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Department of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) online

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vated after the Cpba missile crisis and be-
came increasingly overt as recriminations
were exchanged and inter-Party documents

Cliinese Communist Tlirust for Leadership

The Chinese Communists sought to seize
the leadership of the Communist movement,
notably in the developing areas, and to unite
it with the radical nationalists of Asia and
Africa. They thrust hard against Soviet in-
fluence within Communist parties on every
continent, fragmenting some of them; sought
to bring Castro aboard; moved boldly, over-
playing their hand, in Africa; probably
played some role in triggering the attempted
Communist takeover in Indonesia; and pos-
tured aggressively during the India-Pakistan
war of 1965. As a result of the prob-
lems they created, the Afro-Asian confer-
ence at Algiers in 1965 never materialized.

At one point after another this Chinese
Communist offensive in the developing world
fell apart, leaving the war in Viet-Nam per-

MARCH 27, 1967


haps the last major stand of Mao's doctrine
of guerrilla warfare.

There is a certain historical legitimacy in
this outcome.

For the better part of a decade, an im-
portant aspect of the struggle within the
Communist movement between the Soviet
Union and Communist China had focused on
the appropriate method for Communist par-
ties to seize power. The Soviet Union had
argued that the transit of frontiers with
arms and men should be kept to a minimum
and the effort to seize power should be pri-
marily internal. They argued that it was the
essence of "wars of national liberation" to
expand Communist power without causing
major confrontation with the United States
and other major powers. The Chinese Com-
munists defended a higher risk policy, but
they were militarily cautious themselves.
Nevertheless, they urged others to accept the
risks of confrontation with United States
and Western strength against which the
Soviet Union warned.

Although Hanoi's effort to take over Laos
and South Viet-Nam proceeded from im-
pulses which were substantially independent
of Communist China, its technique consti-
tuted an important test of whether Mao's
method would work even under the optimum
circumstances provided by the history of the
area. As General Giap [Vo Nguyen Giap,
North Vietnamese Minister of Defense] has
made clear, Hanoi is conscious of this link:

South Viet-Nam is the model of the national lib-
eration movement in our time ... if the special
warfare that the United States imperialists are test-
ing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, this means that
it can be defeated everywhere in the world.

These Communist efforts to extend their
power and influence beyond the truce lines
of the cold war interwove, as I suggested
earlier, with a second set of problems: the
dissatisfaction of various ex-colonial na-
tions with the frontiers — and other arrange-
ments — which had emerged from the
passing of colonialism. The list is long of con-
flicts based on real or believed grievances
of this kind: the Arab-Israeli dispute; Suez;
Somalia-Ethiopia; Algeria-Morocco; Kash-

mir; West Irian; the Indonesian confronta-
tion of Malaysia; Cyprus; et cetera. In addi-
tion, older quarrels were exacerbated by the
mood of rising nationalism which swept the
developing world; for example, Peru-Ecua-
dor, Thailand-Cambodia. The Communist
powers sought to exploit a number of these
conflicts in order to expand their leverage in
the developing world via diplomacy, subver-
sion, arms, and economic aid agreements.
But their roots mainly lay in an extension of
anticolonial attitudes and doctrines from the
days of struggle to the early years of inde-
pendence, in a continuity of policy from re-
bellion to governmental policy. It seemed
easier for some leaders of the new nations
to create a sense of nationhood by continu-
ing to evoke the rhetoric and methods of ^
anticolonialism — and xenophobic nationalism
— than to turn immediately to the more mun-
dane concepts and tasks demanded for the
successful building of a viable nation.

Passing of Romantic Revolutionaries

Looking back over this whole sequence,
certain general observations are possible.

First, the postwar international bound-
aries and truce lines have proved remarkably
resistant to efforts to alter them by force.
In this first postwar generation the non-
Communist powers did not achieve a peace-
ful world community under law. But we did
maintain the minimum condition for build-
ing such a community; namely, that aggres-
sion not be successful. And through persist-
ent effort in the United Nations we have
de-fused many small crises and choked off
many episodes of violence which could have
provoked major conflict.

