William Wheeler Thornton.

A treatise on the Federal employers' liability and safety appliance acts, and on the federal statutes on hours of labor, including Interstate commerce commission's rules and diagrams for equiments of cars online

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public policy requires that servants engaged in common em-
ployment shall not have an action against their principal for
injuries resulting from the negligence of one or more of such
servants, because the tendency of such a doctrine is to make
them anxious and watchful and interested for the faithful
conduct of each other, and careful to induce it, while the
opposite doctrine would tend in a different direction.*® The
safety and welfare of the public, therefore, demand the
establishment of the principle of the non-liability on the
part of the employer in such case;" while, when estab-
lished, it can work no injury to the servant," because his en-
tering upon the service is voluntary,** is with a knowledge of
its hazards, and with a power and right to demand such
wages ** as he should deem compensatory. ' ' *• The doctrine o£
Priestly v. Fowler *® was stated by Baron Alderson in a sub-
sequent case in these words: **They have both engaged in a
common service, the duties of which impose a certain risk
on each of them, and in case of negligence on the part of
the other, the party injured knows that the negligence is that
of his fellow servant and not of his master. ' ' * * He knew when
he was engaged in the service that he was exposed to the
risk of injury, not only from his own want of skill and care,
but also from the want of it on the part of his fellow servant,

' Where was the authority to " Experience shows that it does,

say there was an implied con- until legislature after legislature

tract? Did not the court merely has been compelled to modify the

assume there was such contract? harsh rule announced by these de-

• Farwell v. Boston, etc., R. Co. cisions.

4 Mete. 49; 38 Am. Dec. 339. "True only in a limited sense,

"*This is a strange assumption because of the pressure that mod-

in view of the law on the subject ern civilization thrusts upon the

in Continental Europe. laboring man to secure for him-

" Experience of long years' du- self and family the sustenance of

ration shows that the public in life.

Western Continental Europe are as " The supply of labor fixes the

safely cared for as in England wages.

and much more so than in *• Madison, etc. R. Co. v. Bacon«

America, as against the careless- 6 Ind. 206.

ness of servants. ^* 3 Mees & Wels, 1.



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CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTE.



11



and he must be sapposed to have contracted on the terms
that, as between himself and his master, he would run the
risk, 'a risk which he' must be taken to have agreed to run
when he entered into the defendant's service." **The prin-
ciple is," Baron Alderson again said, **that a servant, when
he engages to serve a master, undertakes, as between himself
and his master, to run all the ordinary risks of the service,
and this includes the risk of negligence on the part of a fel-
low servant, whenever he is acting in the discharge of his
duty as servant of him who is common master of both." ^^

§ 7. Validity of statute allowing a recovery for an injury
occasioned by a fellow servant's negligence.— From an ex-
amination of the cases quoted and cited in the foregoing sec-
tion, it will be seen that they rest upon practically two
grounds : That it is against public policy to allow a servant to
recover damages occasioned by the negligence of his fellow



"Hutchinson v. York, etc., R.
Co. 5 Exch. 343; 14 Jur. 837; 19
lu J. (Exch.) 296.

The English rule was forced
upon the courts of Scotland by the
decision of the House of Lords in
Wilson ▼. Merry, L. R. 1 Sc. &
Div. App. Cas. 326; 19 L. T. (N.
S.) 30.

For a few of the hundreds of
eases upon this question, see Wa-
bash, etc, R. Co. V. Ck)nkling, 15
IlL App. 157; Stucke v. Orleans
R. Co. 60 La. Ann. 188, 23 So.
Rep. 342; Ackerson v. Dennison,
117 Mass. 407; World's Colum-
bian Exposition v. Bell, 76 111.
App. 691; Doyle v. White, 9 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 621; 41 N. Y. Supp.
628; 75 N. Y. St Rep. 628; Hicks
T. Southern R. Co. 63 S. C. 559;
41 S. E. Rep. 753; Barton's Hill
Coal Co. V. Ried, 3 Macq. H. L.
C*8. 266; Baltimore, etc., R. Co.
T. Colvin, 118 Pa. St. 230; 12 Atl.
Bep. 337; 20 W. N. C. 531; Chi-
cago, etc., R. Co. V. Ross, 112 U.
8. 377; 28 L. Ed. 787; 5 Sup. Ct
Kep. 184; Latremouille v. Ben-
Binirton, 63 Vt b36; 22 Atl. Rep.



656; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas.
265; Walton v. Bryn Mawr Hotel
Co., 160 Pa. St. 3; 28 Atl. Rep.
438; Olsen v. Nixon, 61 N. J. L.
671; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 516; 40
Atl. Rep. 694; Jungnitsch v.
Michigan, etc., Co. 106 Mich. 270;
63 N. W. Rep. 296; 2 Det. Leg.
N. 107; Blwell v. Hocker, 86 Me.
416; 30 Atl. Rep. 84.

After « review of the early cases
on this Aibjeoty Hon. Addison C.
Harris said in his address before
the Indiana State Bar Association,
July 7, 1909 (Indiana Bar Asso-
ciation Report for 1909, p. 60):
''So^ now no matter how negligent
the employer might be, yet if it
appeared (1) that the accident was
caused by the negligence of a fel-
low servant^ or (2) that the serv-
ant injured contributed in the
slightest degree to the accident,
in none of these cases was there
any right of action. And these
rules were supported by the pre-
sumption (3) that the accident
was caused by some fault of the
servant, because generally men are
not injured while carefully doing
their w«yrk; and so the burden of
proof was pot upon him to sho^



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12 FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.

servant, and the other is that he has by his contract for
service impliedly assumed the risk of such association or of
his fellow servant's negligence. Such being the case, it read-
ily follows that the legislature can change the rule of public
policy or provide that the implied undertaking shall not be a
part of the contract for service. In the usual employers li-
ability statutes this is done only to a limited extent, by pro-
viding in what particular instance the servant may recover
for injuries occasioned by his fellow's negligence, or by
providing in what particular instances the relation in law
of fellow servant shall not be deemed to exist. Such statutes
have been universally upheld, both by the state and Federal
courts." This power has been stated thus tersely: **It is

both ihe negligenoe of his em- affirming 31 Minn. II; IC N. W
ployes and tibat he had not in any Rep. 413; 47 Am. Rep. 771- Pitts-
wise helped or contributed to the burg, etc., R. Co. v. Mont^mery
aocidwit. And the court went fur- 152 Ind. 1 ; 49 N E Rep 482 •
ther and held (4) that if the 69 L. R. A. 875; 71 Am. St 30-
workmen knew, or in the exercise Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Light-
of ordinary oare and obeervation heiser, 168 Ind. 438; 78 N E
should have known, of the negli- Rep. 1033; Indianapolis, etc., R.
genoe of the master, then he could Co. v. Houghton, 157 Ind. 494*; 60
not recover, even though in the N. E. Rep. 943; 64 L. R. A. 787;
hurry and stress of his hazardous Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. II033, 169
service at the immediate time of Ind. 3; 80 N. E. Rep. 84.>- Chi-
the aoddent he did not recall his cago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pontius, 167
master's Bef^igeooo.'' u. S. 209; 39 L. Ed. 675; 15 Sup.
^•McAunick v. Mississippi etc., Ct. Rep. 686, affirming 62 Kan.
R. Co. 20 Iowa, 338; Bucklew v. 264; 34 Pac Rep. 739; Baltimore,
Central, etc., R. Co. 64 Iowa, 611; etc., R. Co. v. Voight, 176 U. S.
Rose V. Des Moines, etc., R. Co. 498; 44 L. Ed. 660; 20 Sup. Ct.
39 Iowa, 246; Kansas, etc., R. Co. Rep. 386; McGuire v. Ch^Vago, -tc.i
V. Peavey, 29 Kan. 169; Missouri R. Co. 131 Iowa, 340; 108 N. w!
Pacific R. Co. V. Mackey, 33 Kan. Rep. 902; Hancock v. Railway Co,
298; 6 Pac. Rep. 291; Attorney- 11:4 N. C. 222; 32 S. E. Rep. 670;
General v. Railroad Cos. 35 Wis. Tullis v. Lake Erie, etc., R. Co.
425; Dithbemer v. Chicago, etc., 175 U. S. 348; 44 L. Ed. 192;
R. Co. 47 Wis. 138; 2 N. W. Rep. 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136; Railroad
69; Herrick v. Minneapolis, etc., Co. v. Thompson, 64 Ga. 609;
R. Co. 31 Minn. 11; 16 N. W. Georgia R. Co. v. Ivey, 73 Ga.
Rep. 413 (upholding Iowa stat- 499; Georgia R. Co. v. Brown, 86
ute) ; Herrick v. Minneapolis, etc., Ga. 320; Georgia R. Co. v. Miller,
R. Co. 32 Minn. 436; 21 N. W. 90 Ga. 674; St. Louis, etc., R. Co!
Rep. 471; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Matthews, 166 U. S. 1; 41 L
V. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; 32 L. Ed. 611; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243;
Ed. 107; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1161, affirming 121 Mo. 298; 26 L. R
affirming 33 Kan. 298; 6 Pac. A. 161; 24 S. W. Rep. 691; Hoi-
Rep. 291; Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. den v. Hardy, 169 U. S 366- 42
V. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210; 32 L. L. Ed. 780; 18 Sup. Ct Rep
Ed. 109; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1176, 383; affirming 14 Utah 71- 87



