William Wait.

A treatise upon some of the general principles of the law, whether of a legal, or of an equitable nature, including their relations and application to actions and defenses in general, whether in courts of common law, or courts of equity; and equally adapted to courts governed by codes (Volume 4) online

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Online LibraryWilliam WaitA treatise upon some of the general principles of the law, whether of a legal, or of an equitable nature, including their relations and application to actions and defenses in general, whether in courts of common law, or courts of equity; and equally adapted to courts governed by codes (Volume 4) → online text (page 48 of 107)
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ages, lie must give special evidence. Delegall v. nighUy, 8 C. & P.
444. In estimating tlie damages in such cases, the jui'j must have
before them some evidence as to the nature and extent of the basiness
carried on by tlie plaintiff, he not l>eing entitled to the same amount
of damages in a case where his business is small as where it is large.
Ingrain, v. Lawson, G Bing. JST. C. 212. Where the libel is con-
tained in a newspaper, evidence is admissible to show the extent of the
circulation of tlie paper, and the consequent injury to the plaintiff. Gatli-
ercole v. Miall^ 15 M. & W. 319 ; and see Cass v. New Orleans Times,
27 La. Ann. 214.

In general, mere apprehension of future ill consequences cannot
constitute special damage. But in an action for a libel upon a copart-
nership it was held that the jury, in estimating the damages, might
take into consideration the prospective injury which might accrue to
the firm from the defendant's act. Gregory v. Williams, 1 Car. & K.
568 ; see Goslin v. Carry, 8 Scott JS". K. 25 ; Pugli v. MoCarty, 40
Ga. 444.

Evidence is not admissible in relation to damages to other persons
than the plaintiff, although they be also assailed in the libel ; as where
the libel contains an imputation that the plaintiff keeps a gaming
house nnder the leadership of a woman of notorious character. Guy
V. Gregory, 9 C. & P. 584.

The court will not disturb the verdict on account of the amount
of damages nnless they are grossly excessive. Hoot v. King, 4 Wend.
113; Sanders x. Johnson, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 51; Cassin x. Delaney,
38 K Y. (11 Tiff.) 178.

If there be no actual injury the jury may find a verdict for nom-
inal damages. WaJcelin v. Jlorrls, 2 F. & F. 26. The report of a
company, containing imputations on the plaintiff as manager, was
issued to the shareholders and afterward published in a newspaper.
It was held that, although privileged as regarded the shareholders,
it was not so in respect to its insertion in the newspaper ; but that, if
the latter publication was made hona fide and without malice, the jury
would be justified in giving yierely nominal damages. Davis v. Cut-
lush, 1 F. tfc F. 487. Where the plaintiff", knowing the defendant's
sentiments, procures the publication, he cannot afterward ascribe his
loss to the defendant's act, but will be deemed the voluntary author of
it. Rogers v. CVfton, 3 B. & P. 592 ; S. C, 5 Esp. 15.

304 LIBEL.



Section 1. In general. The defendant may show that the alleged
libel was not in fact written and used in an injurious and actionable
sense ; or that lie liad nothing to do with its composition or publica-
tion ; or that it does not relate to the plaintiif ; or that, in the delivery
of the libel, he acted in honest ignorance of its contents, and did not
know, or have any reason to suppose, that the act was illegal. Under-
wood V. Paries, Str. 1200 ; Mullett v. IluUon, 4 Esp. 248. Where
it appeared that five packets addressed to as many different jjersons,
and inclosed in one, which was directed to the defendant, was received
at the coach office where he was porter, and that he delivered them,
it was held that, although if the jury found that he did so in the course
of his business and in ignorance of the contents, he was not liable, yet
that it was incumbent upon him to show such ignorance. Day v. Bream,
2 Mood. & Rob. 54. When the libelous matter is sold by an agent of
the defendant, in a shop, in the usual course of business, the defend-
ant may rebut the presumption of a publication with his knowledge and
privity by proving that the libel was sold contrary to his orders in his
absence, or clandestinel}^, or when he was confined to his house by
sickness, or in prison, to which his agent had no access. liex^ v. Almon,
5 Burr. 2GS9, per Astox, J.

