William Wait.

A treatise upon some of the general principles of the law, whether of a legal, or of an equitable nature, including their relations and application to actions and defenses in general, whether in courts of common law, or courts of equity; and equally adapted to courts governed by codes (Volume 4) online

. (page 101 of 107)
Online LibraryWilliam WaitA treatise upon some of the general principles of the law, whether of a legal, or of an equitable nature, including their relations and application to actions and defenses in general, whether in courts of common law, or courts of equity; and equally adapted to courts governed by codes (Volume 4) → online text (page 101 of 107)
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V. Sohoellkopf, 53 N. Y. (8 Sick.) 152. And see Kimel v. Kimd, 4
Jones (N. C), 121.

Where the damages are in their nature permanent, and go to the
entire value of the estate affected by the nuisance, the whole injury
may be at once compensated. But if it be uncertain or contingent
whether further or other injury may result, there can be a recovery for
the damage sustained only at the commencement of the suit. Thus,
one who so managed the water he uses for his mills, as to wash away
the soil of his neighbor, is liable at once for all the injury occasioned
by its removal, because it is, in its nature, a permanent injury ; but if
his works are so constructed, that upon the recurrence of a similar
freshet, the water will probably wash away more of the land, for this
there can be no recovery, until the damage has actually arisen, because
it is yet contingent, whether any such damage will ever arise. Town
of Troy v, Cheshire R. R. Co., 23 N. H. 83 ; Plumer v. Harper, 3 id.
^88 ; Anonymous, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 147 ; Tkay&r v. Brooks, 17 Ohio
YoL.IV.— 98


489 ; Blunt v. McCormick, 3 Denio, 283. See Cumherland, etc., Co.
V. Hitchings, 65 Me. 140.

The true rule of daanages in an action on the case, brought by a re-
versioner on account of an injury done to the premises, is the amount
of the injury done to the estate as a reversion. Dutro v. Wilson, 4 Ohio
St. 101. See Ramer v. Enowles, 6 Hurlst. & N. 454 ; BatMshill v.
Read, 37 Eng. Law & Eq. 317.

In an action on the case against a railroad company for an injury to
a house and lot in a town, by the construction of a railroad cut, in the
street opposite, it was held to be competent to show that the rental
value of the property was thereby diminished ; but that it was not com-
petent to show that the rent of other property, similarly situated, be-
longing to third persons, was diminished by the same cause. Selvia,
etc., R. R. Co. V. Knapp, 42 Ala. 480. See ante, Vol. 2, title Dami-



Section 1. In general. It has been held that any person in the
community may abate a public nuisance although it causes him no im-
mediate danger. Gunter v. Geary, 1 Cal. 462; Lancaster Turn-
pike Co. V. Rogers, 2 Penn. St. 114. But it is the better doctrine that
a private individual cannot abate a public nuisance, any more than he
can maintain a private action on account of it, unless it be specially in-
jurious to him, and its abatement necessary to enable him to exercise
his rights. State v. Keeran, 5 R. I. 497 ; Coshy v. Owenshoro, etc., R.
R. Co., 10 Bush (Ky.), 288 ; Broimi v. Perkins, 12 Gray, 89 ; Griffith
V. McCullnm, 46 Barb. 561 ; Morris v. Nugent, 7 Carr. & P. 572 ;
Dimes v. Petley, 15 Q. B. 276. Thus, a house kept as a house of ill-
fame and as a resort for thieves and other disreputable persons, is a
common and public nuisance ; but no person has a right to abate such
nuisance by demolishing the building. Barclay v. Commomoealth, 25
Penn. St. 503 ; Welch v. St<mell, 2 Dougl. (Mich.) 332 ; Ely v. Niag-
ara Cminty, 36 N. Y. (9 Tiif .) 297 ; Gray v. Ayres, 7 Dana (Ky.),
375. And see Chenango Bridge v. Lewis, 63 Barb. 111. So, it is
fully established by the recent cases that, if there be a nuisance in the
public highway, a ]>rivate individual cannot of his own authority abate
it, unless it does him a Kj)ecial injury, and he can oidy interfere with
it so far as is necessary to exercise his right of passing along the high-
way, and he cannot justify doing any damage to tlic property of the