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CONSTITUTIONALITY OP STATUTE. 13

competent for the legislature, in the exercise of the police
power, to take steps for the protection of the lives and limbs
of all persons who may be exposed to dangerous agencies in
the hands of others. '' *® In a recent case in Colorado the valid-
ity of a statute abolishing the doctrine of co-service as a
defense was passed upon and the statute upheld in the fol-
lowing language: ** The final and important question is the
validity of the co-employe act. It is urged that the act is
unconstitutional in that it is in conflict with the fourteenth
amendment to the Federal Constitution, because it deprives
persons of their property without due process of law. The act
in question renders the employer liable for damages result-
ing from injuries to or death of an employe, caused by the
negligence of a co-employe in the same manner, and to the
same extent, as if the negligence causing the injury or death
was that of the employer. That the act in question may be
regarded by some as harsh or unjust, because imposing too
great a disability, is not a matter which we can consider in
determining its validity by constitutional tests. Whether or
not the employer is liable under the act in question must be
determined by each particular case based on the provisions
of the act. It does not deprive him of any defense to the
liability thereby imposed which, under the established rules
of law could be regarded as sufficient, save and except his
own lack of negligence; but suph a defense is not a consti-
tutional right. The law itself, as a rule of conduct, may,
unless constitutional limitations forbid, be changed at the
will of the legislature. The exercise of the discretion of
that branch of the government to enact laws cannot be ques-

L. R. A. 103; 46 Pac. Rep. 756; N. E. Rep. 415; Mickelson v.

14 Utah, 96; 37 L. R. A. 108: Truesdale, 63 Minn. 137; 65 N.

46 Pac Rep. 1105; St. Louis, etc., W. Rep. 260.

R. O). V. Paul, 173 U. S. 404; »» Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v.

43 L. Ed. 746; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. Houlihan, 157 Ind. 494; 60 N. E.

419; affirming 64 Ark. 83; 37 L. Rep. 943; 54 L. R. A. 787. See

R. A. 604; 62 Am. St. Rep. 164; TuUis v. Railway Co. 175 U. S.

40 S. W. Rep. 705; Pittsburg, etc., 348; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136; 44 L.

R. Co. V. Collins, 168 Ind. 467; 80 Ed. 192.



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14



FEDERAL EMPLOYEBS LIABILITY ACT.



tioned so long as such laws do not conflict with either state
or Federal constitutional provisions. No such provisions have
been called to our attention which limit the authority of the
general assembly to abolish the rule heretofore existing which
exempted the employer from liability to employes caused by
the negligence of a co-employe, and render him liable to his
employes for the negligence of a co-employe. For the pur-
pose of providing for the safety and protection of employes
in the service of a common employer, the law making power
has the undoubted authority to abrogate the exception to the
general rule respondeat superior in favor of the employer,
and make him liable to one of his employes for damages
caused by the negligence of another employe while acting
within the scope of his employment, regardless of the fact
that such employes are fellow servants." ^®



§ 8. Validity of statute as to past contracts of employ-
ment. — ^Where the servant has entered into the employment
of a master before the statute has taken effect, but the em-
ployment is not for a continuous service — as in the case of a
railroad engineer — and after the passage of the statute is in-



«) Vindicator, etc., 0>. v. First-
brook, 36 Cola 498: 86 Pac Rep.
313. Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co.
V. Turnipeeed, 219 U. S. 36;, 31
Sup. Ct 136; .65 L. Ed. 78; affirm-
ing 91 Miss. 273; 4^ So. 360;
124 Am. St. 679; Florida East
Coast V. Lassiter, 68 Fla. 234;
60 So. 428.

