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doing so, as beautiful, horrible, lovable. Feeling is
both momentary and evanescent. Emotion comes to a
climax at moments of time, but it abides, and through
the fluctuations of feeling preserves an identity of its
own as a relation between the subject and the object in
the emotion. Feeling lacks the element of will, and is
hence often described as passive, though in fact it is
neither active nor passive. But emotion is purposed,
deliberate, laden with the force of the will that main-
tains it Feeling, so far as we can seize and describe
it, is, as we have said, without any consciousness of
distinction between the subject of feeling and its cause :
emotion is intensely conscious of the distinction, even
in the very act of overcoming it. Feeling then is the
negation of any and all of the forms of self-consciousness.
Emotion is the consummation of self-consciousness.
Emotion carries with it, as essential to itself, the
characters of will and thought. It carries them with it,
and merges them in something which is not feeling, and
yet is like it — a relation of communion between subject



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46 An Essay on Personality

and object, of which feeling, their unconscious union,
was the prophecy and anticipation.

In the ordinary normal consciousness of the un-
sophisticated human person, the form of self-conscious-
Thcfonnofsdf- ^^^^s, moral, intellectual, or emotional,
consdousness which which seems to arise directly out of
stands in immediate feeling, which finds itself dogged by
contrast to feeling is feeling, is that in which the object is

consciousness of the ^ *'

object rather than of obvious, the Subject implied. Self-
*^* *^* consciousness seems to appear upon the

scene, as the consciousness of an object perceived, a
thing, a person, a world ; or as the consciousness of
a motive, a desire, an obligation, an impulse from with-
out ; or as the consciousness of an object, pleasant or
repellent, qualified by emotion. I am conscious of a
world, intellectual, moral, or emotional, before I am
explicitly conscious of a self. Between feeling and this
form of self-consciousness, the consciousness, moral,
intellectual, or emotional, of an object, there is normally
no intermediate stage in which the subject of conscious-
ness is conscious of itself as the subject of a modification
in its consciousness, and from which the step is made, as
it were, by way of inference to an object as the cause
of the modification. This immediate sequence of self-
consciousness on feeling is the fact of experience as it
presents itself to reflection. If we try to get behind
this, we are in a highly speculative region of thought,
where the psychologist may, or may not, afford us data
for determining the stages in the history of a develop-
ment from merely conscious to self-conscious life, from
feeling to will, thought, and emotion.

Such a development might be imagined, a priori^ to



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Feeling 47

take place in very various ways. In the merely feeling
The course of de- consciousness, the distinction between
▼dopment f rom subject and object is latent. The

conscioiia ne ss to 9611- ^i* /• • "X" • i -x

conadonsness is feeling consciousness of any individual

conjectural. subject of consciousness is in a sense

microcosmic ; its changes reflect the history of the
universe from a particular point of view; more im-
mediately they reflect variations in its own immediate
surroundings, as a centre of consciousness localised in
time or space, or in whatever other sphere we suppose
the individual point of consciousness to be placed. But
in the feeling consciousness itself, itself and its world
are in no way discriminated from one another. Under
what stimulus can we conceive the conscious self to
spring into distinction from its world ?

To review a series of conjectural answers to this
question, without professing to adduce any proof or to
establish any presumption in favour of one rather than
another, is a proceeding which would not seem likely
in itself to lead to any useful result. But it may
appear that there is a conclusion which cannot well
be avoided on any and every hypothesis as to the
process by which self-conscious sprang from conscious
life. And it is worth while to make the attempt to
show that this is so.