Second, as the two postwar decades ended,
some of the aggressive, romantic revolution-
aries — Communist and non-Communist —
were passing from the scene or entering a
phase of protracted frustration, for the time
being at least. We have been dealing with
leaders obsessed by ambitious maps of
their region (or of the world) which they
tried to bring to reality: from Mao's map of
the area where China has, in the remote or
recent past, wielded power or influence to



Nkrumah's vision of a united black Africa
led from Accra; from Castro's vision of the
Andes as the Sierra Maestra of South Amer-
ica to Ho's image of the former French col-
onial empire in Asia run from Hanoi. Each
has confronted both other people's national-
ism, at the expense of which these maps
would be fulfilled, and a more general resist-
ance to changes in the territorial or political
status quo by external violence. Resistance
to the achievement of these visions, com-
bined with the growing demand of people
throughout the world for economic and so-
cial progress, has eroded both ideological
and nationalist aggressive romanticism.

One sees this in the Soviet Union and
throughout Eastern Europe; it is a central
issue in the struggle within mainland China.
This is the essence of the pragmatic tide
rising through the developing nations, sup-
planting the slogans derived from Lenin's
"Imperialism" and the struggle against co-
lonialism with the more austere rhetoric of
economic and social development. A new
generation is emerging, skeptical of the ex-
pansionist and geopolitical concepts and vi-
sions that engaged their elders.

In an interesting leader of January 14,
1967, "The Last Revolution," The Econo-
mist recently advanced the proposition that
the end of Mao would be the end of a line
of romantic revolutionaries reaching back
to 1789. I would put the proposition this

There have been three major types of war
in modern history: colonial wars, wars of re-
gional aggression, and massive wars to alter
the Eurasian balance of power — the latter
attempted by industrially mature powers. In
the first postwar generation we have had
to deal with the threat of the latter, as un-
dertaken by Stalin and Khrushchev, under
inhibitions set by the nuclear age. But we
have also seen a good many acts of regional
aggression arising from the dilemmas and
the exuberance of newly formed national
states, as they looked backward to past hu-
miliation and forward to new opportunity,
while confronting the choices open to them
in the early stages of modernization. Despite

their global pretensions, I would place Mao's
efforts in the latter category.

Given the rhythm of modernization, with
vast continents entering the early stages of
modernization after the Second World War,
it is natural that we should have seen a
phase of regional aggression. From the rec-
ord of history we should be in reasonably
good heart about this phase. For these early,
limited external adventures, associated with
late preconditions or early takeoff periods,
appear generally to have given way to a
phase of absorption in the adventure of mod-
ernizing the economy and the society as a
whole. But, as I shall later emphasize, this
underlying hopeful trend is potential, not
inevitable, and it could be transitory.

If these aggressive impulses have dim-
inished in the technologically mature Soviet
Union and in most of the less developed na-
tions, we should be able to go forward in
the generation ahead from the frustration
of aggression and the absence of major hos-
tilities toward settlement, reconciliation, and
cooperation. This, surely, should be the ob-
ject of policy in Asia, the Middle East, and
Africa; as it is already the object of policy
in the West with respect to the Soviet Union,
Eastern Europe, and mainland China.

International Economic Policy

We have had to allocate in the first post-
war generation an enormous amount of our
energy, talents, and resources to the frustra-
tion of aggression and the avoidance of ma-
jor war. Despite this environment of tension
and to some extent because of it, the world
community has also launched programs of
economic and social development on an in-
ternational basis which are truly revolu-
tionary when compared to what was done
during the interwar years or deeper in the

We began, of course, with the Marshall
Plan and Western Europe. So quickly did
Western Europe respond that — although the
job was by no means completed — minds were
beginning to turn to more systematic efforts
in the developing areas in the winter of
1948-49; for example, at the United Nations

MARCH 27, 1967


General Assembly meeting in Paris. Presi-
dent Truman's Point 4 proposal in January
1949 was an important benchmark in this
transition. In the United States a Presiden-
tial commission was working to systematize
and enlarge this turn in policy when the
attack was made in June 1950 on South
Korea. The Korean war both postponed a
focusing of public attention and resources
on the problems of development and, through
a sharp rise in raw material prices, appeared
to diminish somewhat its urgency.

