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Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 1996 and the future years defense program : hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first session, on S. 1026, authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for milita online

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^^f^^, S. Hrg. 104-387, Pr. 7

^' depar™ent of defense authorization for
?,;,_, appropriations for hscal year 1996 and

THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM



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Departnent of Defense Authorization... k y >^ r;<

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON AKMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION
ON

S. 1026

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996 FOR MILITARY
ACTIYITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CON-
STRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL
YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES



PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES



MARCH 28; APRIL 25; MAY 2, 16, 18, 1995

DEPOSITORV !

JUN 2 6 J996

Boston Public Librarv
Government Dnr„m«ntfil pT

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services




S. Hrg. 104-387, Pt. 7

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
APPROPRIATIONS FOR HSCAL YEAR 1996 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM



HEAEINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION
ON

S. 1026

AUTHORKENG APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CON-
STRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL
YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES



PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES



MARCH 28; APRIL 25; MAY 2, 16, 18, 1995




Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
90-166 CC WASHINGTON : 1996

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Suf)erintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402

ISBN 0-16-052639-6



COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina, Chairman
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia SAM NUNN, Georgia

WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine J. JAMES EXON, Nebraska

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts

DAN COATS, Indiana JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire JOHN GLENN, Ohio

DIRK KEMPTHORNE, Idaho ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas CHARLES S. ROBB. Virginia

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut

RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada

Richard L. Reynard, Staff Director

Arnold L. PUNARO, Staff Director for the Minority



Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN WARNER, Vir^nia J. JAMES EXON, Nebraska

WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine CARL LEVIN, Michigan

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire JEFF BINGAMAN. New Mexico

DIRK KEMPTHORNE, Idaho JOHN GLENN, Ohio

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas RICHARD BRYAN, Nevada

(II)



CONTENTS



CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Requirements and Programs

MARCH 28, 1995

Lopez, Vice Adm. Thomas J., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments; accompanied by Rear
Adm. J.T. Hood, USN, Program Executive Officer for Theater Air Defense .. 3

Gamer, Lt. Gen. Jay M., USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Space

and Strategic Defense Command 9

Department of Energy's Environmental Management Program and Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Reauthorization

APRIL 25, 1996

Crumbly, Thomas P., Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Man-
agement 32

Galvin, Robert W., Chairman, Executive Committee, Calvin Task Force on
Alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National Laboratories,
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board 59

Kendall, Dr. Henry W., Chairman, Environmental Management Programs
Subcommittee, Galvin Task Force on Alternative Futures for the Depart-
ment of Energy National Laboratories, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board 60

Conway, John T., Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board; accom-
panied by Dr. A.J. Eggenberger, Vice Chairman, Facilities Safety Board;
Capt. John W. Crawford, Board Member, Joseph DiNunno, Board Member;
and Dr. Herbert Kouts, Board Member 92

Space Programs and the Department of Defense's Space Management

Initiative

MAY 2, 1995

Dickman, Maj. Gen. Robert S., USAF, Director, Space Programs (SAF/AQS) ... 135

Anselmo, Rear Adm. Philip S., USN, Deputy Director, Space and Electronic

Warfare (N6B) 143

Franklin, Brig. Gen. Peter C, USA, Assistant Deputy for System Manage-
ment and International Cooperation 147

Cambone, Dr. Stephen A., Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies 170

Pace, Dr. Scott, Policy Analyst, Critical Technologies Institute, The RAND

Corporation 180

Department of Energy Weapons Activities, Nonproliferation and National

Security Programs

MAY 16, 1995

Curtis, Charles B., Under Secretary of Energy 205

Reis, Dr. Victor H., Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs 210

Smith, Dr. Harold P., Jr., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic

Energy 218

Baker, Kenneth E., Acting Director, Office of Nonproliferation and National

Security, Department of Energy 222

(III)



IV

Page

Hecker, Dr. Siegfried S., Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory 228

Tarter, Dr. C. Bruce, Director, University of California Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory 251

Hagengruber, Dr. Roger, Vice President for Defense Programs, Sandia Na-
tional Laboratories 265

Bomber Force Issues

MAY 18, 1995

Kaminski, Hon. Paul G., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology 346

Loh, Gen. John M., USAF, Commander, Air Combat Command 377



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
1996 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM



TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 1995

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,

Committee on Armed Services,

Washington, DC.

