Wilfrid Richmond.

The Americana: a universal reference library, comprising the arts ..., Volume 10 online

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and, if his conduct be good, he may look- for-
ward with certainty to retirement at the age of
39 with a life pension. It is not true to say that
all the recruits who enter the Army are good,
or that they all become useful soldiers. Many
are not good, and never become so. But the
unfit are soon 'eliminated and the quality of the
special branches, the Royal Engineers, the
Royal Artillery, the Cavalry and the Guards
is very high. A British regiment returning f rom
India after a long tour of service in that
country, will bear comparison with any body of
fighting men of equal numbers in the world.

The Regular Army of the United Kingdom
consisted, October 1908, of 10,700 officers, 13,-
000 warrant officers, 239,300 non-commissioned
officers and men, or a total of all ranks of
251,300 men.


- Army








Infantry, includ-
ing Foot Guards

Cavalry and Yeo-



Others. .........




















Total officers ex-
cluding Non-




Grand total .






In addition there were about 3,300 men on
the staff and miscellaneous establishments of
the regular army; 2,000 on the permanent staff
of the territorial force; 1,800 militia reserves
and about 5,600 militia and volunteers in the
Channel Islands, Malta, and Bermuda.

The ordinary period of Color Service in the
British Army varies from six to nine years, but
the Brigade of Guards are enlisted for three
years with the Colors, the men having the right
to prolong their service to eight years. Soldiers
are generally permitted, if their conduct has
been good, to extend their first term of service
and to remain with the Colors for 12, and in
some cases, for 21 years. In addition to the
men with the Colors there are the men form-
ing the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve is
an outcome of the great reform accomplished

Digitized by



by Lord Cardwell in 187a That distinguished
War Minister was the first to divide the
soldiers' service into two periods, the first with
the Colors, the second in the Reserve. The Re-
servist is liable to be recalled to his Regiment
in case of war or national emergency only.

The recruits for the Regular Army are
drawn from all parts of the United Kingdom,
as well as from the colonies.

The birthplaces of non-commissioned officers
and men, excluding Indian native troops, ac-
cording to the figures for 1908; are as follows:


Per cent.



RnalMMl ,








walet ;.;:.:....!.;..;....



Scotland *

Ireland, .

India and Cokmies




235, 50Q

The Territorial Force.— The British Army
formerly comprised the Regular Army and the
•Auxiliary Forces,* the latter including the
Militia, the Yeomanry, and the Volunteers. Since
1907 it consists of the 'Regular Army* and the
•Territorial Army.* The term 'Regular Array*
is applied to the regularly embodied troops, and
the army reserve.

The 'Territorial and Reserve Forces Act*
of 1907 abolished the militia as such. Of the
> ' 124 Militia battalions in die United Kingdom
* 74 were converted into reserve battalions of
the Regular Army, viz. : 66 as 3d battalions of
the 66 line regiments (of 2 battalions each),
and 27 as 4th battalions to the same number
of regiments. The Militia Artillery has be*
come, with the exception of certain Irish bat-
talions, units of reserve field artillery, and the
Militia engineer battalions are now turned into
reserve siege and railway companies.

All men of reserve units, whether originally
militiamen or directly recruited, are enlisted as
•special reservists* of the Regular Army. That
is to say, they are partially trained in time of
peace, and are available for transfer to the
Regular Army in time of war, if required. The
period of initial, or recruit, training is six
months for all arms, followed by an annual
training of fifteen days, with the addition of
six days' musketry for the infantry. The 3d
battalions also do the work of regimental depots,
which have been abolished* They are, in fact;
training battalions, supplying material to the
battalions of the first line both in peace and
war. The 27 fourth or 'extra* battalions aj*e
available for service abroad, in event of war,
as entire units. The regular field artillery is
also provided with training units, one group or
'brigade* of three batteries for each of the six
fiela divisions. These units train the special
reservists for the artillery, and are to supply
the ammunition columns on mobilization. Four-
teen reserve cavalry regiments are also to be

The Yeomanry, styled since* ipoi Imperial
Yeomanry* and the volunteers, nave changed
their status. They now form the cavalry and
infantry of the territorial army, which also

comprises a proportionate strength of artillery
(newly created) including horse and field bat-