We may conceive, then, a condition of discord to
arise in the consciousness, giving rise to a vague
We can imagine self- appetency, a sense of uneasiness and
consciousness to arise want, fiTowing into a definite desire

from consciousness — ' o o

from feeling— «s or repulsion — the individual asserting
desire, himself, and claiming to reshape his

surroundings, or to readjust himself to them. If this



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48 An Essay on Personality

were conceived to be the course of the development,
the first step in self-conscious life would be very
evidently volitional. But if so, it is also evident, in
the first place, that the act of will has already become
intellectual, as soon as an object independent of the self
is apprehended as the object of desire or repulsion, and
that this " desire " already contains in itself an emotional
element, in the anticipated feeling of satisfaction in
which desire as desire becomes complete. And further,
even the vague appetency which is here supposed to
precede desire, involves an intellectual recognition of
the outer world as other than the self, and the emotional
consciousness of its discord with the self. It " involves "
them, i.e. these other aspects or phases of this primary
volitional consciousness detach themselves from it as we
reflect upon it, but seem to form a part of it, and to be
inseparable from it in fact.

Or, again, we might imagine in the feeling con-
sciousness, a condition of equipoise, of repose, in which,
in the mere intensity of the pause in a
moment or phase of consciousness, the
object prominent at such a moment in its influence on
consciousness should separate itself from the conscious
self, and the first dim perception should arise. Some
such phase of experience we should say that we have in
moments of rest and reverie, when weariness has led us
to relapse from any kind of spiritual energy into a state
which brings us nearest to the primeval feeling life. If
it were so that self-consciousness arose, we should say
again that the virtual self-assertion, by which the object
is thrust away from the self to be perceived and
observed, is an element of will presupposed in this



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n



Feeling 49

primary perception, and that the quality under which
the object is perceived — what the psychologist would
call the content of this stage of consciousness — is always
an apprehension of the object as aflfecting the self. In
feeling there is no distinction of world and self ; the
world is felt as affecting the self, and the self as affected
by the world. Here, in the first dim perception, it is
under this character, as causing such and such an
affection of the self, that the world, the object, is known.
The primary intellectual perception then would arise
out of the merely feeling life by a volitional self-
assertion, and would pass into an emotional appreciation
of the object, such emotional appreciation being already
involved in the intellectual assertion of its quality, but
passing into a definite emotional verdict by which this
small cycle of personal life would be closed.

Once more we might picture the passage from con-
sciousness — thus. We could conceive a stage of feeling
in which in the fulness of contentment
or as cmo on, ^^ subject of feeling should rise into

consciousness of the world of feeling, the object of
emotion, as a world of worship, an object of adoration.
And here again the impulse of spiritual energy which
asserts itself in the rise of the emotion, makes this rise of
emotion itself primarily an act of will. And the appre-
hension of the object of love or adoration as other than
the subject of the emotion, a separation involved in
the very nature of emotion, shows the trace of the
intellectual activity which is involved where self-con-
scious life thus takes its rise in emotion.

In present experience the self-conscious life of per-
sonality breaks forth abruptly from the background of

E



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50 An Essay on Personality

feeling as will, thought, or emotion. The foregoing
analysis, in the last degree speculative and hypothetical,
but in any case the of possible stages of progress connect-
sdS^ss would "^S conscious and self-conscious life
seem to be ToUtionaL seems to Suggest the natural order in
which these faculties or phases of personality are related
to one another.* And the suggestion is that feeling
breaks into self-consciousness always really by way of
volition,! and then through the intellectual phase
passes into emotion — a suggestion which will be con-
firmed as we pursue our analysis of these faculties of
personality themselves.

* Obviously in this tentative and merely illustrative treatment of the
borderland between feeling and self-conscioufiness we have treated volition
merely as an energy of the subject of self-consciousness, ignoring the no less
significant fact that this eneigy is asserted always in correlation with some
impulse of energy from without. This, instead of the other, might have
been made the prominent factor in the change.

t Cp. Ladd, "Outlines of Descr. Psych.,'* p. 112 : "To be the subject of
a conscious state is to be doing something." Gp. also the passages on
Conation quoted in Note F, on " Will and Causation," p. 201.