person wlio has improperly placed the nuisance in the highway, if avoid-
ing it, lie might have passed on with reasonable convenience. See
Dimes v. Pentlij, 15 Q. B. 276 ; Goldsmith v. Jones^ 43 How. (N. Y.)
415 ; Coll) V. BenneU, 75 Penn. St. 326 ; S. C, 15 Am. Rep. 752 ;
BlmiG V. Klumphsy 29 Cal. 156. But any individual may remove an
unlawful obstruction from a public way, when he has occasion to use it
in a lawful manner, and he may enter upon the land of the party erect-
ing or continuing the nuisance, for the purpose of removing it, doing
as little damage as possible to soil or buildings. Arundel v. J/' Cul-
loch^ 10 Mass. 70. As it respects the abatement thereof, it is import-
ant for the sake of the public peace and to prevent oppression, even on
wrong-doers, not to confound common with private nuisances. In the
c-ase of private nuisances, the individual aggrieved may abate it, if such
abatement involves no breach of the peace, and a public nuisance be-
comes a private one to him who is specially and in some particular way
inconvenienced thereby, as in the case of a gate across a highway,
which prevents a traveler from passing, and which he may therefore
throw down ; but the ordinary remedy for a public nuisance is by in-
dictment, and each individual, who is only injured as one of the public,
can no more proceed to abate than he can bring an action. Mayor of
Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. B, 339 ; Griffith v. McCullum, 46 Barb.
561 ; City of McGregor v. Boyle, 34 Iowa, 268 ; Clark v. Lake St.
Clair, etc., Ice Co., 24 Mich. 508.

Even the worthless and decayed condition of a pub] ic bridge, erected
by authority of law, or the peril attending its crossing, will not author-
ise its destruction or injury by one not suffering particular annoyance
or injury. Owens v. State, 52 Ala. 400. But if a public bridge, in
its original construction and condition, materially impedes the free
navigation on a stream which is a public highway, that fact may be
shown in defense by a person who destroys the bridge to allow a passage
for his raft. Id. So, in StaU v. Farrott, 71 N. C. 311 ; S. C, 17 Am.
Hep. 5, the defendants were held to be guilty of no offense in tearing
down a portion of the railroad bridge over a navigable river, when by
so doing they were removing obstructions to the free navigation of
such river with their boats. See, also. State v. Dibble, 4 Jones' (N. C.)
L. 107 ; Hicks v. Dom, 42 N. Y. (3 Hand) 47 ; S. C, 9 Abb. (N. S.)
47 ; affirming S. C, 54 Barb. 172 ; S. C, 1 Lans. 81. But, in abating
a nuisance, no more injury must be done to the property than is abso-
lutely necessary to effect the object. Id.; State v. Moffett, 1 Greene
(Iowa), 247 ; Death v. Williams, 25 Me. 209.

If a dam be erected across a stream, so as to pen back the water and
flood the lands of a riparian proprietor above, he may abate the portion


of the dam which produces the injury to his land, and an entry for such
purpose upon the premises of the owner below is justifiable. Roberts
V. Rose^ L. E,., 1 Exch. 82 ; Adams v. Barney^ 25 Yt. 225. Where,
however, a nuisance is occasioned by the pollution of a pond of water,
one injured thereby has not the right to fill up the bed of the water,
but he may remove the cause rendering the water impure, or he may
restrain the party whose acts produce that result. Finley v. Hershey^
41 Iowa, 199.

To render a business liable to be abated as a nuisance, it must oe
offensive, unhealthful, etc., to persons of ordinary nature and condition,
and it is not enough that it is offensive merely to delicate and sensitive
organizations. Thus, the use of a warehouse for storing guano in the
ordinary manner cannot be abated, upon showing merely that individual
members of .the complainant's family were nauseated by the odors from
it. Ruffx. Phillips, 50 Ga. 130. And see Meigs v. Lister, 25 N. J.
Eq. 489.

It is held to be neither a cruel nor an unusual pimishment to adjudge
the abatement. McLaughlin v. State, 45 Ind. 338. And the destruc-
tion of property constituting a common-law nuisance, when committed"
for the public safety or health, is not a taking of private property for
public use, without compensation or due process of law, in the sense of
the Constitution. Mamhattan Munuf., etc., Co. v. Yan Keuren, 23 N.
J. Eq. 251. But a power given to a municipal body to abate nuisances
in any manner it may deem expedient is not unlimited, but such
means only are authorized as are necessary for the public good ; and no
wanton or unnecessary injury to the property or rights of individuals
must be committed. Babcock v. City of Buffalo, 56 N. Y. (11 Sick.)