U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS AND

PROGRAMS

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:43 a.m., in room
SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Trent Lott (chair-
man of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Lott, Thurmond, Exon,
and Bryan.

Committee staff members present: Richard L. Reynard, staff di-
rector; George W. Lauffer, deputy staff director; and Christine K.
Cimko, press secretary.

Professional staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee and Eric
H. Thoemmes.

Minority staff member present: William E. Hoehn, Jr., profes-
sional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Pamela L. Farrell, Kathleen M.
Paralusz, and Connie B. Rader.

Committee members' assistants present: Samuel D. Adcock, as-
sistant to Senator Lott; Judith A. Ansley, assistant to Senator War-
ner; Richard F. Schwab assistant to Senator Coats; Thomas L.
Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith; Andrew W. Johnson, assist-
ant to Senator Exon; Richard W. Fieldhouse and David A. Lewis,
assistants to Senator Levin; Steven A. Wolfe, assistant to Senator
Kennedy; Donald A. Mitchell and John P. Stevens, assistants to
Senator Glenn; William Owens, assistant to Senator Robb; and
Randall A. Schieber, assistant to Senator Bryan.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TRENT LOTT, CHAIRMAN

Senator Lott. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I apologize
for being a little tardy in getting started this morning.

I understand our rankmg member. Senator Exon, will be here
momentarily. He has been delayed at a Nebraska Society break-
fast. And that is very important. He certainly has to stay for that
full breakfast.

(1)



The Subcommittee on Strategic Forces meets today to receive tes-
timony from the Navy and the Army on the U.S. ballistic missile
defense requirements and programs. Both services are currently
developing and testing the systems that will form the bedrock of
America's future theater missile defense, TMD, architecture. Once
deployed, these systems will fill a gap in America's defensive capa-
bilities that has existed for far too long.

Since the Persian Gulf war, the need for effective theater missile
defenses has become increasingly obvious. Without these capabili-
ties, even relatively minor military powers will be able to inhibit
and undermine America's ability to project power and maintain for-
ward presence. As the threat has become more salient, it has also
become obvious that no single system or TMD system can fulfill the
entire range of requirements.

The Navy is well suited for the ballistic missile defense mission.
With over $40 billion already spent on the Aegis infrastructure, it
would be irresponsible not to take maximum advantage of this in-
vestment. A naval TMD system offers several unique attributes
that make it particularly attractive: it would not depend on over-
seas bases or airlift to be deployed; it would avoid concerns over
foreign sovereignty; and it would provide a missile defense um-
brella over friendly forces attempting to gain control over a theater
of operations.

While I strongly support the Navy Lower Tier Program, and am
pleased that it is a core BMDO program, I must say that I do not
understand the decision to delay the Upper Tier Program. In my
view, we should proceed with both tiers simultaneously and aggres-
sively. Once the Navy completes its cost and operational effective-
ness assessment in October, it would seem to make sense to final-
ize operational requirements and system design and get on with
the Upper Tier major acquisition program.

The Army's TMD program appears to be in good shape. With the
THAAD program beginning flight testing this year, we are well on
the way to acquiring a genuine wide-area defense system. Patriot
PAC-3 also seems to be on track. The one area where I have real
concerns is with the Corps Sam. The international teaming ar-
rangement that is being developed seems to present more questions
than answers at this time.

In addition to its role in the area of TMD, the Army brings dec-
ades of practical experience to bear on the problem of national mis-
sile defense. In a world where missile threats are becoming more
numerous, sophisticated, and long-range, we will surely want to
draw on this expertise.