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CHAPTER III

WILL

It is with the will then — the volitional form of self-
consciousness — that we begin onr analysis of the
VTiU is observed and ^l^DaeDts or aspeets of personality,
described by self- The tenn " self-consciousness " is
but it is itself self- usually apphed to knowledge. In
conscious. asserting that will and emotion are

distinct modes of self-consciousness, it is necessary to
note not only that intellectual self-consciousness accom-
panies the self-consciousness of will and emotion, but
that in describing either of these latter we necessarily
describe it in terms of the intellectual consciousness.
" That is beautiful," " That is desirable," " I ought to do
this," are intellectual judgments. Words are the language
of thought. It is thought which observes and describes
in perception and reflection alike. It is thought which
observes and describes the action of will. But it is
nevertheless not difficult to see that will is self-conscious
activity, not merely in the sense that it is an activity
accompanied by self-conscious intelligence. We act,
and we know that we act. But we are self-conscious
agents not merely because we know that we act. Our
action itself, as well as our knowledge of it, is self-
conscious. The activity of the will is itself a mode of

51



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52 An Essay on Personality

self-consciousness. We are intellectually conscious of
things, of objects. We call this self-consciousness
WhattheoUectis because we are conscious of the thing
to intelligence tJie or object as distinct from ourselves,
motive IS to volition. ^^ ^^^ morally conscious of motives.

We call this self-consciousness because we are conscious
of the motive as distinct from ourselves. We cannot
desire an object without an intellectual perception of
the object. Granted. It is nevertheless true that our
moral consciousness of the object as desired, as moving
the will, is distinct from our intellectual consciousness
Volition is expressed of it as known. Of this moral con-
jnteUectaaf^^^ "* sciousness, action is the expression^ as
ments. language is of the intellectual con-

sciousness. The motive in operation is described in an
intellectual judgment. Various kinds of motives are
described in various types of judgment. There is a
judgment of desire, of which the type is, "This is
desirable." There is a judgment of obligation, of which
the tjrpe is, " I ought." There are judgments, whose
classification in one order is less obvious, and on which
we cannot here dwell at length,* judgments which
embody some harmony or mutal relation of wills as
united in determining action. But in any or all of
these the moral fact described is distinct from its
intellectual description, and the moral fact is, motived
action.

This distinction of volition or will from intellect and
emotion, the other forms of self-consciousness, and its
relation to them, will be exemplified as we trace it
through the three obvious forms of volition — desire,

* Cp. pp. 59-63.



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mil 53

duty, affection. In every form of volition alike, the
self acts and acts from a motive, i.e. we observe ourselves

VoHtion in all its *^ ^*' ^ ^^ moved to act by some-
f omw laroives a thing distinct from ourselves, and to
^^motive," Lc in- identify ourselves with that by which
(X) action; we are moved. All these three ele-

i^tontl ™° ments are necessary to make the
(3) adoption of the motive. Action is not motived, and
is not volitional, or, indeed, " action "
at all, unless the self that is moved identifies itself with
that which moves it, and which thereby becomes a motive,
This is the primi ^^d leads to action. Whether or not
fade fact of Toiitioa. Q^p volitional consciousness is delusive
is not here the question.* We are so far describing only
what our volitional consciousness is, what the average
man means when he says, '^ I did it." He describes an
experience of which this is primd facie the account
to be given. I act — something not myself prompts
me to act — I adopt the prompting. It is not true
to the facts to describe an action simply as moved ; it
is motived, Le. I acquiesce in, or accept, or adopt, the
impulse t receive. It may turn out, on examination
and analysis, that my consciousness of adopting the
motive is a delusion, a delusion which can be traced to
its source — a delusion whose psychological history can
be written out in black and whita None the less the
consciousness of adopting the impulse from without,
and thereby making it a motive, is part of the pHmd
facie fact to be studied or accounted for. Nor, again,
is it true to the facts to say that self-consciousness
constitutes the impulse from without into a motive,

♦ See Note F, on ** Will and Caiiflation."