It may be shown in defense that the plaintiff himself procured the
act to be done of whicli he complains {King v. Waring, 5 Esp.
13 ; Smith v. Wood, 3 Camp. 323 ; Weatherston v. Jlawliiis, 1
Term R. 110) ; or that the libel was concerning the plaintiff's conduct
in an illegal transaction ( Yrisarri v. Clement, 3 Bing. 432) ; or that
the plaintiff's businesss in relation to which the libel was published
was illegal. Hunt v. Bell, 1 Bing. 1 ; Manning v. Clement, 7 id.

§ 2. Privilegejl coninninications. A privileged communication
means that the occasion of making it rebuts \\\q prima facie infer-
ence of inalicc arising from the ]>u])lication of matter prejudicial to
the cliaracter of tlic plaintiff, and tlirows upon him the burden of
proving malice in fact, but not by i>roving it hy extrinsic evidence
only. He has still a right to require that the alleged libel shall be
submitted to the jury, that they may judge whether there is evidence
of malice on the face of it. WrigJd v. Woodgate, 2 Cromp. M. Sz R.
573 ; Saunders v. Baxter, C Ileisk. (Tenn.) 3G9. The description of

LIBEL. 305

cases recognized as privileged communications must be understood as
founded upon some apparently recognized obligation, legal, moral, or
social, which may fairly be presumed to have led to the publication,
and, therefore, prima facie, relieves it of the implication from which
the genial rule is deduced. ^YMte v. WlcholU, 3 How. (U. S.) 2GG ;
and see Lucas v. Case, 9 Bush (Ky.), 297. Many of what are
called privileged communications are conditionally, not absolutely,
privileged ; the question being one of good faith or motive, which
can only be settled by a jury. The court cannot rule that such
a communication is privileged, without assuming the conditions on
which it is held to be privileged, namely : that it was made in good
faith, foi a justifiable purpose, and with a belief, founded on reasona-
ble grounds, of its truth. Palmer v. Concord, 48 N. H. 217.
Whether or not the communication was privileged is a question of law
for the court ; but whether the defendant fairly and properly con-
ducted himself in the exercise of it is a question of fact for the jury.
Genet v. Mitchell, 7 Johns. 120 ; Thomas v. Croswell, id. 264 ; Bun-
ton. \. Worley, 4 Bibb (Ky.), 38 ; mff v. Bennett, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.)
120 ; Briggs v. Bi/rd, 12 Ired. (JS. C.) 377 ; White v. Carroll, 42 N.
Y. (3 Hand) 161 ; 1 Am. Rep. 503 ; see Carpenter v. Bailey, 56 N.
H. 283.

The publication of legislative proceedings, and of memorials and other
communications properly relating thereto, is absolutely privileged {Hare
V, Mellor, 3 Lev. 169 ; Wason v. Walter, L. R., 4 Q. B. 73 ; Bake v.
King, 1 Saund. 131 ; Cojfiii v. Cojjin, 4 Mass. 1); but not a publica-
tion charging a member of the legislature with corruption. Little-
john V. Greeley, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 41.

Any publication made in the ordinary course of judicial proceed-
ings by judges, magistrates, and others is privileged. The same is
true of a correct report of judicial proceedings, although the person
complaining of the publication was not a party to the proceedings ; and
also of an abridged report, if substantially a fair account of what took
place. Andrews v. Chapman, 3 Car. & K. 289 ; Torrey v. Field, 10
Vt. 353 ; Hill v. Miles, 9 N. H. 9 ; Sanders v. Rollinson, 2 Strobh.
(S. G.) 447; Briggs v. Byrd, 12 Ired. (N. C.) 377; Hartsoch v.
Reddick, 6 Blackf . (Ind. ) 255 ; Holt v. Parsons, 23 Texas, 9 ;
Marsh v. Ellsioorth, 50 N. Y. (5 Sick.) 309 ; Ackerman v. Jones, 5 J.
<fe Sp. (N. Y.) 42. Where the president of a court-martial, in the opin-
ion of the court whicli he delivered to the judge-advocate, animad-
verted in severe terms of censure upon the conduct of an officer who
preferred to the court groundless and malicious charges against his
commander, it was held privileged. Jekyll v. Moore, 6 Esp. 63. It is an
Vol. IV.- 39

306 LIBEL.

established principle upon which the privilege of publishing the report of
a judicial proceeding is admitted to rest, that such report must be strictly
confined to the actual proceedings in court, and must contain no
defamatorj observations or comments from any quarter, in addition to
what forms strictly and properly the legal proceedings {^Delegall v.
Highley, 8 C. & P. 444) ; but the fact that it is couched in coarser
language than is consistent with good taste and decorum will not ren-
der it libelous. Warner v. Payne, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 195 ; Garr v.
Selden, 4 N. Y. (4 Comst.) 91.