And it is held that the board of health of a city, in the legitimate
exercise of its powers, cannot absolutely prohibit the carrying on of a
lawful business, not necessarily a nuisance, but which may be con-
ducted without injury or danger to the public health, and without pub-
lic inconvenience. They will be confined in their interference witli
tlie lawful business of any indi\-idual, to such inteiTuptions as may be
reasonably necessary to enable them to abate any nuisance he may
create in conducting it. Weil v. R'lcord, 24 N. J. Ecj. 169. See City
of Salem v. Eastern R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 431.

If a house is occupied, although it has itself become a nuisance, it
cannot be abated excc])t under very extraordinary circumstances. Perry
V. FitzJume, 8 Ad. tt El. (N. S.) 757 ; Rex v. Rosewell, 2 Salk. 459.
But an unoccupied liouse, which has become a nuisance to owners of
adjoining property, may be abated by any person who is injured


thereby. Ilarvey v. Dewoody^ 18 Ark. 252. And where a house ob-
structs the exercise of a right of common, the commoner may, after notice
and request to remove the house, pull it do^vn, although it be actually
inhabited at the time. Demies v. Williams, 16 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 546.
So, a dwelling-house, divided into small apartments and thickly inhab-
ited, is a nuisance during the prevalence of the cholera, and may be
abated by persons residing in the neighborhood. Meeker v. Van Reiu-
selaer, 15 Wend. 397. And erecting a building on a public square is
a public nuisance, and may be abated by any one aggrieved thereby.
Rung V. ShoTieberger, 2 Watts (Penn.), 23. See Brightinan v. Bristol,
65 Me. 426 ; S. C, 20 Am. Hep. 711. And a boat, lying in a naviga-
ble stream in such a position as to obstruct the passage of other
boats, may be lawfully moved by any means, as a common and public
nuisance. King v. Sanders, 2 Brev. (S. C.) 111. And see ante, Vol.
1, 60, et seq. But a citizen has no right to abate a public nuisance, if
such abatement involve a breach of the peace. Day v. Day,\ 4 Md.



Section 1. In general. The only defense to an action on the case
for a nuisance is the right to do the act complained of, acquired by
grant, prescription, or by license. It is no defense to an action brought
by one, who has sustained damage, peculiar to himself, from a common
nuisance, that a like injury has been sustained by numerous others.
Francis v. Schoellkopf, 53 N. Y. (8 Sick.) 152. Nor can the existence
of a nuisance be justified or its continuance be demanded by establish-
ing that similar nuisances have been permitted. People v. Mallory, 4
K Y. Sup. Ct. (T. & C.) 567 ; S. C, 2 Hun, 381 ; RoUnson y. Baugh,
31 Mich. 290. Nor is it a defense that the business occasioning the
nuisance is lawful {Fletcher v. Ryland, L. R., 1 Exch. 263), or is
necessary to be carried on and useful to the public {Beardinore v. Tred-
well, 3 Griff. 683), or that it is really a benefit to the plaintiff's proj>
erty. Franels v. Schoellkopf, 53 N. Y. (8 Sick.) 152. Nor is it a
defense that the plaintiff, who was a lessee, rented the premises injured
by the nuisance after the business occasioning the nuisance had been
established, and with knowledge of its existence and for a smaller rent
on that account. Smith v. Phillips, 8 Phil. (Penn.) 10. And in a
prosecution for nuisance, the defendant will not be permitted to show
in justification that the public benefit resulting from his acts is equal
to the public inconvenience. State v. Raster, 35 Iowa, 221. So, the


fact tliat Iho Tiuis;moo was causod by the acts of tho ai]:ont or servant of
the dofoiulaiit, niul without tlio knowlc»li;c of tho lattor, is no dofenso.
Reg. V. iSf<'j)^i<'ns, L. R., 1 Q. B. 702 ; /j\-r v. JAy//<v/, (1 Carr. .<: W 25)2.

A license from the town is held to be no justitication, in an action
for a private nuisance, N^ic/ioh v. J*u'h/, 1 Root (Conn.), 12i>. And
one sued as a tort-feasor, for danuiges, for a private nuisance, cannot
defeiul on the iijroinid that he h:u? injured the ]^laintitf in a riij^ht which
he had no authority to exorcise. JL)idr'u'k v. Johti^on^ 5 Port. (Ala.)