That a statute imposing liabil-
ity on the master for an injury to
his servant where he, the master,
is not negligent, eee Ives v. South
Buffalo Ry. Co. 201 N. Y. 271;
94 N. E. 431 ; reversing 140 N. Y.
App. Div. 921; 125 N. Y. Supp.
1126, which affirmed 68 N. Y.
Misc. Rep. 643; 124 N. Y. Supp.
920.

For some Georgia cases holding
under the Code that a recover^'
can be had for an injury caused
by the negligence of a fellow serv-
ant, see Georgia, etc., R. Co. v.
Goldwire, 66 Ga. 196; Marsh v.
South Carolina, etc., R. Co. 66
Ga. 274; Georgia, etc., R. Co. v.
Rhodes, 66 Ga. 646; Georgia, etc..



R. Co. ▼. Brown, 86 Ga. 320; 12
S. E. Rep. 812; Georgia, etc, R.
Co. V. Cosby, 97 Ga. 299; 22 S.
E. Rep. 912; Southern, etc, R.
Co. V. Johnson, 114 Ga. 329; 40
S. E. Rep. 236; Georgia, etc., R.
Co. V. Ivey, 73 Ga. 499; Georgia,
etc., R. Co. V. Hicka, 96 G«. 301;
22 S. El Rep. 613; Chandler v.
Southern R. 0>. 113 Ga. 130; 38
S. E. Rep. 306.

For a recent case on this ques-
tion, see Kiley v. Chicago, etc.,
R. Co. 138 Wis. 216; 119 N. W.
Rep. 309; 120 N. W. 756, and
Earing v. Great Northern, Ry. Co.
137 Wis. 367; 119 N. W. Rep. 326.

These last two cases hold that
the excepting of office and shop
employes of a railroad from the
operation of the act does not ren-
der it invalid. See Callahan v.
Bridge Co., 170 Mo. 473; 71 S. W.
Rep. 208-; 60 L. R. A. 249; 94
Am. St. Rep. 746; Howard v. Illi-
nois Central Ry. Co. 207 U. S.
463; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; 62
L. Ed. 297.



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OONSl'lT UTIONALITT OP STATUTE. 16

jnred by a fellow servant, and he would not have had a right
of recovery except for its provisions, he may recover his dam-
ages, and such legislation is not retroactive nor does it impair
the obligation of a contract.^^ This question came before the
Circuit Court for the Northern District of Iowa upon a con-
struction of the act of June 11, 1906,*^ but the court held
that the statute in its terms was not retroactive. The question
then before the court was whether the act of Congress had
taken away a right of action given by an Iowa statute, the
cause of action having arisen in 1905; and the court held
that the act of 1906 had no retroactive effect, and if it did
so have as to take away the cause of action, it would be void.^*

§ 9. LimitiTig statute to employes of railroad companies
— ^Fourteenth Amendment. — ^A statute concerning liability
of a master to his servant for injuries occasioned by his fellow
is not special legislation, nor is it the taking of prop-
erty without due process of law. ' * The company calls attention
of the court," said Justice Field of the Supreme Court of the
United States, **to the rule of law exempting from liability
an employer for injuries to employes caused by the negligence
or incompetency of a fellow servant which prevailed in Kan-
sas and in several other states previous to the act of 1874,
unless he had employed such negligent or incompetent serv-
ant without reasonable inquiry as to his qualifications, or had
retained him after knowledge of his negligence or incom-
petency. The rule of law is conceded where the person in-
jured, and the one by whose negligence or incompetency the
injury is caused, are fellow servants in the same common
employment, and acting under the same immediate action
• • • Assuming that this rule would apply to the case
presented but for the law of Kansas of 1874, the contention

"Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Light- '•C. 3073, 34 »tatut« at L. 232.

beiser, 168 Ind. 438; 78 N. E. "Hall v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.

