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The essence of the situation today is this:
The European family — long separated, long
set against each other, yet still a family —
is becoming reacquainted and is moving
toward more normal relationships.

The Soviet Union, recovering by heroic
effort from the frightful loss of human life
and resources which it suffered in the war,



las grown greatly in its capacity and its
nclination to satisfy the material needs of
;he Russian i^eople. No one who cares about
;he human condition can fail to rejoice at
;his fact. And its aggressive behavior has
jeen tempered.

(Vestern European Unity

All these things have happened. Yet they
iid not happen by accident.

They have happened because we followed
the course Winston Churchill counseled 21
Srears ago.

They have happened in large part because,
in the face of Stalinist tyranny, we in Amer-
ica brought our power and protection to the
ebuilding European Continent.

They have happened because we helped

d encouraged our European partners in
heir increasing efforts toward self-renewal.

They have happened because — in Berlin,
;n Greece and Turkey, yes, and in Cuba —

e Soviet Union came to recognize that
brute force or its threat could no longer be
an acceptable means of attaining political

If today the Soviet Union takes a more
prudent and cautious course, it is — for more
than any other reason — because together we
and our Western partners have in these two
decades stood firm and fast.

During this time, too, a constructive force
has been at work in Western Europe releas-
ing the constraining bonds of old hostilities
and closed institutions to the fresh stimula-
tion of competition and cooperation across
national boundaries. That constructive force
lias been the will of the peoples of Western
Europe that they should unite.

Their desire for unity has been most
manifest in the building of the European
Communities and in the initiatives of an
increasing number of nations to join those

This, too, has had a powerful influence on
the positive changes which have taken place.
And we have supported it.

Some today see Western European unity

endangered by a rising wave of nationalism
there. And there are those who fear that the
renewal of a narrower nationalism in West-
ern Europe must be accepted as an inevitable
and immutable fact, that we must resign our-
selves to the abandonment of our support for
unity and to the acceptance of a return to
power politics among nations.

There are a small few in other countries
who conclude that the "realistic" next step
toward a settlement of European problems
can therefore only be by bilateral agree-
ment between the Soviet Union and the
United States over the heads of our Western

I do not believe this is "realism." Neither
do I believe a realistic settlement of Euro-
pean problems can be achieved by Euro-
pean nations without our participation and
that of the Soviet Union. It is precisely now,
at the time when new opportunities lie ahead,
that we must retain cohesion with our West-
ern partners — and they with us. If the cold
war is to end, if the Iron Curtain is to be
lifted, we shall need them and they shall
need us.

The task now, in light of a new situation,
is not to throw away what has been success-
ful but to build constructively upon it.

Equal Partnership With Western Europe

I believe that the people of Western
Europe will reject concepts of narrow na-
tionalism and of national adventure and will
continue to move forward toward unity —
toward a unified Western Europe open to
expansion and conscious of its need to
strengthen its ties with the nations of East-
ern Europe.

I believe, too, that they vdll reject any
severing of their ties across the Atlantic,
ties built firmly on common cultural heritage,
on common experience, on common interest.

For our part, we do not mean either to
abandon our friends or to dominate them.
We know that American power continues to
be necessary to stability in Central Europe.
We know that difficult and intractable prob-

MARCH 27, 1967


lems, such as arms control and the reunifica-
tion of Germany, must continue to involve
both American and European effort.

In our alliance, the task is this: to trans-
form what was built on fear and common
threat into a vital, working instrument built
on hope and common opportunity and com-
mon responsibility.

It must be an alliance for peace and peace-
ful progress, not simply against the specter
of invasion from the East. It must be an alli-
ance for promotion of social and economic
welfare, not simply against a Communist

For, as the President has said, the times
require "a shift from the narrow concept
of coexistence to the broader vision of peace-
ful engagement." ^

To strengthen the alliance, we in America
must be determined to treat our Western
European partners as equal partners — to
consult with them, in the true sense of that
word, in every area of common interest, and
to practice forbearance as they find their way
to new forms of cooperation and unity
among themselves.