A comraunicatian fairly made in the discharge of a public duty is
privileged. Moore v. Butler, 48 'N. H. 161 ; Vanwyck v. Guthrie,
4 Duer (jST. Y.), 268. Therefore, a complaint submitted to a magis-
trate for the purpose of enforcing justice against a person accused of
crime does not subject the complainant to an action for libel, Avhether
the charge be true or false. Ilartsoch v. Reddick, 6 Blackf. (Ind.)
255 ; Bailey v. Dean, 5 Barb. 297 ; Noonan v. Orton, 32 Wis. 106 ;
Beid V. McLendon, 44 Ga. 156. It is lawful to publish the testimony
of witnesses taken before a committee of congress {Terry v. Fellows,
21 La. Ann. 375) ; and where a party, upon a preliminary examina-
tion before a magistrate, has been released, an impartial and correct report
of the proceedings is privileged. Duncan v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 556.
A person may make application by complaint for the removal of an
unworthy officer, and, if the complaint be true and made M'ith the hon-
est intention of giving information, and not maliciously, or with
intent to defame, the complaint will not be a libel. Larkin v.
Noonan, 19 Wis. 82 ; see Carpenter v. Bailey, 56 N. II. 283.

The editor of a newspaper is privileged in commenting fully and
freely upon all public questions and matters of general public interest
{Dunne v. Anderson, liy. & M. 287 ; Com. v. Featlierstone, 9 Phil,
[Penn.] 594) ; and the public conduct of public men may be discussed
with the greatest freedom, provided the language be kept within the
limits of an honest intention to discharge a public duty. Seymour v.
Butter loorth, 3 F. & F. 372 ; Parmiter v. Coupland, 6 M. & W. 107 ;
Tan Wyck v. Aspinwall, 17 N. Y. (3 Smith) 190 ; Oydefi v. Morti-
mer, 28 L. T. (N. S.) 801. When any one consents to be a candidate
for a public office, he must be considered as putting his character in
issue, so tar as resj^ects his fitness and qualifications for the otfice ; and
publications of the truth on this subject, with the honest intent of
informing the peo])lc, are not libelous. Co7n. v. Claj>, 4 Mass. 169 ;
Com. V. Odell, 3 I'ittsb. (Penn.) 449. The editor of a newspaper may
lawfully publish the fact that a person has been arrested, and upon
what charge. Usher v. Severance, 20 Mo. 9. So comments in

LIBEL. 307

a newspaper upon the report of a trial which has terminated, fairly
made, without malice, and founded on the facts, are privileged. Wason
V. Walter, L. R., 4 Q. B. 73 ; 8 B. & S. 671. Whether an allegation
in a divorce bill, which is "put upon the files of the court, charging the
defendant therein with adultery with another person named, will war-
rant the publication of tlie charge by a newspaper as a matter of priv-
ilege is questioned in Scripps v. Beilly, 35 Mich. 371.

A fair criticism of the work of another is privileged {Carr v. Hood,
1 Camp. 355, note ; Thompson v. Shackell, 1 M. & M. 187; Tabert v.
Tipper, 1 Camp. 350 ; Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S. 778 ; Hunter
V. Sharpe, 4 F. & F. 983 ; Swan v. Tappan, 5 Cusli. 104) ; and so
likewise is a fair criticism of advertisements, handbills, and placards
{Paris V. Levy, 9 C. B. [K. S.] 342) ; and also fair comments upon
public entertainments {Dibdin v. Bostock, 1 Esp. 29) ; or in relation
to the conduct and appearance of persons attending a public meeting
^Davis V. Duncan, L. R., 9 C. P. 396 ; 10 Eng. Rep. 228) ; and fair
and reasonable comments, however severe in terms, may be published
in a newspaper concerning any thing which is made by its owner a
subject of public exhibition, and are privileged communications for
which no action will lie, without proof of actual malice. Gott v.
Pidsifer, 122 Mass. 235.