Recruitment for the territorial army is en-
tirely voluntary, but the conditions are slightly
more onerous than heretofore. Men joining
the territorial forces are attested and enlisted
instead of simply enrolled. The age for enlist-
ment is from 17 to 35 and the period of en-
gagement four years, with the option of re-
engagement for further periods, not exceed-
ing four years, in each case, up to the age of

Discharge can be obtained at any time by
giving three months' notice and paying £5, but
both notice and payment may be dispensed with
in special cases. Training is on 'Volunteer
lines,* that is to say, there is no period of con-
tinuous training for recruits, as in all other
national militias, and the annual training is 15
days in camp as a maximum, and 8 as a mini-
mum. Other drills and rifle practice are car-
ried out in the men's own time. Absence from
training, or failure to complete the necessary
number of drills, renders the territorial soldier
liable to a fine of £5 or less, according to cir-

The territorial army is organized in 14 di-
visions and 14 cavalry brigades, the composi-
tion of which is similar to those of the Regular
Army. Each of the higher units has, or will
have, its proper proportion of artillery and
ammunition columns, medical and other sub-
sidiary services. The officers, except the divi-
sional generals, and some of the brigadiers and
staff officers, are non-professional. A scheme
for the provision of officers by means of oflfi-
cers (volunteer) training corps has been insti-
tuted. These training corps are merely the pre-
existing Volunteer Corps at the Universities
(senior division) and the similar school cadets
(junior division).

All ranks of the territorial forces receive
pay when called out, at the same rates as in
the Regular Army. A reserve for the terri-
torial army has been approved. It is open to
all who have served m the territorial army or
in the old volunteers for 4 years, up to the
age of 40.

The general officers of Commands are re-
sponsible to the Army Council for the train-
ing of all the troops in their Commands, but the
administration of the territorial army is vested
in County Associations, which stand in much
the same relation to the territorial forces as
the War Office does to the Regular Army.
That is to say, thev undertake the raising,
equipment, and maintenance of the force.
They are also charged with the care of reserv-
ists and discharged soldiers. Each County
Association has its own budget, the funds being
provided by the War Office on regularly pre-
pared estimates, based on previous expendi-
ture under the various approved heads. On
mobilization, the units which are to take the
field (called the field army or 'expeditionary
force,* comprising about four fifths of the
regular force at home ; are brought up to full
war strength by the incorporation of the re-
serves. At the same time the special reservist*
are called up and fill the 3d and 4th battalions
of infantry regiments and other reserve units.
A small proportion of these men (7,359) at
once join the field army for service with the

Digitized by



ammunition columns, etc, The remainder will
be available, after further training, to supply
losses in the held. The territorial army, also,
is to be embodied whenever mobilization takes
place, and is then to undergo a training of 6
months, after which it is supposed that the
force will be ready to meet the enemy in event
of an invasion. A certain number of terri-
torial forces belonging to the subsidiary serv-
ices (5>i02) are expected to volunteer, at once
for the field army, and it is, hoped that others
may do so if their services are required.

It will be observed that, for the first time in
the history of the British Army, the necessity
for creating a secondary reserve (answering
to the Ersatz, or supplementary reserve of con-
tinental armies, to make good the waste of
war), has been recognized. The formation of
an organized territorial army is also a great
step in advance. On the other hand there
will be no second line* (properly so called)
except the 27 fourth battalions, and it has un-
fortunately been found necessary to accept re-
cruits for the special reserve at 17 years of age.
Consequently a considerable proportion of this
reserve will not be available for the purpose
for which it was designed.
v According to the estimate for 1910, the
number of regular troops at home was 136,-
302; the number abroad, 121,807. This did not
include the establishment of the native army in
India, which consisted of 165,000 men of all
rank, and which would have brought the total
force maintained abroad to about 300,000, all
battalions in India being practically on a war
footing. The following table shows the estab-
lishment of the regular army, exclusive of
India, according to the latest estimates:

Non-Com- Rank
Branches of Service Officers missioned and
Officers, etc. File
General and Depart-
mental Staff 1 . . 1 ,005 904 i7