I cannot overemphasize the importance of
open and honest consultation and discussion
among the members of the Atlantic alliance.

For it is precisely now, when there is
movement and ferment in Europe, that the
temptations are greatest for unilateral action
by the individual partners. As I have said, it
is imperative that we retain our solidarity.
And to do so, we must all take the extra step
to insure that no action should be undertaken
by any one of the partners which might
jeopardize the welfare and security of all.

We cannot afford the luxury of division.
We cannot afford it in matters of military
security. Nor can we afford it in matters of
high economic and social concern.

That is why:

We must, and we shall, be forthcoming in
response to the initiatives taken by our

' For an advance text of Pre.sident Johnson's ad-
dress at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see
Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

Atlantic partners toward narrowing the
"technology gap" between us. For if we can-
not narrow this gap between ourselves, how
can we ever hope to narrow the far greater
gap between the Atlantic nations and the
poor nations to the south ?

We must, and we shall, persevere in our
efforts to bring the Kennedy Round trade
negotiation to a successful conclusion — one
in which there is true reciprocity, one in
which arbitrary and artificial restraints to
trade may be removed and from which a far
more efficient allocation of resources may

Achieving the Goal of the Open Door

The goals of Western European unity and
of Atlantic partnership are not in opposition
to the goal of the Open Door. They are a
first necessity in reaching it. They are the
key to that door.

As we strive toward these former goals,
how shall we proceed toward the latter?

First, we mJist ivork together toith our
Western European partners in encouraging
a further development of trade, technologi-
cal, and cultural contacts with Eastern

This is why it is imperative that we seize
each opportunity — such as the East-West
trade bill now before the Congress — to
increase the flow of people and trade to and
from these previously closed societies.

We look, for example, toward the time
when the nations of Eastern Europe may
become members of the GATT [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and full
participants in the work of the U.N. Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe.

Second, we rmist encourage the continued
evolution of Soviet policy beyond the
ambiguities of "peaceful coexistence" toward
more substantial forms of cooperation.

We have negotiated a treaty banning
nuclear weapons from outer space.

We are working with others to bring about
a treaty banning the proliferation of nuclear
weapons — a treaty acceptable and beneficial
to the nuclear and nonnuclear powers alike.



We have concluded an air agreement with
the Soviet Union and have signed a new
U.S.-Soviet cultural agreement.

Through liberalization of credit and easing
of travel restrictions, we hope to accelerate
the exchange of goods and people.

We seek early Senate ratification of the
United States-Soviet consular agreement.

We shall actively work toward closer coop-
eration between the Soviet Union and the
nations of the West in space, in medicine, in
peaceful technology.

We have not responded to the Soviet de-
ployment of a limited anti-ballistic-missile
system by immediately beginning to build
one of our own. Instead, we seek to convince
the Soviet leaders that this would merely
mean yet another costly round in the arms
race. After the expenditure of many billions
of dollars, neither of us would be more secure
than when we started.

Our obiective is not to step up the arms
race but to slow it down or halt it, to the
mutual interest of all nations.

Third, we must work toivard a settlement
of those European 'problems ^vhich have
been left unresolved in the aftermath of the

At the heart of this is the reunification of

As I said earlier, this is a matter which
concerns not only Europeans but America
and the Soviet Union as well.

It is a matter, too — and this sometimes
seems nearly forgotten — important for the
people of Germany.

Thus reunification can only take place
after the most thorough and careful consul-
tations among all parties involved. Reunifi-
cation is a difficult goal. But it is a necessary
one, if stability and peace are finally to be
achieved in Central Europe.

Fourth, no nation can hope to be an island
of security in a turbulent world. We must
therefore consider hoiv the resources of the
industrialized parts of the tvorld can usefully
assist the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America so that progress and stability and
hope may overcome despair and violence.

It does not require much foresight to
realize that the widening gap between grow-
ing populations and diminishing food sup-
plies is approaching a time of explosion.

