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this collective life itself and of our own communion with it.
In the emotional region of the life of personal
beings the evidence of personal conmiunion is of a

HI. In the region of diflferent kind. Action is the ex-
emotion, which coyers pression of will, language is the expres-
the whole of life- gj^^ ^£ thought; emotion, we feel

tempted to say, is its own expression — in fact, its
expression is the whole social life of man, and his
individual life in so far as it shows him to be engaged
in or divorced from emotional communion with his kind ;
and the evidences of the social character of emotion are
to be found scattered over the whole surface of human
life, except in so far as religion, the expression of the
supreme emotion, is realised as gathering and compre-
hending every phase and department of life into itself.

Pleasure is the most individual form of emotion, the
moment of rest in the achievement of individual desire,
of pleasures, mutual *^® appreciation of that which the
pleasures are the individual mind has apprehended. It
must be enough to note here that the
keenest pleasures, and certainly those which are most
characteristic of personal life, are social pleasiures — those
which not only involve, but consist in interchange of
individual pleasure.* It is, indeed, in this form that

• Part n. ch. V. p. 137.



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30 An Essay on Personality

pleasure most obviously asserts its claim to be more
than animal — to be human, personal, spiritual.

Art embodies and defines the social character of
pleasure. In art, the individual aims at making himself
Art implies and *^^ mouthpiece and minister of the
appeals to a collective emotions of a community which in
emotion of beauty, j^^^ ^^ j^^^ j^ universal. And artistic

impulse or artistic appreciation, in higher or lower
forms, permeates human society from end to end, and
retains throughout the same essential character, indi-
vidual expression or individual appropriation of what
is felt to be in idea a collective emotion.

But man, the personal being, lives in a world of
emotion that is evidently social. It is the element

But emotion is the '^ ^^^^ ^® ^^ *^® ^^^*^ ^^ ^^^•

very element of the The child begins to live and move and
social life of man, \^^f^ its being in the atmosphere of

love. To live in one another 'is the ideal of every
relation of family life. And even where the ideal is
apparently furthest from realisation, the life itself is
still an emotiona] fieict, an acutely conscious interchange
of feeling. It is the tendency of emotion thus to make
men cease to be individual units, to weld them into
unities; and the capacity of the individual for thus
passing out of and beyond his own individual life into
union with the lives of others, is to him a source of
unrest, the very inspiration of passion, which finds so
many outlets in the infinite variety of the lives of men.
Men find the satisfaction of this social impulse, the
desire for emotional union with their kind, in very
various ways. They may drug the pangs of desire by
the gratification of sensual passion. They may seek



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The Definition of Personality 31

distraction from the disease of spiritual solitude by
absorption in work. Work itself may bring with it the
fellowship to which work naturally leads, and therewith
the affections and loyalties which accompany every kind
of association — social emotions, these, wliich, though
they only occasionally rise to the level of a passion, are
nevertheless the very element of the life to which they
belong. Such sympathies of association vary in the
degree in which they attain to such a standard of un«
selfishness as entitles them to rank high in common
estimation. They vary in the force which gives them
effect, in the success with which they assert their claim
over those who come within their range. But every
individual carries with him, as a part of himself, the
consciousness of a collective mind, in the " society " to
which he belongs. It may assert itself in his life in
very impalpable ways ; but change his social atmosphere
and surroundings, and we see at once how much he
depended upon it, how much the individual life in the
emotional region consists in membership of the col-
lective life, of the various forms of social union into
which the individual has been absorbed. These are but
vague and fragmentary indications of the most deep-
seated principle of personal life, that which makes
sympathy in some degree the need of all men, and self-
devotion the one commanding need of the best.