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54 ^« Essay on Personality

and then to ignore the fact that it is an impulse moving
from without which is thus made into a motive. The
primary fact, the normal experience wherever we act
at all, is a combination of these two facts — we act
under a motive, we make the motive our own under
which we act. May it be said that sometimes, at least,
we are conscious of merely acting? I should answer,
No, always of directed action — action with an aim in
it, action, i.e., already involving something that moves
us to act, and an identification of ourselves with that
which moves us.

This then is the volitional form or aspect of self-
I. The motive in consciousness, whose relation to thought
d^^u^, and ^^^ emotion we have to trace through
L in desire— described three tjrpical forms of volition. The
Se*objeS^™s*i8 ^^™^ ^^ Volitional self-consciousness
desirable;" which naturally offers itself first for

consideration is that which is generally covered by the
term " desire." * In this region of the moral conscious-
ness a thing desired represents the impulse from with-
out — that which moves us to act; and desire is the
going forth of the mind towards the thing with
strength enough to produce the action. As desired,
the object becomes a motive.

The presence of an intellectual element in this type

* The use of " desire " in this general sense disregards distinctions between
impulse, appetite, instinct, etc., on the one hand, and desire on the other, and
indicates, what I believe to be the truth, that the normal representative of the
simplest type of volition is volition directed to an object Psychologists may
discern more mdimentary forms of conative or appetitive consdousnefis, or
they may analyse desire itself, and note the spontaneous element in desire
under such names as impulse, instinct, etc.; but this does not affect the
normal fact that desire for an object is, in common experience, the primary
form of volition.



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JVill 55

of moral consciousness is obvious enough. We desire
an object. Desire, in its simplest form, is represented
rather by a judgment of the form, " This is desirable,"
plainly invoiviiifi: an than by a judgment of the form, ^' I
^S^SfdiS^"" desire this." DesirabiUty or desiredness
from it: in the object is the motive rather than

desire in us. It is upon the object that attention is
concentrated. And the " object " is, so to say, a recog-
nised intellectual product. The "object" is an object
of intellectual self-consciousness, of that form of intel-
lectual self-consciousness which is commonly called per-
ception. Here, then, is an intellectual element already
involved in desire. But desire involves not only an
intellectual perception of the object desired, but also
an intellectual perception of the desirable quality in
the object. Sometimes the matter will so present itself
to the mind that we should rather say there is in the
desire an intellectual perception of the object as it is
and an intellectual perception of the object as it is
desired to be. This only gives us the perception of the
desirable quality in a diflFerent form.

But allowing for both of these as intellectual per-
ceptions, there still remains the motive relation to the
self of the object as it is desired to be. No account
of the intellectual elements in desire exhausts the
matter. Desire is no mere product or result of intel-
lectual perceptions. What we loosely and generally
call the object is a motive as well as an object ; it is
perceived by the knowing self as existing, it moves the
acting self as desirable. The world is to the knowing
self a world of objects, of things that are; to the
acting self a world of impulses, an infinite congeries of



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56 An Essay on Personality

attractions and repulsions — a world of possible satisfac-
tions, of points on which we depend, of focuses of force
that draw us out of ourselves.

Duty represents a form of moral self-consciousness
quite distinct from desire, the consciousness wlyich we
iL in duty, a form of describe whenever we use the words

I^SSS;:^ " I o^gl^*-" Here the obUgatiou re-
judgment I onffhv* presents the impulse from without —
an impulse not, like desire, appealing tcf a need, and
cialling up a response from the spring of action within, but
authoritative, imposing itself upon the self within whose
bounds it appears, and which in obeying the impulse
accepts it as its own and identifies itself with it.

The judgment of obligation differs at once from the
judgment of desire in the form in which it is expressed.

ajadgmentastothe ^^ *^^ judgment of desire, the thing
saiiject of consdons- desired is, as we saw, the subject of the
°^^ judgment — " This is desirable." In

the judgment of obligation, " I ought," the I, the self,
is the subject of the judgment.