Shall we sit in complacency, lulled by
creature comforts, until we are engulfed in
chaos? Or shall we act, now and together?

It is Europe's problem — and the Soviet
Union's — as much as it is ours; we must con-
sult together, plan together, and combine our
wisdom and resources to help work toward
security and peaceful development in the
poverty-stricken parts of the world.

Those who have launched the technological
revolution — a revolution without ideology —
have the responsibility to see that its bene-
fits are more widely shared by others.

For poverty breeds disorder, and hunger
breeds violence. And it has been the lesson of
these past few years that it is precisely in
the poverty-stricken and hungry parts of the
world where a conflict might arise which
would draw the superpowers into disastrous

Fifth, we must continue to develop and
strengthen international institutions which
will provide a frameivork of law and order
in the world, in which nations of all ideolo-
gies may find common and peaceful grounds
for settlement of disputes.

Churchill said aptly that "jaw, jaw is bet-
ter than war, war."

Most important of such institutions is the
United Nations.

The United Nations, among other things,
is an unmatched buffer zone between con-
flicting interests and ideologies. It is a place
where reason and compromise may interpose
themselves before major nations reach the
point of no return. It is the invaluable mid-
dleman, the honest broker necessary when
normal contacts fail.

And it is also an invaluable instrument of
peacekeeping in places around the world
where major powers might otherwise feel it
necessary to inject themselves.

There is no denying that the Soviet Union,
as our Western partners and ourselves, has
a vital interest in the strength and health of

MARCH 27, 1967


an institution which may serve as a force for
order and restraint among us.
Let us examine these things:

— Greater exchange at all levels with the
nations of Eastern Europe;

— Active pursuit and encouragement of
"peaceful coexistence" with the Soviet

— A European settlement including the re-
unification of Germany;

— Joint efforts with our former adver-
saries in helping the developing countries;

— Building a system of international order
in which these same former adversaries are
our partners.

Would any of these things have been at
all imaginable when Winston Churchill stood
here 21 years ago?

When the final realization sank in on the
last doubter that an Iron Curtain indeed was
being erected across the heart of Europe,
how many of us had reason for hope that in
1967 — so short a time later — it might be pos-
sible to begin replacing it with an Open

In the center of free Berlin there stands
today a stark ruin — the skeleton of a church,
preserved to symbolize eternally the deprav-
ity of war.

It is our hope that the Iron Curtain may
one day, too, lie in ruins, its remnants a sym-
bol of a time mercifully ended.

A great act in the human drama lies at

hand: Through a new engagement in Europe
we have the chance to shape a commonwealth
of progress dedicated not to war but to
peace, not to doctrinal conflict but to con-
structive reconciliation.

We have the chance, as President Johnson
has expressed it,* to help the people of
Europe to achieve together:

— a continent in which the peoples of Eastern and
Western Europe work shoulder to shoulder together
for the common good ;

— a continent in which alliances do not confront
each other in bitter hostility, but instead provide a
framework in which West and East can act together
in order to assure the security of all.

Therefore, I leave you with this: Who is to
say, if we in the West stand together and in
unity, where the next two decades may lead?

Who is to say, if our rich and powerful
nation exerts the enlightened leadership of
which it is capable, what bright new fulfill-
ment may lie ahead for the human family?

Our guide could be no better than that set
forth here 21 years ago by Churchill:

"If we adhere faithfully to the Charter of
the United Nations and walk forward in
sedate and sober strength, seeking no one's
land or treasure, seeking to lay no arbitrary
control upon the thoughts of men . . . the
highroads of the future will be clear, not
only for us, but for all, not only for our time,
but for the century to come."

America is ready to play its role.

' Ibid.



Mr. Rostoio, in this Sir Montague Burton Lecture given at
the University of Leeds in England on February 23, looks
backivard over the ttvo postwar decades and forward to the
agenda which is emerging for the next generation. He dis-
cusses Viet-Nam in this perspective and sees Hanoi's con-
cept of "wars of national liberation" as "old-fashioned."
"If we have the common will to hold together and get on
with the job," he concludes, "the struggle in Viet-Nam
might be the last great confrontation of the postivar era."