But there is a principle in human life, the chosen
channel of the supreme emotion, an aspect, a depart-
Aod as sDch has nient of life in which every aspect and
become the principle every department of life are compre-

^ handed. Religion has assumed this

definite shape. It has undertaken this function in



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32 An Essay on Personality

human life. It has claimed to comprehend and to
inspire every form of life by setting forth love, the
emotion of mutual communion between persons, as the
dominant principle, the key-fact of life and of the world,
the vital secret of happiness. Quite apart from any
question of the truth of Christianity, the feet that, in
Christianity, religion, as the embodiment of the supreme
emotion, has thus appeared upon the stage of history,
that it has created a new form of fellowship, and
through it has intensified every form of fellowship
already existing among mankind, is a significant ele-
ment in the prirad fojcie evidence which we are here
passing in review, that the character of fellowship
attaches to human life as a whole.



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PART II
PERSONALITY AND ITS FACULTIES



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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Personality is the capacity for fellowship. To the
theoretical recognition of this truth there is a practical
1^ ^^u -obstacle in the simple fact that men

The current theory of /. i .

personality reflects largely fail of their destiny, and that
St/rSS'iSrd^^ *^^ individual personaUties of which
often a capacity for the world is full are unrealised, or at
pnnr best very imperfectly realised, Capacities

for fellowship. The sense of practical failure is reflected
in philosophical theory.

And there are reasons why philosophy of its own
accord has been disposed to strike the note, to which
Philosophy itself too *^^ individual experience of isolation
has arisen in times of and divorce from the reality of fellow-
pse. gj^.p j^ g^ ready to respond, and which

this very response tends to perpetuate and to prolong
as the prevailing tone of philosophic thought. European
philosophy has had two births, and both have fallen in
periods when what had been the great social unity was
in collapse, breaking up into its component units.
The philosophy of Plato and Aristotle taught that man
Greek philosophy, was a social animal ; that he had in
J:^?l;i^^^ tlie tendencies of which the
of individual life. TrdXt? — the Greek society — was the
outcome. But this TrdXt? was already ceasing to be

35 D 2



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36 An Essay on Personality

a living social form. Plato's passionate protest against
its decay could not avail to stay the hand of fate.
With Aristotle already the delineation of the type of
individual character which this social life produced is
the prominent feature in his philosophy of life. And
Greek philosophy after Aristotle as a philosophy of life
lived and died as a philosophy of individual life.

The birth of modern philosophy, again, was a feature
in that long process of wakening to a consciousness of
,^ . . ^ , itself in which the mediaeval Church

The modem uitel- «. . . , . . .

lectuAi movement as an effective social institution died a

thTd^T^^e^*^ lingering death. Nationality and the
medueval Empire- local loyalties which grew with it had
begun to take the place of that un-
earthly combination of Church and Empire which had
ruled the heart and mind of Europe. But the individual
sat incomparably looser to the new tie than to the old.
It had neither the commanding authority of a world-
wide sway which was the visible image of the Universal
will, nor yet had it the intimate hold on the individual
life, member as the individual had learnt to believe
himself to be of a visible spiritual society that would
live into eternity. Nor did the study of antiquity
revive the lessons of the social philosophy of Greece.
And modem phiiiK. Modem philosophy sprang out of the
S?i1S?a^^o? common European mind. And it was
the mind from reality, the Logic, not the Politics or even the
Ethics of Aristotle, which had stamped itself on the
Latin mind, and given to Europe the framework of
its thought. The logical proposition, with its subject
and predicate, substance and quality, hardened into that
separation from one another from which the Metaphysic



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Introduction 2n

of Aristotle had sought to save them, these gave
to modem philosophy its root conceptions of ex-
tension and thought, which haunt us through the
history of every school of modem philosophy, the
embodiment of a dualism of which the modem agnostic
is the last pathetic result. Modem philosophy started
with a separation of the mind from reality.

