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African disputes — Somalia-Ethiopia and
Morocco-Algeria — thus avoiding the inter-
vention of extra-African powers. On the eco-
nomic side, the African Development Bank
has been launched and subregional economic
communities are being formed in eastern
and west Africa as a result of planning by
the EC A [Economic Commission for Africa].
Most of Africa, as noted earlier, is in a pre-
industrial stage, building slowly the precon-
ditions for takeoff. It makes good sense to try
to create the essential physical and institu-
tional infrastructure, in this pliant early
phase of development, on a regional and sub-
regional basis. This was a major considera-
tion that led to the reshaping of the Ameri-
can aid program to Africa over the past year
to give greater emphasis to multinational

As the evolution of the movement toward
Western European unity indicates, the build-
ing of regionalism is a long, slow process. At
every stage the case for moving forward
must overcome the inherent attraction and
inertia of staying with familiar national
modes of operation. Moreover, regionalism is
no substitute for building solid national struc-
ture. Nevertheless, the next generation is
likely to see real, if irregular, progress to-
ward regional cooperation, because the po-
litical and economic impulses which underlie
it are compelling. Regional cooperation —
within a framework of global collective secu-

MARCH 27, 1967


rity and common efforts in development — is
likely to grow, as it must, if the desires of
men and governments to take a larger hand
in their own destiny are to be reconciled with
the inadequacies of the nation-state on the
one hand and the imperatives of interdepend-
ence on the other.

For the United States, this move toward
regionalism has a particular meaning. We
were drawn into world responsibility after
the Second World War by the need to fill
certain vacuums of power. The cost of not
helping in Greece, Turkey, Western Europe,
Korea, and elsewhere was self-evident; and
it was judged, case by case, to outweigh the
burden of engagement. But postwar America
was not interested in building a network of
satellites. It looked forward to the earliest
time when other nations could stand on their
own feet and deal with us as partners in as
safe and orderly and progressive a world
community as we all could achieve.

Regionalism, in Western Europe and else-
where, has thus commended itself to the
United States as a way of permitting us to
shift away from the disproportionate bi-
lateral relations inherent in a large power
working with smaller powers.

We see in regionalism a way not of return-
ing to isolation but of leaving the nations of
the various regions to do as much for them-
selves as they can — and more with the pas-
sage of time — while preserving the ties of
interdependence where they are judged on
both sides to be in the common interest.

Key Problems of the Cold War

The central lesson we have drawn from
our experience — and from the whole sweep
of events since 1914 — is that our main task
is the organization of a durable peace. We
tend, looking back, to share Churchill's judg-
ment of the Second World War as "unneces-
sary." We are conscious that in a nuclear age
the human race cannot afford another world
war. Therefore, whatever the frustrations
and difficulties, we are committed to look be-
yond the non-Communist islands of security,
progress, and order to a settlement of the

cold war itself and the shaping of something
like a true global community.

The first condition for such a community
is, I would say again, that alterations of the
international status quo by force not be per-
mitted to succeed. The status quo is, of
course, not sacrosanct. It is always changing.
And in the past two decades it has altered
in major ways through changes within na-
tions and by international agreement. We
now have, for example, a fairly promising
prospect before us in relations between the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the one
hand and the West on the other. But we shall
forget at our peril that this prospect was
created mainly by the strength and unity of
the West when confronted by the challenges
of Stalin and Khrushchev.

Looking ahead, we can define one aspect
of the challenge of the next generation as
this: whether we can in this timespan solve
the three problems which from the early
postwar years onward have virtually defined
the cold war:

— Ending the division of Germany and

— Preventing further nuclear proliferation
and damping the arms race in strategic nu-
clear weapons systems between the United
States and the Soviet Union;

— Bringing mainland China into a normal
relation to the world community.

In diflferent ways, each of these issues is now

The Division of Germany

There is a growing consensus in the West
that our task with respect to the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe is to make the
most of the forces of moderation which have
emerged since 1953, and especially since the
Cuba missile crisis, and gradually to create
an environment in which the East-West con-
frontation is so reduced that the problem of
Germany can be peacefully resolved.