* The Great Transition: Tasks of the First
and Second Postwar Generations

by W. W. Rostow

Special Assistant to the President

In his state of the Union address on Jan-
uary 10 of this year, President Johnson
said: ^

We are in the midst of a great transition — a
transition from narrow nationalism to international
partnership; from the harsh spirit of the cold war
to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a
troubled and a threatened planet.

It is this theme that I should like to elab-
orate today by looking backward over the
two postwar decades and looking forward to
the agenda which is emerging for the next

History is rarely clean-cut in its lines of
demarcation. Wars, revolutions, and other
traumatic events do leave their mark on the
calendar; but their clarity is sometimes illu-
sory, distorting the timing of more profound
changes they reflect. Nevertheless, I believe
we are now — potentially — in a true water-
shed period. We can make some shape out
of the major experiences through which we
all have passed since 1945. We can define
some of the dangers, challenges, and possi-
bilities which are beginning to grip the world

' Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.

community and which will increasingly en-
gage it in the years ahead.

To elaborate this theme, I have chosen to
review the evolution of international affairs
under four major headings, each of which
represents a dimension of our common cen-
tral task — the building of a viable world

First, aggression; that is, deterring or
dealing with efforts to alter the territorial or
political status quo by one form or another
of violence applied across international fron-

Second, economic and social progress in the
world community as a whole and in the de-
veloping regions in particular.

Third, international organization, which
has assumed not merely global forms,
through the United Nations and related in-
stitutions, but also (as Churchill foresaw)
developed increasing vitality in the various

Fourth, reconciliation — the search for and
the discovery of areas of agreement across
ancient and recent barriers so as to reduce
the dangers of conflict, to give to the world

MARCH 27, 1967


community a growing framework of unity
and order, and to fulfill the injunctions of
article 1 of the United Nations Charter.

I shall try briefly to examine how each of
these four continuing strands of policy and
experience has evolved in the past 20 years
and suggest the tasks which will confront us
in the days ahead.

The postwar world was shaped by
two quite arbitrary processes. First, there
emerged de facto or de jure lines of de-
marcation between the Communist and non-
Communist worlds. These lines resulted prin-
cipally from the disposition of military forces
at the end of the Second World War, al-
though they were also affected by events in
the early postwar years — notably Stalin's
consolidation of his position in Eastern
Europe and the Chinese Communist victory
on the mainland.

Second, a series of new states emerged
from the process of decolonization. Most of
these were the product of colonial history;
but in the Indian subcontinent, the Middle
East, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, the
birth of new nations produced new lines on
the map.

A great deal of the first postwar genera-
tion's history consists of eff'orts to frustrate
those who sought to alter these international
boundaries by force: Communists because
they felt that they had the historical right
and duty to move their power forward be-
yond them, certain new nations because they
felt a sense of grievance over the lines which
had emerged. And at certain points the two
efforts interwove, as Communists acted to
exploit postcolonial ambitions, frictions, and

Three Phases of Communist Aggression

The postwar Communist offensive had a
certain shape and rhythm. There was Stalin's
thrust of 1946-51, in association with Mao
from 1949; Khrushchev's of 1958-62; finally,
the offensive conducted over the past 4 years
by Mao and those who accepted his activist
doctrines and policies with respect to so-
called "wars of national liberation."

Starting in early 1946, Stalin consolidated

into Communist states the countries of
Eastern Europe where Soviet troop positions
provided leverage, while pressing hard
against Iran, Greece, Turkey; then via the
Communist parties in Italy and France. His
effort reached its climax in the Berlin block-
ade of 1948-49.

The West responded with the Truman doc-
trine, the Marshall Plan, and the creation of
NATO. A stalemate developed after the suc-
cess of the Berlin airlift in 1949.