The fact that the place is a niaiuifacturing place doe^^ not justify an
e.i'fraofufhuiri/ use of pmporty, introducing a serious aTnioyance, in ad-
dition to those arisinix fn^n the ordinary uses of property in that local-
ity. Mulligan v. /sV/<?,s\ 12 Abb. (N. 8.) 25i).

§ 2. Prescription. There is no such tliinix as a prescriptive rio^ht
or any otluM- right to maintain a public nuisance. 0(j(h'nshur(jh v.
Lirvejoy, 2 N. V. Sup. Ct. (T. & C.) 83; S. 0. atHnned,'58 N. Y. (18
8icU(W;2: MiUs v. //(///, Wend. 315. Thus, the dainniing of
M'ater, though in acconlance with a ]uvscriptive right, creates or cjiuses
such annoyance as seriously to interfere witli the comftu-table enjoy-
ment of j>ro]»erty, or has a diiVct temleui'v to create sii'kness in the im-
miuliate niMghhtM'hood, it constitutes a nuisant'e to which a claim for
pi-eseription is no defense. Ul. ; RIu)d<s v. ]Vhit<h<(uf, 27 Tex. 304.
See, also, lieg. v. /)/Yu\^f<r, 8 Up. Oan. U. {0. H.) 208 ; Phihidelphiiu
ete.y Ji. li. Co. V. >Shit<\ 20 Aid. 157; JiLOc/u-atiT v. JiriA\^on, 4() l>arb.
92 ; iSM<- V. Jimih'n, 3 S. 0. 438 ; S. C, 16 Am. Rep. 737 ; Jforfmi
V. Moore, 15 Crray, 573. Nor can an encroachment n]>on a street or
public highway he legalized by the mere lapse of time. Cross v.
Mayor of Morristoion, 18 N. J. E(j. 305. And no length of time will
legalize an unauthorizetl obstruction in a navigable stream. IK I.ancy
V. Blizzard, 7 Ilun (N. Y.), 7.

If a ]>arty nuiy acquire a prescriptive right to continue a jwiraU
nuisance, it win only be by continuous use for twenty consecutive yeai*s.
Ca/nj>hi/l v. teaman, iV^^.Y. (18 Sick.) 508; S. C, 20 Am. Rep.
5(»7. Such use and enjoyment must be open as of right {Si>lo?non v.
Viiitiurs Co., 4 llurlst.cfe N. 585 ; ir/W^/y; v. /lmly>^i/i, 10 E.xeh.
5), anil with the knowleilge, actual or ]u-esunuvl, of tjie person owning
the fee. W<»h/ v. VkiI, 5 l>. ^V: Aid. 454; i\i<'/u)h v. Aylor, 7 Leigh
(Vh.\ 54»;.

The extent of thi> right of flowagi^ actpiinsl by ]>n.^scription is not
mejisured by tlu* claim which the owner of the dominant tenement
makes during the |»eriod of ])reseri]>tion, nor by tho height of the
structure of the dam he maintains on his own land. P)Ut it is limitetl


to the lines of the actual en joyineiit of the easement, as evidenced by
the extent to which the hind of the owner of tlic servient tenement
was habitually or usually flowed during the period of prescription.
Horner v. StUlwdK 35 N. J. Law, 307. The mode and manner of
the user cannot be materially chanf^ed or varied to the injury of others,
unless the use, as changed, hae been continued for a period of twenty
years. Prentice v. Geiger^ 9 Jlun (N. Y.), 350. And sec Stihs v.
Hooker, 7 Cow. 266 ; Nayes v. Morrill, lOS Mass. 396 ; liexford v.
Marquis, 7 Lans. (N. Y.) 249. Thus, where a dam had been in ex-
istence more than twenty years, but had. been raised a foot higher
within twenty years, the occupant, in defense to an action against him
for backing up the water to the injury of property above, claimed a
prescriptive easement, and it was held that to establish the prescription
the easement must have been enjoyed for twenty ycare, to the extent
claimed at the trial. Postlethwaite v. Payne, 8 Ind. 104. See, also.
Dyer v. Depui, 5 Whart. (Penn.) 584.

