routes by naval gunfire.

Q. Thank you.



Economic Situation in Viet-Nam

Following is the transcript of a press
briefing held at the White House on Febru-
ary 27 by President Johnson, David E. Lilien-
thal, a)id Robert W. Koiner, Special Assistant
to the President.

White House press release dated February 27

President Johnson: You all know Mr.
David Lilienthal. For a good long time I have
been wanting Mr. Lilienthal to spend some
time in Viet-Nam in connection with our
'other war" out there. From the early stage
of the TVA I have looked forward to and
admired the novel, constructive, and far-
reaching thoughts and programs which he
has inaugurated on behalf of people in a
democratic way and in a democratic society.

We finally prevailed on him to go out and
do some studying there.i I have asked him
for his counsel. He has given it to me — just
as General [William C] Westmoreland has
and as the Marines that are out there at Da
Nang have. He has given us his help. I think
it will have far-reaching results and effects.
It is going to be essential to our success in
that area.

This goes back to what was said in
Baltimore in April of 1965,^ if you want to
take that platform.

Mr. Komer and Mr. Lilienthal have just
come back. They have just finished report-
ing to me. In case you are interested in any
of their thoughts or their recommendations
or their views, they are available to you.

Q. Could you tell us what your recommen-
dations to the President are, Mr. Lilienthal?

Mr. Lilienthal: This is just the beginning
of a study of the long-term future of Viet-
Nam. The first 10 or 11 days were really a
preliminary look. But I must say I learned a
lot that I didn't know about Viet-Nam, and
almost all of it was encouraging.

' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1967,

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 79 of 90)