As this duel in the west proceeded, Stalin,
working through the Cominform, launched
an offensive in the east, which can roughly
be dated from Zhdanov's speech of Septem-
ber 1947. It involved guerrilla warfare in
Indochina, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and
the Philippines. And after the Chinese Com-
munists came to power in November 1949,
the offensive in Asia reached its climax in
the invasion of South Korea. It ended in
May 1951 with the successful United Nations
defense at the 38th parallel against a massive
assault by the Chinese Communists, although
costly fighting continued for 2 further pain-
ful years.

From the opening of truce talks in the
summer of 1951 to the launching of the
first Soviet Sputnik in October 1957, there
emerged what passes in postwar history as
a relatively quiet interval. It was, of course,
interrupted by the Suez and Hungarian crises
in 1956; but these resulted less from the ten-
sions of the cold war than from the dynamics
of change within the non-Communist world
and within the Communist bloc, respectively.
During this time, the Soviet Union was
mainly engaged in its post-Stalin redisposi-
tions, political, economic, and military.

Meanwhile, Communist China turned pri-
marily to tasks of domestic development.
Only in Indochina did local conditions favor
major Communist momentum; but the North
Vietnamese settled in 1954 for half of the'
victory they had sought.

Khrushchev's domestic changes represented!
a significant softening of Stalin's harsh re-
gime; and for Soviet citizens, historic gains,,
His foreign policy style, too, was diflferentJ
and, in its way, more flexible. Nevertheless,,



considerable ambitions remained embedded
in Moscow's foreign policy.

And with the launching of Sputnik, a new
phase of attempted Communist expansion got
under way.

Khrushchev had consolidated by that time
unambiguous control over the machinery of
the Soviet Government as well as over the
Communist Party. He looked to the exploita-
tion of two new facts on the world scene:
first, the emerging Soviet capacity to deliver
thermonuclear weapons over long distances
as a means of forcing the West to make
limited diplomatic concessions; second, the
marked acceleration of nationalism and mod-
ernization in Asia, the Middle East, Africa,
and Latin America, yielding an environment
of endemic turbulence on those continents.

The Post-Sputnik Period

It was in this post-Sputnik period that
Moscow laid down its ultimatum on Berlin;
the Communist Party in Hanoi announced
it would undertake to revive guerrilla war-
fare in South Viet-Nam; Castro took over
in Cuba; and Soviet military and economic
aid arrangements were extended to increase
their leverage not only in the Middle East,
where the process had begun earlier, but
also in Indonesia and elsewhere. It was then
that Mao announced: "The East Wind is pre-
vailing over the West Wind," and, in that
spirit, initiated in 1958 the crisis in the Tai-
wan Straits.

There was a good deal of opportunistic
enterprise in all this rather than a majestic
grand design, but it was clearly a phase of
Communist confidence and attempted for-
ward movement.

In 1961-62, Khrushchev's offensive was
met by the West as a whole at Berlin and a
further dramatic test of nuclear blackmail
was faced down in the Cuba missile crisis by
President Kennedy. For the time being, at
least, that latter crisis answered a question
which had greatly engaged Khrushchev:
whether the free world would surrender vi-
tal interests through diplomacy under the
threat of nuclear war.

The answer to the second question — con-

cerning the ability of the West to avoid
successful Communist exploitation of the in-
herent vulnerability of the developing area
— had to be given at many points by many

— In Laos, by an evident determination to
frustrate a Communist takeover, yielding
the Geneva accords of 1962;

— In Viet-Nam, by President Kennedy's
decision in December 1961 to enlarge our
support for the South Vietnamese;

— In Africa, by the whole cast of Euro-
pean and American approaches to the new
African nations, and in particular, support
for the United Nations effort in the Congo;

— In Latin America, by the isolation of
Castro's Cuba.

By the end of the Cuba missile crisis in
the autumn of 1962, the momentum had
largely drained out of Khrushchev's post-
Sputnik offensive; but Moscow's move
toward moderation, symbolized by the nego-
tiation of the atmospheric test ban treaty in
1963, had no echo in Peiping.

The Sino-Soviet split was gravely aggra-

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 83 of 90)