The general rule is, that a party cannot be held liable for a publica-
tion tending to disparage private character, if it is called for by the
ordinary exigencies of social duty, or is necessary or proper to enable
him to protect his own interest, or that of another, and provided it is
made in good faith, and without a willful design to defame. But the
privilege does not extend beyond those to whom the party giving the
information owes the duty. Blackham v. Pugh, 2 C. B. 611 ;
15 L. J. C. P. 290; Morgan v. Lingen, 8 L. T. (N. S.) 800 ; Jlrehs
V. Oliver, 12 Gray, 239 ; Sanderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. (1 Sick.)
188; 7 Am. Rep. 322; lainh v. Colly, id. 427; 7 Am. Rep. 360;
Beardsley v. Tappan, 5 Blatchf. (C. C.) 497; Atwill v. Mack-
intosh, 120 Mass. 177. An advertisement in a newspaper, though
injurious to the character of the persons mentioned in it, is not libel-
ous if it was inserted bona fide, with a view of investigating a fact in
which the party making it is interested. Delany v. Jones, 4 Esp. 191.
A letter written to persons who employed A as their solicitor, convey-
ing charges injurious to his professional character in the management
of certain matters which they had intrusted to him, and in which the
writer of the letter was likewise interested, was held not to be a libel,
the vrriter acting hona fide, with a view to the interests of himself and
the persons whom he addressed. McDougall v. Claridge, 1 Camp, 267.

308 LIBEL.

A railway company may publish a placard at the stations on their
road, giving the name, address, and occupation of a person who has
been convicted before a magistrate of any infringement of the com-
pany's by-laws, stating the nature of the offense and the punishment.
Brings v. Great Eastern B. B. Co., 16 W. R, 908 ; Alexander v.
North Eastern B. B. Co., 6 B. & S. 340. And a report of an incor-
porated society, cautioning the public against trusting a person who
had formerly been employed by them to obtain and collect subscrip-
tions, but who had afterward been dismissed, if true, is privileged.
Gassett v. Gilbert, 6 Gray, 94. So a medical society may publish, in
good faith, a true account of the proceedings of the society in expell-
ing a member. Barrows v. Bell, 7 Gray, 301. See Bhila. B. B. Co.
V. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 202. A memorial to the post-office de-
partment, charging that a successful competitor for proposals has been
guilty of fraud and collusion with other bidders, is a privileged com-
munication. Cooh V. Hill, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 341. A petition ad-
dressed by the creditor of an officer in the army to the secretary of war
hona Jlde, and with a view of obtaining through his interference the
payment of a debt, and containing a statement of facts, which, though
derogatory to the officer's character, the creditor believed to be true, is
not a libel for which an action can be maintained. Fairinan v. Ives
5 Barn. & Aid. 642.

A publication made in the regular course of church discipline, to or
of members of the churchy is lawful {Lucas v. Case, 9 Bush [Ky.],
297); but not a publication respecting a stranger, whose character is
implicated by it. Bex v. Hart, 1 W. Bl. 386 ; Farnsworth v.
Storrs, 5 Cush. 412; Coomhs v. Bose, 8 Blackf, (Ind.) 155 ; Streety v.
Wood, 15 Barb. 105. See Bemingtony. Congdon, 2 Pick. 310 ; York
V. Johnson, 116 Mass. 482.

Where the writer is acting on any legal or moral duty toward the
person to wliom he writes, or is bound by his situation to protect the
interests of such person, that which he writes under such circumstances
is a privileged communication, unless the writer was actuated by
malice. Cockayne v. Hodyklsson, 5 Car. & P. 543. A widow lady
being about to marry the plaintiff, her son-in-law wrote her a letter
containing imputations on the plaintiff's character, and urging her to
make diligent and extensive inquiry as to such character. It was lield
justifiable, if the jury were satisfied that the defendant acted hona fide,
altliough the imputations contained in the letter were false, or l)ased
upon erroneous information. Circumstances of this kind should be
viewed liberally by juries ; and unless they see clearly that there was a

LIBEL. 309

malicious intention of defaming tlie plaintiff, the defendant should be
acquitted. Todd v. Hawkins, 8 Car. & P. 88.

When a master gives a character of a servant, it will be presumed,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the character was given
in good faith ; and the servant to maintain an action must prove that
the character given was both false and malicious. Fountain v. Boodle,
3 Q. B. 11 ; Bogers v. Clifton, 3 B. & P. 587 ; Dale v. Harris, 109
Mass. 193; Hatch v. Lane, 105 id. 394. When a master, having
given a servant a good character, subsequently discovers that the serv-
ant was dishonest, he has a right, and it is his duty, to make known
the fact to the person seeking information. Gardner v. Slade, 13 Q.
B. T99 ; Fowles v. Bowen, 30 N. Y. (3 Tiff.) 20. But the language
used must be such as to negative any inference of malice. Phila. <&
a R. R. Co. V. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 202.