No one can now perceive the time or the
shape of such a resolution. But there is a
common will to create an environment in
which the major unresolved question of the



cold war in Europe can be settled. Under-
lying this process is a dilution, at least, of
the Communist commitment that they must
help impose their doctrines on others; the
' rising tide of national and regional assertive-
ness in both Eastern and Western Europe;
and the washing away, under the tests of
performance, of the Conmiunist conviction
that their systems for organizing society are
inherently superior to those of the West.

The process will not move forward auto-
matically. It could easily be disrupted if the
West fragmented and presented opportuni-
ties for renewed pressure from the East; but
right now it is in at least slow motion with
virtually universal support in the West.

Whereas the moment of truth in East- West
relations, centering on a resolution of the
German problem, may not come upon us for
some time, we face in the months ahead an
urgent and critical question with respect to
the nuclear arms race.

Nuclear Arms Race

We are all actively trying to find the terms
for a nonproliferation agreement, and the
emergence of an anti-ballistic-missile defense
for Moscow has posed for the United States
and the Soviet Union the question of whether
the nuclear arms race shall be brought under
control or go into a vast and expensive round
of escalation on both sides with respect to
both offensive and defensive weapons.

The two issues are partially linked. It may
well be argued that it will be more difficult
for the nonnuclear powers to accept a non-
proliferation agreement if its context is
believed to be a heightening of the bilateral
arms race in strategic systems between the
United States and the Soviet Union. And
there will be other searching questions raised
by the non-nuclear-weapons states in the cur-
rent meeting of the Eighteen Nation Disar-
mament Conference at Geneva and beyond
which require response.

But if we failed to create a world of non-
proliferation, the result would not merely be
more national nuclear systems and the insta-
bilities that might accompany such a situa-

tion but also a fragmenting of political re-
lations within the non-Communist world. But
if we should succeed — as we must try very
hard to do — the world community will be
drawn closer together.

What is at stake, therefore, in the discus-
sions and negotiations that are upon us in
these days, are issues which will set much
of the framework for the organization of the
world community over the next generation.

Communist China

In Communist China we are seeing one of
the great dramas of modem history. The
Long March veterans, who worked for more
than 30 years in what appeared to be re-
markable unity, have now split and are en-
gaged in an open struggle for power. Beneath
the surface of the struggle for power is a
debate on policy between revolutionary ro-
mantics and pragmatists. The resolution of
this debate will shape mainland policy and
Communist China's relations for many years

This judgment reaches back to the nature
and roots of the Chinese crisis. It is clear
that after their remarkable victory in 1949,
Chinese Communist leaders made two gran-
diose errors.

First, they set in motion a pattern of eco-
nomic development focused on heavy industry
and the modernization of their armed forces
which was historically inappropriate. They
behaved as if they were at a stage similar
to Stalin's Soviet Union of 1930; in fact, they
were closer to that of Japan near the turn
of the century. Like Japan at that time, they
needed to develop in modern China — as a
foundation for industrialization — an agricul-
tural system based on strong peasant incen-
tives, combined with the massive application
of chemical fertilizers. They chose collectiv-
ization and inadequate investment in agri-
culture. Despite some shift in recent years
toward a higher priority for agriculture, the
result is a food-population position which is
incompatible with rapid economic develop-

Second, they chose to move out onto the

MARCH 27, 1967


Asian and world scene with objectives that
disregarded the realities of power in the
world arena. They sought an expansion of
control and influence beyond their capacity —
and they failed.

In the face of these failures, the future of
Chinese domestic and foreign policy is evi-
dently now at stake as well as the future of
the leaders engaged.

No one can confidently predict the timing
and the sequence of the outcome. There is a
decent hope, however, that soon or late, a
mainland China will emerge which will ac-
cept as its primary task the modernization
of the life of the nation and accept also the
proposition that the international frontiers
of the region shall not be changed by the use
of force.