It was held in .Croshy v. Bessey, 49 Me. 539, that where a tanner has
thrown his ground bark into a stream for more than twenty years, he
does not thereby acquire a right by prescription to do so, to the injury
of the owner of land on the same stream below, on wliich the nat-
ural action of the water deposits the bark, unless it appears that tlie
bark has been deposited on the same land, with the same injuiy, for
the whole term of twenty years. And althougli the t<anner and those
under whom he claims have thrown their ground bark into the stream
for more than twenty years, yet, if the owner of the land below has
not been thereby annually damaged until witliin the last six years,
this is not sufficient to establish a right by prescription, and the owner
of the land injured may maintain an action for damages. And see
Webster v. Flemming, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 518 ; Ncrrton v. Volentine,
14 Yt. 239.

It has, however, been held that the unifonn and uninterrupted di-
version of water from a running stream for a period of twenty years,
gives a title by prescription, and that it is not necessary that the water
should be used in precisely the same manner, or applied in the same
way ; but that no change could be made which would l>e injurious to
those whose interests are involved. Stein v. Burden., 24 Ala. 130.

A prescription to render running water unfit for drinking or domes-
tic pui-poses requires the strictest proof. And if an upper riparian pro-
prietor claims the right of prescription to pollute tlie stream, he caimot
do it to a greater extent than it was polluted at the commencement of
the period of prescription. That is to say, if tlie pollution at the time
was slight or not injurious to any extent, he cannot, at any time within


that period, increase it five or ten fold, so as entirely to destroy the
water for domestic use. The right must be measured by the enjoy-
ment, and it cannot be used in a different and more extensive manner.
McCallum V. Germantown Water Co.^ 54 Penn. St. 40.

That a use for twenty years is sufficient to legalize a noisy nuisance,
see Elliotson v. Feetham, 2 Bing. N. C. 134 ; S. C, 2 Scott, 174.
And see, as to the right of prescription to exercise a trade which sends
smoke and offensive stenches over neighboring premises, Roberts v.
Clarke, 18 L. T. (N. S.) 48 ; Bliss v. Hall, 4 Bing. N. C. 183 ; 6
Scott, 500 ; Charity v. Riddle, 14 E. C. (S. C.) 340.

"Where one ground of defense to an action for the obstruction of a
water-course was a right in the defendant, acquired by prescription, to
raise the water, in the manner and to the height alleged, it was held
that at the time when his dam was in the course of erection, and be-
fore it was so far completed as to permanently raise the water and set
it back upon the plaintilTs premises, was not to be included in the
duration of the use from which the prescriptive right was claimed.
Branch v. Doane, 17 Conn. 401. And see Polly v. McCall, 37 Ala.
20 ; Roundtree v. Brantley, 34 id. 544 ; Murgatroyd v. Rolymson, 7
El. & Bl. 391. See Parker v. Foot, 19 Wend. 309 ; Young v. Spen-
cer, 10 B. & C. 145. See ante. Vol. 2, tit. Easements.

§ 3. Legalized nuisances. A work authorized by the legislature
cannot be adjudged a nuisance, if executed in an authorized manner, in
an authorized place. Easton v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 24 N. J.
Eq. 49 ; Stoudinger v. Newark, 28 id. 187, 446 ; Rex v. Pease, 4
Bam. & Ad. 30. Thus, a person or a corporation having legal author-
ity to construct a railroad or a turnpike, or to erect a bridge over a
navigable stream, or to carry on a particular kind of business, cannot
Ije proceeded against as for the erection or maintenance of a public
nuisance {People v. New York Oa^s-Light Co., G Lans. [N. Y.] 467 ;
S. C, 64 Barb. 55 ; Danville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 73
Penn. St. 29 ; Beckett v. Upton, 33 Eng. Law & Eq. 108 ; State v.
Williamstown Turnpike Co., 4 Zabr. [N. J.] 547 ; Vasan v. South Car-
oli/na R. R. Co., 42 Ga. 637) ; provided, however, that the nuisance
arises as a necessary and probable result of the act done in pursuance
of the authority conferred. Reg. v. Bradford Navigation Co., 6
Best & Sm. 631 ; Richardson v. Vermont Central R. R. Co., 25 Vt.
465. Thus, where an act of the legislature declared a stream to be
navigable, and ])rohibitcd the obstruction of tlie navigation thereof, by
the erection of dams or otherwise, and a subsequent act authorized a
person therein named to erect a dam across such stream, it was held
tliat the only effect of the latter act was to remove the restriction im-