Rep. 1033; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. 149 Fed. Rep. 564.
T. Lightheiser, 163 Ind. 247; 71
N. E. Rep. 218, 660.



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16 FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.

of the company • • • is that the law imposes upon rail-
road companies a liability not previously existing, in the
enforcement of which their property may be taken ; and thus
authorizes, in such cases, the taking of property without due
process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment.

• * * The supposed hardship and injustice consist in im-
puting liability to the company, where no personal wrong or
negligence is chargeable to it or to its directors. But the
same hardship and injustice, if there be any, exist where the
company, without any wrong or negligence on its part, is
charged for injustice to passengers. • • • The utmost
care on its part ^vill not relieve it from liability, if the pas-
senger injured be himself free from contributory negligence.
The law of 1874 extends this doctrine and fixes a liability
upon railroad companies, where injuries are subsequently suf-
fered by employes, though it may be by the negligence or
incompetency of a fellow servant in the same general employ-
ment and acting under the same immediate direction. That its
passage was within the competency of the legislature we oan
have no doubt. The objection that the law of 1874 deprives
the railroad companies of the equal protection of the law is
even less tenable than the one considered. It seems to act
upon the theory that legislation which is special in its char-
acter is necessarily within the constitutional inhibition; but
nothing can be further from the fact. The greater part of
all legislation is special, either in the objects sought to be
attained by it, or in the extent of its application. Laws for
the improvement of municipalities, the opening and widen-
ing of particular streets, the introduction of water and gas,
and other arrangements for the safety and convenience of
their inhabitants, and the laws for the irrigation and drain-
age of particular lands, for the construction of levees and
the bridging of navigable rivers, are instances of this kind.

• • * A law giving to mechanics a lien on buildings con-
structed or repaired by them, for the amount of their work,
and a law requiring railroad corporations to erect and main-



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OONSTITUnONALITT OP STATUTE.



17



tain fences along their roads, separating them from land of
adjoining proprietors so as to keep cattle oflE their tracks, are
instances of this kind. Such legislation is not obnoxious to
the last clause of the fourteenth amendment, if all persons
snbject to it are treated alike under similar circumstances
and conditions in respect of both the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. • • • But the hazardous
character of the business of operating a railway would seem
to call for special legislation with respect to railroad cor-
porations, having for its object the protection of their em-
ployes as well as the safety of the pubic. "^* In a subse-
quent case a like decision was made, where a statute applied
only to railroads.*'^



"Miasouri Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Mickey, 127 U. S. 205; 8 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 1161 ; 32 L. Ed. 107 ; affirming
33 Kan. 298; 6 Pac. Rep. 291;
Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Her-
rick, 127 U. S. 210; 8 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 1176; 32 L. Ed. 109, and af-
firming Herrick v. Minneapolis,
etc, R. Co. 31 Minn. 11; 16 N.
W. Rep. 413; 47 Am. Rep. 771;
Herrick ▼. Minneapolis, etc., Co.
32 Minn. 435; 21 N. W. Rep. 471;
Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Mont-
gomery, 152 Ind. 1 ; 49 N. E. Rep.
482; 60 L. R. A. 875; 71 Am. St
Rep. 30; Indianapolis Union Ry.
Co. V. Houlihan, 157 Ind. 494; 60
N. R Rep. 943; 54 L. R. A. 787.
"Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Ellis, 165
U. S. 150; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255;
41 L. Ed, 666; reversing 87 Tex.
10; 26 8. W. Rep. 986, Almnmun
Od. t. Bamaey 32 Sup. Ct, 76.