So far as the United States is concerned.
President Johnson has made clear on a num-
ber of occasions that we look forward to
that day and to welcoming that kind of main-
land China into the community of nations.

Shaping Historical Possibilities

What I have asserted thus far is that the
tasks of the second postwar generation may
consist in:

First, moving from the mere frustration
of aggression to a phase of settlement, recon-
ciliation, and cooperation with respect to
endemic disputes arising either with Com-
munist regimes or between non-Conamunist

Second, moving forward in the tasks of
growth in the developing regions and espe-
cially coming to grips, as a world community,
with the food-population problem;

Third, carrying forward, refining, and con-
solidating the movements toward regionalism
— in Western Europe and elsewhere — as well
as global cooperative enterprises in the fields
of aid, trade, money, and in various tech-
nical fields which lend themselves best to
universal effort;

Fourth, moving toward a liquidation of key
issues of the cold war in Europe and toward
arms control, while working to bring a more

moderate Communist China into a normal
relationship to Asia and the world.

Taken together they offer expanding scope
for the United Nations in the years ahead.
In the past two decades the U.N. has contrib-
uted to each major dimension of international
policy, but the inherent schisms and conflicts
of those years often bypassed the U.N. or
permitted it only a secondary or marginal
role. If we can move forward on the agenda
I have outlined, the U.N. may begin more
nearly to fulfill the functions envisaged for
it in 1945.

Having held up this challenging but essen-
tially hopeful vision of what may lie ahead,
I would now wish to underline a general
proposition: On occasion it may be proper to
regard the course of history as inevitable,
ex post; but not ex ante.

There was nothing inevitable about what
we achieved in the first postwar generation:
the revival of Western Europe; the preserva-
tion of freedom in Turkey, Greece, and West
Berlin; the saving of South Korea and Ma-
laya; the Alliance for Progress; the removal
of Soviet missiles from Cuba; and all the
rest. These enterprises took brave, and often
visionary, men and women of many nations.
They did not rely on inevitable historical
trends: They shaped historical possibilities
by their commitment.

Nor were our failures over these years in-
evitable — explicable, as always, but not in-

And there is no inevitability built into the
projection I have outlined for the second
postwar generation, only possibilities. And
these constructive possibilities will not be
made good unless we work as hard at them
as we have worked in the past 20 years on
a somewhat different agenda.

It would, in fact, not be difficult — survey-
ing the forces at work within Western
Europe, in East-West relations, in the dy-
namics of the developing regions, in the
forces at play within Communist China — to
project a quite different prospect: a prospect
of progressive movement not toward order



and reconciliation and progress but toward
disruption, fragmentation, mass hunger, and
renewed danger.

For example, the great hopes for progress
in East-West relations depend on the main-
tenance of an adequate, flexible, and inte-
grated defense system in the West, as well
as on an imaginative and creative approach
to the East. There is no reason to believe that
a failure of the West to stay together might
not tempt Moscow again toward adventure.

Similarly, a failure of the Vietnamese and
their allies to see through the engagement to
an honorable peace could destroy the emerg-
ing foundation for confidence and regional
cooperation in Asia, with further adverse
consequences on every continent.

The Confrontation in Viet-Nam

I have said little thus far about the Ameri-
can position on Viet-Nam because I wished
to expose one American's view of the broad
tasks of foreign policy that lie before us all.
President Johnson is conducting a policy
which, in fact, is already at grips with many
of what I have called second-generation tasks.
I come from a Government which, contrary
to a widespread view, is not overwhelmed
and obsessed by the problem of Viet-Nam.

On the other hand, we are confident that
what we are seeking to accomplish in Viet-
Nam is right and essential if we are to move
successfully through the great transition.

We are honoring a treaty which committed
us to "act to meet the common danger" in
the face of "aggression by means of armed
attack" in the treaty area.^ And this commit-
ment is also being honored by Australia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand — as
well as by the remarkable action of South
Korea, which was not bound by treaty in
this matter.