A military man giving evidence before a military court of inquiry,
which has no power to administer an oath, is entitled to the same pro-
tection as that enjoyed by a witness on oath in an ordinary judicial
tribunal. Daiokins v. Rokehy, L. R., 7 H. L. Cas. 744.

§ 3. What communications are not privileged. A publication is
not privileged, unless made in pursuance of some public or private duty
{Com. V. Featlierstone, 9 Phila. [Penn.] 594) ; and the privilege does
not extend beyond the occasion or person calling for the exercise of the
duty. Sunderlin\. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. (1 Sick.) 188; 7 Am. Pep-
322. A defamatory writing signed by the chairman of a public meet-
ing, called to select a candidate for governor of the State, and published
by order of the meeting, is not privileged. Lewis \. Few, 5 Johns. 1-
If the communication be made maliciously, or is not believed to be
true by the party making it, it will not be protected. Ward v. Smith,
6Bing. 749; Tuson v. Fvans, 12 Ad. & Ed. 733; 3 P. & D. 396 ;
Wakefield v. Smithwick, 4 Jones Q^. C), 327 ; Fry v. Bennett, 3
Bosw. (N. Y.) 200 ; Palmer v. Concord, 48 N". li. 211 ; Rector v.
Smith, 11 Iowa, 302 ; Flam v. Badger, 23 111. 498 ; Park v. Pied-
mont Life Ins. Co., 51 Ga. 510.

The privilege in respect to judicial proceedings does not apply0vhen
the court has no jurisdiction {McGregor y. Thioaites, 3 B. &C. 24;
Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461) ; nor when the publication relates
to a matter not pertinent to the issue. Torrey v. Field, 10 Yt. 353 ;
Gilbert v. People, 1 Denio, 41. Where a party, * in applying to
the court for an extension of time to file a transcript, charged his
attorney with having entered into a collusive agreement with the
attorney of the adverse party, it was held libelous per se. Wyatt v.
BueU, 47 Cal. 624. A publication of calumnious statements, made by

310 LIBEL.

counsel in the trial of a cause, is not privileged. Saunders t. Mills,
6 Bing. 218. Publishing of a judge that he is wanting in integrity
and capacity is actionable. Robhins v. Treadway, 2 J. J. Marsh. 540 ;
Matter of Moore, 63 IS". C. 397. The report of a trial is not privileged,
unless it gives a true account of the proceedings. Clement v. Lewis,
3Brod. ifeB. 297; 7 Moore, 200; Flint x. Pike, 4 B. & C. 484;
Shechell v. Jackson, 10 Cush. 25. It is, therefore, libelous to add to
such report the publisher's own observations, in which it is insinuated
that the plaintiff committed perjury. Stiles v. Nokes, 7 East, 493.

Where a person accused of crime, after .an examination before a
magisti'ate, has been committed for trial, or held to bail, a report of the
proceedings is not privileged. Lewis v. Levy, El. Bl. & Ell. 537 ; 27
L. J. Q. B. 282 ; Stanley v. Well, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 21. And although
it is lawful, to publish in a newspaper the fact that a person has been
arrested on a criminal charge, it is libelous to state that such person is
guilty. Usher v. Severance, 20 Me. 9. A newspaper article changing
the theft of letters was held not to be actionable in the absence of ex-
trinsic facts going to show the meaning of the article to be a charge of
theft by the plaintiff. Smith v. Coe, 22 Minn. 276.