The Army and the Navy are to be commended for the way they
have begun to work together on TMD. In an era of tight budgets
and never-ending roles and missions studies, this is quite an ac-
complishment. I was particularly pleased to hear the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff testify that Army
and Navy TMD programs are not competitors, but complementary
efforts, each equally essential. I believe that the services have a lot
to learn from one another in this area, and I urge them to continue
with this cooperation,

I remain extremely concerned by the administration's apparent
willingness to have TMD limitations incorporated into the ABM



Treaty. If we agree to performance limitations on TMD systems, we
will be forced to forego promising TMD options, and our current
programs will soon bump up against an artificial technological ceil-
ing. Why we would allow an agreement that was designed to regu-
late the U.S.-Soviet Cold War relationship to limit our TMD op-
tions and growth potential is beyond my comprehension.

I would like to welcome this morning Vice Adm. T.J. Lopez, the
Deputy CNO for Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assess-
ments. Admiral Lopez is joined by Rear Adm. J.T. Hood, the Navy's
Program Executive Officer for Theater Air Defense. And let me
note that Rear Adm. Rodney Rempt, Director of Theater Air De-
fense, is also present, but not at the witness table.

I would also like to welcome Lt. Gen. Jay M. Garner, Command-
ing General, U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command.
General Garner is joined by Mr. A.Q. Oldacre, the Army's Deputy
Program Executive Officer for Missile Defense.

Before recognizing our witnesses, let me yield to the Senator
from Nevada, if he would like to make any opening statement of
his own or on behalf of the minority ranking member who is on his
way here from a Nebraska Society breakfast, I would be glad to do
that.

Senator Bryan. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I have no opening
statement to make. I would simply ask that the record be left open
in the event that the minority ranking member does care to offer
a statement, to make it part of the record.

Senator Lott. That certainly will be done. Gentlemen, we are
ready to begin with Admiral Lopez.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM- THOMAS J. LOPEZ, USN, DEPUTY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR RESOURCES, WARFARE
REQUIREMENTS AND ASSESSMENTS; ACCOMPANIED BY
REAR ADM. J.T. HOOD, USN, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER
FOR THEATER AIR DEFENSE

Admiral Lopez. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, particu-
larly for inviting me here to address this session and to talk about
the Navy's theater ballistic missile defense.

I am anxious, as General Garner is, to entertain the questions,
so I will be brief.

The President's budget, which you are considering, relies upon a
significant naval contribution to meet the difficult problem of bal-
listic missile defense. This contribution will come from one area
particularly; the strength of naval forces; independence — that is,
freedom from sovereignty issues; and forward positioning for early
action; and of course we use systems that are on the cutting edge
of modem technology.

We are excited about this challenging new mission of theater bal-
listic missile defense, and we bring a potentially robust capability
to the table. We are anxious to get on with it.

The United States has an obligation to our forward-deployed and
expeditionary elements of our Armed Forces to field a highly effec-
tive area ana theater ballistic missile defense system.

The threat is real, and American lives will be at risk in any con-
frontation. Theater missile defense is an extraordinarily difficult
challenge, and no single system, I believe, will do the job. A joint



and synergistic approach is necessary. And of course, the one oper-
ational system we have today is Patriot.

Together with the BalHstic Missile Defense Office, BMDO, the
Navy is developing a two-tier system. The first system, area de-
fense, will have a capability to defend against the shorter ballistic
missile for debarkation in ports, coastal airfields, and expeditionary
forces as they go ashore.

I might comment, I do not see how we can go ashore if we do
not have this system.

This is a first priority for us. If we did not have it, to repeat what
I said, I think Marine and Army lives will be lost even before they
begin to fight.

Second, to greatly improve coverage and achieve defense in-
depth, we are developing a long-range theater-wide capability,
which can enable defense of an entire region fi-om only a few ships.
The world's oceans permit forward positioning of ships to achieve
an early ascent-phase intercept. This capability will free us from
the need to provide significant terminal defense around every po-
tential target.