The question indeed occurs, in applying to this form
of moral consciousness our definition of " motive,"
but nevertheless whether the "ought," the obligation,
describii^ an impulse is not within US too — whether con-
romwi ou , scieutious action is indeed, as it has

been said to be, " self-movement." It is self-movement
only with the proviso that something other than our-
selves has found a footing in ourselves, and that con-
scientious action is the surrender of ourselves to be
determined by it. I surrender myself to duty always
with the consciousness that the self which surrenders
itself is other than that to which it surrenders itself.



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IVill 57

In other words, we mast maintain that the conscious-
ness of action in obedience to duty is a consciousness
of being moved as well as of being self-moved. This
is, at this stage, the primd facie moral fact, whatever
explanation may remain to be given of it. When we
act upon the impulse of duty, we obey, we are com-
manded, we are obliged, and the authoritative character
of the impulse carries with it at once the implication
that we are moved by something other than ourselves,
and that we adopt the impulse as our own.

And there is an intellectual el^nent in this form of
moral consciousness, though it is different from that
iavoivisffitsown which we saw present in desire. The
formofinteUectiiai judffment which describes the con-

CQoacioiisficss, from ^ ^

which agftin it ia sciousness of duty, the judgment ^^I
distinct as a motive, ought," is an intellectual judgment
equally with the judgment " This is desirable," though
in the form of the expression it is the predicate
instead of the subject which implies the perception of
something different from the self. This perception is
the perception of a law. Under the motive of desire,
the mind is occupied with the particular thing desired
at the moment. Under the motive of duty, it is occu-
pied with a law or rule covering a number of actions.
This in itself implies an intellectual apprehension of a
different kind. It is a different operation of the intellect
which apprehends a law governing a number of different
cases. The perception involved in any generalisation
is different from the "perception" commonly called
perception, the perception of a fact. But it is an in-
tellectual perception, nevertheless, which, merely as a
generalisation, the law of duty involves.



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58 An Essay on Personality

That the consciousness of duty is more than an
intellectual perception of a general truth is implied
in the difference of meaning which attaches to law
with the sense of authority as contrasted with law
merely in the sense of generalisation. The law of
moral consciousness is a motive. And it is a motive
clearly distinct from desire. It is different not only
moti initsdf ^ *^® intellectual operation involved,
different from the The nature of the impulse as authori-
motive of desire: tative makes a difference in the moral
region, in the character of the motive itself. It may
be true that desire in the individual self-consciousness
or in the world carries with it much of the imperative
character. Impulse is authoritative. Desire has in it
something of the nature of a command. Or, again,
it may be true that at certain stages of the moral
history of mankind we come across descriptions of the
moral fact — like the Greek to koKou^ where duty seems
to be regarded as an object of desire, a quality in the
thing to be done which draws the self into action,
rather than an imperative acting upon it within.
But the fact that in such cases as these we seem to
catch duty in the act of disengaging itself from desire
illustrates rather than confuses the distinction between
the two. The facts in either case, in themselves rather
baffing and difficult to describe, become clearer when
viewed as lying on the borderland between the two
regions of volition. The two regions of volition remain
none the less distinct.

The higher motive of social affection and the higher
region of the moral life to which it belongs is more
difficult to describe. It may, perhaps, be indicated thus.



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IVill 59

The history of an imaginary transition from desire to
duty has often been traced by philosophers. It is to
iii in affection— ^^ observed, as to any such history,
tiic common account that it leaves the essential distinction

of the transition from •■ -■ i i • i -i

desire to duty involves between duty and desire untouched;
a sodai tow of that duty as it ultimately emerges from

morals* ^Mrbicn sufif" ^ i • i i

gests a higher social desire is distinct from desire, though
motive, ^^^y jg nevertheless the direct outcome

of desire. But there is another observation to be
made on these speculations. If we start from the man
as a unit of desire, desire, through the sheer impotence
to satisfy desire, binds men into societies,* leads them
to discover this fact about themselves, that they rise to
a higher level of self-satisfaction in a society, and it is
social life that brings with it the new spiritual force or
motive of obligation. This view of duty and the moral
life of men as a social fact has predominated of late.
The moral life is viewed, not so much as an individual


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