And this separation of the mind from reality, the
assumption borrowed by philosophy from the life out of
1.5 1.1 which it grew, has been intensified and
philosophy, appeaiiag fixed by the operation of another cause
SlS'iS.^" "^ti^e ^ philosophy itself. PhUosophy
pecuiUriy powerless is the supreme expression of the intel-
toorercome. j^^^^^j ^^^^^^ j^ personal life. And

the intellect in philosophy naturally tends to magnify its
office. That communion with reality, in which we are
to maintain that the knowledge of reality consists, is
not to be achieved by the intellectual faculty, except in
its due relation with the moral and emotional faculties.*
Philosophy, in fact, has set to thought an eminently
uncongenial task where it has demanded that it should
abolish single-handed the dualism which especially
belongs to thoughtf A sense of " bloodless " unreality

* Cp. Bradley, " Principles of Logic," p. 533 : " It may come from a failm«
of my metaphysics or from a weakness of the flesh, which continues to blind
me, bat the notion that existence conld be the same as understanding strikes
as cold and ghostlike as the dreariest materialism. That the glory of this
world in the end is appearance leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it
as a show of some friller splendour ; but the sensuous curtain is a deception
and a cheat, if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some spectral
woof of impalpable abstraction, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories."

t On the intimate connection of the three, as seen from the point of view
of psychology, cp. Ladd, " Descr. Psych.," p. 18 : " Every psychic fact is
actually complex with an irreducible threefold complexity ; it is at the same
time a fact of intellection, a fact of feeling, and a fact of conation.^' So



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38 An Essay on Personality

has haunted the highest achievement of the thought
which has ignored its relation to emotion and will.
The analysis of the intellectual process in isolation and
abstraction from the other personal faculties could not
even yield a rationale of the intellectual achievement
itself. It can only plausibly appear to do so because
the isolation of the intellectual faculty cannot really be
made complete.

It is impossible to attempt to enter on a systematic
appeal to the facts of experience in order to justify the
To commend the principle that personal fellowship is the
definition of peraoii- key-fact of experience, until we have

ality as the capacity g% -tt i« /•!

for feUowship, the u^st cxammed the relation of the various
faculties of person- faculties of personal life to one another,

auty mu st be ezhi-

bited in their union Sufficiently at least to show that they
with one another. ^^^ inseparable from one another, and
that it is through their ordered co-operation that we
experience that communion with reality in which it is
to be maintained that experience consists.

Th6 definition of experience is the object throughout.
But the terms of the definition must be cleared from
misunderstanding. It is personality as a whole which
is the faculty for fellowship. Philosophical speculation
has separated the various phases or forms of personal
life from one another. They must be restored to their
organic union with one another, as members of the whole
individual personality, before the individual personality
itself can be exhibited as the faculty for fellowship in
the various regions of experience.

Ward, '* Encyc. Brit.," part 77, p. 39. As to the " conBtituent elements " of
consciousness, '^ there is in the main substantial agreement : the elementary
facts of mind cannot, it is held, be expressed in less than three propositions —
I feel somehow, I know something, I do something."



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CHAPTER II

FEELING

In analysing the individual personality^ feeling first
demands definition. Feeling is the background of per-
Feeiin? in the back- sonality , the element of * * consciousness "
pnomidofpcrsoiiaHty, that interpenetrates and accompanies
that accomiMuiies all the difierent forms of ''self-con-
"8eif-coii8cioiisiic88."gcious" life.* FecUng apart, every
form of personal life is a form of self-consciousness —
self-consciousness meaning here not consciousness of b,
self, but consciousness in relation to a self, conscious-
ness of that which can only be defined in distinction
from a self, where the self is not explicit but implicit
in the consciousness, not necessarily present but neces-
sarily involved. The intellectual consciousness of an
object, for instance, or the moral consciousness of a
motive are forms of self-consciousness. The object or
the motive can only be defined as an object or a motive
in distinction from a self. And every form of will and

• Bradley, "Mind," N.S., No. 6, p. 212 : "What cornea first in each of
ns is rather feeling (than consciousness), a state as yet withont either a
subject or an object. Feeling here natoraUy does not mean mere pleasure
and pain. . . . Feeling is immediate experience withont distinction or rela-
tion in itself. It is a unity complex, but without relations ; and there is here
no difference between the state and its content, since, in a word, the experi-
enced and the experience are one. And a distinction between cognition and
other aspects of our nature is not yet dereloped. Feeling is not one differ-
entiated aspect, but it holds all aspects in one."