Forward deploying a theater ballistic missile defense system
aboard naval ships can provide substantial political and military
advantages. We will be early and first on the scene. We will have
operational flexibility. And we will be independent of foreign sov-
ereignty. And last, we will ease the demand on airlift requirements
in the opening days of a crisis.

The Navy intends to deploy our theater ballistic missile defense
capability using our already-available Aegis cruisers and destroy-
ers. The Navy system will be comprised of two existing major sys-
tems: the SPY-1 radar and Standard missile, and a supporting sys-
tem for command and control that will utilize the Cooperative En-
gagement Capability, CEC.

The SPY-1 radar has already demonstrated the ability to track
theater ballistic missiles in ranges in excess of 500 kilometers. Our
Standard missile is based upon 30 years of continued design evo-
lution. The SM-2 Block IV extended range Aegis missile has re-
cently completed successful test firings at sea on the U.S.S. Lake
Erie.

The missile will provide a common defense against sea-skimming
cruise missiles, aircraft, and theater ballistic missiles.

For theater ballistic missile defense we would use a Lightweight
Exo-Atmospheric Projectile, or LEAP. And this is a kinetic kill ve-
hicle added to our standard Block IV missile, which will provide
wide-range theater capability.

We have conducted two LEAP tests — the latest was this morn-
ing — to verify LEAP integration with Navy missiles, and ultimately
demonstrate the exo-atmospheric kill of a ballistic missile target
from a ship.

Our system, we believe, is treaty compliant. We know that the
area system is treaty compliant. And the theater-wide system we
are quite positive is going to be the same. However, it is currently
under review.

We have accomplished a great deal already, and we have ambi-
tious plans for the future. There is a sound technical basis for our
system, and a solid Aegis infrastructure already in place.



The Navy theater ballistic missile system can be at sea by the
end of this decade, and can fill our warfighting CINCs' require-
ments.

Thank you, sir. And I am ready for your questions.

[The prepared statement of Aamiral Lopez follows:]

Prepared Statement by Vice Adm. Thomas J. Lopez, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments

Naval Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (Naval TBMD)

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Strateeic
Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the
Department of the Navy's Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) Program.

m my testimony today I will make three main points:

First, the threat from theater ballistic missiles is real. More and more countries
have recognized the political power wielded by a long range weapon of terror, as dis-

Elayed by Saddam Hussein auring Desert Storm. In fact, greater than 15 countries
ave theater ballistic missiles (TBM) and more than 25 countries possess or are de-
veloping nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. An unmanned ballistic missile is
mucn cheaper to obtain and maintam than a manned aircraft, making it much more
attractive to cash-short, developing nations.

Second, Naval TBMD will be required in future conflicts to ensure the safe entry
of our forces and to ensure the safe flow of follow-on reinforcements into overseas
theaters. The actual vs. desired flow of forces into a theater are not equal, and hard
choices will have to be made regarding what assets are brought into a theater first.
If TBMD can be provided by ships at sea, this will greatly alleviate the critical de-
mand for sealift and airlift in the early days of a crisis.

Third, and equally important, is the fact that we have already invested over $40
billion in Aegis ships, with their Spy radars, vertical launcher? command and con-
trol capability, personnel, and the Standard Missiles which they emplov. To not take
advantage of this existing capability would be a disservice to the Nation. Navy
TBMD can be fielded quickly and relatively cost-effectively.

To support these points in more detail, I provide the following testimony, which
will address national concerns and solutions. Naval TBMD leverage, our accomplish-
ments and plans, and a few remarks about the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty compli-
ance of the Navy TBMD program.

NATIONAL concerns

There are a number of concerns with respect to the proliferation threat of ballistic
missiles, potentially delivering weapons of mass destruction. Primary United States'
strategic objectives include deterring conflict in the first place, or rapidly stopping
the war once it begins. In the case of tactical ballistic missiles the United States
is committed to defending forward deployed and expeditionary elements of our own
Armed Forces and to support the defense of friendly forces and allies. Specific con-
cerns include:

— Protection of U.S. forces already deployed in a crisis area.

— The means to provide engagement of TBMs with high confidence through de-
fense in depth in order to reassure threatened coalition allies.