Multilateral Support

It was in the post-Korea phase that
thought and policy began to crystallize
around the problem of accelerating economic
growth in developing nations. In the early
1950's the best work on development by the
United States was done in places in which
we had major security commitments; for
example, Turkey, Taiwan, and Korea. The
substantial and sustained assistance provided
for security purposes was gradually put to
good advantage in terms of development.
But toward the end of the 1950's, doctrines
took hold and institutions emerged aimed at
development itself — outside a narrow secu-
rity context — notably the Development Loan
Fund, the Inter-American Bank, the Wise
Men's study of India and Pakistan for the
World Bank, and the creation of the World
Bank's soft loan window, the International
Development Association.

Evidently the United States was not alone
in this transition. As colonies moved toward
independence, the metropolitan powers be-
gan to provide systematic aid to the new
nations for which they formerly had borne
a direct responsibility. The Colombo Plan
organization was set up, for example, as
early as 1950.

But only in the first half of the 1960's
did the world community begin to bring de-
velopment policy toward the center of the
stage: with the consortia arrangements of
the World Bank for India and Pakistan; the
Alliance for Progress; and a variety of other
international consultative institutions. In the
United States this transition assumed — put-

ting aside Viet-Nam — the form of a shift
from military to economic support and from
generalized supporting assistance to pur-
poseful development aid. Economic assist-
ance of nations other than the United States
rose by 18 percent from 1960 to 1965.

This barely noticed expansion in the multi-
lateral machinery and resources available for
support of developing nations was accompa-
nied by a learning process within those
nations which has been quite dramatic. One
after another success story in development
emerged in the sense that nations learned
the trick of generating sustained and reason-
ably balanced growth at rates which substan-
tially outstripped population increase. The
list is now quite long: Greece, Turkey, Israel,
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Paki-
stan, Iran, Turkey, and nations in Latin
America containing perhaps three-quarters
of the population of that continent.

The problems of development are, of
course, by no means solved. Large parts of
Africa, for example, have not yet developed
the human and physical infrastructure and
sufficient political unity required for a sus-
tained takeoff. And in each of the other de-
veloping regions some countries have not yet
established the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions — economic and political — for takeoff.

Finally, India, with 500 million human be-
ings, is not yet stably on the road to sus-
tained growth. But many of the prerequisites
exist, and beneath the surface of the present
political and agricultural situation, important
new elements of agricultural and industrial
vitality give solid grounds for hope.

In general, we have made great but uneven
progress thus far in the 1960's. Many of the
old contentious debates have subsided as men
perceived their irrelevance; for example, ar-
guments concerning private versus public
enterprise, industry versus agriculture. They
have given way to a pragmatic synthesis.
New concepts, working methods, and institu-
tions have emerged which should permit
vigorous growth in the developing nations
in the generation ahead.

But a lion stands in the path: the food-
population problem. The solution to this



problem will certainly be central to the
agenda of the coming generation.

The elementary facts are these. If present
trends continue, the world's population will
, grow from some 3.4 billion today to about
4.5 billion by 1980. Nearly three-fourths of
this tremendous expansion will be in the
population of the developing world. Popula-
tion control measures instituted over this
period could damp this increase somewhat;
but they could have a profound effect by
the year 2000. To feed this increased popula-
tion at existing levels of consumption — and
allowing for the impact of urbanization and
' income increases on effective food demand —
will require an annual rate of increase of at
least 4 percent of food production in the de-
veloping world. The overwhelming portion
of this increase will have to be met from in-
creased production in the developing world.
The average rate of increase in food produc-
tion over the past 5 years has been only
slightly over 2 percent. To avoid mass star-
vation — in President Johnson's phrase, ^ "to
help bring our most basic human account
into balance" — the whole world community
will have to apply to its solution every device
at its command. Moreover, sometime during
the coming generation, mainland China will
have to acknowledge more fully and act on
the proposition that agriculture and popula-
tion control is its fundamental problem; and
it may need the help of the world community
to avoid mass starvation.