We are also dealing with the gross and
systematic violation of an agreement,^ signed

' For text of the SEATO treaty, see ibid., Sept. 20,
1954, p. 393.

' For background and text, see ibid., Aug. 13, 1962,
p. 259.

in 1962, which committed all parties, includ-
ing Hanoi, to withdraw their military forces
from Laos, to refrain from reintroducing
such forces, and to refrain from using the
territory of Laos for interference in the in-
ternal affairs of other countries.

We are also encouraged by the efforts of
the people of South Viet-Nam to make a
transition to orderly constitutional govern-
ment of the kind which the people of South
Korea have accomplished with such notable
success since 1961.

And we are answering, as we have had
to answer on other occasions, the question:
Are the word and commitment of the United
States reliable? For the United States cannot
be faithful to its alliances in the Atlantic and
unfaithful to its alliances in the Pacific.

I know that some of the younger genera-
tion in the United States — and, I daresay, in
Great Britain — believe that we in the Ameri-
can Government are old-fashioned in our ap-
proach to Viet-Nam. It is true that we recall
often the lessons of the 1930's; we recall ex-
periences in Greece and Berlin and Korea
which are not part of the living memory of
those now in universities. That is, I think,
because our experience has forced us to con-
template the chaos since 1914 and the reality
of the task of building a durable peace. A
new generation will, of course, decide what
in its experience is to be remembered and set
its own goals and priorities.

But in the perspective I have presented
tonight, what is old-fashioned about Viet-
Nam is the effort by the leaders in Hanoi
to make their lifelong dream of achieving
control over Southeast Asia come to reality
by the use of force.

It is their concept of "wars of national
liberation" that is old-fashioned. It is being
overtaken not merely by the resistance of
the seven nations fighting there but also by
history and by increasingly pervasive atti-
tudes of pragmatism and moderation.

History, I deeply believe, will show in
Southeast Asia, as it has displayed in many
other parts of the world, that the interna-
tional status quo cannot be altered by use of

MARCH 27, 1967


external force. That demonstration is costing
the lives of many South Vietnamese, Ameri-
cans, Koreans, Australians, and others who
understand the danger to them of permitting
a change in the territorial or political status
quo by external violence, who cherish the
right of self-determination for themselves
and for others.

If the argument I have laid before you is
correct — and if we have the common will to
hold together and get on with the job — the
struggle in Viet-Nam might be the last great
confrontation of the postwar era.

If the Cuba missile crisis was the Gettys-
burg of the cold war, Viet-Nam could be the
Wilderness; for, indeed, the cold war has
been a kind of global civil conflict. Viet-Nam
could be made the closing of one chapter in
modem history and the opening of another.

Dealing With the New Agenda

As befits a world in transition, then, we in
the American Government, under President
Johnson's leadership, are dealing with ele-
ments from the old agenda while doing what
we can to define, grip, and move forward the
new agenda.

President Johnson is honoring a treaty
placed before the Senate by President Eisen-
hower in 1954 and overwhelmingly approved.
He is insisting on compliance with an inter-
national agreement made in Geneva in 1962,
by the administration of President Kennedy.
But his thrust is forward. He has placed be-
fore the Congress a space treaty; proposals
to expand East-West trade, to create the
Asian Development Bank; a consular conven-
tion with the Soviet Union; a request for a
resolution to multilateralize the American
contribution to a sustained effort to win the

race between food supplies and population

It is clearly his hope to be able to present
to the Senate a nonproliferation agreement;
and we are prepared to put our best and most
constructive minds to work in negotiations to
head off, if possible, another major round in
the arms race in strategic nuclear weapons.

In all this we are conscious that there is
little we can accomplish by ourselves. The
nation-state — whatever its size and resources
— cannot solve the vast problems now before
us or foreseeable. Nor is this any longer a
bipolar world, despite the continued dispro-
portionate concentration of nuclear power in
the United States and the Soviet Union. The
dynamics of the lively first postwar genera-
tion has yielded a world arena of diverse
nations determined to take a hand in their
own destiny.