— Reinlorcement of deployed forces through protected debarkation ports, airfields
and staging areas.

— Reduction in early demand for airlift and sealift.

THEATER THREAT

For example, in the Western Pacific theater, more than 80,000 U.S. active duty
personnel (including 20,000 marines and 15,000 sailors) are at risk of attack from
TBMs today. The supply depots, repair facilities, support organizations and military
families in the area are also at risk. While the majority of the threat TBMs are the
shorter range (100-600 KM) Scud variants, several longer range (600-1200 KM) No-
Dong and (1000—3500 KM) Taepo Dong missiles are in various stages of develop-
ment. The threat is real; American lives are at risk.

NATIONAL SOLUTIONS

Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is an extremely difficult challenge. No one system
will do the job. A joint "system of systems" synergistic approach is necessary. "Today,
the Nation's existing TBM defense capability rests with the Patriot System and its



evolving improvements. This system has proven terminal defense capabilities
against the relatively shorter range TBMs which spend most of their flight time
within the atmosphere. The Navy and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
(BMDO) are also developing a similar capability to provide area defense o7 debarka-
tion ports, coastal airnelos, amphibious objective areas and U.S. expeditionary
forces as they go ashore.

To improve area coverage and achieve a two tier, layered terminal defense, the
BMDO is developing a Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor to-
gether with a Tneater Missile Defense-Ground Based Radar (TMD-GBR). For the
Navy, BMDO is developing an even longer range Theater Wide capability which
would enable defense of entire regions (the eastern Mediterranean, the western Pa-
cific) from a few strategically placed ships. Positioning long range TBM defenses at
sea provides dramatic deterrent and war winning leverage. Because of the ability
to reposition ships closer to the launch point of the TBM, the same radar capability
and TBM interceptor performance that provides tens of thousands of square kilo-
meters of terminal defense ashore, provides hundreds of thousands of square kilo-
meters of defended area if positioned at sea closer to the country that is threatening
to fire these TBMs. The world's oceans permit this forward positioning at sea, ena-
bling the Navy to achieve an early ascent phase intercept in just the areas we are
most likely to need it; e.g., the Sea of Japan, the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterra-
nean. This frees us from the need to provide terminal defenses around every poten-
tial target we wish to protect.

NAVY TBMD COVERAGE

Forward deploying TBMD aboard naval ships provides substantial political and
military leverage. Naval forces are mobile they can arrive on the scene early and
sustain themselves for days. In fact, in most cases, naval forces will be first on scene
when a crisis is imminent. They provide great operational flexibility, especially as
the United States continues to withdraw from overseas bases. Naval ships project
a positive and engaged U.S. image to reassure friends and encourage regional stabil-
ity. They are relatively independent of host nation support and can immediately in-
fluence political events. A single Aegis cruiser with Tneater Wide TBMD capability
on station in the Sea of Japan, would do much to ease the continuing concern over
potential nuclear weapons and long range TBM development programs on going in
the region. In addition to deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction and reas-
suring allies, TBMD equipped naval forces would buy time for negotiation and pro-
mote the cohesion essential to allied coalitions. Employment of TBMD from naval
ships would be independent of foreign sovereignty, free from reliance on overseas
bases, and would dramatically ease the demand for airlift, in the opening days of
a crisis ... a resource which is in critically short supply.

DEPLOYMENT

Our experience in Desert Shield is a good indicator as to how TBMD forces might
arrive in theater during a crisis. After an alert order, the first Patriot battalion com-
pleted airlift to Saudi Arabia in 34 days, while the second battalion was in place
on day 82, having come primarily by sealift. The two Patriot Fire Units that de-
ployed[ from Germany to Israel in 48 hours reauired more than 50 C-5As and di-
verted over 120 sorties each day from other hign priority lift requirements. The ex-
tensive airlift/sealift requirements for land-based air defenses has been the subject



Online LibraryUnknownDepartment of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 1996 and the future years defense program : hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first session, on S. 1026, authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for milita → online text (page 1 of 64)