Cavalry, inc. Household

Cavalry 563 1,380 ia,524

Royal Artillery 1,338 3.060 28, 579

Royal Engineers 675 * »49i 7 . 248

Infantry, inc. Foot

Guard 3.451 9,632 82,064

Colonial and Native

Indian Corps 289 SOO 7,755

Departmental Corps.... 330 901 i.Sio

Army Service Corps 459 1.367 4. 980

Medical Corps 692 584 3,363

Additional Numbers 300 1 ,000

Miscellaneous Establish-
ments 373 851 243

Total 9.759 23,251 150.190

It was also estimated that the total strength
of the British army, including the regular
army, the army reserves, the special reserves
and the territorial army, was 805,173. The
total cost of the army, exclusive of the troops
in India, was estimated at about $115,000,000,
in iqio.

Bibliography. — The literature dealing with
the British Army in all its aspects is very vol-
uminous. The following works which bear upon
and illustrate the subjects referred to in the
preceding article may be consulted with ad-

•The territorial army is frequently spoken of as the
" second line." But the bestowal of this title does not
enable the force to fulfil the functions of the second line of
Continental armies.

vantage. Fortescue, C A History of the British
Army* (London) ; Scott, 'The British Army,
its Origin, Progress and Equipment* (Lon-
don) ; May, 'Imperial Defence* (London) ;
Ross, 'Representative Government and War* ;
Constable Wilkinson, 'The, Brain of the Army*
(Edinburgh) ; Arnold-Forster, 'The Army in
1906* (London) : 'The Journal of Royal United
Service Institution* (London).

OMcial Publications.— 'The Army Annual
Act*; 'The Army Estimates* (annual);
c Army Orders* ; General Annual Return of
the British Army*; ( Annual Report of the In-
spector of Recruitiner* ; * King's Regulations
and Orders for the Army* ; 'The Militia and
Yeomanry Act* ; 'Regulations for the Militia* ;
'The Reserve Forces Act* ; 'The Reserve Force
and Militia Act* ; 'Regulations for the Volun-
teer Force* O904) ; 'Report of the War Offices
Reconstruction Committee* (1905); 'Report of
the Royal Commission on the War in South
Africa* (The Elgin Commission).

H. O. Arnold-Forster,
Formerly Secretary to the Admiralty and Sec-
retary of State for War; Author of <The
Citizen Reader? i A History of Bngland?
c Jn a Conning Tower? i Our Home Army?

39 (a). Great Britain — England and
Europe. It is the purpose of these observa-
tions to explain, as clearly and as briefly as
possible, the policy of England in Europe as it
has been, as it is, and as, most probably, it will
be. In order to elucidate the problem, it is nec-
essary to look, in the first place, exclusively at
Europe, and then to turn our eyes to England.

For about five centuries after the fall of the
Roman Empire, that is, from the 5th up to the
opening of the nth century, there was one ab-
sorbing issue before Europe. That issue was
whether European civilization was to continue
to exist or not. During that time the Moslems
on the South, the Danes, Swedes, Goths, and
Norwegians from the Cattegat, and eastward
the Slavs and Hungarians swarmed round the
dissolving limbs of Christendom, so that Chris-
tendom bade fair to disappear. As Baronius
said, a it was as if Christ slept in the vessel that
bore mankind.* The 10th century brought
Europe nearest to destruction. But about the
year 1000 an almost magical change began to
operate. Invasion ceased. Europe was saved.
Since that time external barbarism has often
threatened, but never with overwhelming force.

The next epoch of Europe has lasted from
the nth century tip to our own day and is not
yet concluded. Europeans are busy finding a
solution for a problem which has haunted them
for eight centuries. That problem is the re-
organization of Europe after its almost complete
destruction by the barbarians. To the most
profound minds two ways of reconstructing
Europe have presented themselves. The first was
to amalgamate this small continent under one
supreme authority, and to do what the states-
men of China and of America have achieved so
admirably for China and the United States.
Great prestige has attached to that solution be-
cause the Romans had carried it out to a large
extent already with fair political results. But
the solution has derived its fundamental au-

Digitized by



thority from tht fact that there is a certain
amount of reasonableness and utility in the idea
of having one sovereignty to control the penin-
sula which Europe is.