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40 An Essay on Personality

thought and emotion are in this sense self-conscious.
But behind and along with every form of self-conscious
life there is a form of consciousness which is not self-
consciousness.*

Every perception, every volition, every self-con-
scious emotion, is dogged by its own shadow of ante-
Feeiin? is observed ^^^^* feeling, and this feeling, like
byinteUectuaiseif- every other part of our conscious life,
coDsaoos&ess, ^^ observe and reflect upon. The

intellectual consciousness endeavours to seize and to
define it. But feeling eludes definition, because in
endeavouring to define it the intellectual consciousness
alters feeling. In the attempt to seize and describe
which breaks up feeling, the mind divides it into feel-
"/**^'M"*® ^^^> moments, phases of feeling. But

^ feeling is in itself continuous; its

phases or pulsations pass into one another, often as
smoothly as the summit and the hollow of a wave in
the swell of an unbroken sea. The successive phases
or pulsations difier from one another. But it is not
the feeling consciousness that marks off these phases
from one another and contrasts them with one another.
This is the work of reflection, of the intellectual con-
sciousness that observes the stream of feeling. Feeling,
again, knows neither subject nor object; it is, to the
merely feeling consciousness, neither the feeling of an
object causing the changes of feeling, nor the feeling
of a subject of feeling undergoing changes in its con-
and describes it in sciousness, and conscious of the changes,
judgments, jq^Q judgment either of perception or

reflection expresses feeling. It is not mere feeling

* See Note E, Appendix, p. 192, on "Consdonanessand Self-conscionsness."



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Feeling 41

that is expressed in the perceptive judgment, " That is
hot," or in the reflective judgment, " I am cold/' And
some such judgment as this latter, thought in observing
feeling inevitably forms. If feeling could express itself
directly in language, its language would have neither
substantives nor adjectives. It would express itself in
a series of adverbs — ^a series the members of which
would not be more distinct from one another than the
gradations by which the bee passes from the busy
hum of honey-laden contentment to the angry buzz of
thwarted endeavour, for the purport of these momentary
gmieitasafcject, expressions of feeling could not be
and a definite content, defined to mere feeling by any contrast
of one point in the stream of consciousness with another.
When the psychologist speaks of the "content"* of
consciousness, he is detaching an adjective from its
substantive, a quality from the thing it qualifies, a
modification of the feeling consciousness from the fed-
ing consciousness of which it is a modification. Only
as qualifying the thing as the predicate of a perceptive
judgment is the quality apprehended as a quality at
all ; only as the predicate of a reflective judgment, as
the content of a moment or phase of consciousness
marked ofi* from other moments or phases of conscious-
ness, in distinction from the feeling consciousness and
in relation to it, is the modification of consciousness a
content at alLf The feeling consciousness is observed

* Cp. James, "Text-book of Psychology," p. 466: "Shall we describe
the experience as a quality of our feeling, or our feeling of a quality ? The
ambiguous word ' content ' hag been recently invented instead of ' object,*
to escape a decision."

t On the " presentation '* of psychology as still more open to this criticism,
see Note £, on " Consciousness and Self-consciousness."



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42 An Essay on Personality

and described post-mortem * by the thinking conscious-
ness whether of the ordinary man in his reflective
moments or of the psychological observer. The phase
of feeling, which in the instinctive working of the intel-
ligence of the ordinary man passes into a perception,
is viewed by the self-observing intelligence in the
reflecting mind as a phase of the feeling self. The
feeling self, as feeling, is not a self, it does not feel
itself to be a self, it is the selfhood of the thinker
which is viewed (and no doubt truly viewed) by thought
as the subject of successive phases of feeling. And to
the observing intellect, to the self thus, as thinker,
taking note of itself as feeling, the feeling appears to
have a complex and indefinite content — this observation
being, so to say, the obverse side of that vaguely com-
plex world which thought presents to reflection in the
perception which comes nearest to feeling. The content
which, as feeiingr, of the perception is reflected back into