We shall achieve arrangements of authen-
tic partnership — based on mutual respect and
acknowledgement of interdependence, or we
shall not deal successfully with the new

America is now — and, I believe, will con-
tinue to be — ready to play its proper role in
such partnerships.

I concluded my last survey of American
foreign policy from a British university plat-
form 20 years ago with this injunction from
one of our poets.

One thought ever at the fore —
That in the Divine Ship, the World,

breasting Time and Space,
All peoples of the globe together sail,

sail the same voyage,
Are bound to the same destination.

That, I believe, will remain the spirit of
America's foreign policy in the generation



Ambassador Goldberg Reports on His Trip to Asia

At the request of President Johnson, U.S.
Representative to the United Nations Arthur
J. Goldberg visited five Asian countries
Febi^uai-y 23-March 6. Following are tran-
scripts of news conferences he held at Ken-
nedy International Airport, New York, N.Y.,
upon his return from the trip on March 6
and at the White House after making his
report to the President on March 8.


U.S./U.N. press release 24 dated March 6

Opening Statement by Ambassador Goldberg

My colleagues, I am glad to be back. I have
a very brief statement that I would like to
read and then I shall be very glad to respond
to questions.

I have completed the first leg of a more
extended trip which President Johnson asked
me to make to Asian capitals. The first leg
has taken me to five countries — Japan,
Korea, the Republic of China on Taiwan,
South Viet-Nam, and the Philippines. In
each country I had the opportunity for
friendly and candid exchanges of views with
chiefs of state, with foreign ministers, and
other leading officials and personalities, as
well as for discussions with representatives
of our own Government stationed in these

I intend, of course, to report to the Presi-
dent in detail on the discussions I have held,
as well as some of my own observations and
impressions. At this time, all that is appro-
priate are some very general observations.

I have sought to make clear from the very

outset that this trip has not been undertaken
as a mission related to any new proposals or
initiatives for peace in Viet-Nam. I say this
regretfully. Given the intense interest in
Viet-Nam throughout Asia, as well as my
own vital concern as the United States Rep-
resentative to the U.N. with the prospects for
a possible and peaceful settlement, it was
quite natural that the situation in Viet-Nam
was one of the principal topics discussed in
the five countries I visited.

While I would not pretend to speak for any
other government than my own, I can report
to you that I found in all these countries
understanding of three facets of our policy:
the limited nature of our objective; that the
people of South Viet-Nam must be left alone
to determine their own political destiny
under conditions of freedom and without any
external interference and our resolve to help
them achieve this objective and abide by
commitments we have undertaken; and our
equal resolve to keep the door open and to
persevere in achieving a full and honorable
peace through unconditional negotiations.

While in Viet-Nam, I had the opportunity
to discuss at length with the leaders of the
Government and the members of the con-
stituent assembly the vitally important
process of establishing a constitutional gov-
ernment. I was encouraged to learn of the
progress already made toward completing a
constitution and to find a common determina-
tion on the part of both the Government and
constituent assembly to consummate the
creation of a constitutional government and
proceed with national elections at an early
date. And our Government places the highest
premium on this, and I can say to you that

MARCH 27, 1967


the word I had in Saigon would look toward
the consummation of this process perhaps
within the next 10 days.

I also had an opportunity for wide-ranging
discussion about two other processes which
have a vital and direct bearing to the pros-
pects for peace: the economic and social pro-
grams now underway and the process of
national reconciliation in South Viet-Nam,
as described in the Manila communique.

While I learned much of the progress al-
ready achieved in all these areas in this
limited period, as well as in the military
situation, I do not minimize the obstacles
and difficulties ahead. Indeed, one of the
strongest impressions I bring back is a sense

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 56, Jan- Mar 1967) → online text (page 85 of 90)