Editors of newspapers must exercise their right to discuss matters of
public interest fairly, without a reckless disregard of private rights. Sny-
der V. Fulton, 34 Md. 128; 6 Am. Rep. 314; Cass v. Neio Orleam
Times, 27 La. Ann. 214 ; Smith v. Trihune Co., 4 Bis. (C. C.) 477 ; Joan-
nes V. Jennings, 6 N. Y. Sup. (T. & C.) 138 ; S. C, 4 Hun, m.
And it will be no defense to a false and defamatory article, that it was
taken from another paper {Curtis v. Mussey, 6 Gray, 261) ; nor that
it was the subject of common report. Fuller v. Dean, 31 Ala. 654 ;
Haskins v. Lumsden, 10 Wis. 359. A false and calumnious publica-
tion, concerning a candidate for office, is not privileged {Powers v.
Dulois, 17 Wend. 63 ; Seely v. Blair, AVright [Ohio], 358 ; Com. v.
Odell, 3 Pittsb. [Penn.] 449 ; Aldrich v. Press Printing Co., 9 Minn.
133) ; nor one relative to a person as a member of the legislature, after
his term of office has expired {Cramer v. Riggtt, 17 Wend. 20^) ; nor
publiaking of a politician, that he was paid large sums of money for
procuring the appointment of persons to office by the governor ( Weed
y. Foster, 11 Barb. 2»)3) ; nor a false publication concerning the trustee
of a mining association, although it relates to a matter of public inter-
est; and is publisliftd in good faith, and without malice ( Wilson v. Fitch,
41 Cal. 363) ; nor a report of speeches and proceedings at vestry meetings
{Damson v. Duncan, 7 Ell. & Bl. 231 ; Popham v. Pickhurn, 31 L.
J. Exch. 133) ; nor the publication of defamatory remarks, made by a

LIBEL. 311

person under sentence of death, at the place of execution. Sanford v.
Bennett, 24 N. Y. (10 Smith) 20.

Where part of a communication is confidential, and written in good
faith, another part foreign to the subject, and defaming an individual,
is not privileged. Warren v. Warren, 1 Cromp. M. & K. 250 ; Cole v.
Wilson, 18 B. Monr. (Ky.) 212 ; Godson v. Home, 1 Brod. & Bing. 7 ;
Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. (2 Smith) 369.

§ 4. Of justification or excuse. It is a sufficient answer to tlie
action, that the alleged libel is true, llawhins v. New Orleans Print-
ing^ etc., Co., 29 La. Ann. 134. This is necessarily the case, for the
reason that the falsity of the publication is the foundation of the claim
to damages, no person being permitted to recover damages, for a
supposed injury to character, which he does not possess. M. ^Pherson
V. Daniels, 10 B. & C. 272; Boot v. King, 7 Cow. 613; S. C, 4
AVend. 113; Joannes v. Jennings, 6 N. Y. Sup. (T. & C.) 138;
Bayne v. Taylor, 14 La. Ann. 406 ; Perret v. Times Newsijaper, 25
id. 170. If the defendant cannot justify, by showing the truth of
the matter, he may excuse the publication, by showing that it was made
upon a lawful occasion, upon probable cause, and from good motives.
The question for the jury in such case is not whether the defendant
believed the libel to be true, but whether he had probable cause to
believe it. Carpenter v. Bailey, 53 N. II. 590.

Where the truth of defamatory matter is set up in defense, it must
be pleaded specially. Snyder v, Andrews, 6 Barb. 43 ; TIagan v.
Hendy, 18 Md. 177. When the libel consists of several charges which
are distinct, the defendant may justify as to part. Clarhson v. Law-
son, 6 Bing. 587 ; Torrey v. Field, 10 Yt. 353. If the libel be not
made up of distinct cliivges, the justification must embrace the whole
charge. Ilelsham v. Blackwood, 11 C. B. Ill ; Smith v. ParJcer, 13
M. & W. 459 ; Cooper v. Barher, 24 Wend. 105 ; Brickett v. Davis, 21
Pick. 404 ; Jones v. Cecil, 10 Ark. 502 ; Ames v. Hazard, 6 E. I.
335 ; Wachter v. Quenser, 29 N. Y. (2 Tiff.) 547 ; Smith v. Trihune
Co., 4 Bis. (C. C.) 477. The justification must be certain ; but it need
not embrace a forced construction of the libel. Ames v. Hazard, 8R.
I. 143. The charges must be met directly, and not argumentatively ;
and. according to the sense given to them by the plaintiff. Fidler v.
Delavan, 20 Wend. 57. Where the publication contains specific charges,
a general answer tliat they are true is sufficient. Yanwycky. Guthrie,
4 Duer (N. Y.), 268.

The justification must be as broad as the libel. Brooks v. Bemiss,
8 Johns. 455 ; Stow v. Converse, 4 Conn. 17 ; Roberts v. Miller, 2

Online LibraryWilliam WaitA treatise upon some of the general principles of the law, whether of a legal, or of an equitable nature, including their relations and application to actions and defenses in general, whether in courts of common law, or courts of equity; and equally adapted to courts governed by codes (Volume 4) → online text (page 48 of 107)