JSSti^^,2" *l^« feeling life- Feeling «« f«lt ^
not have. never be described or expressed. It

is described as reflected on by thought. Feeling as

it passes is separated by the self -observing intelligence

into moments or elements : in itself it is continuous,

and knows neither division nor distinction. It is unified

and regarded as a stream, a mass of consciousness : in

feeling itself there is nothing to make it a whole. It

is attributed to a subject of sentient consciousness, who

is distinguished from the variety of his consciousness :

feeling itself knows no distinction of a subject feeling

from a feeling felt The intellectual observer, noting

* Seth, " Man's Place in the Cosmos," p. 120 : ** All introspection is really
retrospection; it is a ^s^-morf em examination.*'



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ly^



Feeling 43

the emergence from feeling of the judgment of percep-
tion, and finding in the judgment of reflection into
which this judgment of perception is instinctively con-
verted a complex and various content, infers from the
variety and complexity of the self-conscious life a like
variety and complexity in feeling itself. At any given
moment of our conscious life there is present to us as
perceived a vaguely bounded world, the immediate
environment of the bodily self, all that is within the
range of the senses, or of such immediate and uncon-
scious inference as the operation of the senses usually
includes. Here is a perception — with a content. We
reflect, i.e. we become conscious " I am perceiving," and
what was the content of the perceptive judgment imme-
diately becomes the content of a reflective judgment.
But reflection also tells us — " before I perceived, I felt,"
and the psychologist is apt to transfer to the antecedent
feeling the content of the reflective judgment.

This process, by which thought reflects back into
feeling its own organised relation of variety in unity,
may be said to be the converse of that by which feeling
communicates to the fiirst and instinctive judgments of
perception, and in some measure to those of reflection too,
a vividness and assurance, a sense of intimacy and close
communion with the thing or mind observed, which
becomes lost in the further development of thought.

If the question be asked. How can the feeling con-
sciousness be observed at all by a thinking consciousness
so alien from it in character ? it can, I think, only be
answered that we are endeavouring to describe the facts
of personal life — that diflferent phases or forms of
personal life are not, as a matter of fact, separate from



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44 ^« Essay on Personality

one another like the limbs of a body. They are rather
Diverse as feeling: aspects or forms of personal life, the
M a mttodTfa^ activity of each one of which involves
we perceive that we the activity of all the others. They
as perc^^, ceasM ^^^ thus, SO to say, internal to one
to be felt another.* Each as it comes to the front

absorbs but does not obliterate the other. And so
here, as there is a feeling of perceiving, we can also
perceive that we feel, though in perceiving that we feel,
we i'pso facto cease to merely feel. Feeling, as it is
intellectually apprehended, ceases to be felt.

Philosophical discussion has associated feeling espe-
cially with thought, because thought is in us the observer,
VoUtion as weU as *^® phUosopher. But feeling equally
ttou^t springs from ^Qgg the steps of the various forms of
moral self-consciousness, as they appear
upon the threshold of self-conscious life. Here too
definite consciousness often begins with a vague com-
plex of motives, impulses, and desires, dormant or
dominant in different degrees in different moments of
consciousness, and it is against this vague background
of desires that some definite motive or desire asserts
itself. And here too the awakening desire, the impulse
which is nearest to feeling, has a force and spontaneity
of its own which it seems to bring with it from the
feeling out of which it springs.

The relation of feeling to what we are in this essay
to distinguish from it as emotion, needs to be more
clearly marked, because the distinction does not corre-
spond to any division recognised in popular language.

* Cp. Tertnllian, '* De Animft/* ii. 7 : '' Quia mihi ezhibebit sensum non
intelligentetn quod sentit? aut intellectam non sentientem qnod inteUigit."



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Feeling 45

We shall mean, then, by emotion, self-conscious feeling,
and by feeling, emotion without distinction in conscious-
And feeling, as ness between the subject of feeling and

tolSediSSSS^ its occasion. The things which we
from emotion, the distinguish in self-conscious feeling as
SiSStt'u £f^* subject and object, the cause of feeling
antidpation. and the consciousness that feels, are

in mere feeling merged in one another. In emotion,
it is essential to the feeling that we should be con-
scious of the thing admired, loved, abhorred, as distinct
from ourselves, qualifying our feeling, causing in us
love, abhorrence, admiration, and itself qualified by


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