The chief exponents of this great idea can
easily be named. First, there was the mediaeval
Papacy which, springing up in the nth century,
claimed universal sovereignty as a right. As
Pope Gregory VII. said at that date, the Papacy
is the Master of Emperors. .Then in the 13th
century, when the mediaeval Papacy had fallen,
the French monarchy made a similar attempt.
Mathew . Pavis, Peter Dubois, and Jandun all
agreed that France was the new claimant to
universal power. Later Pope Urban, in 1382,
pointed out that ^France desires the universal
monarchy of the world."

The next successor in the field was the House
of Hapsburg. That family fought for this idea
during two centuries, from the middle of the
15th to the middle of the 17th century. * Aus-
tria's mission is to rule the world," was their
motto, and their greatest prince was Charles V.
They came in course of time to rule both at
Vienna and at Madrid. The two branches of the
house were intertwined together. Together they
fell. The decline of the German branch was
registered by the peace of Westphalia in 1648,
and that of the Spanish branch by the peace of
the Pyrenees in 1659.

The next power which strove to raise from
the ground the broken sceptre of the Gesars was
France again, under Louis XIV. Louis inaugu-
rated their policy in 1661. This dream of French
supremacy in Europe was consistently pursued
by France up to 181 5. Its consummate exponent
was Napoleon, who claimed to be the heir of the
Caesars. In the summer of 1808 he attained the
nearest to his ambition when he told Talleyrand
that he was now ^master of Europe.®

After Napoleon had fallen in 181 5, Russia
succeeded to his aspirations. In 1812 she had
extinguished the ambitions of Napoleon in the
Russian snow. The last two centuries had been
a route march for her, East as well as West,
South as well as North. Her day had come she
thought But that is not so certain. The
Crimean War showed her to be not so strong
as she imagined, and since that date, Germany,
under Prince Bismark, has arisen to dispute the
title. Michelet once described Germany as the
India of Europe, vast, vague and unsettled. All
that was ended by the man of blood and iron.
We will not pronounce whether European
supremacy rests at this moment with Russia, at
the head of the Dual Alliance, or with Germany
at the head of the Triple Alliance. Probably it
inclines toward Germany. However that may
be, the struggle for the supremacy lies at pres-
ent between these two powerful champions. Of
the two, Germany appears to claim it with more
zest and resolution.

But in spite of all these constantly renewed
ambitions to grip the supremacy of Europe, all
aspirants to supreme dominion have failed. No
one has been strong enough to reconstitute the
empire of Rome. What force has thwarted this
consummation? It is the force of nationality.
The issue before Europe has been the issue be-
tween despotism and freedom. Freedom has
won. Europe has chosen to organize herself
into a number of mutually independent nations,
some 20 in number, rather than to place herself

in subjection to one supreme authority, whether
of Pope or of Emperor.

The definite appearance of the national spirit,
and therefore of nations, may be dated from the
13th century. At that time a whole cluster of
young nations appeared on the horizon, like a
group of islands, Hawaiian or Philippine, des-
cried far out at sea. Some were powerful, such
as France, or insignificant, such as Austria ; some
monarchial, such as Castile, or republican, such
as Florence; some Slavonic, such as Poland, or
Romance, such as Aragon ; or Teutonic, such as
Holland ; some dying like the Areiate, or full of
the germs of progress, like Brandenburg, or
precarious, like Hungary. What a bewildering
scene ! What an inextricable task to follow the
dance of these atoms for seven centuries up to
ourown day, as they coalesce and disperse and
again amalgamate into the nations which we
know so well!

Enough has been said to make quite plain
what the main history of European politics
really is. It consists of a conflict between two
theories of government embodied in men's pas-
sions. One theory proclaims the advantage of
unity under one authority. The other theory
announces the goodliness of nationality of free-
dom, of a Europe split into many independent
sovereignties. Since the nth century Europe
has been rent by this question. Wars innumera-
ble have been fought over it. Such has been the
fearful legacy of ambition left by the Caesars to
the barbarians.