As work on development moved forward,
a parallel and related evolution occurred in
cooperation among the industrialized nations.
The OEEC [Organization for European Eco-
nomic Cooperation], which managed Euro-
pean revival, was converted to the OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] in 1961, embracing Japan in
1964. It gradually became a forum for exam-
ining the economic relations among the more
advanced states, generating a spirit of ac-
knowledged interdependence among the in-
dustrialized nations which has also suffused
monetary and trade poUcy in such world


organizations as the IMF [International
Monetary Fund] and GATT [General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade] .

Much in postwar security pohcy was
rooted in a consciousness of our tragic com-
mon failure to stop aggression in time during
the 1930's. Similarly, postwar economic
policy reflected the memory of the nationalis-
tic policies which converted the recession
after 1929 into a convulsive global catas-

We have clearly done better in interna-
tional economic policy during the first post-
war generation than we did during the inter-
war years, although at least four major mat-
ters remain on the agenda for the years

— An international aid policy geared to
self-help measures but sufficiently expanded
in scale to permit high and steady rates of
growth in those developing nations prepared
to take the necessary parallel domestic

— A satisfactory international monetary
system which recognizes and relates problems
of liquidity to problems of international capi-
tal sources and movements and the
realities of the balance-of -payments adjust-
ment process.

— A reconciliation of agricultural policies
in the light of the overwhelming fact of the
food-population problem, and the adoption
of, and support for, voluntary programs of
population control in the developing world.

— A satisfactory trade policy embracing
the legitimate interests of developed and de-
veloping nations.

The Movement Toward Regionalism

The tasks of economic cooperation have
combined with a movement toward organized
interdependence in the world community —
especially in regional groups — -whose roots
go deeper than economics. The nations of the
Western Hemisphere had successfully pressed
for a formal recognition of its regional
grouping at the United Nations Charter
Conference in San Francisco in 1945; but the
postwar movement toward regionalism be-
gan, of course, in Western Europe.

MARCH 27, 1967


Essentially, the movement toward Western
European unity recognized three facts:

— As many Western European leaders
looked ahead, starting from the devastation
of the Second World War and the acute de-
pendence on the United States of the post-
war days, they reached out for a method of
organization which would give them a larger
voice in their own destiny.

— They perceived, however, that in mili-
tary, economic, and other matters, a measure
of interdependence with the United States
would be required for the indefinite future;

— They accepted the fact that the nation-
state — even nation-states of 50 million com-
manding the best in modern science and tech-
nology — could not deal effectively either with
the United States as a partner or with the
scale of the problems which were emerging
on the world scene, whether East-West or

Western European regionalism was con-
ceived by Europeans as a method for solving
this three-sided dilemma. And it had the
steady support of the United States which in
1947 made — and has sustained — a conscious
decision that a strong, unified Western
Europe was mere in its longrun interest
than fragmented but less capable European

In the first postwar generation. Western
European unity moved forward substantially,
goaded by the Soviet threat but inhibited by
an understandable reluctance to surrender
deeply rooted national concepts. Today — de-
spite evident and grave problems — that move-
ment is still alive and active despite the ris-
ing sense of security since the Berlin crisis
and the Cuba missile crisis of 1961 and 1962.
And as one contemplates the agenda for the
coming generation, as nearly as it can now be
defined, the case remains valid, strengthened
by evidence that it is difficult to absorb and
apply certain types of new technology with-
out investments in research and development
and markets beyond the reach of nations of
50 million. Western Europe is unlikely to
make the maximum contribution that it

could make to the tasks of security, human
welfare, reconciliation, and institution-build-
ing in the world community unless it con-
tinues to move toward unity.