posed by the former act, and relieve the person building a dam in pur-
suance of the authority given to him, from liability to prosecution, by
indictment or otherwise, for obstructing the navigation, and that it af-
forded no protection for nuisances occasioned by the dam in other
respects. Clark v. Mayo7\ etc.^ of Synicxise^ 13 Barb. 32. It is like-
wise to be understood that a legislative grant operates as an excuse or
defense only against those ticts which, in the exercise of the highest
degree of care and skill to avoid injurious results, still operate injuri-
ously. If negligence can be shown, an individual or a corporation will
be held liable for all the consequences civilly and criminally, resulting
therefrom, notwithstanding the grant. Crittenden v. Wilson, 5 Cow.
165; People v. President, etc., of New York G as-Light Co., 6 Lans.
(N. Y.) 467 ; S. C, 6-4 Barb. 55 ; Walker v. Board of PuUic Works,
16 Ohio, 540; Louisville v. Polling MIU Co.,^ Bush (Ky.), 416 ;
Wilson V. City of New Bedford, 108 Mass. 261 ; S. C, 11 Am. Rep.
352 ; Lee v. Pemlrroke Iron Co., 57 Me. 481 ; 2 Am. Rep. 59 ; Bis-
coe V. Great Eastern Pailway Co., L. R., 16 Eq. Cas. 636 ; S. C,
7 Eng. R. 630 ; Picket v. Metropolitan Pailway Co., L. R., 2 II. L.
175. And the act must not be in excess of the power given {Common-
wealth V. Old Colony P. P. Co., 14 Gray, 93) ; and the fact that the
excess arises from a misapprehension of the power conferred is no
excuse. Hudson Piwer P. P. Co. v. Artcher, 6 Paige, 83 ; Sandford
V. Pailroad Co., 24 Penn. St. 378. A railroad authorized by its char-
ter to be made at one place, if made at another, is held to be a mere
nuisance on every highway it touches in its illegal course. Comrnon-
wealth V. Erie, etc., P. P. Co., 27 id. 339.

So, an individual or a corporation has no authority to obstruct the
navigation of a river, under a legislative grant of power, merely for the
building of a bridge across the river, when the bridge can reasonably
be constructed so as not to destroy the navigability of the river. Hickok
v. Iline, 23 Ohio St. 523 ; S. C, 13 Am. Rep. 255.
Vol. lY— 99


ABATEMENT : " page.

Of nuisance by individnals 778

Right to abate public nuisance 778

Destruction of building ; 778

Removing obstruction in highways 778

Removing bridges 779

Removing portions of dams 779

Of business as a nuisance 780

Of occupied houses 780

Must not involve a breach of the peace 781


Insurance against 108

Death by, defined 108

(See Insurance; Accident.)


When interest allowed upon , . .• 129

When interest is not allowed upon 130


By innkeepers 11

Against innkeepers 12

Of mandamus 357

For malicious prosecution 337

Of interpleader 149

On contracts of insurance , . 120

By joint-stock companies 167

Against joint-stock companies ^ 167

By tenants in common and joint tenants 181

Against tenants in common and joint tenants 182

Between tenants in common and joint tenants 182

Upon judgments 184, 193

Upon decrees 197

For rent 269

Who may maintain 270

For use and occupation 270

Recoupment in 272

Defenses to 272

Of covenant 273

Of waste 273

788 INDEX.

ACTION— Continued: page.

Of ejectment 274

Of covenant by tenant ; 275

By tenant 275

Specific performance of agreement to lease 275

Ejectment 275

Eeplevin 276

Trespass 276

Action on case ... 277

Forcible entry and detainer 278

For libel • 297

Pleadings in .- 298

Plaintiffs 299

Defendants 300

Damages - 301

Special damages 302

Amount of recovery 303

Defenses to 304

To enforce liens 321

Against master for breach of contract 401

For injuries to servant 406

For money lent ' 447

For money paid 449

For money received 469

For negligence 653

For nuisance .* 726


When chargeable with interest 139

Interpleader by 158

Power to lease 224

Lial)ilities for waste 274


Mortgages to secure future 541


By tenants in common 178

Renders lease void 260

Title by 260


lusuranco n^ents 26

Wliu tliey reprcisent 27

Liability of principal for errors of 27

Online LibraryWilliam WaitA treatise upon some of the general principles of the law, whether of a legal, or of an equitable nature, including their relations and application to actions and defenses in general, whether in courts of common law, or courts of equity; and equally adapted to courts governed by codes (Volume 4) → online text (page 101 of 107)