Having now indicated the nature of the poli-
tics of Europe, let us turn to England, this
minute speck of an islet off the European coast.
What has been her policy as regards this con-
tinent? Japan, an island similarly situated, has
enjoyed an easy time, because China, on the
coast opposite, has been the most peaceable
neighbor in the world. But, as for us, we have
been faced by the most savage and quarrelsome
races, the scum of Asia, almost always at war.
Therefore, we have had perforce to take our
part. We have had imperatively to say whether
we should side with autocracy, as represented
by the Pope, by the Spanish Armada, by
Louis XIV., by Napoleon, by the Czar Nicholas,
and by Bismark; or whether we should side with
the force of freedom ever ready to resist these
powers. It has been somewhat a hard choice.
We have often tried to shut our eyes and take
no part. We have sometimes taken the side of
power and authority, as James I. did in siding
with Spain, or as Charles II. did in siding with
France. But, on the whole, since the days of
William the Conqueror we have sided with
freedom. For the liberties of Europe ever coin-
cide with the interests of England.

Our reason for siding with the liberties of
the Continent has been a practical business
reason. We know perfectly well that the day
of the amalgamation of Europe under one au-.
thority is the day of our destruction. We are J
not strong enough to maintain ourselves against'
a whole hostile continent. We fell inevitably
before Rome, as soon as Rome had mastered the
West. It was only by the most strenuous ef-
fort that we saved ourselves from the latest heir
of the Caesars, — Napoleon. Hence it is that we
have opposed the Papacy, and Spain, and Louis
XIV., and Napoleon, and the Czar. Hence
to-day our profound anxiety at the progress of

Digitized by



German ambition toward Austria and toward
Holland. Hence our love of the balance of
power in Europe which is a conception rooted
in our history, and was as familiar to Henry
VIII. and Wolsey as it is in our own hour to
any of our foreign ministers. Hence our in-
stinctive love of small states, of Holland and
Belgium and Portugal, and Switzerland, each of
which is a bar against autocracy and a pledge of
European freedom. Hence our «perndiousness,»
that is, our aptitude ever to abandon the com-
pany of a too dominant star. Hence at this
moment our love of France whom we disliked
ever since the rise of Louis XIV., but whose
successive falls in 1815 and 1870 have brought
us at last to her side. Hence our profound and
fundamental indifference to European politics, so
long as no power is visibly in the ascendant
across the Channel. Hence, too, the predomi-
nant part which, in all the real crises of Euro-
pean history, England has played. Who but
they thwarted the Pope, and the Hapsburgs,
and Louis XIV., and Napoleon ? Who but they
have proved the ultimate obstacle to Czars and
Kaisers ?

For Americans all this has a good deal of
significance. What is to be the policy of the
United States in Europe ? The interests of the
United States in Europe are nothing like so
vital and immediate as those of England; but
subject to that consideration, they run on
parallel lines. It can never be the interest of the
United States to be faced across the Atlantic
by an united and amalgamated Europe. For,
first, that would mean the conquest of England ;
and next, the power thus organized would be a
menace to the greatness of the United States.
Just as the United States desires the open door
and the balance of power in the Far East, so,
and for the same reason, she needs a Europe in
which national freedom prevails, rather than a
Europe armed under one authority and dictat-
ress of the world. That consideration is not yet
materialized in the American mind. But the day
will come when it will be materialized and then
it will be seen that the identity of the European
policy of England and of the United States con-
stitute yet another link between the two na-

The future of Europe and of England's policy
in Europe remains to be considered. At first
sight it would seem that never before has the
principle of nationality, of freedom, been so
firmly established in Europe, or so much revered.
There seem so many nations, and all so strong.
The project of universal dominion would at first
sight appear hopeless. Where Napoleon failed,
is it likely that anyone can succeed? If all this
be so, then England may rest at peace as regards
♦Europe and devote herself wholly to her duties
oversea. Is it so ? It is not so. The old prob-
lem of eight centuries is still with us, and still
must regulate our policy.

First, though nationality has won, Europe is
paying a fearful price for this victory. The na-
tions have had to arm to the teeth. They are
groaning under their armaments, necessitated
by the ambitions still glowing in the soil of our
volcanic continent. Hence, on all sides, there is
observable beneath the surface a profound re-

Online LibraryWilfrid RichmondThe Americana: a universal reference library, comprising the arts ..., Volume 10 → online text (page 48 of 185)