Deppe ▼. Chicago, eltc^ R. Co. 86
lowm, 52; Sehroeder ▼. Chicago,
etc, R. Co. 47 Iowa, 876; Potter v.
ChicagD, etc, R. Co. 46«Iowa, 899;
O^Brim ▼. Chieago^ ete., R. Oo. 116



Fed. Rep. 502; Chicago, etc. R. Co.
▼. Pontius, 52 Ejul 264; 34 Pac
Rep. 739; affirmed, 157 U. S. 209;
15 Sup. Ct Rep. 585; 39 L. Ed.
675; Lavallee v. St Paul, etc.,
R. Co. 40 Minn. 249; 41 N. W.
Rep. 974; Johnson v. St. Paul,
etc., R. Co. 43 Minn. 222; 45 N.
W. Rep. 156; 8 L. R. A. 419;
Hancock v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co.
124 N. C. 222; 32 S. E. Rep.
679; Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v.
Houlihan, 157 Ind. 494; 60 N. E.
Rep. 943; 54 L. R. A. 787; Dith-
bemer v. Chicago, etc, R. Co., 47
WU. 138.

There has been much discussion
whether or not the prohibition in
the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibiting states enacting laws giv-
ing unequal protection to citizens
is the same in meaning with ref-
erence to such states as the pro-
hibition in the Fifth Amendment
is with reference to the power of
Congress. The question has never
been decided. See Stratton v.
Morris, 89 Tenn. 497.



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18 FEDERAL EHPLOYEBS' LIABILITY ACT.

§10. Validity of statute classifying instrumentalities.—

Not only may the legislature select railway companies for
legislation concerning their employes, but it may specify in
what particulars they shall be liable, as, for instance, con-
cerning **any signal, telegraph oflSce, switch yard, shop,
round house, locomotive engine or train upon a railway.'*
** These,'* said the Supreme Court of Indiana, **were proper
to be selected as sources of unusual danger which should be
guarded against; the object to be accomplished was to incite
railroad companies to use the utmost diligence in the selection
and supervision of their servants who are put in charge of
these dangerous agencies, so that fewer lives and limbs of
those who are entitled to claim the protection of our laws
would be sacrificed; the legislature evidently considered
that strangers and employes (the attorney and the ticket
seller, for example) who were not fellow servants of those in
charge of the agencies named were suflSciently protected by
the railroad company's existing liability to them for the
negligent operation of those dangerous agencies; the legis-
lature evidently determined to protect all persons who were
not already protected for the negligent use of particular in-
struments; this classification is made on the basis of the
peculiar hazards in railroading, relating equally to all em-
ployers within the class; to separate railroading from other
business was not an unconstitutional discrimination, because
the dangers (the basis of the classifications) do not arise
from the same sources ; but the claim that a classification not
made on the basis of dangerous agencies employed in the
business, but founded on the question whether the employe
who was injured without his fault by a fellow servant's
negligent use of a dangerous agency was acting at the time
on his own initiative in the line of his duty or imder the
orders of a superior, is the only constitutional classification,
is unwarranted; a train is wrecked through the negligence
of the engineer, two brakemen are injured without fault on
their part, one acting at the time in obedience to the con-



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CONSnTUnONAUTY OP STATUTB.



19



ductor's orders, the other acting on his own initiative within
the line of his duty ; there should be and there is no consti-
tutional limitation upon the legislature's exercise of the
police power by which a law may not be enacted to protect
both brakemen equally from the negligence of the engineer.
We hold, therefore, that the act is not obnoxious to the ob-
jections urged by appellants. " ^'

§11. Power of Congress to enact statute of 1908.— The

Employers Liability Act of 1906 was stricken down because
congress had attempted to legislate upon a subject or sub-
ject-matter that related wholly to the power of a state; and
had so attempted to interblend that power with its power to
legislate upon the subject of interstate commerce that the
several clauses could not be separated and those clauses re-
biting alone to interstate commerce remain. It was upon
this ground alone that this statute of 1906 was overthrown.



* Indianapolis Union Ry. Co. v.
Houlihan, 167 Ind. 494; 60 N. £.
Bep. 943; 54 L. R. A. 787.

That a classification cannot be
made arbitrarily, see Gulf, etc.,
R. Co. V. EUis, 165 U. S. 150;
17 Snp. Ct: Rep. 266; 41 L. Ed.



Online LibraryWilliam Wheeler ThorntonA treatise on the Federal employers' liability and safety appliance acts, and on the federal statutes on hours of labor, including Interstate commerce commission's rules and diagrams for equiments of cars → online text (page 10 of 102)