Meanwhile, in the course of the 1960's,
forces similar to those which have initiated
economic regionalism in Western Europe be-
gan to take hold in other parts of the world,
notably in Latin America and, most recently,
in Asia.

Economic Cooperation in Latin America

Latin American unity is an old dream, dat-
ing from the days of Bolivar. It has taken on
a new vitality as Latin Americans have
moved from the first stage of their indus-
trialization, focused on the production of con-
sumer goods in substitution for imports, to
growth centered on medium and heavy indus-
try. In terms of stages of growth, the more
advanced countries of Latin America — Mex-
ico, the southern regions of Brazil, and
Argentina, for example — are emerging from
takeoff and moving toward technological ma-
turity. In Mexico, at least, that transition has
been successfully made, although throughout
Latin America industrialization is hobbled
by an overly protective system which has di-
minished competition, efficiency, and full
utilization of capacity. Powerful vested in-
terests are embedded in those national pro-
tective systems.

But as the Latin Americans move into in-
dustries of higher and more sophisticated
technology, they are beginning to try to over-
come this heritage of takeoff. They feel
acutely the constriction of national markets
and the irrationality of building steel, auto-
mobile, chemical, and other industries on a
national basis. They are also being pushed
toward economic integration by an aware-
ness that their traditional exports are un-
likely to earn the foreign exchange needed
for their further development. They must
therefore cultivate industrial exports. But at
the present time they must go through a
transitional stage of regional protectionism
before they can emerge with competitive ef-
ficiency on the world scene.



Meanwhile, the Central American Com-
mon Market has demonstrated that countries
at a much earlier stage of development can
profit greatly from a common market ar-
, rangement — a lesson worth the serious atten-
tion of Africa, the Middle East, and South-
east Asia.

Finally, the Latin Americans are beginning
to look inward from the coastal cities, which
have historically been the basis for their
modernization. They are beginning to recog-
nize expanding needs and possibilities for
international collaboration in developing the
inner frontiers of South America.

These convergent and palpable economic
forces making for economic cooperation and
integration are supported by a sense — not
unlike that which continues to motivate the
European unity movement — that in the world
of the present and the future the voice of
Latin America will be strengthened to the
extent that Latin Americans can find com-
mon ground and common policies.

It is natural, therefore, that the currently
discussed meeting of the Presidents of the
American Republics should focus primary at-
tention on economic integration and multi-
national projects.

Surge of Regionalism in Asia and Africa

In Western Europe and Latin America
those pressing toward unified action could
build on a substantially common tradition.
But in Asia, history offered a less promising
initial base. Nevertheless, we have seen in the
past 2 years a quite remarkable surge of
regional enterprise in Asia.

From South Korea to Australia, from Ja-
pan to Singapore, there are solid and par-
ticular national reasons why the nations of
Asia and the Pacific should begin to group
together in mutual support. These under-
lying considerations were strengthened by
the American commitment of major forces in
Viet-Nam in 1965, which has given to the
region confidence that it has a future to de-

As in Europe and Latin America, the ini-
tial expression of this movement has been in
the form of economic institutions: the rapid

negotiation of the Asian Development Bank,
the new vitality of the Mekong Committee,
gatherings to survey the possibilities of re-
gional action in education, agriculture, et
cetera. It remains to be seen how the en-
couraging political impulses which underlay
the Asian and Pacific Council in Seoul and
the Association of Southeast Asia will evolve.

In Africa, too, where regional cooperation
has existed in some regions, such as east
Africa, one can detect other beginnings, at
least, of the same mixture of economic and
political impulses that have led to regional-
ism elsewhere. The Organization of African
Unity has existed since May 1963. Despite
political schisms, regional and ideological, it
undertook to deal with two substantial

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 84 of 90)